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"Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) have spread in Chile, since the late 1990s, in the form of commons institutions. TURFs are presented by some scholars as a social-ecological success; by others as showing economic and compliance problems. Studies looking at the material conditions in which fishers produce and reproduce their livelihoods, and in which TURFs emerge, are scarcer. Ostrom's theory on the commons claims that certain collective action conditions have to be met to become thriving commons institutions. Our hypothesis is that while institutions are moulded by local material conditions, such as geographical location and social embeddedness, these impose challenges and constraints upon fishers influencing TURFs' long-term viability. How are collective action conditions influenced when the new TURFs commons do not emerge in tabula rasa contexts but in occupied spaces? Do material conditions influence TURFs' sustainability? This paper set out to explore these conditions. Huentelauquén's and Guayacán's TURFs (central-northern Chile) were chosen, as they represent two extremes (rural-urban; on private property-on State/municipal property; mainly diver - mainly fisher) contexts in which TURFs have emerged. We mainly used Participatory Rural Approach (PRA) tools triangulated with other qualitative methods. This study shows that both social embeddedness (private/State lands), and geographical location (rural/urban) matter, resulting in different access to the coast for different TURFs, thus determining some important differences between our cases in at least three relevant areas: entrance, social relations between the fishers' organization (entitled the TURFs) and the landowner (private or municipal/State) and the existence or absence of fishing and general infrastructure. Competition for space among key actors seems to affect the process of acquiring a TURF as well as the conditions conductive to collective action. TURFs' assessments s

"To halt degradation of benthic resources in Chile, management areas (MAs) were set up under the Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) framework in the late 1990s. Integrated into the global market, MAs have since expanded along the Chilean coast, involving thousands of small-scale artisanal fishers. This paper analyses how economic criteria relates to social and ecological performance of Chilean MAs, by applying TURFs, commons and co-management theory to two cases: MAs Peñuelas and Chigualoco. To collect and analyse data Participatory Rural Appraisal tools, interviews and official statistics and reports were used. Our results show that MAs' economic benefits are connected to fluctuations on the global market. Adapting to changing world market prices then becomes paramount. TURFs' main goal is ecological conservation, but achieving this seems to depend on meeting fishers' livelihoods; failure to do so likely results in failure to meet conservation objectives. A serious weakness of the Chilean TURFs system is that it does not pay enough attention to fishers' livelihoods or to the global market context. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship between good economic benefits and social sustainability. But irrespective of economic performance, fisher organizations have been empowered and gained increased resource control with the TURFs system. At policy level, a differentiated and more flexible system could be more suitable for existing heterogeneous MAs and their particular economic, social and ecological challenges. For improved economic sustainability and resource conservation, a system with multiple-species managing MAs could be promoted as well. Finally, to enhance theory of commons, co-management and TURFs, we argue for greater acknowledgement of TURFs' social benefits in addition to economic assessments. More attention should also be paid to global market conditions of which MAs are dependent and in which they are embedded: macrostructures tha

"To halt degradation o benthic resources in Chile, managementareas (MAs) were set up under the Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)ramework in the late 1990s. Integrated into the global market, MAs have sinceexpanded along the Chilean coast, involving thousands o small-scale artisanalshers. This paper analyses how economic criteria relates to social and ecologicalperormance o Chilean MAs, by applying TURFs, commons and co-managementtheory to two cases: MAs Peñuelas and Chigualoco. To collect and analyse dataParticipatory Rural Appraisal tools, interviews and ocial statistics and reportswere used. Our results show that MAs' economic benets are connected tofuctuations on the global market. Adapting to changing world market prices thenbecomes paramount. TURFs' main goal is ecological conservation, but achievingthis seems to depend on meeting shers' livelihoods; ailure to do so likely resultsin ailure to meet conservation objectives. A serious weakness o the ChileanTURFs system is that it does not pay enough attention to shers' livelihoods orto the global market context. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship betweengood economic benets and social sustainability. But irrespective o economicperormance, sher organizations have been empowered and gained increasedresource control with the TURFs system. At policy level, a dierentiated andmore fexible system could be more suitable or existing heterogeneous MAsand their particular economic, social and ecological challenges. For improvedeconomic sustainability and resource conservation, a system with multiple-species managing MAs could be promoted as well. Finally, to enhance theory o commons, co-management and TURFs, we argue or greater acknowledgement"

"While most of the attention in the scientific and policy literature onrights-based institutions has been devoted to Individual Transferable Quotas(ITQs), there are alternatives that involve different configurations of use rights.One such alternative is a space-based option commonly referred to as Territo-rial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs). TURFs have been utilized in island fisheriesoff Southeast Asia for decades, and they have been well studied, particularly byanthropologists and sociologists. This paper discusses case studies of TURF or-ganizations in Japan and Chile from an economics perspective. We discuss thehistorical origins of each system, outline the legal and institutional structures of the systems, and then discuss how each system manages nearshore coastal re-sources. We discuss similarities and differences across the many specific collectivemanagement structures adopted by Japanese and Chilean TURF organizations.We then discuss how outcomes differ from what might emerge under ITQs"

Entre os TURFs tratados na Oficina TURFs & TERRITÓRIOS PESQUEIROS o Prof. Gonzalo Rodiriguez se deterá nos TURFs associados a aquiculutura, cuja atividade gera externalidades negativas intrasetoriasee intrersetoriais. No artigo de Becky Mansfield em anexo o foco é nas extenalidades intersetoriais e trata das implicações para a saude do consumidores dos produtos resultante do deslocamento da produção do ambiente natural para o ambiente artificial da aquicultura.

O Alberto Calderon apresenta um Estudo de Caso da única experiência Argentina como o TURF. A referência é a pesca artesanalo no El Riacho na Patagônia, e, ressalta a origem do problema e as dificuldade no âmbito da governança.

Apresentação do Prof. Gonzalo Rodriguez a ser feita na Oficina TURFs e os Territórios Pesqueiros, realizada como parte co x Encontro da Sociedade Brasileira de Economia Ecológica.

Alberto Calderon apresenta os TURFs como um instrumento para o manejo dos recursos pesqueiros. O texto traz um detalhamento dos argumentos a ser utilizados na sua apresentação na Oficna TURFs e TERRITÓRIOS PESQUEIROS.

Aqui temos mais um desses "betas" que se multiplicam no mundo virtual. ´No caso, é um agregador que foi mobilizado para potencializar a difusão das informações sobre os TURFs $ TERRITÓRIOS PESQUEIROS. A gestão da distribuição continua sobre o comando do Diigo.

Fundamental. The term "common-property resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policy analysis. In this paper we develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.

Em Neither Market nor State - Governance of Common-Pool Resource in the Twenty-First Century, Elinor Ostrom volta a problemática semantica dos recursos de propriedade comum, tendo como base uma distinção entre estoque e fluxo do recurso natural renovavel, ressaltando as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is diff

Ontem na Banca de Jéssica Cruz, no Instituto de Biologia da UFBA inciamos uma interloculação em torno da institucionalização das funções ecosistêmicas embutidas nos Sistemas Socioecológico. O ponto de partida da discussão foi a instrumentalização e problematização da tipologia de funções ecosistêmicas proposta por DE GROOT et al A typology for the clasification, description and valuation of ecosystems functions, goods and services in Ecological Economics, 2002. v.42, pp. 393-408. A problematização foi feita por um dos orientadores, em cuja tese de doutoramento descontrói a compreensão vigente da função ecosistêmica da biodiversidade e da especie, ancorando-a no organismo (Ver NUNES-NETO, Function in Ecology: an organizational approach in Biol. PHilophy, 2013 (no prelo). A partir da sua reconstrução das funções ecosistêmicas, chamamos atenção para a possibilidade de considerar, do ponto de vista do policymaking, os diferentes tipos de funções, não como concorrentes, mas como complementar, e assim poder considerá-las com funções associadas aos estoques e as funções vinculadas ao fluxo, integrando no programa de pesquisa dos sistemas socioecológicos a Teoria das Funções Ecosistêmicos. Resultado: ponto de pauta para um grupo em processo de articulação que deverá tratar da relação da Economia Ecológica com a Teoria da Funções Ecosistêmicas.

Aqui a Elinor Ostrom ressalta as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is difficult and costly to design institutions that successfully exclude some potential beneficiaries from access to CPRs, many CPRs are in fact open-access resources where anyone who wishes can gain access and appropriate resource units. Given that

Evidenciada a natureza hibrida (nem mercado, nem estado) dos recursos de propriedade comum, Elinor Ostrom considera as instituições como um capital social que evolui ao longo do tempo: "[....] institutions are a form of social capital resulting from the time and effort invested by their creators in improving their productivity. The institutions, of course, have not remained entirely fixed over their lifetimes. Ali of them are complex and have had to change over time", mas chama atenção para sua relativa estabilidde, já que para ela as " institutions are, however "robust" or in "institutional equilibrium" in the sense defined by Shepsle (1989, 143), who regards "an institution as 'essentially' in equilibrium if changes transpired according to an ex ante plan (and hence part of the original institution) for institutional change." Esta estabilidade associa as rules-in-use (mas não associa a um conjunto de regras particlares) que se origina dos "[....] the appropriators (users) designed their own rules, created organizations to undertake the day-to-day management of their resources, and modified their own rules over time in light of past experience. The specific rules-in-use, however, differ markedly from one case to the next. Given the great variation in rules-in-use, the sustainability of these resources and their institutions cannot be cxplained by the presence or absence of particular rules. That the rules do differ partly explains the sustainability of these systems. By differing, the rules take into account specific attributes of the physical systems, cultural views of the world, and the economic and politicai relationships that exist in the setting. Without different rules, appropriators could not take advantage of the positive features of a local CPR or avoid potential pitfalls that could occur in one setting but not in others.

A apresentação de Alberto Calderon na Oficina TURFs e TERRITRÓRIOS DE PESCA

Os slides da apresentação do Prof. Alberto Calderon na Oficina TURFs & Territórios Pesqueiros realizada no X Econtro Nacional da Sociedade Brasileira de Economia Ecológica

A partir do problema da exploraçao predatoria dos recursos pesqueiros (Commons ) , Hilborn et al (2005) chamam a atençao sobre a importancia das instituçoes ( formais e informais) e dos incentivos gerados a partir das estruturas institucionais para solucionar problemas em pesca. Artigo fundamental nas discuçoes do grupo de pesca.

Particularmente interessante as caracteristicas dos direiros de propiedade reas. Artigo seminal. To what extent is the recently invented individual catch quota a form of real property right? This article introduces six quantitative characteristics of all personal interests in land and natural resources. It is shown that medieval fishing rights had some of these characteristics, but these rights were not developed in the common law of property. The article then turns to modern regulatory licenses and catch quotas and examines the extent to which they embody property characteristics. In a digression, the obstacles to political acceptance of the individual fishery property concept are surveyed. The paper concludes by suggesting that catch quotas may develop into shares in the fish stock or biomass itself.

Uma premissa importante na estruturação do argumento é que para o autor, as instituições são "unchanging relative, relative to the more rapid fluctuations of economic activities", o que justifica nas evidências históricas mostrarem queas políticas govrnamenais não tem tido sucesso em imort novs intituições não governamentais, como imaginam os economia que defendem os "new`rights-based regimes",enfim novos direitos de propriedade não são facilmente instituidos,. Na verdade segundo o autor, o que acontece é que as sociedades já dispõe de um conjunto de direitos de propriedade padrão que podem ser introduzido s regimes pesqueiros. Este entendimento põe os regimes de propriedade vigentes como os recursos a ser manejados na configuração dos regimes pesqueiros, o que pressupõe que o policymaking tenha um domínio do direito positivo (vigente) de propriedade..

"Scholars of common property resource theory (CPR) have long asserted that certain kinds of institutional arrangements based on collective action result in successful environmental stewardship, but feedback and the direct link between social and ecological systems remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangements contribute to sustainable mangrove fisheries in coastal Ecuador, focusing on the fishery for the mangrove cockle (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis), a bivalve mollusk harvested from the roots of mangrove trees and of particular social, economic, and cultural importance for the communities that depend on it. Specifically, this study examines the emergence of new civil society institutions within the historical context of extensive mangrove deforestation for the expansion of shrimp farming, policy changes in the late 1990s that recognized "ancestral" rights of local communities to mangrove resources, and how custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, affect the cockle fishery. Findings from interviews with shell collectors and analysis of catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common property regimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources, mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shell sizes, but the benefits are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors feel further marginalized by the loss of gathering grounds, potentially deflecting problems of overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove fisheries are weakly managed by the State. Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, the explicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at different levels, examining the relationship between collective action and the environment through quantitative approaches at the fishery level and qualitative analysis at the level

"TERRA E ÁGUA:Territórios dos pescadores artesanais de São Francisco do Paraguaçu-Bahia" rabalho do Grupo GEOGRAFAR da UFBA. O objetivo do trabalho é " a análise da produção do espaço e da territorialização dos pescadores artesanais na terra e na água, focado na localidade de São Francisco do Paraguaçu, situada no município de Cachoeira, Recôncavo Baiano. Identifica "uma especificidade territorial que desencadeia um processo de formação de territórios articulados (terra e água) que é muito complexo, envolvendo uma gama muito grande de agentes, interesses e conflitos. Este recorte nos fornecerá as condições de possibilidades de reflexão dos direitos baseados no local, onde se aninha os TURFs, já que opera com um conceito que reflete uma realidade bastante complexa que transborda o universo marítimo no sentido estrito, mas em vez de nos afastar da problemática, nos apresenta novos ângulos, já que identifica processo sociais que são determinantes da relação dos pescadores artesanais com os recursos pesqueiros.

Rögnvaldur Hannesson introduz a evolução dos direitos de propriedade tendo como telos o Bem estar Econômico. Em seguida introduz o Direito Internacional dos Mares, e, neste contexto trata dos direitos de propriedades sobre os recursos pesqueiros,destacando os direitos de uso individual tanto do ponto de vista teórico como aplicado (New Zealand, Chile, Norway, and Canada), detendo-se nos ITQs na Islandia(Iceland) pra tratar da controversia em torno da reforma do seu regime e no desenvolvimento dos ITQs nos USA.

O ponto de partida do artigo é a constatação que "Privatization is often viewed to provide positive stimulus for the economy that can lead to the better-ment of society", o que se pode complementar, com a constatação de E Ostrom, segundo a qual, em algumas situações o regime privado se coloca como uma panancéia. Naste mesma linha, os autores chamam atenção que que qando " the appropriate governance systems are not functionally in place, the unwanted effects of privatization can have deleterious consequences." "This paper highlights the conse-quences of undesirable privatization and the emergent unwanted privatization tendencies of the coastal commons, particularly in the developing countries such as the Philippines. The lack of coherent policies,standards, and weak enforcement of policies in leasing the coastal commons (e.g. various unregulatedaqua culture) in the Philippines in particular, have resulted to alarming displacement, deprivation and marginalization of fishing and farming communities and have degraded many coastal zone areas. Os autores tratam do usos multiplos do solo, In addition, poorly planned coastal tourism and housing development projects in the foreshore areas,inappropriate reclamation of coastal areas, illegal usurpation of indigenous peoples rights over ancestral domain areas, and conversion of fishing and fish farming zones into ecotourism zones further aggravated this scenario. Equitable access to resources is of paramount importance to afford concerned stakeholders greater participation in terms of developing greater capacity for coastal communities to engage and demand for improved coastal governance e an important facet of public dministration often identifiedas one of the challenges in managing the commons. Co-management with an Ecosystem-Based Management approach as core operational mechanism provides opportunities to enhance policy formulation and implementation, secure community safety nets, and facilitate the crea