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Aqui a Elinor Ostrom ressalta as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is difficult and costly to design institutions that successfully exclude some potential beneficiaries from access to CPRs, many CPRs are in fact open-access resources where anyone who wishes can gain access and appropriate resource units. Given that

Evidenciada a natureza hibrida (nem mercado, nem estado) dos recursos de propriedade comum, Elinor Ostrom considera as instituições como um capital social que evolui ao longo do tempo: "[....] institutions are a form of social capital resulting from the time and effort invested by their creators in improving their productivity. The institutions, of course, have not remained entirely fixed over their lifetimes. Ali of them are complex and have had to change over time", mas chama atenção para sua relativa estabilidde, já que para ela as " institutions are, however "robust" or in "institutional equilibrium" in the sense defined by Shepsle (1989, 143), who regards "an institution as 'essentially' in equilibrium if changes transpired according to an ex ante plan (and hence part of the original institution) for institutional change." Esta estabilidade associa as rules-in-use (mas não associa a um conjunto de regras particlares) que se origina dos "[....] the appropriators (users) designed their own rules, created organizations to undertake the day-to-day management of their resources, and modified their own rules over time in light of past experience. The specific rules-in-use, however, differ markedly from one case to the next. Given the great variation in rules-in-use, the sustainability of these resources and their institutions cannot be cxplained by the presence or absence of particular rules. That the rules do differ partly explains the sustainability of these systems. By differing, the rules take into account specific attributes of the physical systems, cultural views of the world, and the economic and politicai relationships that exist in the setting. Without different rules, appropriators could not take advantage of the positive features of a local CPR or avoid potential pitfalls that could occur in one setting but not in others.

Um ponto de partida de Ostrom é sua condenação as panaceias, em especial " Those researchers and practitioners who propose panaceas for solving complex environmental problems make two false assumptions. First they assume that all problems of a general type, such as air pollution or maintaining species diversity, are similar; and second, all of the people involved have the same preferences, information, and authority to act. Neither is true [...] . Mas, não cai no outro extremo, onde admite-se que "Sustaining natural resource systems is far too important a problem for scholars to espouse "doing nothing." We must make every effort to cope with these really wicked problems involved in avoiding ecological disasters." Sua posição é proativa, ainda que precavida: " But, we also need to recommend caution about overusing simple blueprints and to develop diagnostic theories drawing on the lessons that can be learned from theoretical and empirical research on why some governance systems lead to improved performance of social-ecological systems and others lead to failures (Ostrom 1990). " E apoiada em evidências, tal como as sistematizadas por Brock and Carpenter (2007) illustrate how models of adaptive control processes in the Northern Highlands Lake District of Wisconsin are prone to panacea traps [...] . We will continue doing more harm than good if panaceas are recommended to solve resource problems rather than learning how to match potential solutions to a serious diagnosis of specific problems in the ecological and social context in which they are nested. Similarly, assuming that effective property-rights systems will simply evolve as resource units become more valuable (e.g., Demsetz 1967) is not an adequate understanding of the challenge of matching property rights and governance systems to particular ecological systems (Fitzpatrick 2006) O desafio portanto, segundo ela é Moving beyond panaceas to develop a cumulative capacity to dia

Fundamental. The term "common-property resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policy analysis. In this paper we develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.

Em Neither Market nor State - Governance of Common-Pool Resource in the Twenty-First Century, Elinor Ostrom volta a problemática semantica dos recursos de propriedade comum, tendo como base uma distinção entre estoque e fluxo do recurso natural renovavel, ressaltando as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is diff

Ontem na Banca de Jéssica Cruz, no Instituto de Biologia da UFBA inciamos uma interloculação em torno da institucionalização das funções ecosistêmicas embutidas nos Sistemas Socioecológico. O ponto de partida da discussão foi a instrumentalização e problematização da tipologia de funções ecosistêmicas proposta por DE GROOT et al A typology for the clasification, description and valuation of ecosystems functions, goods and services in Ecological Economics, 2002. v.42, pp. 393-408. A problematização foi feita por um dos orientadores, em cuja tese de doutoramento descontrói a compreensão vigente da função ecosistêmica da biodiversidade e da especie, ancorando-a no organismo (Ver NUNES-NETO, Function in Ecology: an organizational approach in Biol. PHilophy, 2013 (no prelo). A partir da sua reconstrução das funções ecosistêmicas, chamamos atenção para a possibilidade de considerar, do ponto de vista do policymaking, os diferentes tipos de funções, não como concorrentes, mas como complementar, e assim poder considerá-las com funções associadas aos estoques e as funções vinculadas ao fluxo, integrando no programa de pesquisa dos sistemas socioecológicos a Teoria das Funções Ecosistêmicos. Resultado: ponto de pauta para um grupo em processo de articulação que deverá tratar da relação da Economia Ecológica com a Teoria da Funções Ecosistêmicas.

"During the last decade there has been increased attention to the study o social-ecological systems (SESs). Social-ecological systems link social and ecologicalsystems (Berkes and Folke 1998). The inherently transdisciplinary eld o SES-scholars has ocused on resilience o SESs and ways to govern resilience o SESs.Resilience is dened as the ability o a system to withstand perturbations andremain within the same stability regime (Holling 1973). Governance o SESsocuses on enhancing the ability o the system to remain within the desired stabilityregime, or to create opportunities to move toward a desired stability regime. Forexample, suppression o orest res lead to the accumulation o uel (the trees thatare not burned) creating conditions or later res o such intensity that the soiland seed banks are damaged. This may prevent the orest system rom recoveringrom such a re. A more appropriate policy is to use small controlled burn tomaintain the resilience o the orest system.The study o SESs was initiated by ecologists who became interested inthe social dimensions o ecosystem management (Berkes and Folke 1998). Butincreasingly we see social scientists adopting an SES approach, taking into accountmore explicit ecological dynamics o resource systems than earlier social scienceresearch. The work o Ostrom (1990) originally ocused on the dimensions o thesocial system o a common resource. In recent work the study o the commons isapproached rom an SES perspective where natural resources and social systemshave equal representation and equal detailed analysis (Anderies et al. 2004;Ostrom 2007,2009).In this special issue a series o papers has been collected to urther the rontiero the study o the governance o social-ecological systems."

O call for parte parte da constatação da existência de um viés ideológico que faz parte de " part of an agenda to strengthen individual property rights" o que debita a "a limited understanding of Hardin's "the tragedy of the commons.", já que não consideram que " Hardin later attempted to clarify the meaning of the essay- that tragedy occurred in the unregulated commons." E, com esta orientação inspira-se nas investigações de Elinor Ostrom para mostrar " [...] how commons can be effectively managed, and how alternate ways to manage the commons can lead to different outcomes with respect to inequality." É a partir deste background que convoca uma ampliação e aprofundamento do debate, incentivando por meio desta "call for papers" "a broad heterodox inquiry into the world of the common." Os tópicos sugeridos são instigantes, principalmente para pesquisadores com Hugo Ballesteros que, na sua busca de compreender o "furtivismo", depara-se a todo momento com a questão da legitimidade cultural de uma atividade ilegal: i) How is it to be understood; ii) how do people engaged in common endeavors interact and manage themselves; iii) how do gender, race, and other divisions intertwine with the commons; iv) how do we protect and enlarge what we hold in common? v) Who benefits from the existence of different aspects of the commons, and vi) who might be harmed by them?"

"Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) have spread in Chile, since the late 1990s, in the form of commons institutions. TURFs are presented by some scholars as a social-ecological success; by others as showing economic and compliance problems. Studies looking at the material conditions in which fishers produce and reproduce their livelihoods, and in which TURFs emerge, are scarcer. Ostrom's theory on the commons claims that certain collective action conditions have to be met to become thriving commons institutions. Our hypothesis is that while institutions are moulded by local material conditions, such as geographical location and social embeddedness, these impose challenges and constraints upon fishers influencing TURFs' long-term viability. How are collective action conditions influenced when the new TURFs commons do not emerge in tabula rasa contexts but in occupied spaces? Do material conditions influence TURFs' sustainability? This paper set out to explore these conditions. Huentelauquén's and Guayacán's TURFs (central-northern Chile) were chosen, as they represent two extremes (rural-urban; on private property-on State/municipal property; mainly diver - mainly fisher) contexts in which TURFs have emerged. We mainly used Participatory Rural Approach (PRA) tools triangulated with other qualitative methods. This study shows that both social embeddedness (private/State lands), and geographical location (rural/urban) matter, resulting in different access to the coast for different TURFs, thus determining some important differences between our cases in at least three relevant areas: entrance, social relations between the fishers' organization (entitled the TURFs) and the landowner (private or municipal/State) and the existence or absence of fishing and general infrastructure. Competition for space among key actors seems to affect the process of acquiring a TURF as well as the conditions conductive to collective action. TURFs' assessments s

O ponto de partida do artigo é a constatação que "Privatization is often viewed to provide positive stimulus for the economy that can lead to the better-ment of society", o que se pode complementar, com a constatação de E Ostrom, segundo a qual, em algumas situações o regime privado se coloca como uma panancéia. Naste mesma linha, os autores chamam atenção que que qando " the appropriate governance systems are not functionally in place, the unwanted effects of privatization can have deleterious consequences." "This paper highlights the conse-quences of undesirable privatization and the emergent unwanted privatization tendencies of the coastal commons, particularly in the developing countries such as the Philippines. The lack of coherent policies,standards, and weak enforcement of policies in leasing the coastal commons (e.g. various unregulatedaqua culture) in the Philippines in particular, have resulted to alarming displacement, deprivation and marginalization of fishing and farming communities and have degraded many coastal zone areas. Os autores tratam do usos multiplos do solo, In addition, poorly planned coastal tourism and housing development projects in the foreshore areas,inappropriate reclamation of coastal areas, illegal usurpation of indigenous peoples rights over ancestral domain areas, and conversion of fishing and fish farming zones into ecotourism zones further aggravated this scenario. Equitable access to resources is of paramount importance to afford concerned stakeholders greater participation in terms of developing greater capacity for coastal communities to engage and demand for improved coastal governance e an important facet of public dministration often identifiedas one of the challenges in managing the commons. Co-management with an Ecosystem-Based Management approach as core operational mechanism provides opportunities to enhance policy formulation and implementation, secure community safety nets, and facilitate the crea