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Aqui a Elinor Ostrom ressalta as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is difficult and costly to design institutions that successfully exclude some potential beneficiaries from access to CPRs, many CPRs are in fact open-access resources where anyone who wishes can gain access and appropriate resource units. Given that

Evidenciada a natureza hibrida (nem mercado, nem estado) dos recursos de propriedade comum, Elinor Ostrom considera as instituições como um capital social que evolui ao longo do tempo: "[....] institutions are a form of social capital resulting from the time and effort invested by their creators in improving their productivity. The institutions, of course, have not remained entirely fixed over their lifetimes. Ali of them are complex and have had to change over time", mas chama atenção para sua relativa estabilidde, já que para ela as " institutions are, however "robust" or in "institutional equilibrium" in the sense defined by Shepsle (1989, 143), who regards "an institution as 'essentially' in equilibrium if changes transpired according to an ex ante plan (and hence part of the original institution) for institutional change." Esta estabilidade associa as rules-in-use (mas não associa a um conjunto de regras particlares) que se origina dos "[....] the appropriators (users) designed their own rules, created organizations to undertake the day-to-day management of their resources, and modified their own rules over time in light of past experience. The specific rules-in-use, however, differ markedly from one case to the next. Given the great variation in rules-in-use, the sustainability of these resources and their institutions cannot be cxplained by the presence or absence of particular rules. That the rules do differ partly explains the sustainability of these systems. By differing, the rules take into account specific attributes of the physical systems, cultural views of the world, and the economic and politicai relationships that exist in the setting. Without different rules, appropriators could not take advantage of the positive features of a local CPR or avoid potential pitfalls that could occur in one setting but not in others.

The Digital Observatory for Protected Areas "Providing the right information to the right people with the right tools" Supporting GEO's Biodiversity Observation Network (GEO-BON), the Digital Observatory for Protected Areas (DOPA) is conceived as a set of distributed Critical Biodiversity Informatics Infrastructures (databases, web modeling services, broadcasting services, ...) combined with interoperable web services to provide a large variety of endusers including park managers, decision-makers and researchers with means to assess, monitor and possibly forecast the state and pressure of protected areas at the global scale. DOPA has three main objectives: 1) Provide best available material (data, indicators, models) agreed on by contributing institutions which can serve for establishing baselines for research & reporting; 2) Provide free web based tools (databases, portals, modeling services) designed to generate the best available material but also for research purposes, decision making and capacity building activities for conservation; 3) Provide an interoperable and, as much as possible, open source framework to allow institutions to get their own means to assess, monitor and forecast the state and pressure of protected areas and help these to further engage with the organizations hosting critical biodiversity informatics infrastructures. Developped in collaboration by major institutions active in the field of biodiversity conservation (UNEP-WCMC, BirdLife International, GBIF, IUCN, ...), DOPA is designed to encourage a multi-scale cross-disciplinary approach to biodiversity without being exposed to excessive risks coming from mixing data from undocumented sources and/or with undocumented uncertainties. - See more at: http://dopa.jrc.ec.europa.eu/#sthash.63zAz2Cx.dpuf Supporting GEO's Biodiversity Observation Network (GEO-BON), the Digital Observatory for Protected Areas (DOPA) is conceived as a set of distributed Critical Biodiversity Informatics Infrastr

"Scholars of common property resource theory (CPR) have long asserted that certain kinds of institutional arrangements based on collective action result in successful environmental stewardship, but feedback and the direct link between social and ecological systems remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangements contribute to sustainable mangrove fisheries in coastal Ecuador, focusing on the fishery for the mangrove cockle (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis), a bivalve mollusk harvested from the roots of mangrove trees and of particular social, economic, and cultural importance for the communities that depend on it. Specifically, this study examines the emergence of new civil society institutions within the historical context of extensive mangrove deforestation for the expansion of shrimp farming, policy changes in the late 1990s that recognized "ancestral" rights of local communities to mangrove resources, and how custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, affect the cockle fishery. Findings from interviews with shell collectors and analysis of catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common property regimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources, mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shell sizes, but the benefits are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors feel further marginalized by the loss of gathering grounds, potentially deflecting problems of overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove fisheries are weakly managed by the State. Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, the explicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at different levels, examining the relationship between collective action and the environment through quantitative approaches at the fishery level and qualitative analysis at the level

O artigo de Andres Thiel e sus companheiros segue em anexo. É do tipo um "achado". De um lado, a questão, Como as características dos recursos naturais renováveis e o framework regulatório (no caso o europeu) explica a infraestrutura institucional local (a estrutura de governança) ? Do outro o referencial neoinstitucionalista é usado com a precisão de um artesão, sem afetação, para develarmos como as características dos recursos afeta a transação, e, em seguida juntar com os condicionantes da regulação para enquadrar as instituições locais (a estrutura de governança). E como se não bastasse, faz uso do ABDUCTIVE APPROACH de forma criativa e com excelente resultado. "This paper scrutinizes determinants of regional-level institutions regulating the provisionof biodiversity and ecosystem services. Two cases of maintaining ecosystem services,provided by quite different resource systems, are compared: the protection of wolvesand the management of a high nature value agroforestry system, scattered fruit treemeadows. Taking an abductive approach, we suggest that the distinct characteristicsof resources - in particular the mobility of resource units - and differences in theoverarching European regulatory framework - the obligation to protect wolves versusvoluntary compensation payments to maintain scattered fruit tree meadows - largelyexplain the existing institutional structures at regional level. Cost-effectiveness considera-tions concerning the transaction costs of governance seem to act as determinants for thedesign and implementation of regional institutions. Livestock depredated by wolves isprotected by a liability rule and hierarchical governance structures. In turn, maintenance of scattered fruit trees is subject to a property rule and voluntary long-term agreements."

"Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) have spread in Chile, since the late 1990s, in the form of commons institutions. TURFs are presented by some scholars as a social-ecological success; by others as showing economic and compliance problems. Studies looking at the material conditions in which fishers produce and reproduce their livelihoods, and in which TURFs emerge, are scarcer. Ostrom's theory on the commons claims that certain collective action conditions have to be met to become thriving commons institutions. Our hypothesis is that while institutions are moulded by local material conditions, such as geographical location and social embeddedness, these impose challenges and constraints upon fishers influencing TURFs' long-term viability. How are collective action conditions influenced when the new TURFs commons do not emerge in tabula rasa contexts but in occupied spaces? Do material conditions influence TURFs' sustainability? This paper set out to explore these conditions. Huentelauquén's and Guayacán's TURFs (central-northern Chile) were chosen, as they represent two extremes (rural-urban; on private property-on State/municipal property; mainly diver - mainly fisher) contexts in which TURFs have emerged. We mainly used Participatory Rural Approach (PRA) tools triangulated with other qualitative methods. This study shows that both social embeddedness (private/State lands), and geographical location (rural/urban) matter, resulting in different access to the coast for different TURFs, thus determining some important differences between our cases in at least three relevant areas: entrance, social relations between the fishers' organization (entitled the TURFs) and the landowner (private or municipal/State) and the existence or absence of fishing and general infrastructure. Competition for space among key actors seems to affect the process of acquiring a TURF as well as the conditions conductive to collective action. TURFs' assessments s

Addressing this need, we present a framework on collective action, conflict prevention, and social-ecological resilience, linking local stakeholder dynamics to the broader institutional and governance context. Accounting for both formal and informal relationships of power and influence, as well as values and stakeholder perceptions alongside material interests, the framework aims to provide insight into the problem of (re)building legitimacy of commonpool resource management institutions in conflict-sensitive environments. We outline its application in stakeholder-based problem assessment and planning, participatory monitoring and evaluation, and multi-case comparative analysis.

"This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangementscontribute to sustainable mangrove sheries in coastal Ecuador, ocusing onthe shery or the mangrove cockle (  Anadara tuberculosa and  A. similis ), abivalve mollusk harvested rom the roots o mangrove trees and o particularsocial, economic, and cultural importance or the communities that dependon it. Specically, this study examines the emergence o new civil societyinstitutions within the historical context o extensive mangrove deorestationor the expansion o shrimp arming, policy changes in the late 1990s thatrecognized "ancestral" rights o local communities to mangrove resources, andhow custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, aect the cockleshery. Findings rom interviews with shell collectors and analysis o catch-per-unit-eort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common propertyregimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources,mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shellsizes, but the benets are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors eel urther marginalized by the loss o gathering grounds, potentially defecting problems o overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove sheries are weakly managed by the State.Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) ramework, theexplicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at dierent levels,examining the relationship between collective action and the environment throughquantitative approaches at the shery level and qualitative analysis at the level"

"nstitutions based on the concept"common property" have played socially beneficial roles in natural resources management from economic pre-history up to thepresent. These same institutions promisehelp in solving pressing resourcesproblems in both the devel- oped and the developing countries. It isall the more important that these institutions be the focus of an economic study because they have been misunderstood by modern day economists: We refer to the so-called "theory of common property resources" orwhat is oftentermed the "tragedy of the commons."1"

"While most of the attention in the scientific and policy literature onrights-based institutions has been devoted to Individual Transferable Quotas(ITQs), there are alternatives that involve different configurations of use rights.One such alternative is a space-based option commonly referred to as Territo-rial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs). TURFs have been utilized in island fisheriesoff Southeast Asia for decades, and they have been well studied, particularly byanthropologists and sociologists. This paper discusses case studies of TURF or-ganizations in Japan and Chile from an economics perspective. We discuss thehistorical origins of each system, outline the legal and institutional structures of the systems, and then discuss how each system manages nearshore coastal re-sources. We discuss similarities and differences across the many specific collectivemanagement structures adopted by Japanese and Chilean TURF organizations.We then discuss how outcomes differ from what might emerge under ITQs"

Fundamental. The term "common-property resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policy analysis. In this paper we develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.

Em Neither Market nor State - Governance of Common-Pool Resource in the Twenty-First Century, Elinor Ostrom volta a problemática semantica dos recursos de propriedade comum, tendo como base uma distinção entre estoque e fluxo do recurso natural renovavel, ressaltando as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is diff

Ontem na Banca de Jéssica Cruz, no Instituto de Biologia da UFBA inciamos uma interloculação em torno da institucionalização das funções ecosistêmicas embutidas nos Sistemas Socioecológico. O ponto de partida da discussão foi a instrumentalização e problematização da tipologia de funções ecosistêmicas proposta por DE GROOT et al A typology for the clasification, description and valuation of ecosystems functions, goods and services in Ecological Economics, 2002. v.42, pp. 393-408. A problematização foi feita por um dos orientadores, em cuja tese de doutoramento descontrói a compreensão vigente da função ecosistêmica da biodiversidade e da especie, ancorando-a no organismo (Ver NUNES-NETO, Function in Ecology: an organizational approach in Biol. PHilophy, 2013 (no prelo). A partir da sua reconstrução das funções ecosistêmicas, chamamos atenção para a possibilidade de considerar, do ponto de vista do policymaking, os diferentes tipos de funções, não como concorrentes, mas como complementar, e assim poder considerá-las com funções associadas aos estoques e as funções vinculadas ao fluxo, integrando no programa de pesquisa dos sistemas socioecológicos a Teoria das Funções Ecosistêmicos. Resultado: ponto de pauta para um grupo em processo de articulação que deverá tratar da relação da Economia Ecológica com a Teoria da Funções Ecosistêmicas.

Tine De Moor's 'Silent Revolution'. Reconsidering her theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of institutions for the collective management of resources

: The social-ecological systems framework was designed to provide a common research tool for interdisciplinary investigations of social-ecological systems. However, its origin in institutional studies of the commons belies its interdisciplinary ambitions and highlights its relatively limited attention to ecology and natural scientific knowledge. This paper considers the biophysical components of the framework and its epistemological foundations as it relates to the incorporation of knowledge from the natural sciences.

Richard Hovitt e seu companheiros colocam o conflito de interesses no âmbito dos sistemas interclultural de gestão dos recursos naturais na Australia e Malaysia. Eles exploram as maneiras pelas quais o " ontological pluralism and the interplay of socio-cultural, political-economic and biophysical influences shape NRM systems", uma problemática muito próxima aos nossos territórios pesqueiros. O objetivo dos autores é ampliar " discursive space in which to reframe the challenges of capacity building in the rapidly changing spaces of intercultural NRM systems." Para nós a relevância do texto deve-se em boa parte porque eles "...synthesizes the conceptual arguments of field research to conclude that capacity deficits of dominant institutions, processes and knowledge systems drive many systemic failures in land and sea management affecting Indigenous peoples. We advocate urgent action to build intercultural competence and new capacities and competencies in those institutions." Enfim, segundo eles, " The paper reframes intercultural NRM in terms of coexistence an and invites wider debate about these 'new geographies of coexistence' in intercultural NRM systems"

A partir do problema da exploraçao predatoria dos recursos pesqueiros (Commons ) , Hilborn et al (2005) chamam a atençao sobre a importancia das instituçoes ( formais e informais) e dos incentivos gerados a partir das estruturas institucionais para solucionar problemas em pesca. Artigo fundamental nas discuçoes do grupo de pesca.

A vertente institucionalista no âmbito da política é, em boa parte, fundamentada na Economia dos Direitos de Propriedade, a qual é tomada na maioria das vezes acítica, dado que se considera uma critica a abordagem convencional que mesmo reconhecendo o direito de propiredade, não o considera como possível de ser objeto da política, ou seja, afasta--o do âmbito analítico considerando-o constante, por meio do suposto do "tudo o mais constante". Aqui, a Economia dos Direitos de Propriedade e problematizada.

This conference will not only celebrate the last 40 years of outstanding science accomplishments in aquaculture it will identify the top science challenges for the next generation of global aquaculture. The conference will be essential for helping assist in a generational change to new leaders for the next science accomplishments needed to double global aquaculture production. You should attend if you are at the cutting edge of science understanding genetics, diseases, feeds, ecological interactions, and sustainable systems. Topics List Aquaculture hatcheries: Science advances and future research needs Combining marker assisted selection with classic selection programs Transdisciplinary research needs for the expansion of aquaculture in rural economies Raw materials and feed ingredients needed for the future of aquaculture Interactions of aquaculture and the environment Research institutions and research strategies in aquaculture 3rd -7th November 2013 Palacio de Congresos de Canarias, Las Palmas, Gran Canaria

Este livro tem uma característica impar, a despeito de tratar de uma questão bem específica, tem a estrutura de um manual, pavimentando a estrada para quem queira entrar no campo. "This book presents alternative concepts, tools, methods, and conservation strategies, many of which were developed with IDRC support. It shows how to use these methods in a practical way and places a strong emphasis on ecosystem management and participatory decision-making. Natural resource managers, particularly of fisheries and aquatic resources, in developing countries, will find this book very useful, as will managers in other sectors because of the increasing spillover of management approaches across resource sectors. This book will also be of use to representatives from all government agencies, development institutions, nongovernmental organizations, international executing agencies, and donor agencies that are involved in fisheries management, particularly for the small-scale sector."