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"The idea that decision-making processes andmanagement in public policy and publicadministration are complex has entered theminds of practitioners and scholars in publicadministration. Insights from theories oncomplexity, however, have hardly been usedin public administration and management. Inother social sciences, like economics forinstance, an evolutionary approach hasreceived far more attention. The questionwhether such a complexity theory approachcould help to increase our understanding ofpublic management phenomena is an intri-guing one. In this volume the reader will finda selection of articles on public managementusing insights from the complexity theory.Before we present the seven articles, whichall deal with notions from the complexitytheory and apply them to phenomena in thepublic sector, we will briefly introduce somebasic ideas concerning this theory. Key words Complexity theory, public administration,complex decision-making, complex systems Vol. 10 Issue 3 2008 287-297Public Management Review ISSN 1471-9037 print/ISSN 1471-9045 online Ó 2008 Taylor & Francishttp://www.tandf.co.uk/journalsDOI: 10.1080/14719030802002451 "

Diante das múltiplas possibilidades que se abrea configuração da estrutura de governança é pertinente considerar-se a contribuiçpão da "governance network theory" , em especial sua orientação teórica e normativa, ressaltando seus conceitos chaves e suposições, além do tipo de resposta que ela oferece

"To halt degradation of benthic resources in Chile, management areas (MAs) were set up under the Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) framework in the late 1990s. Integrated into the global market, MAs have since expanded along the Chilean coast, involving thousands of small-scale artisanal fishers. This paper analyses how economic criteria relates to social and ecological performance of Chilean MAs, by applying TURFs, commons and co-management theory to two cases: MAs Peñuelas and Chigualoco. To collect and analyse data Participatory Rural Appraisal tools, interviews and official statistics and reports were used. Our results show that MAs' economic benefits are connected to fluctuations on the global market. Adapting to changing world market prices then becomes paramount. TURFs' main goal is ecological conservation, but achieving this seems to depend on meeting fishers' livelihoods; failure to do so likely results in failure to meet conservation objectives. A serious weakness of the Chilean TURFs system is that it does not pay enough attention to fishers' livelihoods or to the global market context. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship between good economic benefits and social sustainability. But irrespective of economic performance, fisher organizations have been empowered and gained increased resource control with the TURFs system. At policy level, a differentiated and more flexible system could be more suitable for existing heterogeneous MAs and their particular economic, social and ecological challenges. For improved economic sustainability and resource conservation, a system with multiple-species managing MAs could be promoted as well. Finally, to enhance theory of commons, co-management and TURFs, we argue for greater acknowledgement of TURFs' social benefits in addition to economic assessments. More attention should also be paid to global market conditions of which MAs are dependent and in which they are embedded: macrostructures tha

Henry E. Smith de alguma forma chama atenção para os possiveis excessos de customização dos direitos de propriedade, ao fazer defesa de um desenho genérico dos direitos, ao arguir " [...] that general legal concepts play a crucial role of lowering information costs, and that recognizing this economizing role of property concepts allows us to reconcile various positions on some of the key issues in property theory. These include, in addition to conceptualism itself, the proper role of formalism in property, the relation of functionalism and interpretivism, and the way in which property theory must in practice be holistic". Esta visão de Henry E. Smith expressa a mesma preocupação de Anthony Scott ao ressaltar em Development of Property in the Fishery que as evidências históricas mostram que as políticas governamenais não tem tido sucesso em impor novas instituições não governamentais, como imaginam os economistas que defendem os "new`rights-based regimes", isto orque, segundo ele, novos direitos de propriedade não são facilmente instituídos e, se não for padronizados eleva os custos de transação. Na verdade segundo Henry E. Smith, cujo texto estar disponibilizado abaixo, o que acontece é que as sociedades já dispõe de um conjunto de direitos de propriedade padrão que podem ser deslizados para os regimes pesqueiros. Este entendimento põe os regimes de propriedade vigentes como os principais recursos a ser manejados na configuração dos regimes pesqueiros, o que pressupõe que o policymaking tenha um domínio do direito positivo (vigente) de propriedade d a jurisdição na qual se insere a área em consideração...

Um ponto de partida de Ostrom é sua condenação as panaceias, em especial " Those researchers and practitioners who propose panaceas for solving complex environmental problems make two false assumptions. First they assume that all problems of a general type, such as air pollution or maintaining species diversity, are similar; and second, all of the people involved have the same preferences, information, and authority to act. Neither is true [...] . Mas, não cai no outro extremo, onde admite-se que "Sustaining natural resource systems is far too important a problem for scholars to espouse "doing nothing." We must make every effort to cope with these really wicked problems involved in avoiding ecological disasters." Sua posição é proativa, ainda que precavida: " But, we also need to recommend caution about overusing simple blueprints and to develop diagnostic theories drawing on the lessons that can be learned from theoretical and empirical research on why some governance systems lead to improved performance of social-ecological systems and others lead to failures (Ostrom 1990). " E apoiada em evidências, tal como as sistematizadas por Brock and Carpenter (2007) illustrate how models of adaptive control processes in the Northern Highlands Lake District of Wisconsin are prone to panacea traps [...] . We will continue doing more harm than good if panaceas are recommended to solve resource problems rather than learning how to match potential solutions to a serious diagnosis of specific problems in the ecological and social context in which they are nested. Similarly, assuming that effective property-rights systems will simply evolve as resource units become more valuable (e.g., Demsetz 1967) is not an adequate understanding of the challenge of matching property rights and governance systems to particular ecological systems (Fitzpatrick 2006) O desafio portanto, segundo ela é Moving beyond panaceas to develop a cumulative capacity to dia

O contraponto da "PATH-DEPENTE PROCESS" com as CRITICAL JUNCTURES, abre um novo universo de possibilidades no campo da politica pesqueira, já que a partir desta dicotomia é possível fazer interagir diferentes tradições analíticas, a exemplo da ciência política focada na ação política (policymaking)e a filosofia política focada no ato politico (politymaking). Atente-se que a criação dessa janela de oportunidade deve-se ao fato da inserção de uma temporalidade (ou mesmo vai acontecer quando introduzirmos a uma espacialidade). A AÇÃO POLITICA é considerada como se desdobrando ao longo do tempo, mas sempre tendo como objeto um"path-dependent process" que evolui de forma incremental, enquanto o ATO POLÍTICO é considerado como uma intervenção instituinte de um novo "PATH-DEPENDNET PROCESS e, como tal, constitui uma inflexão na trajetória, o que é nomeado como uma CRITICAL JUNCTURE. Diante deste quadro, se tomamos a realidade da Política Pesqqueira, a qual tem como objeto um processo que se projeta como uma TRAGEDIA DOS COMMONS,julgamos prudene concebermos tal polícita tanto, pela ótica da AÇÃO POLITICA, como pela perspectiva do ATO POLITICO.

"To halt degradation o benthic resources in Chile, managementareas (MAs) were set up under the Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)ramework in the late 1990s. Integrated into the global market, MAs have sinceexpanded along the Chilean coast, involving thousands o small-scale artisanalshers. This paper analyses how economic criteria relates to social and ecologicalperormance o Chilean MAs, by applying TURFs, commons and co-managementtheory to two cases: MAs Peñuelas and Chigualoco. To collect and analyse dataParticipatory Rural Appraisal tools, interviews and ocial statistics and reportswere used. Our results show that MAs' economic benets are connected tofuctuations on the global market. Adapting to changing world market prices thenbecomes paramount. TURFs' main goal is ecological conservation, but achievingthis seems to depend on meeting shers' livelihoods; ailure to do so likely resultsin ailure to meet conservation objectives. A serious weakness o the ChileanTURFs system is that it does not pay enough attention to shers' livelihoods orto the global market context. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship betweengood economic benets and social sustainability. But irrespective o economicperormance, sher organizations have been empowered and gained increasedresource control with the TURFs system. At policy level, a dierentiated andmore fexible system could be more suitable or existing heterogeneous MAsand their particular economic, social and ecological challenges. For improvedeconomic sustainability and resource conservation, a system with multiple-species managing MAs could be promoted as well. Finally, to enhance theory o commons, co-management and TURFs, we argue or greater acknowledgement"

"nstitutions based on the concept"common property" have played socially beneficial roles in natural resources management from economic pre-history up to thepresent. These same institutions promisehelp in solving pressing resourcesproblems in both the devel- oped and the developing countries. It isall the more important that these institutions be the focus of an economic study because they have been misunderstood by modern day economists: We refer to the so-called "theory of common property resources" orwhat is oftentermed the "tragedy of the commons."1"

"Scholars of common property resource theory (CPR) have long asserted that certain kinds of institutional arrangements based on collective action result in successful environmental stewardship, but feedback and the direct link between social and ecological systems remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangements contribute to sustainable mangrove fisheries in coastal Ecuador, focusing on the fishery for the mangrove cockle (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis), a bivalve mollusk harvested from the roots of mangrove trees and of particular social, economic, and cultural importance for the communities that depend on it. Specifically, this study examines the emergence of new civil society institutions within the historical context of extensive mangrove deforestation for the expansion of shrimp farming, policy changes in the late 1990s that recognized "ancestral" rights of local communities to mangrove resources, and how custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, affect the cockle fishery. Findings from interviews with shell collectors and analysis of catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common property regimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources, mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shell sizes, but the benefits are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors feel further marginalized by the loss of gathering grounds, potentially deflecting problems of overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove fisheries are weakly managed by the State. Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, the explicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at different levels, examining the relationship between collective action and the environment through quantitative approaches at the fishery level and qualitative analysis at the level

"Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) have spread in Chile, since the late 1990s, in the form of commons institutions. TURFs are presented by some scholars as a social-ecological success; by others as showing economic and compliance problems. Studies looking at the material conditions in which fishers produce and reproduce their livelihoods, and in which TURFs emerge, are scarcer. Ostrom's theory on the commons claims that certain collective action conditions have to be met to become thriving commons institutions. Our hypothesis is that while institutions are moulded by local material conditions, such as geographical location and social embeddedness, these impose challenges and constraints upon fishers influencing TURFs' long-term viability. How are collective action conditions influenced when the new TURFs commons do not emerge in tabula rasa contexts but in occupied spaces? Do material conditions influence TURFs' sustainability? This paper set out to explore these conditions. Huentelauquén's and Guayacán's TURFs (central-northern Chile) were chosen, as they represent two extremes (rural-urban; on private property-on State/municipal property; mainly diver - mainly fisher) contexts in which TURFs have emerged. We mainly used Participatory Rural Approach (PRA) tools triangulated with other qualitative methods. This study shows that both social embeddedness (private/State lands), and geographical location (rural/urban) matter, resulting in different access to the coast for different TURFs, thus determining some important differences between our cases in at least three relevant areas: entrance, social relations between the fishers' organization (entitled the TURFs) and the landowner (private or municipal/State) and the existence or absence of fishing and general infrastructure. Competition for space among key actors seems to affect the process of acquiring a TURF as well as the conditions conductive to collective action. TURFs' assessments s

Fundamental. The term "common-property resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policy analysis. In this paper we develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.

Em Neither Market nor State - Governance of Common-Pool Resource in the Twenty-First Century, Elinor Ostrom volta a problemática semantica dos recursos de propriedade comum, tendo como base uma distinção entre estoque e fluxo do recurso natural renovavel, ressaltando as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is diff

Ontem na Banca de Jéssica Cruz, no Instituto de Biologia da UFBA inciamos uma interloculação em torno da institucionalização das funções ecosistêmicas embutidas nos Sistemas Socioecológico. O ponto de partida da discussão foi a instrumentalização e problematização da tipologia de funções ecosistêmicas proposta por DE GROOT et al A typology for the clasification, description and valuation of ecosystems functions, goods and services in Ecological Economics, 2002. v.42, pp. 393-408. A problematização foi feita por um dos orientadores, em cuja tese de doutoramento descontrói a compreensão vigente da função ecosistêmica da biodiversidade e da especie, ancorando-a no organismo (Ver NUNES-NETO, Function in Ecology: an organizational approach in Biol. PHilophy, 2013 (no prelo). A partir da sua reconstrução das funções ecosistêmicas, chamamos atenção para a possibilidade de considerar, do ponto de vista do policymaking, os diferentes tipos de funções, não como concorrentes, mas como complementar, e assim poder considerá-las com funções associadas aos estoques e as funções vinculadas ao fluxo, integrando no programa de pesquisa dos sistemas socioecológicos a Teoria das Funções Ecosistêmicos. Resultado: ponto de pauta para um grupo em processo de articulação que deverá tratar da relação da Economia Ecológica com a Teoria da Funções Ecosistêmicas.

Particularmente interessante as caracteristicas dos direiros de propiedade reas. Artigo seminal. To what extent is the recently invented individual catch quota a form of real property right? This article introduces six quantitative characteristics of all personal interests in land and natural resources. It is shown that medieval fishing rights had some of these characteristics, but these rights were not developed in the common law of property. The article then turns to modern regulatory licenses and catch quotas and examines the extent to which they embody property characteristics. In a digression, the obstacles to political acceptance of the individual fishery property concept are surveyed. The paper concludes by suggesting that catch quotas may develop into shares in the fish stock or biomass itself.

Uma premissa importante na estruturação do argumento é que para o autor, as instituições são "unchanging relative, relative to the more rapid fluctuations of economic activities", o que justifica nas evidências históricas mostrarem queas políticas govrnamenais não tem tido sucesso em imort novs intituições não governamentais, como imaginam os economia que defendem os "new`rights-based regimes",enfim novos direitos de propriedade não são facilmente instituidos,. Na verdade segundo o autor, o que acontece é que as sociedades já dispõe de um conjunto de direitos de propriedade padrão que podem ser introduzido s regimes pesqueiros. Este entendimento põe os regimes de propriedade vigentes como os recursos a ser manejados na configuração dos regimes pesqueiros, o que pressupõe que o policymaking tenha um domínio do direito positivo (vigente) de propriedade..

A propriedade cada vez mais é tratada a partir das suas funções, as quais se dividem em dois grandes grupos nos quais se alojam suas funções sociais e regulativas, ambas posicionadas na interface do direito publico com o direito privado. Ao tratamos dos Sistemas Sócio-Ecológicos a exemplo das Reservas Extrativistas Marinhas e os Territórios, a partir da perspectiva da propriedade temos uma oportunidade de explorar suas possibilidades funcionais, tanto no âmbito social como regulativo. Aqui temos um ponto de partida para a exploração das suas possibilidades regulativas. Com relação aos Sistemas Sócio-Ecológico, consulte Marco A. Janssen, Resilience and adaptation in the governance of social-ecological systems

"My aim in this paper is to consider whether the relativity of title is consistent withthe idea of ownership in law", enquanto que nosso objetivo é mostrar que a propriedade no caso brasileiro, a partir do novo Código Civil nos permite relativizar seu titulo e, assim, potencializar suas possibildades regulatórias e sociais, o que ainda não foi devidamente explorado, em parte, devido a ênfase na poliymaking fundada na AÇÃO POLITICA tendo como referência empírica os "path-dependent process", deixando em segundo plano, a politymaking fundado no ATO POLITICO e tendo como referência as CRITICAL JUNCTURES, tal como posto por CAPOCCIA, The Study of Critical Junctures - Theory, Narrative, And Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism

A vertente institucionalista no âmbito da política é, em boa parte, fundamentada na Economia dos Direitos de Propriedade, a qual é tomada na maioria das vezes acítica, dado que se considera uma critica a abordagem convencional que mesmo reconhecendo o direito de propiredade, não o considera como possível de ser objeto da política, ou seja, afasta--o do âmbito analítico considerando-o constante, por meio do suposto do "tudo o mais constante". Aqui, a Economia dos Direitos de Propriedade e problematizada.

Uma boa parte da contribuição da comunidade dos economistas a gestão dos recursos pesqueiros se assenta nos pressupostos do individualismo metodológico, o que implica a desconsideração da pluralidade do valores que se expressam nos complexos processos de tomada de decisão. O autor atento a este detalhe, e, sensível aos preceitos da economia ecológica sugere e argumenta que " [....] the new approach to environmental problems by economists will have to be a political economy of Nature." O "norte" de Spash é claro e instigante, além de ter subjacente o programa da economia ecológica, eis suas palavras: "Within the field of environmental and resource economics discontent with the policy relevance of prescriptions is often evident, but neoclassical theory still seems to maintain a dominant role. That was true until the late 1980s when ecologists and economists started to talk in a more formal fashion. The result has been the formation of ecological economics, which is attempting to take a fresh look at how economic systems interact with Nature. The methodology of this newer approach is still refreshingly open, and part of the thrust of this paper is to suggest the direction that it should take."

Entrevista com Eleonice Sacramento integrante do Movimento dos Pescadores e Pescadoras Artesanais em 02/10/2013 enviada por Liandra, juntamente com uma serie de editais para a exploração aquícola em aguas continentais. A entrevista revela a apreensão das novas diretrizes governamentais, evidenciado os conflitos entre distintos agentes e propostas de institucionalzação do acesso aos recursos pesqueiros em areas ocupadas por populções tradicionias, a exemplo de pesquisadores artesanais.

" 1 Introduction THE QUESTION OF 'philosophical foundations' of environmental thinking in law may strike the lawyer, as much as the legal philosopher, asa strange one. For while a search for the philosophical commitments of envi-ronmental thinking undoubtedly makes sense in the context of ethics, or political theory, environmental law (it might be felt) lacks any such philosophicalunderpinning: in the eyes of many professional lawyers, environmental regula-tion manifests itself almost exclusively through an array of statutory provisions,severally concerned with curbing certain negative consequences arising fromparticular spheres of human action. Although these various measures have thecommon purpose of achieving a reduction in the erosion of our quality of life,there is not (on this view) to be found any deeper rationale or overarchingprinciple beyond this purely instrumental concern with human wellbeing. Legalregulation of the environment is, therefore, largely a set of facts to be learnedabout the way the law deals with environmental issues. Particular statutoryprovisions and judicial decisions will, of course, raise some quite interestingquestions of interpretation or application, but such questions, it is felt, areresolved within the ordinary standards and criteria which influence legal argu-ment, and do not require deeper philosophical explication.Much of the intuitive appeal of this view derives from a related, though some-times implicit, claim about the nature of environmental law. Environmentallaw, it is sometimes said, is not in the strictest sense a distinctive area of the lawat all, but merely a convenient umbrella term for the collection of particularlegal provisions which are relevant to environmental protection. There may bemany reasons why it is useful and informative to group a set of legal provisionsin a certain way, but (we might say) the underlying motivation for so doing willalways be pedagogic rather than reflective of some penetrati