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Fundamental. The term "common-property resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policy analysis. In this paper we develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.

Em Neither Market nor State - Governance of Common-Pool Resource in the Twenty-First Century, Elinor Ostrom volta a problemática semantica dos recursos de propriedade comum, tendo como base uma distinção entre estoque e fluxo do recurso natural renovavel, ressaltando as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is diff

Ontem na Banca de Jéssica Cruz, no Instituto de Biologia da UFBA inciamos uma interloculação em torno da institucionalização das funções ecosistêmicas embutidas nos Sistemas Socioecológico. O ponto de partida da discussão foi a instrumentalização e problematização da tipologia de funções ecosistêmicas proposta por DE GROOT et al A typology for the clasification, description and valuation of ecosystems functions, goods and services in Ecological Economics, 2002. v.42, pp. 393-408. A problematização foi feita por um dos orientadores, em cuja tese de doutoramento descontrói a compreensão vigente da função ecosistêmica da biodiversidade e da especie, ancorando-a no organismo (Ver NUNES-NETO, Function in Ecology: an organizational approach in Biol. PHilophy, 2013 (no prelo). A partir da sua reconstrução das funções ecosistêmicas, chamamos atenção para a possibilidade de considerar, do ponto de vista do policymaking, os diferentes tipos de funções, não como concorrentes, mas como complementar, e assim poder considerá-las com funções associadas aos estoques e as funções vinculadas ao fluxo, integrando no programa de pesquisa dos sistemas socioecológicos a Teoria das Funções Ecosistêmicos. Resultado: ponto de pauta para um grupo em processo de articulação que deverá tratar da relação da Economia Ecológica com a Teoria da Funções Ecosistêmicas.

Henry E. Smith de alguma forma chama atenção para os possiveis excessos de customização dos direitos de propriedade, ao fazer defesa de um desenho genérico dos direitos, ao arguir " [...] that general legal concepts play a crucial role of lowering information costs, and that recognizing this economizing role of property concepts allows us to reconcile various positions on some of the key issues in property theory. These include, in addition to conceptualism itself, the proper role of formalism in property, the relation of functionalism and interpretivism, and the way in which property theory must in practice be holistic". Esta visão de Henry E. Smith expressa a mesma preocupação de Anthony Scott ao ressaltar em Development of Property in the Fishery que as evidências históricas mostram que as políticas governamenais não tem tido sucesso em impor novas instituições não governamentais, como imaginam os economistas que defendem os "new`rights-based regimes", isto orque, segundo ele, novos direitos de propriedade não são facilmente instituídos e, se não for padronizados eleva os custos de transação. Na verdade segundo Henry E. Smith, cujo texto estar disponibilizado abaixo, o que acontece é que as sociedades já dispõe de um conjunto de direitos de propriedade padrão que podem ser deslizados para os regimes pesqueiros. Este entendimento põe os regimes de propriedade vigentes como os principais recursos a ser manejados na configuração dos regimes pesqueiros, o que pressupõe que o policymaking tenha um domínio do direito positivo (vigente) de propriedade d a jurisdição na qual se insere a área em consideração...

Particularmente interessante as caracteristicas dos direiros de propiedade reas. Artigo seminal. To what extent is the recently invented individual catch quota a form of real property right? This article introduces six quantitative characteristics of all personal interests in land and natural resources. It is shown that medieval fishing rights had some of these characteristics, but these rights were not developed in the common law of property. The article then turns to modern regulatory licenses and catch quotas and examines the extent to which they embody property characteristics. In a digression, the obstacles to political acceptance of the individual fishery property concept are surveyed. The paper concludes by suggesting that catch quotas may develop into shares in the fish stock or biomass itself.

Uma premissa importante na estruturação do argumento é que para o autor, as instituições são "unchanging relative, relative to the more rapid fluctuations of economic activities", o que justifica nas evidências históricas mostrarem queas políticas govrnamenais não tem tido sucesso em imort novs intituições não governamentais, como imaginam os economia que defendem os "new`rights-based regimes",enfim novos direitos de propriedade não são facilmente instituidos,. Na verdade segundo o autor, o que acontece é que as sociedades já dispõe de um conjunto de direitos de propriedade padrão que podem ser introduzido s regimes pesqueiros. Este entendimento põe os regimes de propriedade vigentes como os recursos a ser manejados na configuração dos regimes pesqueiros, o que pressupõe que o policymaking tenha um domínio do direito positivo (vigente) de propriedade..

"Scholars of common property resource theory (CPR) have long asserted that certain kinds of institutional arrangements based on collective action result in successful environmental stewardship, but feedback and the direct link between social and ecological systems remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangements contribute to sustainable mangrove fisheries in coastal Ecuador, focusing on the fishery for the mangrove cockle (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis), a bivalve mollusk harvested from the roots of mangrove trees and of particular social, economic, and cultural importance for the communities that depend on it. Specifically, this study examines the emergence of new civil society institutions within the historical context of extensive mangrove deforestation for the expansion of shrimp farming, policy changes in the late 1990s that recognized "ancestral" rights of local communities to mangrove resources, and how custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, affect the cockle fishery. Findings from interviews with shell collectors and analysis of catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common property regimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources, mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shell sizes, but the benefits are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors feel further marginalized by the loss of gathering grounds, potentially deflecting problems of overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove fisheries are weakly managed by the State. Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, the explicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at different levels, examining the relationship between collective action and the environment through quantitative approaches at the fishery level and qualitative analysis at the level

FORMS OF PROPERTY IN RIGHTS-BASED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Management measures may be classed as input and output controls.Input controls regulate fishing effort. Output controls directly controlcatch amounts. Input controls such as licensing may create limited prop-erty rights, although more sophisticated output control mechanismshave been adopted by a number of countries. These include territorialuse rights in fisheries (TURFS), stock use rights in fisheries (SURFS), andcommunity development quotas (CDQs). Increasingly common are quota based systems, such as the individual quota (IQ), the individual fishingquota (IFQ), individual vessel quotas (IVQ), the individual transferableshare quota (ITSQ), and the individual transferable quota (ITQ). Each of these approaches shall be considered in turn. DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS A number of States have implemented, in varying degrees, rights-basedfishing entitlements. These include Australia, Canada, Iceland, NewZealand, and the United States. The domestic implementation and sta-tus of these measures is considered for each country in turn. AN APPRAISAL OF RIGHTS-BASED MEASURES In light of domestic experiences of property rights-based instruments it isappropriate to remark upon the success of quota systems to date. Quotas systems have attracted critical comment in three broad areas: economic success, conservation and management effectiveness, and allocationalconcerns. At this point it is worth emphasising that because legal reason-ing is consequence sensitive, these factors have a role to play in the law-making process. These are considered in turn, before some final remarksare made on how the legal construction of property rights more generally has influenced the development and operation of rights-based fishing measures.

Um ponto de partida de Ostrom é sua condenação as panaceias, em especial " Those researchers and practitioners who propose panaceas for solving complex environmental problems make two false assumptions. First they assume that all problems of a general type, such as air pollution or maintaining species diversity, are similar; and second, all of the people involved have the same preferences, information, and authority to act. Neither is true [...] . Mas, não cai no outro extremo, onde admite-se que "Sustaining natural resource systems is far too important a problem for scholars to espouse "doing nothing." We must make every effort to cope with these really wicked problems involved in avoiding ecological disasters." Sua posição é proativa, ainda que precavida: " But, we also need to recommend caution about overusing simple blueprints and to develop diagnostic theories drawing on the lessons that can be learned from theoretical and empirical research on why some governance systems lead to improved performance of social-ecological systems and others lead to failures (Ostrom 1990). " E apoiada em evidências, tal como as sistematizadas por Brock and Carpenter (2007) illustrate how models of adaptive control processes in the Northern Highlands Lake District of Wisconsin are prone to panacea traps [...] . We will continue doing more harm than good if panaceas are recommended to solve resource problems rather than learning how to match potential solutions to a serious diagnosis of specific problems in the ecological and social context in which they are nested. Similarly, assuming that effective property-rights systems will simply evolve as resource units become more valuable (e.g., Demsetz 1967) is not an adequate understanding of the challenge of matching property rights and governance systems to particular ecological systems (Fitzpatrick 2006) O desafio portanto, segundo ela é Moving beyond panaceas to develop a cumulative capacity to dia

A propriedade cada vez mais é tratada a partir das suas funções, as quais se dividem em dois grandes grupos nos quais se alojam suas funções sociais e regulativas, ambas posicionadas na interface do direito publico com o direito privado. Ao tratamos dos Sistemas Sócio-Ecológicos a exemplo das Reservas Extrativistas Marinhas e os Territórios, a partir da perspectiva da propriedade temos uma oportunidade de explorar suas possibilidades funcionais, tanto no âmbito social como regulativo. Aqui temos um ponto de partida para a exploração das suas possibilidades regulativas. Com relação aos Sistemas Sócio-Ecológico, consulte Marco A. Janssen, Resilience and adaptation in the governance of social-ecological systems

"This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangementscontribute to sustainable mangrove sheries in coastal Ecuador, ocusing onthe shery or the mangrove cockle (  Anadara tuberculosa and  A. similis ), abivalve mollusk harvested rom the roots o mangrove trees and o particularsocial, economic, and cultural importance or the communities that dependon it. Specically, this study examines the emergence o new civil societyinstitutions within the historical context o extensive mangrove deorestationor the expansion o shrimp arming, policy changes in the late 1990s thatrecognized "ancestral" rights o local communities to mangrove resources, andhow custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, aect the cockleshery. Findings rom interviews with shell collectors and analysis o catch-per-unit-eort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common propertyregimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources,mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shellsizes, but the benets are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors eel urther marginalized by the loss o gathering grounds, potentially defecting problems o overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove sheries are weakly managed by the State.Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) ramework, theexplicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at dierent levels,examining the relationship between collective action and the environment throughquantitative approaches at the shery level and qualitative analysis at the level"

"nstitutions based on the concept"common property" have played socially beneficial roles in natural resources management from economic pre-history up to thepresent. These same institutions promisehelp in solving pressing resourcesproblems in both the devel- oped and the developing countries. It isall the more important that these institutions be the focus of an economic study because they have been misunderstood by modern day economists: We refer to the so-called "theory of common property resources" orwhat is oftentermed the "tragedy of the commons."1"

"Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) have spread in Chile, since the late 1990s, in the form of commons institutions. TURFs are presented by some scholars as a social-ecological success; by others as showing economic and compliance problems. Studies looking at the material conditions in which fishers produce and reproduce their livelihoods, and in which TURFs emerge, are scarcer. Ostrom's theory on the commons claims that certain collective action conditions have to be met to become thriving commons institutions. Our hypothesis is that while institutions are moulded by local material conditions, such as geographical location and social embeddedness, these impose challenges and constraints upon fishers influencing TURFs' long-term viability. How are collective action conditions influenced when the new TURFs commons do not emerge in tabula rasa contexts but in occupied spaces? Do material conditions influence TURFs' sustainability? This paper set out to explore these conditions. Huentelauquén's and Guayacán's TURFs (central-northern Chile) were chosen, as they represent two extremes (rural-urban; on private property-on State/municipal property; mainly diver - mainly fisher) contexts in which TURFs have emerged. We mainly used Participatory Rural Approach (PRA) tools triangulated with other qualitative methods. This study shows that both social embeddedness (private/State lands), and geographical location (rural/urban) matter, resulting in different access to the coast for different TURFs, thus determining some important differences between our cases in at least three relevant areas: entrance, social relations between the fishers' organization (entitled the TURFs) and the landowner (private or municipal/State) and the existence or absence of fishing and general infrastructure. Competition for space among key actors seems to affect the process of acquiring a TURF as well as the conditions conductive to collective action. TURFs' assessments s

A vertente institucionalista no âmbito da política é, em boa parte, fundamentada na Economia dos Direitos de Propriedade, a qual é tomada na maioria das vezes acítica, dado que se considera uma critica a abordagem convencional que mesmo reconhecendo o direito de propiredade, não o considera como possível de ser objeto da política, ou seja, afasta--o do âmbito analítico considerando-o constante, por meio do suposto do "tudo o mais constante". Aqui, a Economia dos Direitos de Propriedade e problematizada.

O artigo de Andres Thiel e sus companheiros segue em anexo. É do tipo um "achado". De um lado, a questão, Como as características dos recursos naturais renováveis e o framework regulatório (no caso o europeu) explica a infraestrutura institucional local (a estrutura de governança) ? Do outro o referencial neoinstitucionalista é usado com a precisão de um artesão, sem afetação, para develarmos como as características dos recursos afeta a transação, e, em seguida juntar com os condicionantes da regulação para enquadrar as instituições locais (a estrutura de governança). E como se não bastasse, faz uso do ABDUCTIVE APPROACH de forma criativa e com excelente resultado. "This paper scrutinizes determinants of regional-level institutions regulating the provisionof biodiversity and ecosystem services. Two cases of maintaining ecosystem services,provided by quite different resource systems, are compared: the protection of wolvesand the management of a high nature value agroforestry system, scattered fruit treemeadows. Taking an abductive approach, we suggest that the distinct characteristicsof resources - in particular the mobility of resource units - and differences in theoverarching European regulatory framework - the obligation to protect wolves versusvoluntary compensation payments to maintain scattered fruit tree meadows - largelyexplain the existing institutional structures at regional level. Cost-effectiveness considera-tions concerning the transaction costs of governance seem to act as determinants for thedesign and implementation of regional institutions. Livestock depredated by wolves isprotected by a liability rule and hierarchical governance structures. In turn, maintenance of scattered fruit trees is subject to a property rule and voluntary long-term agreements."

Aqui a Elinor Ostrom ressalta as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is difficult and costly to design institutions that successfully exclude some potential beneficiaries from access to CPRs, many CPRs are in fact open-access resources where anyone who wishes can gain access and appropriate resource units. Given that

Evidenciada a natureza hibrida (nem mercado, nem estado) dos recursos de propriedade comum, Elinor Ostrom considera as instituições como um capital social que evolui ao longo do tempo: "[....] institutions are a form of social capital resulting from the time and effort invested by their creators in improving their productivity. The institutions, of course, have not remained entirely fixed over their lifetimes. Ali of them are complex and have had to change over time", mas chama atenção para sua relativa estabilidde, já que para ela as " institutions are, however "robust" or in "institutional equilibrium" in the sense defined by Shepsle (1989, 143), who regards "an institution as 'essentially' in equilibrium if changes transpired according to an ex ante plan (and hence part of the original institution) for institutional change." Esta estabilidade associa as rules-in-use (mas não associa a um conjunto de regras particlares) que se origina dos "[....] the appropriators (users) designed their own rules, created organizations to undertake the day-to-day management of their resources, and modified their own rules over time in light of past experience. The specific rules-in-use, however, differ markedly from one case to the next. Given the great variation in rules-in-use, the sustainability of these resources and their institutions cannot be cxplained by the presence or absence of particular rules. That the rules do differ partly explains the sustainability of these systems. By differing, the rules take into account specific attributes of the physical systems, cultural views of the world, and the economic and politicai relationships that exist in the setting. Without different rules, appropriators could not take advantage of the positive features of a local CPR or avoid potential pitfalls that could occur in one setting but not in others.

Special Issue: The Commons and The Common Call for Papers The Commons (or the common) is of interest to radicals on the left for many reasons. Most obvious at present is the condition of the earth we share-everyone's common. Global warming and environmental degradation threaten human existence and that of other living creatures and things. Yet agreement on how to better treat planet Earth has proven elusive. Another reason for interest in the commons is the left's fight against privatization, for decades now a hallmark of neoliberalism. Enclosure of common space and resources was part of the development of the capitalist system, and it continues today. Can this process be stopped; reversed? The terms commons and common do not simply refer to open access resources (res nullins). This category of common resource is the air we breathe, or the ocean. Another category of the commons is res communis, a commonly held resource. It has figured prominently in projects and aspirations of socialists, anarchists, feminists, and communists. Privatization can be associated with a world of scarcity, and the common with abundance. In addition, more than property is held in common. Language, stories, images, humor, culture and other aspects of communal interaction share this root. In addition, more than property is held in common. Language, stories, images, humor, culture and other aspects of communal interaction share this root. How can a clearer sense of the commons help inform a renewal of left trajectories: a more egalitarian and sustainable world? While advocated to overcome problems presumed to be inherent in managing the commons, privatization substitutes problems fundamental to an individualized world. One of the most obvious of these problems is inequality: of access, control, income, and resources. Inequality is reflected in class-riven societies, as well as those characterized by differential a

A partir do problema da exploraçao predatoria dos recursos pesqueiros (Commons ) , Hilborn et al (2005) chamam a atençao sobre a importancia das instituçoes ( formais e informais) e dos incentivos gerados a partir das estruturas institucionais para solucionar problemas em pesca. Artigo fundamental nas discuçoes do grupo de pesca.

O call for parte parte da constatação da existência de um viés ideológico que faz parte de " part of an agenda to strengthen individual property rights" o que debita a "a limited understanding of Hardin's "the tragedy of the commons.", já que não consideram que " Hardin later attempted to clarify the meaning of the essay- that tragedy occurred in the unregulated commons." E, com esta orientação inspira-se nas investigações de Elinor Ostrom para mostrar " [...] how commons can be effectively managed, and how alternate ways to manage the commons can lead to different outcomes with respect to inequality." É a partir deste background que convoca uma ampliação e aprofundamento do debate, incentivando por meio desta "call for papers" "a broad heterodox inquiry into the world of the common." Os tópicos sugeridos são instigantes, principalmente para pesquisadores com Hugo Ballesteros que, na sua busca de compreender o "furtivismo", depara-se a todo momento com a questão da legitimidade cultural de uma atividade ilegal: i) How is it to be understood; ii) how do people engaged in common endeavors interact and manage themselves; iii) how do gender, race, and other divisions intertwine with the commons; iv) how do we protect and enlarge what we hold in common? v) Who benefits from the existence of different aspects of the commons, and vi) who might be harmed by them?"