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Workforce mobility and changing communication patterns are two more trends that are driving change at the infrastructure layer, and so unified communication and collaboration requirements form an important part of Enterprise 2.0 strategy.

Enterprise Web 2.0 might be about putting the user (i.e. employee, customer, or stakeholder) first, but in order to do so it also requires supporting technology. And so at the IT infrastructure level, Enterprise 2.0 means Internet Protocol (IP) everywhere -- voice, video, and data. Enterprise 2.0 also means, 'open' standards rather than proprietary or 'closed' systems. Furthermore, Enterprise 2.0 technology means user-driven technology and not IT-driven technology.

Having accepted the fact that 'processes' means 'people', then we have to look for ways in which these people (i.e. processes) can self-organise and reference one another. Then, where possible, we need to somehow incapsulate the processes into a set of business services. One day (we might call it Web 3.0), Artificial Intelligence (AI) will enable organisations to do with computers that which they do via human beings today, but until that day arrives, organisations must do more to aid interdepartment and inter-company collaboration. Workflow has not yet figured largely in the consumer-oriented world of Web 2.0, but Butler Group sees this as pivotal when considering Enterprise Web 2.0.

Today applications that embody processes are built by IT professionals, but tomorrow they will be built by a new breed of power user, using mashup builders, software agents, and other Web 2.0 technologies.

Business and IT managers must therefore prepare themselves for the new generation of power user who will be creating mashups and situational applications that have a far broader impact than the typical spreadsheet macro of yesteryear, and that if organisations are to avoid a proliferation of unmanageable, siloed, micro-applications, then they must blend the power of personal productivity with an appropriate management layer and a degree of central oversight.

Web 2.0 is no longer PC-centric.

It is clearly a mistake to think that Web 2.0 is all about technology, and likewise Enterprise Web 2.0, but it is also a mistake to dismiss the technology altogether. Therefore, selecting and implementing enterprise social software solutions, next-generation collaboration solutions, and Rich Internet Applications requires careful thought, consideration, and planning.

The driving force behind just about every aspect of Enterprise Web 2.0, is of course, the user -- something that has not always ranked highly on the list of priorities for corporate IT mangers -- and so the challenge for all forward-looking organisations is to refocus on this aspect of their IT strategies.

Il me semble seulement que le “comment je fais l’entreprise 2.0″ signifie juste “je ne veux pas m’attaquer à tout ça alors je fais l’entreprise 2.0 et tout va se mettre en place seul”. Sauf que faire l’entreprise 2.0 c’est justement s’attaquer à “tout cela”.

L’entreprise 2.0 n’est pas une baguette magique qui évite de s’attaquer aux questions importantes et structurantes. Elle est justement la conséquence du fait qu’on s’y attaque. Inutile donc de lui donner une stratégie car elle est stratégie elle-même. Elle est le nom donné à ce qu’il faut faire donc inutile d’aller chercher plus loin.

Respondents also say they have been able to burnish their innovation skills, perhaps because their companies and customers jointly shape and cocreate products using Web 2.0 connections.

The median level of gains derived from internal Web 2.0 use ranged from a 10 percent improvement in operational costs to a 30 percent increase in the speed at which employees are able to tap outside experts.

Web 2.0 delivers benefits by multiplying the opportunities for collaboration and by allowing knowledge to spread more effectively. These benefits can accrue through companies’ use of automatic information feeds such as RSS2 or microblogs, of which Twitter is the most popular manifestation. Although many companies use a mix of tools, the survey shows that among all respondents deriving benefits, the more heavily used technologies are blogs, wikis, and podcasts—the same tools that are popular among consumers

Similarly, among those capturing benefits in their dealings with suppliers and partners, the tools of choice again are blogs, social networks, and video sharing. While respondents tell us that tapping expert knowledge from outside is their top priority, few report deploying prediction markets to harvest collective insights from these external networks.

Comparing respondents’ industries, those at high-technology companies are most likely to report measurable benefits from Web 2.0 across the board, followed by those at companies offering business, legal, and professional services

These survey results indicate that a different type of company may be emerging—one that makes intensive use of interactive technologies. This networked organization is characterized both by the internal integration of Web tools among employees, as well as use of the technologies to strengthen company ties with external stakeholders—customers and business partners.

As such, companies reporting business benefits also report high levels of Web 2.0 integration into employee workflows. They most often deploy three or more Web tools, and usage is high throughout these organizations

Respondents reporting measurable benefits say their companies, on average, have Web 2.0 interactions with 35 percent of their customers. These companies forged similar Web ties to 48 percent of their suppliers, partners, and outside experts. An organizational structure that’s more porous and networked may make companies more resilient and adaptive, sharpening their ability to access knowledge and thus innovate more effectively.

The survey results confirm that successful adoption requires that the use of these tools be integrated into the flow of users’ work (Exhibit 5). Furthermore, encouraging continuing use requires approaches other than the traditional financial or performance incentives deployed as motivational tools.

They also say role modeling—active Web use by executives—has been important for encouraging adoption internally.

Les outils seraient donc, à ce moment, le support d’une politique d’entreprise et ils y trouveraient de suite leur place par le besoin même de l’organisation.

Stratégie 2.0 implique ==> Management 2.0, Outils 2.0, marketing 2.0, recrutement 2.0, Rh 2.0 afin de construire ==> Entreprise 2.0.

Le projet entreprise 2.0 doit donc être un projet d’entreprise.

And while some of it must remain under strict control, particularly in public companies, much of it is unnessarily — and usually to a fault — hidden, unreused, and unexploited.

Explain the reasoning behind retaining more knowledge, in making it public, searchable, and organizing it via tagging.  Describe the benefits of being able to access much fresher and more up-to-date information elsewhere in the organization because their colleagues are managing more of their projects, tasks, and other work via social tools. 

Provide useful templates for common activities and reference material such as projects, tasks, resource management, policies, procedures, standards, and so on.  You still have to keep template layouts and template usage simple; excessive structure tends to kill the golden goose of contributions quickly.  But a little basic structure goes a long way and prevents contributors from having to figure out how to structure all the white space and provide a simple layer of consistency.

The enterprise has not caught up, largely because most enterprise information doesn't allow a hyperlink structure, and links aren't encouraged very much when it does

setting up blog and wiki directories as well as good enterprise search based on link ranking (which is what Google does to make the right information come up in the first few pages of search results.) 

Provide your own search engine in the tools only if you must.

, the real issue, day in and day out, with getting Enterprise 2.0 to take off is to educate, evangelize, demonstrate, and most importantly, evolve the interface and structure of your tools until you pick the right formula that resonates with your audience.

This boils down to having some form of moderation, either human or automated, to ensure that the level of discourse remains at some bare minimimum acceptable standard. 

A high-profile executive sponsor that obviously uses the tools can also help in a big way.

Triggering an Enterprise 2.0 ecosystem quickly is likely an early activity driver.  This can mean a lot of things but the link structure of Web tools allows information to quickly flow, circulate, and mesh together.  You can leverage this in a almost infinite number of ways to drive user activity, interesting content, create awareness of what the company is "thinking", and more.  For example, create a blog for every employee in the company and mail the link to them with instructions on how to use it. >  Create a social bookmarking site for the enterprise where everyone can see what is being bookmarked by everyone else that day. >  Create an internal Wikipedia that contains a seperate copy of all Intranet content and let users edit away. >  The possibilities are endless and provide a much greater number of "entry points" where people can get started with these tools.

The problems will be with the business culture, not the technology. 

For example, create a blog for every employee in the company and mail the link to them with instructions on how to use it. 

Create a social bookmarking site for the enterprise where everyone can see what is being bookmarked by everyone else that day.

Create an internal Wikipedia that contains a seperate copy of all Intranet content and let users edit away.

Allowing the output of SQL queries to be inserted into wikis when they load, calling Web services or using Flash badges that access data resources can turn Enterprise 2.0 tools from pure knowledge management into actual hybrids of software and data

And the reverse should be true as well, getting data back out into traditional tools including Office documents, PDFs, and XML must be easy to inspire trust and lower barriers to use.

Les outils "2.0" recouvrent un certain nombre de solutions telles que les flux RSS, les Tags (taxonomies et/ou folksonomies), les blogs, les wikis, les commentaires, les votes, les réseaux sociaux,... Tous n'imposent pas les mêmes contraintes en terme de mise en oeuvre, d'accompagnement, de gestion du changement.

Darwin cherche à faire émerger les thèmes corrélés entre eux issus d’un environnement chaotique en se basant sur la mesure de corrélation vue dans la théorie du chaos. Ainsi, Darwin s'éloigne clairement des systèmes de classification par vote ou popularité actuellement utilisés par nombreux moteurs de recherche et aggregateurs de contenu pour ordonner leur résultats.

Darwin n’est pas un engin de remplacement des technologies entreprise 2.0, tableaux de bord, et autre outils de management des documents. Il est conçu pour compléter et renforcer ces technologies en rendant plus visible le savoir tacite enfermé dans leurs systèmes.

C’est une application internet (Scan Cloud™) ou cela peut aussi devenir une solution customisée grâce à l'accès API offert. Cela fonctionne sur un serveur Web avec des services et base de données qui corrèlent les différentes sources Web 2.0.

47 % des responsables interrogés admettent que les employés essaient de contourner la politique de sécurité Web des entreprises.

Facebook est, par exemple, un vecteur de codes malicieux, qui se propagent via les applications, des extensions du site créées par tout un chacun, et auxquelles les utilisateurs doivent donner un accès complet à leur profil pour profiter de nouvelles fonctions alléchantes (préparer des sondages pour ses amis, savoir qui a écrit quoi sur quelqu'un, etc.).

80 % des responsables informatiques se déclarent confiants pour la sécurité de leur entreprise. Mais Websense, qui travaille dans le secteur, affirme : "Les chiffres montrent qu'elles (les entreprises, NDLR) ne sont pas bien équipées pour se protéger contre les menaces du Web 2.0." Paradoxalement, lorsque les questions du sondage se font plus précises, seules 9 % des entreprises reconnaissent avoir déployé des moyens de sécurité couvrant tous les vecteurs de menaces : rien à voir avec la confiance affichée au début.

L'étude montre une méconnaissance du Web 2.0 et des nouveaux usages d'Internet en général, de la part des entreprises. Peut-être ont-elles besoin de temps pour s'adapter, mais, au vu des menaces, la prise de conscience risque d'être plutôt brutale.

Second is a set in which 2.0 is an alternative or addition to 1.0, not a replacement for it.

the primary goal of enterprise IT is not to delight users, but rather to increase the value of the company. But do these two outcomes have to be in conflict?

The biggest challenge will probably be to get corporate technologists (a group that includes IT departments, vendors, and consultants) to stop thinking like monopolists that can dictate tools to users with great confidence that, because of the lack of alternatives, they’ll get used.

I can think of four negative consequences of ignoring these patterns and continuing to act like a 1.0 enterprise technology monopolist.

enterprises will deploy technologies that are disliked and/or not used

employees will use ’stealth IT’ and any knowledge / information captured therein will not be retained by the enterprise

employees and customers will leave because of their frustration with poor enterprise technologies

the enterprise will be handicapped or crippled  –  less productive, innovative, collaborative, agile, ‘wise,’ foresightful, insightful, transparent, clear than it could be otherwise, or than its competitor is.

Peut on “upgrader” les seniors ? Oui, certains en tout cas. Mais pas en passant en force. Cette génération n’est pas foncièrement hermétique, mais l’expérience lui a également appris le recul et la circonspection. Et ils sont habitués à des cycles de changement beaucoup plus longs que ceux que nous connaissons et connaitrons à l’avenir. Le changement passera par l’exemple. Ils ne sont pas contre a priori, mais ils sont également les gardiens d’un système qui fonctionne (plus ou moins) tant que la preuve que quelque chose de plus efficace existe ne leur sera pas apportée de manière tangible. Bien sur qui ne tente rien n’a rien et, c’est peut être là le point d’achoppement principal, ils ont moins la culture de l’expérimentation que leurs successeurs.

Bref nous entrons dans une ère de transition où on devra s’appuyer sur des seniors moteurs, en convaincre quelque autres, faire en sorte que les digital natives ne s’acculturent pas et utiliser la génération intermédiaire comme véritable cheville ouvrière

construire des synergies entre ces deux tendances qui seront les piliers de l’entreprise dès demain.

A moins que la réalité économique ne nous impose une transition plus abrupte…

When the Orange Revolution erupted in Ukraine in late 2004, Burton went to Technorati, a search engine that scours the “blogosphere,” to find the most authoritative blog postings on the subject. Within minutes, he had found sites with insightful commentary from American expatriates who were talking to locals in Kiev and on-the-fly debates among political analysts over what it meant. Because he and his fellow spies were stuck with outdated technology, they had no comparable way to cooperate — to find colleagues with common interests and brainstorm online.

Indeed, throughout the intelligence community, spies are beginning to wonder why their technology has fallen so far behind — and talk among themselves about how to catch up. Some of the country’s most senior intelligence thinkers have joined the discussion, and surprisingly, many of them believe the answer may lie in the interactive tools the world’s teenagers are using to pass around YouTube videos and bicker online about their favorite bands.

perhaps, they argue, it’ s time to try something radically different. Could blogs and wikis prevent the next 9/11?

during the cold war, threats formed slowly. The Soviet Union was a ponderous bureaucracy that moved at the glacial speed of the five-year plan. Analysts studied the emergence of new tanks and missiles, pieces of hardware that took years to develop.

Writing reports was thus a leisurely affair, taking weeks or months; thousands of copies were printed up and distributed via interoffice mail. If an analyst’s report impressed his superiors, they’d pass it on to their superiors, and they to theirs — until, if the analyst was very lucky, it landed eventually in the president’s inner circle.

The F.B.I. terminals were connected to one another — but not to the computers at any other agency, and vice versa.

If an analyst requested information from another agency, that request traveled through elaborate formal channels. The walls between the agencies were partly a matter of law.

Islamist terrorists, as 9/11 proved, behaved utterly unlike the Soviet Union. They were rapid-moving, transnational and cellular.

To disrupt these new plots, some intelligence officials concluded, American agents and analysts would need to cooperate just as fluidly — trading tips quickly among agents and agencies. Following the usual chain of command could be fatal. “To fight a network like Al Qaeda, you need to behave like a network,” John Arquilla,

This control over the flow of information, as the 9/11 Commission noted in its final report, was a crucial reason American intelligence agencies failed to prevent those attacks. All the clues were there — Al Qaeda associates studying aviation in Arizona, the flight student Zacarias Moussaoui arrested in Minnesota, surveillance of a Qaeda plotting session in Malaysia — but none of the agents knew about the existence of the other evidence. The report concluded that the agencies failed to “connect the dots.”

Spies, Andrus theorized, could take advantage of these rapid, self-organizing effects. If analysts and agents were encouraged to post personal blogs and wikis on Intelink — linking to their favorite analyst reports or the news bulletins they considered important — then mob intelligence would take over.

Pieces of intel would receive attention merely because other analysts found them interesting. This grass-roots process, Andrus argued, suited the modern intelligence challenge of sifting through thousands of disparate clues: if a fact or observation struck a chord with enough analysts, it would snowball into popularity, no matter what their supervisors thought.

What most impressed Andrus was Wikipedia’s self-governing nature. No central editor decreed what subjects would be covered. Individuals simply wrote pages on subjects that interested them — and then like-minded readers would add new facts or fix errors.

He pointed out that the best Internet search engines, including Google, all use “link analysis” to measure the authority of documents.

Each agency had databases to amass intelligence, but because of the air gap, other agencies could not easily search them. The divisions were partly because of turf battles and partly because of legal restrictions — but they were also technological.

This, Burton pointed out, is precisely the problem with Intelink. It has no links, no social information to help sort out which intel is significant and which isn’t. When an analyst’s report is posted online, it does not include links to other reports, even ones it cites.

“Analytical puzzles, like terror plots, are often too piecemeal for individual brains to put together. Having our documents aware of each other would be like hooking several brains up in a line, so that each one knows what the others know, making the puzzle much easier to solve.”

With Andrus and Burton’s vision in mind, you can almost imagine how 9/11 might have played out differently. In Phoenix, the F.B.I. agent Kenneth Williams might have blogged his memo noting that Al Qaeda members were engaging in flight-training activity. The agents observing a Qaeda planning conference in Malaysia could have mentioned the attendance of a Saudi named Khalid al-Midhar; another agent might have added that he held a multi-entry American visa. The F.B.I. agents who snared Zacarias Moussaoui in Minnesota might have written about their arrest of a flight student with violent tendencies. Other agents and analysts who were regular readers of these blogs would have found the material interesting, linked to it, pointed out connections or perhaps entered snippets of it into a wiki page discussing this new trend of young men from the Middle East enrolling in pilot training.

“The 16 intelligence organizations of the U.S. are without peer. They are the best in the world. The trick is, are they collectively the best?”

in a system like this, as Andrus’s theory goes, the dots are inexorably drawn together. “Once the intelligence community has a robust and mature wiki and blog knowledge-sharing Web space,”

From now on, Meyerrose said, each agency would have to build new systems using cheaper, off-the-shelf software so they all would be compatible. But bureaucratic obstacles were just a part of the problem Meyerrose faced. He was also up against something deeper in the DNA of the intelligence services. “We’ve had this ‘need to know’ culture for years,” Meyerrose said. “Well, we need to move to a ‘need to share’ philosophy.”

In the fall of 2005, they joined forces with C.I.A. wiki experts to build a prototype of something called Intellipedia, a wiki that any intelligence employee with classified clearance could read and contribute to.

By the late summer, Fingar decided the Intellipedia experiment was sufficiently successful that he would embark on an even more high-profile project: using Intellipedia to produce a “national intelligence estimate” for Nigeria. An N.I.E. is an authoritative snapshot of what the intelligence community thinks about a particular state — and a guide for foreign and military policy.

But it will also, Fingar hopes, attract contributions from other intelligence employees who have expertise Fingar isn’t yet aware of — an analyst who served in the Peace Corps in Nigeria, or a staff member who has recently traveled there.

In the traditional method of producing an intelligence estimate, Fingar said, he would call every agency and ask to borrow their Africa expert for a week or two of meetings. “And they’d say: ‘Well, I only got one guy who can spell Nigeria, and he’s traveling. So you lose.’ ” In contrast, a wiki will “change the rules of who can play,” Fingar said, since far-flung analysts and agents around the world could contribute, day or night.

Intelink allows any agency to publish a Web page, or put a document or a database online, secure in the knowledge that while other agents and analysts can access it, the outside world cannot.

Rasmussen notes that though there is often strong disagreement and debate on Intellipedia, it has not yet succumbed to the sort of vandalism that often plagues Wikipedia pages, including the posting of outright lies. This is partly because, unlike with Wikipedia, Intellipedia contributors are not anonymous. Whatever an analyst writes on Intellipedia can be traced to him. “If you demonstrate you’ve got something to contribute, hey, the expectation is you’re a valued member,” Fingar said. “You demonstrate you’re an idiot, that becomes known, too.”

So why hasn’t Intelink given young analysts instant access to all secrets from every agency? Because each agency’s databases, and the messages flowing through their internal pipelines, are not automatically put onto Intelink. Agency supervisors must actively decide what data they will publish on the network — and their levels of openness vary.

It would focus on spotting and predicting possible avian-flu outbreaks and function as part of a larger portal on the subject to collect information from hundreds of sources around the world, inside and outside of the intelligence agencies.

Operational information — like details of a current covert action — is rarely posted, usually because supervisors fear that a leak could jeopardize a delicate mission.

“See, these people would never have been talking before, and we certainly wouldn’t have heard about it if they did,” the assistant said. By September, the site had become so loaded with information and discussion that Rear Adm. Arthur Lawrence, a top official in the health department, told Meyerrose it had become the government’s most crucial resource on avian flu.

Intelink has grown to the point that it contains thousands of agency sites and several hundred databases. Analysts at the various agencies generate 50,000 official reports a year, many of which are posted to the network. The volume of material online is such that analysts now face a new problem: data overload. Even if they suspect good information might exist on Intelink, it is often impossible to find it. The system is poorly indexed, and its internal search tools perform like the pre-Google search engines of the ’90s.“

But Meyerrose insists that the future of spying will be revolutionized as much by these small-bore projects as by billion-dollar high-tech systems. Indeed, he says that overly ambitious projects often result in expensive disasters, the way the F.B.I.’s $170 million attempt to overhaul its case-handling software died in 2005 after the software became so complex that the F.B.I. despaired of ever fixing the bugs and shelved it. In contrast, the blog software took only a day or two to get running. “We need to think big, start small and scale fast,” Meyerrose said.

But the agency’s officials trained only small groups of perhaps five analysts a month. After they finished their training, those analysts would go online, excited, and start their blogs. But they’d quickly realize no one else was reading their posts aside from the four other people they’d gone through the training with. They’d get bored and quit blogging, just as the next trainees came online.

This presents a secrecy paradox. The Unclassified Intellipedia will have the biggest readership and thus will grow the most rapidly; but if it’s devoid of truly sensitive secrets, will it be of any use?

Many in the intelligence agencies suspect not. Indeed, they often refuse to input sensitive intel into their own private, secure databases; they do not trust even their own colleagues, inside their own agencies, to keep their secrets safe.

These are legitimate concerns. After the F.B.I. agent Robert Hanssen was arrested for selling the identities of undercover agents to Russia, it turned out he had found their names by trawling through records on the case-support system.

“When you have a source, you go to extraordinary lengths to protect their identities,” I. C. Smith, a 25-year veteran of the bureau, told me. “So agents never trusted the system, and rightly so.”

What the agencies needed was a way to take the thousands of disparate, unorganized pieces of intel they generate every day and somehow divine which are the most important.

A spy blogosphere, even carefully secured against intruders, might be fundamentally incompatible with the goal of keeping secrets. And the converse is also true: blogs and wikis are unlikely to thrive in an environment where people are guarded about sharing information. Social software doesn’t work if people aren’t social.

the C.I.A. set up a competition, later taken over by the D.N.I., called the Galileo Awards: any employee at any intelligence agency could submit an essay describing a new idea to improve information sharing, and the best ones would win a prize.

The first essay selected was by Calvin Andrus, chief technology officer of the Center for Mission Innovation at the C.I.A. In his essay, “The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community,”

For the intelligence agencies to benefit from “social software,” he said, they need to persuade thousands of employees to begin blogging and creating wikis all at once. And that requires a cultural sea change: persuading analysts, who for years have survived by holding their cards tightly to their chests, to begin openly showing their hands online.

Indeed, Meyerrose’s office is building three completely separate versions of Intellipedia for each of the three levels of secrecy: Top Secret, Secret and Unclassified. Each will be placed on a data network configured so that only people with the correct level of clearance can see them — and these networks are tightly controlled, so sensitive information typed into the Top Secret Intellipedia cannot accidentally leak into the Unclassified one.

The chat room was unencrypted and unsecured, so anyone could drop in and read the postings or mouth off. That way, Meyerrose figured, he’d be more likely to get drop-ins by engineers from small, scrappy start-up software firms who might have brilliant ideas but no other way to get an audience with intelligence chiefs. The chat room provoked howls of outrage. “People were like, ‘Hold it, can’t the Chinese and North Koreans listen in?’ ” Meyerrose told me. “And, sure, they could. But we weren’t going to be discussing state secrets. And the benefits of openness outweigh the risks.”

Fingar says that more value can be generated by analysts sharing bits of “open source” information — the nonclassified material in the broad world, like foreign newspapers, newsletters and blogs. It used to be that on-the-ground spies were the only ones who knew what was going on in a foreign country. But now the average citizen sitting in her living room can peer into the debates, news and lives of people in Iran. “If you want to know what the terrorists’ long-term plans are, the best thing is to read their propaganda — the stuff out there on the Internet,”

Beat cops in Indiana might be as likely to uncover evidence of a terror plot as undercover C.I.A. agents in Pakistan. Fiery sermons printed on pamphlets in the U.K. might be the most valuable tool in figuring out who’s raising money for a possible future London bombing. The most valuable spy system is one that can quickly assemble disparate pieces that are already lying around — information gathered by doctors, aid workers, police officers or security guards at corporations.

The premise of spy-blogging is that a million connected amateurs will always be smarter than a few experts collected in an elite star chamber; that Wikipedia will always move more quickly than the Encyclopaedia Britannica; that the country’s thousand-odd political bloggers will always spot news trends more quickly than slow-moving journalists in the mainstream media.

In three meetings a day, the officials assess all the intel that has risen to their attention — and they jointly decide what the nation’s most serious threats are.

The grass roots, they’ve found, are good at collecting threats but not necessarily at analyzing them. If a lot of low-level analysts are pointing to the same inaccurate posting, that doesn’t make it any less wrong.

Without the knowledge that comes from long experience, he added, a fledgling analyst or spy cannot know what is important or not. The counterterrorism center, he said, should decide which threats warrant attention.

Many of the officials at the very top, like Fingar, Meyerrose and their colleagues at the office of the director of national intelligence, are intrigued by the potential of a freewheeling, smart-mobbing intelligence community. The newest, youngest analysts are in favor of it, too. The resistance comes from the “iron majors” — career officers who occupy the enormous middle bureaucracy of the spy agencies. They might find the idea of an empowered grass roots to be foolhardy; they might also worry that it threatens their turf.

The normal case for social software is failure,” Shirky said. And because Intellipedia is now a high-profile experiment with many skeptics, its failure could permanently doom these sorts of collaborative spy endeavors.

It might be difficult to measure contributions to a wiki; if a brilliant piece of analysis emerges from the mob, who gets credit for it?

“A C.I.A. officer’s career is advanced by producing reports,”

Though D.N.I. officials say they have direct procurement authority over technology for all the agencies, there’s no evidence yet that Meyerrose will be able to make a serious impact on the eight spy agencies in the Department of Defense, which has its own annual $38 billion intelligence budget — the lion’s share of all the money the government spends on spying.

if the spies do not join the rest of the world, they risk growing to resemble the rigid, unchanging bureaucracy that they once confronted during the cold war.

Osez accepter les critiques en interne comme en externe, un client mécontent vous en apprend bien plus qu’un client anonyme, investissez dans la perte ! N’ayez pas peur de l’échec juste de ne pas apprendre, ne pas bouger, osez de nouveaux projets, développez l’imagination, l’innovation.

Ce qui se passe actuellement c’est un basculement des outils 2.0 avec une perte de leur sens originel  désormais résumé à des discours creux sur la place de l’homme dans l’entreprise et donnent lieu à toutes les manipulations possibles pour augmenter le chiffre d’affaire sans grand souci ni des hommes, ni de l’environnement.