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O artigo de Andres Thiel e sus companheiros segue em anexo. É do tipo um "achado". De um lado, a questão, Como as características dos recursos naturais renováveis e o framework regulatório (no caso o europeu) explica a infraestrutura institucional local (a estrutura de governança) ? Do outro o referencial neoinstitucionalista é usado com a precisão de um artesão, sem afetação, para develarmos como as características dos recursos afeta a transação, e, em seguida juntar com os condicionantes da regulação para enquadrar as instituições locais (a estrutura de governança). E como se não bastasse, faz uso do ABDUCTIVE APPROACH de forma criativa e com excelente resultado. "This paper scrutinizes determinants of regional-level institutions regulating the provisionof biodiversity and ecosystem services. Two cases of maintaining ecosystem services,provided by quite different resource systems, are compared: the protection of wolvesand the management of a high nature value agroforestry system, scattered fruit treemeadows. Taking an abductive approach, we suggest that the distinct characteristicsof resources - in particular the mobility of resource units - and differences in theoverarching European regulatory framework - the obligation to protect wolves versusvoluntary compensation payments to maintain scattered fruit tree meadows - largelyexplain the existing institutional structures at regional level. Cost-effectiveness considera-tions concerning the transaction costs of governance seem to act as determinants for thedesign and implementation of regional institutions. Livestock depredated by wolves isprotected by a liability rule and hierarchical governance structures. In turn, maintenance of scattered fruit trees is subject to a property rule and voluntary long-term agreements."

The Digital Observatory for Protected Areas "Providing the right information to the right people with the right tools" Supporting GEO's Biodiversity Observation Network (GEO-BON), the Digital Observatory for Protected Areas (DOPA) is conceived as a set of distributed Critical Biodiversity Informatics Infrastructures (databases, web modeling services, broadcasting services, ...) combined with interoperable web services to provide a large variety of endusers including park managers, decision-makers and researchers with means to assess, monitor and possibly forecast the state and pressure of protected areas at the global scale. DOPA has three main objectives: 1) Provide best available material (data, indicators, models) agreed on by contributing institutions which can serve for establishing baselines for research & reporting; 2) Provide free web based tools (databases, portals, modeling services) designed to generate the best available material but also for research purposes, decision making and capacity building activities for conservation; 3) Provide an interoperable and, as much as possible, open source framework to allow institutions to get their own means to assess, monitor and forecast the state and pressure of protected areas and help these to further engage with the organizations hosting critical biodiversity informatics infrastructures. Developped in collaboration by major institutions active in the field of biodiversity conservation (UNEP-WCMC, BirdLife International, GBIF, IUCN, ...), DOPA is designed to encourage a multi-scale cross-disciplinary approach to biodiversity without being exposed to excessive risks coming from mixing data from undocumented sources and/or with undocumented uncertainties. - See more at: http://dopa.jrc.ec.europa.eu/#sthash.63zAz2Cx.dpuf Supporting GEO's Biodiversity Observation Network (GEO-BON), the Digital Observatory for Protected Areas (DOPA) is conceived as a set of distributed Critical Biodiversity Informatics Infrastr

"Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) have spread in Chile, since the late 1990s, in the form of commons institutions. TURFs are presented by some scholars as a social-ecological success; by others as showing economic and compliance problems. Studies looking at the material conditions in which fishers produce and reproduce their livelihoods, and in which TURFs emerge, are scarcer. Ostrom's theory on the commons claims that certain collective action conditions have to be met to become thriving commons institutions. Our hypothesis is that while institutions are moulded by local material conditions, such as geographical location and social embeddedness, these impose challenges and constraints upon fishers influencing TURFs' long-term viability. How are collective action conditions influenced when the new TURFs commons do not emerge in tabula rasa contexts but in occupied spaces? Do material conditions influence TURFs' sustainability? This paper set out to explore these conditions. Huentelauquén's and Guayacán's TURFs (central-northern Chile) were chosen, as they represent two extremes (rural-urban; on private property-on State/municipal property; mainly diver - mainly fisher) contexts in which TURFs have emerged. We mainly used Participatory Rural Approach (PRA) tools triangulated with other qualitative methods. This study shows that both social embeddedness (private/State lands), and geographical location (rural/urban) matter, resulting in different access to the coast for different TURFs, thus determining some important differences between our cases in at least three relevant areas: entrance, social relations between the fishers' organization (entitled the TURFs) and the landowner (private or municipal/State) and the existence or absence of fishing and general infrastructure. Competition for space among key actors seems to affect the process of acquiring a TURF as well as the conditions conductive to collective action. TURFs' assessments s

"The idea that decision-making processes andmanagement in public policy and publicadministration are complex has entered theminds of practitioners and scholars in publicadministration. Insights from theories oncomplexity, however, have hardly been usedin public administration and management. Inother social sciences, like economics forinstance, an evolutionary approach hasreceived far more attention. The questionwhether such a complexity theory approachcould help to increase our understanding ofpublic management phenomena is an intri-guing one. In this volume the reader will finda selection of articles on public managementusing insights from the complexity theory.Before we present the seven articles, whichall deal with notions from the complexitytheory and apply them to phenomena in thepublic sector, we will briefly introduce somebasic ideas concerning this theory. Key words Complexity theory, public administration,complex decision-making, complex systems Vol. 10 Issue 3 2008 287-297Public Management Review ISSN 1471-9037 print/ISSN 1471-9045 online Ó 2008 Taylor & Francishttp://www.tandf.co.uk/journalsDOI: 10.1080/14719030802002451 "

"This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangementscontribute to sustainable mangrove sheries in coastal Ecuador, ocusing onthe shery or the mangrove cockle (  Anadara tuberculosa and  A. similis ), abivalve mollusk harvested rom the roots o mangrove trees and o particularsocial, economic, and cultural importance or the communities that dependon it. Specically, this study examines the emergence o new civil societyinstitutions within the historical context o extensive mangrove deorestationor the expansion o shrimp arming, policy changes in the late 1990s thatrecognized "ancestral" rights o local communities to mangrove resources, andhow custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, aect the cockleshery. Findings rom interviews with shell collectors and analysis o catch-per-unit-eort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common propertyregimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources,mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shellsizes, but the benets are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors eel urther marginalized by the loss o gathering grounds, potentially defecting problems o overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove sheries are weakly managed by the State.Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) ramework, theexplicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at dierent levels,examining the relationship between collective action and the environment throughquantitative approaches at the shery level and qualitative analysis at the level"

"During the last decade there has been increased attention to the study o social-ecological systems (SESs). Social-ecological systems link social and ecologicalsystems (Berkes and Folke 1998). The inherently transdisciplinary eld o SES-scholars has ocused on resilience o SESs and ways to govern resilience o SESs.Resilience is dened as the ability o a system to withstand perturbations andremain within the same stability regime (Holling 1973). Governance o SESsocuses on enhancing the ability o the system to remain within the desired stabilityregime, or to create opportunities to move toward a desired stability regime. Forexample, suppression o orest res lead to the accumulation o uel (the trees thatare not burned) creating conditions or later res o such intensity that the soiland seed banks are damaged. This may prevent the orest system rom recoveringrom such a re. A more appropriate policy is to use small controlled burn tomaintain the resilience o the orest system.The study o SESs was initiated by ecologists who became interested inthe social dimensions o ecosystem management (Berkes and Folke 1998). Butincreasingly we see social scientists adopting an SES approach, taking into accountmore explicit ecological dynamics o resource systems than earlier social scienceresearch. The work o Ostrom (1990) originally ocused on the dimensions o thesocial system o a common resource. In recent work the study o the commons isapproached rom an SES perspective where natural resources and social systemshave equal representation and equal detailed analysis (Anderies et al. 2004;Ostrom 2007,2009).In this special issue a series o papers has been collected to urther the rontiero the study o the governance o social-ecological systems."

"Scholars of common property resource theory (CPR) have long asserted that certain kinds of institutional arrangements based on collective action result in successful environmental stewardship, but feedback and the direct link between social and ecological systems remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangements contribute to sustainable mangrove fisheries in coastal Ecuador, focusing on the fishery for the mangrove cockle (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis), a bivalve mollusk harvested from the roots of mangrove trees and of particular social, economic, and cultural importance for the communities that depend on it. Specifically, this study examines the emergence of new civil society institutions within the historical context of extensive mangrove deforestation for the expansion of shrimp farming, policy changes in the late 1990s that recognized "ancestral" rights of local communities to mangrove resources, and how custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, affect the cockle fishery. Findings from interviews with shell collectors and analysis of catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common property regimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources, mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shell sizes, but the benefits are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors feel further marginalized by the loss of gathering grounds, potentially deflecting problems of overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove fisheries are weakly managed by the State. Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, the explicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at different levels, examining the relationship between collective action and the environment through quantitative approaches at the fishery level and qualitative analysis at the level

Uma boa parte da contribuição da comunidade dos economistas a gestão dos recursos pesqueiros se assenta nos pressupostos do individualismo metodológico, o que implica a desconsideração da pluralidade do valores que se expressam nos complexos processos de tomada de decisão. O autor atento a este detalhe, e, sensível aos preceitos da economia ecológica sugere e argumenta que " [....] the new approach to environmental problems by economists will have to be a political economy of Nature." O "norte" de Spash é claro e instigante, além de ter subjacente o programa da economia ecológica, eis suas palavras: "Within the field of environmental and resource economics discontent with the policy relevance of prescriptions is often evident, but neoclassical theory still seems to maintain a dominant role. That was true until the late 1980s when ecologists and economists started to talk in a more formal fashion. The result has been the formation of ecological economics, which is attempting to take a fresh look at how economic systems interact with Nature. The methodology of this newer approach is still refreshingly open, and part of the thrust of this paper is to suggest the direction that it should take."

This presentation will: Discuss challenges faced in protected area management in the Caribbean Explore why a rights-based approach to conservation is critical Address transparency of government and corporate actors in relation to the use of natural resources in protected areas Address rights of the public to participate in protected area management Address accountability of government actions to stated policy goals Present case studies about the Portland Bight Protected Area in Jamaica , la Reserva de Biosfera Jaragua-Bahoruco-Enriquillo in Dominican Republic, and Caracol Bay in Haiti

Fundamental. The term "common-property resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policy analysis. In this paper we develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.

Em Neither Market nor State - Governance of Common-Pool Resource in the Twenty-First Century, Elinor Ostrom volta a problemática semantica dos recursos de propriedade comum, tendo como base uma distinção entre estoque e fluxo do recurso natural renovavel, ressaltando as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is diff

Ontem na Banca de Jéssica Cruz, no Instituto de Biologia da UFBA inciamos uma interloculação em torno da institucionalização das funções ecosistêmicas embutidas nos Sistemas Socioecológico. O ponto de partida da discussão foi a instrumentalização e problematização da tipologia de funções ecosistêmicas proposta por DE GROOT et al A typology for the clasification, description and valuation of ecosystems functions, goods and services in Ecological Economics, 2002. v.42, pp. 393-408. A problematização foi feita por um dos orientadores, em cuja tese de doutoramento descontrói a compreensão vigente da função ecosistêmica da biodiversidade e da especie, ancorando-a no organismo (Ver NUNES-NETO, Function in Ecology: an organizational approach in Biol. PHilophy, 2013 (no prelo). A partir da sua reconstrução das funções ecosistêmicas, chamamos atenção para a possibilidade de considerar, do ponto de vista do policymaking, os diferentes tipos de funções, não como concorrentes, mas como complementar, e assim poder considerá-las com funções associadas aos estoques e as funções vinculadas ao fluxo, integrando no programa de pesquisa dos sistemas socioecológicos a Teoria das Funções Ecosistêmicos. Resultado: ponto de pauta para um grupo em processo de articulação que deverá tratar da relação da Economia Ecológica com a Teoria da Funções Ecosistêmicas.

Um ponto de partida de Ostrom é sua condenação as panaceias, em especial " Those researchers and practitioners who propose panaceas for solving complex environmental problems make two false assumptions. First they assume that all problems of a general type, such as air pollution or maintaining species diversity, are similar; and second, all of the people involved have the same preferences, information, and authority to act. Neither is true [...] . Mas, não cai no outro extremo, onde admite-se que "Sustaining natural resource systems is far too important a problem for scholars to espouse "doing nothing." We must make every effort to cope with these really wicked problems involved in avoiding ecological disasters." Sua posição é proativa, ainda que precavida: " But, we also need to recommend caution about overusing simple blueprints and to develop diagnostic theories drawing on the lessons that can be learned from theoretical and empirical research on why some governance systems lead to improved performance of social-ecological systems and others lead to failures (Ostrom 1990). " E apoiada em evidências, tal como as sistematizadas por Brock and Carpenter (2007) illustrate how models of adaptive control processes in the Northern Highlands Lake District of Wisconsin are prone to panacea traps [...] . We will continue doing more harm than good if panaceas are recommended to solve resource problems rather than learning how to match potential solutions to a serious diagnosis of specific problems in the ecological and social context in which they are nested. Similarly, assuming that effective property-rights systems will simply evolve as resource units become more valuable (e.g., Demsetz 1967) is not an adequate understanding of the challenge of matching property rights and governance systems to particular ecological systems (Fitzpatrick 2006) O desafio portanto, segundo ela é Moving beyond panaceas to develop a cumulative capacity to dia

Fisheries collapse can be prevented by expanding the reach of accords among artisanal fishermenand exclusive marine reserves to include a system of environmental services payments and self-monitoring for avoided overfishing, especially in critical reproductive periods. The case of theArraial do Cabo Marine Extractive Reserve in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is explored, identifying theinstitutional features of an appropriate set of contracts in this direction. Extending the concept of environmental service payments (PES) to fisheries is a logical approach in Brazil, where thefederal government already makes regular compensatory payments to fishermen during the "defeso" period of highest reproductive activity. Unfortuna tely, this system is fraught with free-ridership since there is little effective monitoring and in many fishing areas, limited collectiveresource management restraint. PES for the Arraial do Cabo RESEX goes beyond a strictly fishingorientation to include the closely linked marine tourism sector. In studies to gauge the importanceto fishermen, local residents and tourists of the marine reserve and its environmental attributes,tourists were found more likely to express willingness to contribute toward the RESEX‟ protection, at a higher per visit amount than were either fishermen or their neighbors. Payments bytourists would complement funds obtained from compensation and royalties from conflictingactivities such as port operations and petroleum exploration, together with value-added taxrevenues (ICMS-Ecológico) to finance the structuring of the RESEX management capacity toeffectively monitor and control overfishing and external incursions

O ponto de partida do artigo é a constatação que "Privatization is often viewed to provide positive stimulus for the economy that can lead to the better-ment of society", o que se pode complementar, com a constatação de E Ostrom, segundo a qual, em algumas situações o regime privado se coloca como uma panancéia. Naste mesma linha, os autores chamam atenção que que qando " the appropriate governance systems are not functionally in place, the unwanted effects of privatization can have deleterious consequences." "This paper highlights the conse-quences of undesirable privatization and the emergent unwanted privatization tendencies of the coastal commons, particularly in the developing countries such as the Philippines. The lack of coherent policies,standards, and weak enforcement of policies in leasing the coastal commons (e.g. various unregulatedaqua culture) in the Philippines in particular, have resulted to alarming displacement, deprivation and marginalization of fishing and farming communities and have degraded many coastal zone areas. Os autores tratam do usos multiplos do solo, In addition, poorly planned coastal tourism and housing development projects in the foreshore areas,inappropriate reclamation of coastal areas, illegal usurpation of indigenous peoples rights over ancestral domain areas, and conversion of fishing and fish farming zones into ecotourism zones further aggravated this scenario. Equitable access to resources is of paramount importance to afford concerned stakeholders greater participation in terms of developing greater capacity for coastal communities to engage and demand for improved coastal governance e an important facet of public dministration often identifiedas one of the challenges in managing the commons. Co-management with an Ecosystem-Based Management approach as core operational mechanism provides opportunities to enhance policy formulation and implementation, secure community safety nets, and facilitate the crea

Este livro tem uma característica impar, a despeito de tratar de uma questão bem específica, tem a estrutura de um manual, pavimentando a estrada para quem queira entrar no campo. "This book presents alternative concepts, tools, methods, and conservation strategies, many of which were developed with IDRC support. It shows how to use these methods in a practical way and places a strong emphasis on ecosystem management and participatory decision-making. Natural resource managers, particularly of fisheries and aquatic resources, in developing countries, will find this book very useful, as will managers in other sectors because of the increasing spillover of management approaches across resource sectors. This book will also be of use to representatives from all government agencies, development institutions, nongovernmental organizations, international executing agencies, and donor agencies that are involved in fisheries management, particularly for the small-scale sector."

FORMS OF PROPERTY IN RIGHTS-BASED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Management measures may be classed as input and output controls.Input controls regulate fishing effort. Output controls directly controlcatch amounts. Input controls such as licensing may create limited prop-erty rights, although more sophisticated output control mechanismshave been adopted by a number of countries. These include territorialuse rights in fisheries (TURFS), stock use rights in fisheries (SURFS), andcommunity development quotas (CDQs). Increasingly common are quota based systems, such as the individual quota (IQ), the individual fishingquota (IFQ), individual vessel quotas (IVQ), the individual transferableshare quota (ITSQ), and the individual transferable quota (ITQ). Each of these approaches shall be considered in turn. DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS A number of States have implemented, in varying degrees, rights-basedfishing entitlements. These include Australia, Canada, Iceland, NewZealand, and the United States. The domestic implementation and sta-tus of these measures is considered for each country in turn. AN APPRAISAL OF RIGHTS-BASED MEASURES In light of domestic experiences of property rights-based instruments it isappropriate to remark upon the success of quota systems to date. Quotas systems have attracted critical comment in three broad areas: economic success, conservation and management effectiveness, and allocationalconcerns. At this point it is worth emphasising that because legal reason-ing is consequence sensitive, these factors have a role to play in the law-making process. These are considered in turn, before some final remarksare made on how the legal construction of property rights more generally has influenced the development and operation of rights-based fishing measures.