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Aqui a Elinor Ostrom ressalta as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is difficult and costly to design institutions that successfully exclude some potential beneficiaries from access to CPRs, many CPRs are in fact open-access resources where anyone who wishes can gain access and appropriate resource units. Given that

Evidenciada a natureza hibrida (nem mercado, nem estado) dos recursos de propriedade comum, Elinor Ostrom considera as instituições como um capital social que evolui ao longo do tempo: "[....] institutions are a form of social capital resulting from the time and effort invested by their creators in improving their productivity. The institutions, of course, have not remained entirely fixed over their lifetimes. Ali of them are complex and have had to change over time", mas chama atenção para sua relativa estabilidde, já que para ela as " institutions are, however "robust" or in "institutional equilibrium" in the sense defined by Shepsle (1989, 143), who regards "an institution as 'essentially' in equilibrium if changes transpired according to an ex ante plan (and hence part of the original institution) for institutional change." Esta estabilidade associa as rules-in-use (mas não associa a um conjunto de regras particlares) que se origina dos "[....] the appropriators (users) designed their own rules, created organizations to undertake the day-to-day management of their resources, and modified their own rules over time in light of past experience. The specific rules-in-use, however, differ markedly from one case to the next. Given the great variation in rules-in-use, the sustainability of these resources and their institutions cannot be cxplained by the presence or absence of particular rules. That the rules do differ partly explains the sustainability of these systems. By differing, the rules take into account specific attributes of the physical systems, cultural views of the world, and the economic and politicai relationships that exist in the setting. Without different rules, appropriators could not take advantage of the positive features of a local CPR or avoid potential pitfalls that could occur in one setting but not in others.

Fundamental. The term "common-property resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policy analysis. In this paper we develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.

Em Neither Market nor State - Governance of Common-Pool Resource in the Twenty-First Century, Elinor Ostrom volta a problemática semantica dos recursos de propriedade comum, tendo como base uma distinção entre estoque e fluxo do recurso natural renovavel, ressaltando as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is diff

Ontem na Banca de Jéssica Cruz, no Instituto de Biologia da UFBA inciamos uma interloculação em torno da institucionalização das funções ecosistêmicas embutidas nos Sistemas Socioecológico. O ponto de partida da discussão foi a instrumentalização e problematização da tipologia de funções ecosistêmicas proposta por DE GROOT et al A typology for the clasification, description and valuation of ecosystems functions, goods and services in Ecological Economics, 2002. v.42, pp. 393-408. A problematização foi feita por um dos orientadores, em cuja tese de doutoramento descontrói a compreensão vigente da função ecosistêmica da biodiversidade e da especie, ancorando-a no organismo (Ver NUNES-NETO, Function in Ecology: an organizational approach in Biol. PHilophy, 2013 (no prelo). A partir da sua reconstrução das funções ecosistêmicas, chamamos atenção para a possibilidade de considerar, do ponto de vista do policymaking, os diferentes tipos de funções, não como concorrentes, mas como complementar, e assim poder considerá-las com funções associadas aos estoques e as funções vinculadas ao fluxo, integrando no programa de pesquisa dos sistemas socioecológicos a Teoria das Funções Ecosistêmicos. Resultado: ponto de pauta para um grupo em processo de articulação que deverá tratar da relação da Economia Ecológica com a Teoria da Funções Ecosistêmicas.

O artigo de Andres Thiel e sus companheiros segue em anexo. É do tipo um "achado". De um lado, a questão, Como as características dos recursos naturais renováveis e o framework regulatório (no caso o europeu) explica a infraestrutura institucional local (a estrutura de governança) ? Do outro o referencial neoinstitucionalista é usado com a precisão de um artesão, sem afetação, para develarmos como as características dos recursos afeta a transação, e, em seguida juntar com os condicionantes da regulação para enquadrar as instituições locais (a estrutura de governança). E como se não bastasse, faz uso do ABDUCTIVE APPROACH de forma criativa e com excelente resultado. "This paper scrutinizes determinants of regional-level institutions regulating the provisionof biodiversity and ecosystem services. Two cases of maintaining ecosystem services,provided by quite different resource systems, are compared: the protection of wolvesand the management of a high nature value agroforestry system, scattered fruit treemeadows. Taking an abductive approach, we suggest that the distinct characteristicsof resources - in particular the mobility of resource units - and differences in theoverarching European regulatory framework - the obligation to protect wolves versusvoluntary compensation payments to maintain scattered fruit tree meadows - largelyexplain the existing institutional structures at regional level. Cost-effectiveness considera-tions concerning the transaction costs of governance seem to act as determinants for thedesign and implementation of regional institutions. Livestock depredated by wolves isprotected by a liability rule and hierarchical governance structures. In turn, maintenance of scattered fruit trees is subject to a property rule and voluntary long-term agreements."

Um ponto de partida de Ostrom é sua condenação as panaceias, em especial " Those researchers and practitioners who propose panaceas for solving complex environmental problems make two false assumptions. First they assume that all problems of a general type, such as air pollution or maintaining species diversity, are similar; and second, all of the people involved have the same preferences, information, and authority to act. Neither is true [...] . Mas, não cai no outro extremo, onde admite-se que "Sustaining natural resource systems is far too important a problem for scholars to espouse "doing nothing." We must make every effort to cope with these really wicked problems involved in avoiding ecological disasters." Sua posição é proativa, ainda que precavida: " But, we also need to recommend caution about overusing simple blueprints and to develop diagnostic theories drawing on the lessons that can be learned from theoretical and empirical research on why some governance systems lead to improved performance of social-ecological systems and others lead to failures (Ostrom 1990). " E apoiada em evidências, tal como as sistematizadas por Brock and Carpenter (2007) illustrate how models of adaptive control processes in the Northern Highlands Lake District of Wisconsin are prone to panacea traps [...] . We will continue doing more harm than good if panaceas are recommended to solve resource problems rather than learning how to match potential solutions to a serious diagnosis of specific problems in the ecological and social context in which they are nested. Similarly, assuming that effective property-rights systems will simply evolve as resource units become more valuable (e.g., Demsetz 1967) is not an adequate understanding of the challenge of matching property rights and governance systems to particular ecological systems (Fitzpatrick 2006) O desafio portanto, segundo ela é Moving beyond panaceas to develop a cumulative capacity to dia

"During the last decade there has been increased attention to the study o social-ecological systems (SESs). Social-ecological systems link social and ecologicalsystems (Berkes and Folke 1998). The inherently transdisciplinary eld o SES-scholars has ocused on resilience o SESs and ways to govern resilience o SESs.Resilience is dened as the ability o a system to withstand perturbations andremain within the same stability regime (Holling 1973). Governance o SESsocuses on enhancing the ability o the system to remain within the desired stabilityregime, or to create opportunities to move toward a desired stability regime. Forexample, suppression o orest res lead to the accumulation o uel (the trees thatare not burned) creating conditions or later res o such intensity that the soiland seed banks are damaged. This may prevent the orest system rom recoveringrom such a re. A more appropriate policy is to use small controlled burn tomaintain the resilience o the orest system.The study o SESs was initiated by ecologists who became interested inthe social dimensions o ecosystem management (Berkes and Folke 1998). Butincreasingly we see social scientists adopting an SES approach, taking into accountmore explicit ecological dynamics o resource systems than earlier social scienceresearch. The work o Ostrom (1990) originally ocused on the dimensions o thesocial system o a common resource. In recent work the study o the commons isapproached rom an SES perspective where natural resources and social systemshave equal representation and equal detailed analysis (Anderies et al. 2004;Ostrom 2007,2009).In this special issue a series o papers has been collected to urther the rontiero the study o the governance o social-ecological systems."

"nstitutions based on the concept"common property" have played socially beneficial roles in natural resources management from economic pre-history up to thepresent. These same institutions promisehelp in solving pressing resourcesproblems in both the devel- oped and the developing countries. It isall the more important that these institutions be the focus of an economic study because they have been misunderstood by modern day economists: We refer to the so-called "theory of common property resources" orwhat is oftentermed the "tragedy of the commons."1"

"Scholars of common property resource theory (CPR) have long asserted that certain kinds of institutional arrangements based on collective action result in successful environmental stewardship, but feedback and the direct link between social and ecological systems remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangements contribute to sustainable mangrove fisheries in coastal Ecuador, focusing on the fishery for the mangrove cockle (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis), a bivalve mollusk harvested from the roots of mangrove trees and of particular social, economic, and cultural importance for the communities that depend on it. Specifically, this study examines the emergence of new civil society institutions within the historical context of extensive mangrove deforestation for the expansion of shrimp farming, policy changes in the late 1990s that recognized "ancestral" rights of local communities to mangrove resources, and how custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, affect the cockle fishery. Findings from interviews with shell collectors and analysis of catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common property regimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources, mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shell sizes, but the benefits are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors feel further marginalized by the loss of gathering grounds, potentially deflecting problems of overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove fisheries are weakly managed by the State. Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, the explicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at different levels, examining the relationship between collective action and the environment through quantitative approaches at the fishery level and qualitative analysis at the level

"To halt degradation of benthic resources in Chile, management areas (MAs) were set up under the Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) framework in the late 1990s. Integrated into the global market, MAs have since expanded along the Chilean coast, involving thousands of small-scale artisanal fishers. This paper analyses how economic criteria relates to social and ecological performance of Chilean MAs, by applying TURFs, commons and co-management theory to two cases: MAs Peñuelas and Chigualoco. To collect and analyse data Participatory Rural Appraisal tools, interviews and official statistics and reports were used. Our results show that MAs' economic benefits are connected to fluctuations on the global market. Adapting to changing world market prices then becomes paramount. TURFs' main goal is ecological conservation, but achieving this seems to depend on meeting fishers' livelihoods; failure to do so likely results in failure to meet conservation objectives. A serious weakness of the Chilean TURFs system is that it does not pay enough attention to fishers' livelihoods or to the global market context. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship between good economic benefits and social sustainability. But irrespective of economic performance, fisher organizations have been empowered and gained increased resource control with the TURFs system. At policy level, a differentiated and more flexible system could be more suitable for existing heterogeneous MAs and their particular economic, social and ecological challenges. For improved economic sustainability and resource conservation, a system with multiple-species managing MAs could be promoted as well. Finally, to enhance theory of commons, co-management and TURFs, we argue for greater acknowledgement of TURFs' social benefits in addition to economic assessments. More attention should also be paid to global market conditions of which MAs are dependent and in which they are embedded: macrostructures tha

Special Issue: The Commons and The Common Call for Papers The Commons (or the common) is of interest to radicals on the left for many reasons. Most obvious at present is the condition of the earth we share-everyone's common. Global warming and environmental degradation threaten human existence and that of other living creatures and things. Yet agreement on how to better treat planet Earth has proven elusive. Another reason for interest in the commons is the left's fight against privatization, for decades now a hallmark of neoliberalism. Enclosure of common space and resources was part of the development of the capitalist system, and it continues today. Can this process be stopped; reversed? The terms commons and common do not simply refer to open access resources (res nullins). This category of common resource is the air we breathe, or the ocean. Another category of the commons is res communis, a commonly held resource. It has figured prominently in projects and aspirations of socialists, anarchists, feminists, and communists. Privatization can be associated with a world of scarcity, and the common with abundance. In addition, more than property is held in common. Language, stories, images, humor, culture and other aspects of communal interaction share this root. In addition, more than property is held in common. Language, stories, images, humor, culture and other aspects of communal interaction share this root. How can a clearer sense of the commons help inform a renewal of left trajectories: a more egalitarian and sustainable world? While advocated to overcome problems presumed to be inherent in managing the commons, privatization substitutes problems fundamental to an individualized world. One of the most obvious of these problems is inequality: of access, control, income, and resources. Inequality is reflected in class-riven societies, as well as those characterized by differential a

"This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangementscontribute to sustainable mangrove sheries in coastal Ecuador, ocusing onthe shery or the mangrove cockle (  Anadara tuberculosa and  A. similis ), abivalve mollusk harvested rom the roots o mangrove trees and o particularsocial, economic, and cultural importance or the communities that dependon it. Specically, this study examines the emergence o new civil societyinstitutions within the historical context o extensive mangrove deorestationor the expansion o shrimp arming, policy changes in the late 1990s thatrecognized "ancestral" rights o local communities to mangrove resources, andhow custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, aect the cockleshery. Findings rom interviews with shell collectors and analysis o catch-per-unit-eort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common propertyregimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources,mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shellsizes, but the benets are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors eel urther marginalized by the loss o gathering grounds, potentially defecting problems o overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove sheries are weakly managed by the State.Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) ramework, theexplicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at dierent levels,examining the relationship between collective action and the environment throughquantitative approaches at the shery level and qualitative analysis at the level"

"To halt degradation o benthic resources in Chile, managementareas (MAs) were set up under the Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)ramework in the late 1990s. Integrated into the global market, MAs have sinceexpanded along the Chilean coast, involving thousands o small-scale artisanalshers. This paper analyses how economic criteria relates to social and ecologicalperormance o Chilean MAs, by applying TURFs, commons and co-managementtheory to two cases: MAs Peñuelas and Chigualoco. To collect and analyse dataParticipatory Rural Appraisal tools, interviews and ocial statistics and reportswere used. Our results show that MAs' economic benets are connected tofuctuations on the global market. Adapting to changing world market prices thenbecomes paramount. TURFs' main goal is ecological conservation, but achievingthis seems to depend on meeting shers' livelihoods; ailure to do so likely resultsin ailure to meet conservation objectives. A serious weakness o the ChileanTURFs system is that it does not pay enough attention to shers' livelihoods orto the global market context. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship betweengood economic benets and social sustainability. But irrespective o economicperormance, sher organizations have been empowered and gained increasedresource control with the TURFs system. At policy level, a dierentiated andmore fexible system could be more suitable or existing heterogeneous MAsand their particular economic, social and ecological challenges. For improvedeconomic sustainability and resource conservation, a system with multiple-species managing MAs could be promoted as well. Finally, to enhance theory o commons, co-management and TURFs, we argue or greater acknowledgement"

"Os Common-pool resources e o debate sobre Direitosde Propriedade para as Reservas Extrativistas Marinhas no Brasil"

Tine De Moor's 'Silent Revolution'. Reconsidering her theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of institutions for the collective management of resources

Addressing this need, we present a framework on collective action, conflict prevention, and social-ecological resilience, linking local stakeholder dynamics to the broader institutional and governance context. Accounting for both formal and informal relationships of power and influence, as well as values and stakeholder perceptions alongside material interests, the framework aims to provide insight into the problem of (re)building legitimacy of commonpool resource management institutions in conflict-sensitive environments. We outline its application in stakeholder-based problem assessment and planning, participatory monitoring and evaluation, and multi-case comparative analysis.

Este livro tem uma característica impar, a despeito de tratar de uma questão bem específica, tem a estrutura de um manual, pavimentando a estrada para quem queira entrar no campo. "This book presents alternative concepts, tools, methods, and conservation strategies, many of which were developed with IDRC support. It shows how to use these methods in a practical way and places a strong emphasis on ecosystem management and participatory decision-making. Natural resource managers, particularly of fisheries and aquatic resources, in developing countries, will find this book very useful, as will managers in other sectors because of the increasing spillover of management approaches across resource sectors. This book will also be of use to representatives from all government agencies, development institutions, nongovernmental organizations, international executing agencies, and donor agencies that are involved in fisheries management, particularly for the small-scale sector."

Richard Hovitt e seu companheiros colocam o conflito de interesses no âmbito dos sistemas interclultural de gestão dos recursos naturais na Australia e Malaysia. Eles exploram as maneiras pelas quais o " ontological pluralism and the interplay of socio-cultural, political-economic and biophysical influences shape NRM systems", uma problemática muito próxima aos nossos territórios pesqueiros. O objetivo dos autores é ampliar " discursive space in which to reframe the challenges of capacity building in the rapidly changing spaces of intercultural NRM systems." Para nós a relevância do texto deve-se em boa parte porque eles "...synthesizes the conceptual arguments of field research to conclude that capacity deficits of dominant institutions, processes and knowledge systems drive many systemic failures in land and sea management affecting Indigenous peoples. We advocate urgent action to build intercultural competence and new capacities and competencies in those institutions." Enfim, segundo eles, " The paper reframes intercultural NRM in terms of coexistence an and invites wider debate about these 'new geographies of coexistence' in intercultural NRM systems"

This presentation will: Discuss challenges faced in protected area management in the Caribbean Explore why a rights-based approach to conservation is critical Address transparency of government and corporate actors in relation to the use of natural resources in protected areas Address rights of the public to participate in protected area management Address accountability of government actions to stated policy goals Present case studies about the Portland Bight Protected Area in Jamaica , la Reserva de Biosfera Jaragua-Bahoruco-Enriquillo in Dominican Republic, and Caracol Bay in Haiti