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When the Orange Revolution erupted in Ukraine in late 2004, Burton went to Technorati, a search engine that scours the “blogosphere,” to find the most authoritative blog postings on the subject. Within minutes, he had found sites with insightful commentary from American expatriates who were talking to locals in Kiev and on-the-fly debates among political analysts over what it meant. Because he and his fellow spies were stuck with outdated technology, they had no comparable way to cooperate — to find colleagues with common interests and brainstorm online.

Indeed, throughout the intelligence community, spies are beginning to wonder why their technology has fallen so far behind — and talk among themselves about how to catch up. Some of the country’s most senior intelligence thinkers have joined the discussion, and surprisingly, many of them believe the answer may lie in the interactive tools the world’s teenagers are using to pass around YouTube videos and bicker online about their favorite bands.

perhaps, they argue, it’ s time to try something radically different. Could blogs and wikis prevent the next 9/11?

during the cold war, threats formed slowly. The Soviet Union was a ponderous bureaucracy that moved at the glacial speed of the five-year plan. Analysts studied the emergence of new tanks and missiles, pieces of hardware that took years to develop.

Analysts also did not worry about anything other than their corners of the world.

The F.B.I. terminals were connected to one another — but not to the computers at any other agency, and vice versa.

If an analyst requested information from another agency, that request traveled through elaborate formal channels. The walls between the agencies were partly a matter of law.

Islamist terrorists, as 9/11 proved, behaved utterly unlike the Soviet Union. They were rapid-moving, transnational and cellular.

To disrupt these new plots, some intelligence officials concluded, American agents and analysts would need to cooperate just as fluidly — trading tips quickly among agents and agencies. Following the usual chain of command could be fatal. “To fight a network like Al Qaeda, you need to behave like a network,” John Arquilla,

What most impressed Andrus was Wikipedia’s self-governing nature. No central editor decreed what subjects would be covered. Individuals simply wrote pages on subjects that interested them — and then like-minded readers would add new facts or fix errors.

Spies, Andrus theorized, could take advantage of these rapid, self-organizing effects. If analysts and agents were encouraged to post personal blogs and wikis on Intelink — linking to their favorite analyst reports or the news bulletins they considered important — then mob intelligence would take over.

Pieces of intel would receive attention merely because other analysts found them interesting. This grass-roots process, Andrus argued, suited the modern intelligence challenge of sifting through thousands of disparate clues: if a fact or observation struck a chord with enough analysts, it would snowball into popularity, no matter what their supervisors thought.

This control over the flow of information, as the 9/11 Commission noted in its final report, was a crucial reason American intelligence agencies failed to prevent those attacks. All the clues were there — Al Qaeda associates studying aviation in Arizona, the flight student Zacarias Moussaoui arrested in Minnesota, surveillance of a Qaeda plotting session in Malaysia — but none of the agents knew about the existence of the other evidence. The report concluded that the agencies failed to “connect the dots.”

He pointed out that the best Internet search engines, including Google, all use “link analysis” to measure the authority of documents.

Each agency had databases to amass intelligence, but because of the air gap, other agencies could not easily search them. The divisions were partly because of turf battles and partly because of legal restrictions — but they were also technological.

This, Burton pointed out, is precisely the problem with Intelink. It has no links, no social information to help sort out which intel is significant and which isn’t. When an analyst’s report is posted online, it does not include links to other reports, even ones it cites.

“Analytical puzzles, like terror plots, are often too piecemeal for individual brains to put together. Having our documents aware of each other would be like hooking several brains up in a line, so that each one knows what the others know, making the puzzle much easier to solve.”

With Andrus and Burton’s vision in mind, you can almost imagine how 9/11 might have played out differently. In Phoenix, the F.B.I. agent Kenneth Williams might have blogged his memo noting that Al Qaeda members were engaging in flight-training activity. The agents observing a Qaeda planning conference in Malaysia could have mentioned the attendance of a Saudi named Khalid al-Midhar; another agent might have added that he held a multi-entry American visa. The F.B.I. agents who snared Zacarias Moussaoui in Minnesota might have written about their arrest of a flight student with violent tendencies. Other agents and analysts who were regular readers of these blogs would have found the material interesting, linked to it, pointed out connections or perhaps entered snippets of it into a wiki page discussing this new trend of young men from the Middle East enrolling in pilot training.

“The 16 intelligence organizations of the U.S. are without peer. They are the best in the world. The trick is, are they collectively the best?”

in a system like this, as Andrus’s theory goes, the dots are inexorably drawn together. “Once the intelligence community has a robust and mature wiki and blog knowledge-sharing Web space,”

In the fall of 2005, they joined forces with C.I.A. wiki experts to build a prototype of something called Intellipedia, a wiki that any intelligence employee with classified clearance could read and contribute to.

From now on, Meyerrose said, each agency would have to build new systems using cheaper, off-the-shelf software so they all would be compatible. But bureaucratic obstacles were just a part of the problem Meyerrose faced. He was also up against something deeper in the DNA of the intelligence services. “We’ve had this ‘need to know’ culture for years,” Meyerrose said. “Well, we need to move to a ‘need to share’ philosophy.”

By the late summer, Fingar decided the Intellipedia experiment was sufficiently successful that he would embark on an even more high-profile project: using Intellipedia to produce a “national intelligence estimate” for Nigeria. An N.I.E. is an authoritative snapshot of what the intelligence community thinks about a particular state — and a guide for foreign and military policy.

But it will also, Fingar hopes, attract contributions from other intelligence employees who have expertise Fingar isn’t yet aware of — an analyst who served in the Peace Corps in Nigeria, or a staff member who has recently traveled there.

In the traditional method of producing an intelligence estimate, Fingar said, he would call every agency and ask to borrow their Africa expert for a week or two of meetings. “And they’d say: ‘Well, I only got one guy who can spell Nigeria, and he’s traveling. So you lose.’ ” In contrast, a wiki will “change the rules of who can play,” Fingar said, since far-flung analysts and agents around the world could contribute, day or night.

Intelink allows any agency to publish a Web page, or put a document or a database online, secure in the knowledge that while other agents and analysts can access it, the outside world cannot.

Rasmussen notes that though there is often strong disagreement and debate on Intellipedia, it has not yet succumbed to the sort of vandalism that often plagues Wikipedia pages, including the posting of outright lies. This is partly because, unlike with Wikipedia, Intellipedia contributors are not anonymous. Whatever an analyst writes on Intellipedia can be traced to him. “If you demonstrate you’ve got something to contribute, hey, the expectation is you’re a valued member,” Fingar said. “You demonstrate you’re an idiot, that becomes known, too.”

So why hasn’t Intelink given young analysts instant access to all secrets from every agency? Because each agency’s databases, and the messages flowing through their internal pipelines, are not automatically put onto Intelink. Agency supervisors must actively decide what data they will publish on the network — and their levels of openness vary.

It would focus on spotting and predicting possible avian-flu outbreaks and function as part of a larger portal on the subject to collect information from hundreds of sources around the world, inside and outside of the intelligence agencies.

Operational information — like details of a current covert action — is rarely posted, usually because supervisors fear that a leak could jeopardize a delicate mission.

“See, these people would never have been talking before, and we certainly wouldn’t have heard about it if they did,” the assistant said. By September, the site had become so loaded with information and discussion that Rear Adm. Arthur Lawrence, a top official in the health department, told Meyerrose it had become the government’s most crucial resource on avian flu.

Intelink has grown to the point that it contains thousands of agency sites and several hundred databases. Analysts at the various agencies generate 50,000 official reports a year, many of which are posted to the network. The volume of material online is such that analysts now face a new problem: data overload. Even if they suspect good information might exist on Intelink, it is often impossible to find it. The system is poorly indexed, and its internal search tools perform like the pre-Google search engines of the ’90s.“

But Meyerrose insists that the future of spying will be revolutionized as much by these small-bore projects as by billion-dollar high-tech systems. Indeed, he says that overly ambitious projects often result in expensive disasters, the way the F.B.I.’s $170 million attempt to overhaul its case-handling software died in 2005 after the software became so complex that the F.B.I. despaired of ever fixing the bugs and shelved it. In contrast, the blog software took only a day or two to get running. “We need to think big, start small and scale fast,” Meyerrose said.

But the agency’s officials trained only small groups of perhaps five analysts a month. After they finished their training, those analysts would go online, excited, and start their blogs. But they’d quickly realize no one else was reading their posts aside from the four other people they’d gone through the training with. They’d get bored and quit blogging, just as the next trainees came online.

This presents a secrecy paradox. The Unclassified Intellipedia will have the biggest readership and thus will grow the most rapidly; but if it’s devoid of truly sensitive secrets, will it be of any use?

Many in the intelligence agencies suspect not. Indeed, they often refuse to input sensitive intel into their own private, secure databases; they do not trust even their own colleagues, inside their own agencies, to keep their secrets safe.

These are legitimate concerns. After the F.B.I. agent Robert Hanssen was arrested for selling the identities of undercover agents to Russia, it turned out he had found their names by trawling through records on the case-support system.

“When you have a source, you go to extraordinary lengths to protect their identities,” I. C. Smith, a 25-year veteran of the bureau, told me. “So agents never trusted the system, and rightly so.”

What the agencies needed was a way to take the thousands of disparate, unorganized pieces of intel they generate every day and somehow divine which are the most important.

A spy blogosphere, even carefully secured against intruders, might be fundamentally incompatible with the goal of keeping secrets. And the converse is also true: blogs and wikis are unlikely to thrive in an environment where people are guarded about sharing information. Social software doesn’t work if people aren’t social.

the C.I.A. set up a competition, later taken over by the D.N.I., called the Galileo Awards: any employee at any intelligence agency could submit an essay describing a new idea to improve information sharing, and the best ones would win a prize.

The first essay selected was by Calvin Andrus, chief technology officer of the Center for Mission Innovation at the C.I.A. In his essay, “The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community,”

The chat room was unencrypted and unsecured, so anyone could drop in and read the postings or mouth off. That way, Meyerrose figured, he’d be more likely to get drop-ins by engineers from small, scrappy start-up software firms who might have brilliant ideas but no other way to get an audience with intelligence chiefs. The chat room provoked howls of outrage. “People were like, ‘Hold it, can’t the Chinese and North Koreans listen in?’ ” Meyerrose told me. “And, sure, they could. But we weren’t going to be discussing state secrets. And the benefits of openness outweigh the risks.”

Indeed, Meyerrose’s office is building three completely separate versions of Intellipedia for each of the three levels of secrecy: Top Secret, Secret and Unclassified. Each will be placed on a data network configured so that only people with the correct level of clearance can see them — and these networks are tightly controlled, so sensitive information typed into the Top Secret Intellipedia cannot accidentally leak into the Unclassified one.

For the intelligence agencies to benefit from “social software,” he said, they need to persuade thousands of employees to begin blogging and creating wikis all at once. And that requires a cultural sea change: persuading analysts, who for years have survived by holding their cards tightly to their chests, to begin openly showing their hands online.

Fingar says that more value can be generated by analysts sharing bits of “open source” information — the nonclassified material in the broad world, like foreign newspapers, newsletters and blogs. It used to be that on-the-ground spies were the only ones who knew what was going on in a foreign country. But now the average citizen sitting in her living room can peer into the debates, news and lives of people in Iran. “If you want to know what the terrorists’ long-term plans are, the best thing is to read their propaganda — the stuff out there on the Internet,”

Beat cops in Indiana might be as likely to uncover evidence of a terror plot as undercover C.I.A. agents in Pakistan. Fiery sermons printed on pamphlets in the U.K. might be the most valuable tool in figuring out who’s raising money for a possible future London bombing. The most valuable spy system is one that can quickly assemble disparate pieces that are already lying around — information gathered by doctors, aid workers, police officers or security guards at corporations.

The premise of spy-blogging is that a million connected amateurs will always be smarter than a few experts collected in an elite star chamber; that Wikipedia will always move more quickly than the Encyclopaedia Britannica; that the country’s thousand-odd political bloggers will always spot news trends more quickly than slow-moving journalists in the mainstream media.

In three meetings a day, the officials assess all the intel that has risen to their attention — and they jointly decide what the nation’s most serious threats are.

The grass roots, they’ve found, are good at collecting threats but not necessarily at analyzing them. If a lot of low-level analysts are pointing to the same inaccurate posting, that doesn’t make it any less wrong.

Without the knowledge that comes from long experience, he added, a fledgling analyst or spy cannot know what is important or not. The counterterrorism center, he said, should decide which threats warrant attention.

Many of the officials at the very top, like Fingar, Meyerrose and their colleagues at the office of the director of national intelligence, are intrigued by the potential of a freewheeling, smart-mobbing intelligence community. The newest, youngest analysts are in favor of it, too. The resistance comes from the “iron majors” — career officers who occupy the enormous middle bureaucracy of the spy agencies. They might find the idea of an empowered grass roots to be foolhardy; they might also worry that it threatens their turf.

The normal case for social software is failure,” Shirky said. And because Intellipedia is now a high-profile experiment with many skeptics, its failure could permanently doom these sorts of collaborative spy endeavors.

It might be difficult to measure contributions to a wiki; if a brilliant piece of analysis emerges from the mob, who gets credit for it?

“A C.I.A. officer’s career is advanced by producing reports,”

Though D.N.I. officials say they have direct procurement authority over technology for all the agencies, there’s no evidence yet that Meyerrose will be able to make a serious impact on the eight spy agencies in the Department of Defense, which has its own annual $38 billion intelligence budget — the lion’s share of all the money the government spends on spying.

if the spies do not join the rest of the world, they risk growing to resemble the rigid, unchanging bureaucracy that they once confronted during the cold war.

Ensure that you have an effective resource and content plan in place to manage your community. Your new social software can enable an existing community or form new ones, but in order to be successful, communities need ongoing cultivation. Make sure that you have the resources and a plan in place to cultivate your community.

Initiate conversations with your legal, HR and IT teams early on, in order to understand the limitations and risks that may be associated with your initiative. As with any new business initiative, you should make sure that you understand the risks involved with implementing social software.

Another problem is that managers may not worry that their employees would not be comfortable contributing information to a social-networking tool. Rasmussen said he talked with one executive who said employees may not want to contribute personal items to their home page.

" 'Are you kidding?' " Rasmussen responded. "This is work. We force people to do stuff [they don't want to do] all the time — we make people come in sober and wear clothes. In certain cases top-down may not work, but in certain cases it does."

Contributors need to learn to accept "an agency-neutral non-ownership" stance to their articles, he said.

"If you bring too many locks into an overly cautious culture, that's all you get: locks," Rasmussen said. He also mentioned that mashups remain to be too difficult for non-programmers to create, and social networks continue to be held, presumably unfairly, by higher standards than other technologies.

the transition to social business is about involving and engaging people far more than it is about picking a technology or building the infrastructure.

There is no simpler or more effective way to build the connections and your social business fabric than creating conversation.

But sitting back and waiting for the world to involve your business in what they do is just no longer an option. Too often, they will just go off to the communities that have already engaged them and that will be that. "Experience share" is your new measure of success, meaning the amount of time that the world interacts with you socially.

As I said then, "communities exist to serve the needs of their members" and themselves second if they intend to have a successful long-term relationship, as in most human relationships.

Social business doesn't mean we throw open the doors to everything automatically as a public process either. But we are usually so far in the other direction that a step towards this is just the right medicine right now.

Social analytics, however, are already here and this story is about individuals anyway. If workers aren't measured by how effective they are at creating value on the network, they will just focus on what they are measured on to get their recognition, raises, and promotions. This is a complex subject that will often have very different ground rules for different organizations.

Do not use social channels for traditional push communication. Classic examples: Don't use online communities for distributing press releases, product literature, PR, or spokesperson canned messages.

Censorship kills participation. Nothing will stop a social business in its tracks faster than inappropriate censorship.

But nothing will remove you from the world of social businesses faster or more effectively. Honest, open conversation is always the better choice and is truly valuable in its own right. Respond to criticism constructively and quickly.

If you are working closely with customers, partners, employees using social tools (as well as people are potentially want to be in one of those three groups) the more you do it, the more it will seem as if there is one cohesive community.

Where one gets a paycheck and what organization's name is on a business card is less important than the fact that everyone is getting more value than if they were doing things in a non-social way.

Everyone involved in a social relationship must get something out of it or there's no reason for it.

Being social for it's own sake may generate downstream value accidentally but social businesses will often have a long list of intentional reasons they are being social.

There are almost certainly a lot more rules for social businesses, but we're still learning them.

* New metrics. Because we deal with different stuff, we need to invent metrics that are relevant to what we are trying to follow and drive. For social software, one can start with the usual web and online community metrics. Some new initiatives, such as Me-trics, open doors to more in-depth analytics that are worth considering (with a barrage of ethical considerations however).

In fact, calculating the ROI on social software is complicated to the point that economically it is unrealistic to do so. Instead of an estimation a posteriori a pilot phase, ROI as it is commonly referenced in the “Enterprise 2.0″ scene is pure guess and absolute non-sense in most cases.

Why Balanced Score Cards? For four reasons: 1. Kaplan & Norton have escaped the collusion of measurement and quantity. Measurement is not necessarily quantitative. That is a common source of confusion and of inefficiencies in numerous parts of human activity (to name a few: reporting (exhaustiveness), research (methodology), education (elite creation via selection on maths)). Measurement can be qualitative (see  Georgescu Roegen work if you’re curious). It is no surprise if numerous initiatives in intellectual capital used Balanced Score Cards 2. Balanced Score Cards are notably visual, which is not so with quantitative ratios.  That visual characteristic invites greater meaning and relevance. 3. Balanced Score Cards are heterogeneous and are therefore a more natural receptacle for a) qualitative and quantitative analytics and b) can encompass a variety of topics. In this regard, one can build official reporting encompassing both physical and knowledge activities. 4. Balanced Score Cards are aggregative so that one can build reports from various levels in the organisations. Coupled with its heterogeneous nature (previous point), one can build reports for HR, Marketing, Finance, … under the same format and surface analytics at one or many levels. The result is that some knowledge related metrics can climb the hierarchy up to the summit.

Workforce mobility and changing communication patterns are two more trends that are driving change at the infrastructure layer, and so unified communication and collaboration requirements form an important part of Enterprise 2.0 strategy.

Enterprise Web 2.0 might be about putting the user (i.e. employee, customer, or stakeholder) first, but in order to do so it also requires supporting technology. And so at the IT infrastructure level, Enterprise 2.0 means Internet Protocol (IP) everywhere -- voice, video, and data. Enterprise 2.0 also means, 'open' standards rather than proprietary or 'closed' systems. Furthermore, Enterprise 2.0 technology means user-driven technology and not IT-driven technology.

Having accepted the fact that 'processes' means 'people', then we have to look for ways in which these people (i.e. processes) can self-organise and reference one another. Then, where possible, we need to somehow incapsulate the processes into a set of business services. One day (we might call it Web 3.0), Artificial Intelligence (AI) will enable organisations to do with computers that which they do via human beings today, but until that day arrives, organisations must do more to aid interdepartment and inter-company collaboration. Workflow has not yet figured largely in the consumer-oriented world of Web 2.0, but Butler Group sees this as pivotal when considering Enterprise Web 2.0.

Today applications that embody processes are built by IT professionals, but tomorrow they will be built by a new breed of power user, using mashup builders, software agents, and other Web 2.0 technologies.

Business and IT managers must therefore prepare themselves for the new generation of power user who will be creating mashups and situational applications that have a far broader impact than the typical spreadsheet macro of yesteryear, and that if organisations are to avoid a proliferation of unmanageable, siloed, micro-applications, then they must blend the power of personal productivity with an appropriate management layer and a degree of central oversight.

Web 2.0 is no longer PC-centric.

It is clearly a mistake to think that Web 2.0 is all about technology, and likewise Enterprise Web 2.0, but it is also a mistake to dismiss the technology altogether. Therefore, selecting and implementing enterprise social software solutions, next-generation collaboration solutions, and Rich Internet Applications requires careful thought, consideration, and planning.

The driving force behind just about every aspect of Enterprise Web 2.0, is of course, the user -- something that has not always ranked highly on the list of priorities for corporate IT mangers -- and so the challenge for all forward-looking organisations is to refocus on this aspect of their IT strategies.