Group items tagged

Courtenay Honeycutt and Susan Herring discuss the collaborative potential of Twitter. This is of particular relevance to the discussion of Anonymous organisation tools, as Anonymous uses Twitter for a large amount of its public relations. @Anonops, @AnonymousIRC and @Youranonnews are twitter users with substantial followers, each with greater than 250,000 followers. Anonymous's favourite method of attack - Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS - works better with every additional participant. Anonymous must recruit members to participate in such attacks through Twitter, Facebook and Youtube. Twitter presents the most anonymous and easily digestible communication channel of the three, whilst also being extremerly active during past operations such as #oppayback. Therefore, Twitter plays a central role in the collaboration of anonymous, especially communicating with those who do not take an active role in IRC chats. Honeycutt and Herring examine the conversational and collaborative potential of Twitter with the use of the @ symbol to direct conversation. This activity is very prominent among the Anonymous Twitter account listed earlier. Anonymous Twitter feeds are full of responses to criticisms and answers to questions. It is worthwhile to note that Honeycutt and Herrings article was written in 2009, before use of the @ symbol became recognised by Twitter as a certified way of creating conversation. Now, it is easy to transverse conversation simply by clicking tweets with an @ symbol. During Anonymous operations, Twitter provides an invaluable resource in being able to address such a number of followers at once. Honeycutt and Herring also note similarities between Twitter and IRC channels, also noting that the hectic, crossing conversation are perhaps part of the appeal to some of IRC. This is certainly present in Twitter, but without the constraints of server based IRC channels. Twitter presents a global audience to which Anonymous reaches out, when recruiting

Catone, J. (2012). Relax: Twitter's New Censorship Policy Is Actually Good for Activists. Mashable. Retrieved March 23, 2012 from http://mashable.com/2012/01/27/twitter-censorship-activism/ This news article from the online news site Mashable takes a look at the announcement that Twitter will now censor tweets on a country-by-country basis, and argues that this is actually a good thing for online activists. This is contrary to the widespread backlash that has been made against Twitter with users pledging to boycott the service over its new censorship rules. The author points out that Twitter has always been subject to takedown requests, and that this was on a global scale so that if a tweet or user was removed it had to be done for everyone in the world. The author believes it is a lot better that "now, Twitter can remove that tweet in that country, but allow the world to see it". His rationale is that everyone outside of the offending country can still see the tweets, and that if Twitter were to refuse a takedown notice from an oppressive regime it could have its service totally blocked for all users in that country. The fact that Twitter has pledged to increase its transparency in dealing with takedown notices strengthens his argument. I agree with the author on this and find this an especially useful resource as it provides links to circumvent Twitter's technology in an effort to get around censors, and arguments that this new change could even allow the message of censored activists to be more powerful.

This article is of relevance to my chosen topic (the Anonymous online activism group) as it deals with Twitter and the way oppressive governments seek to deal with it's collaborative and organisational power. Mansfield-Devine (2011) discusses how Anonymous use Twitter heavily as a method of collaboration during their activism operations. Though the article says otherwise, if Twitter's censorship were to inhibit this kind of collaboration this could affect the way in which Anonymous organises itself. The reliability of the source is reasonable. Mashable may be a somewhat sensationalist online news website at times, but this article in particular has many links within allowing one to see the sources behind various claims. The article is of considerable relevance to the topic of online movements as it deals with threats to online activism. Twitter itself is subject to pressure to silence of voices of dissension in certain rendering Twitter less useful for activism purposes. I found the article somewhat useful. It highlights that Twitter impervious to control and censorship. It also highlights that Twitter is a powerful tool for organising uprisings and political movements. This article is quite valuable to the overall collaborative resource development project as it is reasonably reliable, deals with the collaborative potential of Twitter and highlights some of the threats to online movements. Mansfield-Devine, Steve. 2011. "Anonymous: Serious threat or mere annoyance?" Network Security 1: 4-10. http://dx.doi.org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.1016/S1353-4858(11)70004-6

Prior to reading this article, I had not been aware of Twitter's new censorship policy related to each individual country. After reading the title of the article, I failed to see how censorship on Twitter could possibly be considered to be a good thing for activists so I was interested to see the writer's arguments. I definitely agree that Twitter's opting to censor certain tweets is the more desirable outcome than a whole country be denied access to the site. Twitter's approach to censorship, something that they don't seem to be able to avoid on some level, has been handled in the best way possible given the circumstances. I believe that transparency of the 'take down requests' has real potential to alleviate some of the frustration users may feel when they notice that something that was there yesterday is suddenly gone today. This method of publically displaying the reason why something has been removed seems to work well for YouTube in similar censorship cases, particularly in relation to copyright cease and desist claims.

Krebs, B. (2012). Twitter bots target Tibetan protests. The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved on March 24, 2012 from http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/security-it/twitter-bots-target-tibetan-protests-20120322-1vl5h.html This news article examines the emerging use of Twitter bots to hinder and thwart political protest. Twitter bots are automated Twitter accounts that auto-follow and send junk tweets that can jam up a Twitter feed. The news article covers the current political unrest in Tibet where dissidents are using the social media tool Twitter to protest their suppression under Chinese rule. Popular Tibetan hash tags used by the protesters are being targeted by these Twitter bots and effectively rendered useless as they are flooded with meaningless tweets. The author reports that this practice of online suppression was also put into use by pro-government forces during the disputed parliamentary elections in Russia last year, where anti-Kremlin tweets were diluted by the inundation of automated pro-government messages. This article shows the challenges being faced by political protesters using Twitter as its strength as a message platform is being subverted and used against them. It also highlights how governments can avoid taking the extreme action of shutting down Twitter in their country, and the negative backlash this would bring, and instead leaving it open for their own ends. And whilst the author notes that Twitter did crack down on the events in Russia, it remains to be seen what action, if any, will be taken in Tibet and what actions the protesters themselves can take to circumnavigate this threat.

This article reveals an emergence of spam-bots and pro-governmental forces using social media to suppress political activism. It is ironic that this liberating technology that provides activists with an outlet to report, communicate and collaborate information, is being used against them to prevent further protesting. Clearly, this news report is of great value towards the discussion of political activism because most articles appear to discuss the way in which protesters have harnessed the web to their advantage. Yet, there is evidence to suggest that the government, or at least pro-governmental supporters, are using the same technology to interfere with events. Tibetan protestors were using Twitter as a tool in their stand against Chinese rule. It follows suit of the successful Arab Revolution, by organizing the dissemination of information and reports with the tags #tibet and #freetibet (Krebs, 2012). However, it took a turn for the worst when spam-bots started flooding these hashtags with meaningless information to break down the means of communication for protestors (Krebs, 2012). This shares similarities with the methods used by the Iranian government to spread misinformation to protestors, by manipulating the technology to their own advantage (Grossman, 2009). The authorities infiltration of Twitter appears to be an effortless solution to thwart political protest, rather than completely shutting down access to the Internet. Whilst this has the potential to endanger the lives of citizens, people are quick to recognize the difference between bots and genuine people, as other users were warned to be wary of new Twitter accounts spreading misinformation in Iran (Grossman, 2009). Clearly, this article is highly relevant to the topic and appears to be a reliable source. It discusses an aspect of political protesting that has had little to no coverage in the broader mainstream media and academic papers. Reference: Grossm

Steve Mansfield-Devine, editor of Network Security, analyses the threat of the Anonymous activist hacking group. In doing so he discusses the collaborative tools used to organise the members of Anonymous into a focussed effort. The tools discussed include the Low Orbit Ion Cannnon (LOIC) and various spinoffs, Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and Twitter. Mansfield-Devine's discusses the Anonymous group's usage of the LOIC as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) weapon. Mansfield-Devine makes a clear point that only with enough users is the LOIC effective, making the effective usage of the LOIC a collaborative operation. The more users collaborating with the tool, the more effective it becomes. Mansfield-Devine discusses how Anonymous members are coerced into participating in an LOIC attack, specifying IRC and Twitter as the main forms of mobilisation of members. His discussion highlights IRC as a primary form of organisation, with Twitter being taking a more secondary role in directing potential participants into IRC channels. Mansfield-Devine does note that Twitter became an integral part of Anonymous organisation when their domain names were taken offline by authorities during Anonymous operations. Tweets were sent out to redirect the Anonymous participants into new IRC chat rooms to continue the attack. Overall, this article concisely covers IRC, Twitter and LOIC based aspects of Anonymous collaboration and organisation. Mansfield-Devine, Steve. 2011. "Anonymous: Serious threat or mere annoyance?" Network Security 1: 4-10. http://dx.doi.org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.1016/S1353-4858(11)70004-6

In this article Mansfield-Devine explores the threat of the organisation Anonymous and the collaborative tools they use to organise the group. In relation to this, he specifies that Anonymous uses "Low Orbit Ion Cannnon (LOIC) and various versions, Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and Twitter" as his key tools for facilitating organised attacks on institutions (Mansfield-Devine, 2011, p. 4). This article links to the article 'Kony 2012: The Template for Effective Crowdsourcing?' by Olubunmi Emenanjo, on more than one level, they are both about outside organisations against institutions, and they both undeniably rely on social media and the power of the crowds for the mobilization and facilitation of their actions and recruitment (Emenanjo, 2012). The success of the Kony 2012 campaign and Anonymous's attacks can be pin-pointed to how the organisations are aimed at a particular audience, reinforced by social media platforms, and most importantly how they harnessed networking tools to deliver their messages. However a major difference between the two groups is that the Kony 2012 organisation has a consistent online identity, while Anonymous has anonymity. Little is known about the organisation itself but the tools they utilise (LOIC, IRC, and Twitter) lead us so assume that their audiences engage with the organisation. References Emenanjo, O. (2012). Kony 2012: The Template for Effective Crowdsourcing? Communia. Retrieved from http://stipcommunia.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/kony-2012-the-template-for-effective-crowdsourcing/ Mansfield-Devine. (2011). Anonymous: Serious threat or mere annoyance?. Network Security, 1, 4-10. http://dx.doi.org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.1016/S13534858(11)70004-6

Although much of this article is not particularly useful to my focus on Anonymous, this article still raises some interesting notes. The way in which the author plays down the impact of Anonymous' actions towards the end of this article is of particular interest. The author often refers to the disorganized nature of the Anonymous movement, and suggests frequently that although a number of individuals may be involved, automated 'botnets' are often more effective than Anonymous members (Mansfield-Devine, 2011). For my focus, this is the most important part of the article because of the way in which the author neglects to take note of Anonymous members who do more than simply use LOIC and other DDoS attacks. Although it may be true that Anonymous DDoS attacks may not result in significant, long term damage to their targets, the disruption caused by such attacks can often provide enough distraction for Anonymous hacktivists to retrieve data from said targets. With hacktivist groups within movements such as Anonymous being responsible for the largest amount of stolen data in 2011 (AFP, 2012), Anonymous DDoS attacks could pave the way for much more damage to be done to websites than the temporary service disruptions noted by the author of this article. Mansfield-Devine, S. (2011). Anonymous: Serious threat or mere annoyance? Network Security 1: 4-10. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/science/article/pii/S1353485811700046 AFP. (2012). 'Hacktivists' biggest data thieves in 2011: Verizon. Retrieved from http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/world/13242086/hacktivists-biggest-data-thieves-in-2011-verizon/

Vieweg, S., Hughes, A., Starbird, K & Palen, L. (2010). Microblogging During Two Natural Hazards Events: What Twitter May Contribute to Situational Awareness. Retrieved 15 March 2012 from http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~palen/vieweg_1700_chi2010.pdf Individuals affected by the emergency events of the Red River Floods and the Oklahoma Grassfires in North America during the Spring of 2009, posted information about their respective situations via the microblogging service, Twitter. In this study, the authors analyse "situational update" information tweeted by individuals experiencing these hazards 'on the ground' to see how these people used the tweets to inform and develop an awareness of the current situation within their community. Twitter is seen as a commonly used social tool increasingly used for emergency communications "because of its growing ubiquity, communication rapidity, and cross platform accessibility", and are "a place for "harvesting" information during a crisis event to determine what is happening on the ground". From the analysis of collected data, coding was allocated by geo-location, location referencing and situational update information. Findings indicated Tweeters broadcasted similar types of information in both emergency situations, and tweets of high Tweeterers during emergencies were 'content rich' and displayed 'big picture situational awareness', with retweets indicating important updates. This study confirms how individuals facing a crisis rely on social media for their own safety and use the tool for altruistic purposes by providing current awareness of the crisis. In addition, the authors developed a Microblog-Enhanced Situational Features for Emergency outline of information categories for use in emergency response. They suggest this outline be used to assist with the development of system s

This article relates to the article by Sutton (2010) because it talks about how micro-blogging in the time of disasters is one of the easiest ways for individuals to retrieve, produce and spread information through social networking sites such as Twitter. Sutton (2010) states that Twitter can bring people together in disasters which not only prompts micro-blogging but also can involve micro-volunteering as well. Online communities such as Twitter are decentralized which brings about self-organization and mobilization of information. The two articles are linked in that they both discuss how micro-blogging during disasters is about how information such as warnings, evacuations and peoples locations is shared online by different individuals in the community. Both articles had images implemented to show the readers where the location was that they were discussing as well as graphs to compare the data that is being focused. This made it very reliable to the topic and the range of references also showed how different perspectives were used in this research. I found the article relevant in showing how Twitter had an impact in disaster management and how micro-blogging can actually make a huge effect on how people communicate during a crisis. The graphs and images in the article were very useful because that provided evidence which complemented the text. The article is very valuable for this project because it shows how Twitter is evolving from being used for just a social medium to disaster management. References: Sutton, N. J. (2010). Twittering Tennessee: Distributed Networks and Collaboration Following a Technological Disaster. Proceedings of the 7th International ISCRAM Conference. Retrieved from http://www.jeannettesutton.com/uploads/Twittering_Tennessee_FINAL.pdf (Accessed 16/03/2012)

Lotan, G., Graeff, E., Ananny, M., Gaffney, D., Pearce, I., & boyd, d. (2011). The Revolutions Were Tweeted: Information Flows during the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions. International Journal of Communications, 5, 1375-1405. Retrieved March 24, 2012, from http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1246/643 This article investigates how information was disseminated via Twitter during the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. It is clear that there were advantages in relying upon Twitter and social media during this time, because these sites provided real-time updates that mainstream media could not convey, due to the limitations of the platform, or censorship (Grossman, 2009; p.1399). The use of hashtags or key words assisted in the organisation of information, such as #sidibouzid and #Tunisia (p. 1376; p. 1395). However, the constant and rapid flow of content made it difficult to determine what is false and what is legitimate information - Twitter's strength and weakness in this situation. It is essential to understand how information can be organised and filtered through the positions of 'actor types' (classification of users in this study), making this article valuable to the study of political protests. There were many different actors mentioned but the most important contributors to the dissemination of content were journalists, bloggers, and activists. These actors had a tendency to retweet information from the same actor type or amongst the three aforementioned categories, to essentially create a sense of reliable organisation to the Twitter chaos (p. 1393). The study also concluded that individuals, rather than organisations, were considered more reliable during the uprising (p. 1398). This appears to demonstrate the scepticism associated with mainstream media in a society that no longer wishes to be talked 'at', but rather invo

This article relates my topic in its discussion of Twitter usage in online activism. The online activist group Anonymous (my topic of choice) also performed activist activities surrounding Egypt and Tunisia. Much of Anonymous' activities were organised through the use of Twitter making this article quite relevant. As suggested in the article, Anonymous did appear to have certain high powered actors who highlighted information of particular relevance to the operations, affecting the flow of information through the Twitter network. The article is published in a peer-reviewed journal making it a highly reliable source. It is also quite recent, written in 2011, which is a huge asset given the rate at which social networking technology progresses. The article is also perfectly relevant to the discussion of Twitter usage in political protests. The way that information flows and is determined critical or irrelevant through various actors' retweets is an important topic. I found the article quite useful as the topic is closely related to the online activism performed by the Anonymous group. This article contributes a great deal of value to this collaborative resource development project on a whole, as it is a reliable source, is very recent and it is highly relevant, dealing with Twitter as a collaboration and organisation tool.

Beaumont, P. (2011, February 25). The Truth about Twitter, Facebook and the Uprisings in the Arab World. The Guardian. Retrieved March 24, 2012, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/25/twitter-facebook-uprisings-arab-libya?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 This article discusses how political activists harnessed the web for their benefit, during the Arab revolutions. Unlike other resources, this article is of great value as it reveals that written tweets were not the only way that protestors and activists utilised the web. The people involved used phones to capture images and videos of the destruction around them, to not only inform their fellow protestors, but also to provide credible evidence to the outside world. People also contributed medical information and important phone numbers to assist and organise others involved in the uprising. This indicates the power of the 'other' described in "The Revolutions Were Tweeted: Information Flow during the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions" as ordinary people provide the bulk of the information. Each of these contributions demonstrates a form of collaboration, whereby; participants worked towards a common goal and participated in knowledge sharing (Blau, 2011, p.23). The article conveys that this provided a clear image of what was happening where, via specific sites. It is also noted that each uprising used the web differently, due to constrictions and organisation of the group. Facebook provided the voice to people in Tunisia as it was one of the only social networking sites that had not been shut down, despite the government's desire to do so, they feared it would cause more unrest. However, Egypt appeared to be the most organised group, as "details of demonstrations were circulated by both Facebook and Twitter and the activists' 12-page guide to confronting the regime was distributed by email" (Beaumont, 2011). The author also comments on the Western media's quick judgments on how social media was used

Freeman, M. (2011). Fire, Wind and Water: Social Networks in Natural Disasters. Journal of Cases on Information Technology,13 (2), p.69 -79. A study of the increasing adoption of social networking tools (SNTs) as a channel for critical communication during disasters in Australia, is the platform used by the author to look into how society is accepting the use of SNTs as a whole for emergency management. Using recent natural disasters, the use of SNT's is traced from their limited use during the Victorian Bushfires in 2009 to their increased use and the reliance on SNTs by authorities and individuals, during the Queensland Floods of 2010/2011 and Tropical Cyclone Yasi in 2011 (February). During the fires of 2009, Twitter was used by the ABC radio station 774 Melbourne to provide as much coverage of the fires as possible. Followers increased from 250 to 1200 indicating the popularity of this form of communication, and offering an sight for future use. Two years later, the Queensland Police Service used Twitter and Facebook extensively to broadcast accurate information to those affected by the floods and correct misinformation. The same tactics were employed for Tropical Cyclone Yasi. Technologies are discussed as a medium of communication for accurate and timely information during disasters and for the sharing of knowledge, increasingly coming from the bottom up, but also utilised appropriately from the top down when required. Although this article was easy to understand, the author's discussion of the disasters and technologies, the extensive discussion of qualitative research, followed by a presentation of the case, lead to a repetition of information about the disasters. A more succinct and structured presentation of the results of this triangulated approach to research would have made it easier to appreciate the benefits of SNTs to communities.

This article, recently published by security firm Imperva, investigates how an Anonymous attack is mounted. A Particularly interesting point is that this article makes no mention of IRC channels, instead painting Facebook, Twitter and Youtube channels as the main methods of communication for Anonymous. Also interesting is that such communication is referred to as recruitment, recruitment of technically savvy hackers and not so technically savvy activists who are willing to participate in the attack. Particular attention should be paid to pages 6-8 which outline the recruitment activities over Facebook, Youtube and Twitter. Imperva outline the technical methods used to stage the attack, mentioning that there are 10 -15 'Anons' working to analyse the victim website for security vulnerabilities. These are more experienced hackers who are searching for a vulnerability that might allow them to retrieve private data from the victim (p.6). Although not mentioned in this article, perhaps these experienced hackers collaborate using Internet Relay Chat. When no vulnerability was found, Imperva notes that Anonymous instead tries a DDoS attack, but instead of employing the LOIC, a web based version is used for ease of participation (p.13). This way, users of any device can be recruited (through social media) into participate in the attack with minimum of barriers to entry. Although this article focusses heavily on the technical aspect of the attack, a significant portion of the article deals with the recruitment of participant through social media, alongside discussion of the online variant of the LOIC collaborative Denial of Service tool. Anatomy of an Anonymous Attack. 2012. Imperva. http://www.imperva.com/docs/HII_The_Anatomy_of_an_Anonymous_Attack.pdf

This document may prove to be quite a significant additional reference to my focus of my chosen topic of the Anonymous movement and hacktivism. This article discusses precisely what Mansfield-Devine (2011) neglected to note; that within the Anonymous movement, there are a number of individuals with significant hacking skills who are able to retrieve valuable data from the targets of Anonymous attacks. The article quite thoroughly deconstructs the order in which Anonymous attacks typically occur, the differences between the two major types of individuals who participate, and circumstances under which Anonymous attacks are generally able to be successfully performed (2012). Of particular interest, is the emphasis placed on the importance of acknowledging the fact that Anonymous attacks are not always as harmless as they may appear. Another interesting note is found within the conclusion of the report. The report suggests that targeted, small-scale data retrieval attacks are the preferred means of attack for the Anonymous movement and that "DDoS is the hacker's last resort" (Anatomy of an Anonymous Attack, 2012). This would suggest that unlike many sources of information regarding Anonymous hacktivism attacks, Imperva has identified the serious nature of many incidents involving the Anonymous movement, which do not necessarily receive as much immediate attention as a simple DDoS attack may. Anatomy of an Anonymous Attack. (2012). Imperva. Retrieved from http://www.imperva.com/docs/HII_The_Anatomy_of_an_Anonymous_Attack.pdf Mansfield-Devine, S. (2011). Anonymous: Serious threat or mere annoyance? Network Security 1: 4-10. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/science/article/pii/S1353485811700046

Matt Brian, mobile editor for The Next Web, discusses the popularity of pastebin.com among hacking (or perhaps more accurately 'cracking') groups. Brain notes that Pastebin is a tool originally designed for collaboratively editing code, but has since gained popularity among malicious security crackers as a method of releasing stolen data to the public. While there are numerous spinoffs of the simple text-sharing concept, pastebin.com remains the most popular. Searching the pastebin.com website for 'anonymous' or their (now disbanded and arrested) spinoff group 'Lulzsec' reveals a considerable level of Pastebin usage by Anonymous. Manifestos and anouncment seem to be a popular use of Pastebin by Anonymous. For example searching '#opegypt' reveals a list of sites taken down by Anonymous - perhaps it was collaboratively updated while the operation took place? The Anonymous group link to Pastebin.com pastes (or other equivalent websites) through blogs and twitter accounts associated with the Anonymous movement. Brain notes its utility in escaping the 140 character limitation of twitter, whilst still retaining anonymity with minimum fuss. If illegal material was posted on Anonymous blogs such as anonops.blogspot.com, youranonnews.tumblr.com or anonnews.org it would likely violate terms of service and result in blogs being closed. Pastebin.com therefore, provides a suitably nebulous zone for posting illegal content. Brain makes extensive note of the use of Pastebin.com to release sensitive, stolen information to the web. Although the hacking groups mentioned are not always directly related to Anonymous, it highlights the usage of Pastebin.com as a tool for sharing information. Hacker groups could potentially be working on releases or manifestos collaboratively with their peers, although this in not discernible in the final Pastebin product. Brian, Matt. 2011, June 5. "Pastebin: How a popular code-sharing site became the ultimate hacker hangout." The Next Web: Social M

This article provides an interesting (if somewhat brief) account of the Anonymous movement, and associated (as well as un-associated) hacktivist networks, using a relatively simple internet tool and altering the intended usage to suit the purposes of the movement. The article focuses mainly on the usage of Pastebin by an offshoot of the Anonymous movement called LulzSec, and how the group was able to use Pastebin to greatly aid their hacktivism efforts (Brian, 2011). Although now disbanded and with most of its members arrested (Apps, 2012), LulzSec very successfully utilised Pastebin for various leaks and links to their efforts of retrieving data from a number of high-profile organizations. This article touches on another example of the confrontational tactics for raising media awareness outlined by Andrews and Caren (2010), and thus the two articles may provide relevant references for discussions relating to the reactions to hacktivist groups such as LulzSec, as well as providing information regarding another tool used by such movements. In terms of my focus on the Anonymous movement, the article may not provide a direct reference to the divides between individuals within the movement based on motivation for activities under the Anonymous movement. The article does however provide a relevant secondary source for additional discussion relating to the way in which particular offshoots of the Anonymous movement operate. Andrews, K., & N. Caren. (2010) Making the News: Movement Organisations, Media Attention, and the Public Agenda. Retrieved from http://proquest.umi.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/pqdweb?did=2527572391&sid=1&Fmt=6&clientId=22212&RQT=309&VName=PQD Apps, P. (2012). LulzSec Arrests Hurt Hacker Groups, Anonymous Movement Hard To Kill. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/08/lulzsec-arrests-anonymous_n_1331982.html Brian, M. (July 5th, 2011). Pastebin: How a popular code-sharing site became the ultimate hacker hangout. Retrieved fr

Lysenko, V., Desouza, K. (2011). Moldova's internet revolution: Analyzing the role of technologies in various phases of the confrontation. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 79 (2012) 341-361. Retrieved March 23, 2012 from http://www.sciencedirect.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/science/article/pii/S0040162511001223 This research article published in the journal 'Technological Forecasting & Social Change' analyses the role played by online collaboration and organisation tools in Moldova's revolution of April 2009. It specifically details the different technologies used during various phases of the revolution. The research is quite detailed in identifying the different groups involved - dissenters and authorities - with statistics and case studies breaking down the timeline and dynamics of the revolution. Overall the researchers found that: "1) the protesters organized their initial mobilization through social network services (SNS) and short message service (SMS); 2) Twitter was mostly used during later phases of the revolution - the active street protests and the subsequent information war - for communication about the conflict both locally and globally; and 3) through skillful use of new Internet-based ICTs, it is possible to conduct a successful revolution without noticeable prior offline organization". I chose this article as it highlights the power of Twitter as an organization tool through its involvement in providing a communication platform for the dissenters to organize street protests and then update from the ground what was happening. It also shows Twitters strength as a collaborative tool for movements with the involvement of supporters outside of Moldova tweeting about the revolution.

I love this article as it relates to the Orange Revolution. I am also a proud protester of a post Orange Revolution protest in New Europe (Latvia) where I had personal exchanges with MP's in a New European country - read here http://balticguide.ee.klient.veebimajutus.ee/index.php?s=1&n=110&a=4161 In Latvia there have been many protests and I sought to increase international pressure on the Latvian government through my founding the Australian Chamber of Commerce in Latvia and in many other ways. I even managed to gain the participation of Curtin University honours Business Students that stayed in a remote city of Latvia to assist the council with its plans. The use of mobile SNS was not part of the protests I was aware of and participated in. Friends informed me what was being posted on websites about the time and place of the next protest. This enabled the inclusion of older proud Latvians and this caused the dynamic situation where younger people restrained their physical action in respect of the older participants so they would not get caught up in altercations. Later protests were much more violent. I as a primary source of information about student protests in New European countries can attest to the fact that the use of mobile SNS would have been very helpful and would have increased the momentum of protests. Because of the many protests in Latvia, many of the citizens that would like to see change, are suffering from protest fatigue. Possibly the earlier more effective use of mobile SNS could have made a difference. I blogged http://austchamriga.blogspot.com.au/ and wrote threatening letters to the IMF as well as led by example through organising courses for the youth of Latvia http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9uBThbeXy9Q I will be back to Latvia to push more for the direction and changes the people want. I am arming myself with information like in this paper and what I learn in the Masters of Internet Communication. What is clear to me is that without a

Chatora, A. (2012). Encouraging Political Participation in Africa: The Potential of Social Media Platforms. Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved March 22, 2012 from http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/15Mar2012SocialMedia.pdf This situation report is from the Institute for Security Studies (a pan-African applied policy research institute based in South Africa), and examines the role of social media in facilitating political participation. It uses as its catalyst the recent popular protests dubbed the 'Arab Spring' to explore the possibility of an 'African Spring' protest movement. The report includes case studies on several African countries highlighting difficulties faced by different countries utilising social media, which includes historical experiences, institutional arrangements and socioeconomic and political conditions. Of note are the actions taken in Cameroon where the government blocked the Twitter service for ten days during the Arab Spring protests for reasons of 'national security', and in Uganda when the 'walk-to-work' protests were successfully initiated by protest groups making use of social media such as Twitter, the government suspended the use of social networks causing 'walk-to-work' protests to lose their momentum. The report concludes that despite the severe challenges facing Africans in taking up social media, that ultimately "engaging with these platforms will allow citizens to circumvent the wide range of tactics used to stifle public opinion". I find this report to be a valuable resource as it explores the current environment, requirements, and limitations within Africa for movements to successfully incorporate social media such as Twitter into their political protests.

This article discusses the potential for political protests in African nations, in light of the recent activism in Arab countries. I found this article beneficial, as it clearly highlights the profound difficulties that are faced in some African nations, and discusses elements that are not covered in other articles related to the topic. An element of particular importance was the consideration of historical context when investigating the potential for political activism, both online and offline. The widespread poverty and clear digital divide between some people in Africa, is of significance as many choose to engage in activities of survival, rather than that of political action (Chatora, 2012, p.4). Computer literacy skills and the willingness of people to disobey controlling governments must also be considered, as people in Angola have shown no signs of retreating from political discussion and the organization of protests online, compared to people in Cameroon and Zimbabwe who are facing various difficulties against repressive regimes (Chatora, 2012, p.9-10). The importance of historical context clearly resonates with the article I discussed - "Protest 2.0: Online Interactions and Aboriginal Activists." The Aboriginal activists were uncomfortable with using new technology, due to a lack of computer literacy, as well as, the evident interference it made with the historical context of communication in their culture, as visual storytelling is favoured over the written word used online (Petray, 2011, p.927). This article adds value to the discussion of political activism as it is of great relevance to the topic and appears to be a reliable source of information. Whilst it does comment on various elements not covered in other articles, it also highlights an area of significance regarding the uptake of social media in African nations - clearly implying that there will be future developments in this area of research. Reference: Petray, T.L. (20

As with any critical research involving new technologies the acknowledgment of a 'lack of concrete academic scrutiny and scientific evidence' (Boria et al, 2008) is important. In this article it acts as a timely reminder that mobile devices are still a currently evolving technology. This point serves the reader well when they are trying to position the use of mobile devices and their abilities in sourcing information. There are a number of important points highlighted throughout the article that are directly linked to this evolution. Firstly the evolving role of the consumer that is emerging empowered, sophisticated, critical and well informed. Secondly the developments towards effective leveraging and deriving value from social media-based tools and thirdly the continual shift in consumer behavior away from 'corporate communication' and towards 'peer reviews', ultimately affecting buyer intentions (Boria et al, 2008). Taking the fore noted current evolution of mobile devices into account, a small suggestion that we are 'in the process of replacing phones…' (Boria et al, 2008) all together, can be best understood with reference to traditional mobile technologies. They could not access the Internet. Although this is the only direct reference to a mobile device there is extensive analysis into the sourcing of information by consumers. With out mentioning the Smartphone but accepting its general mainstream adoption, it is easy to assume that consumers sourcing and contributing product information could do so easily from their mobile devices whilst in the act of shopping.

Reference: Boria, Constatinides and Romero. 2008. Social Media: A New Frontier for Retailers?. Retrieved from http://www.utwente.nl/mb/nikos/publications/ecpapers/constantinidessocialmedia.pdf

This article is beneficial because it touches on key issues relating to the retail industry's lack of adaptation and understanding of online technologies. It highlights the future potential of online shopping, identifies non-adaptation of new technologies as a threat whilst pointing out the potential risk in adopting them. There has been a lot of media coverage about this topic in recent months and whilst this paper was written in 2008 it is not until now that many retail giants are utilising online platforms, take David Jones for example. The study mentions the lack of academic resources relating to Web 2.0 technologies, this is similar to the Twitter paper by Burton & Soboleva, 2011 where there is also little research relating to understanding the real value in the adaptation of Twitter by businesses. "Lack of concrete academic scrutiny and scientific evidence is a warning to businesses to be cautious when engaging in Social Media as marketing tools." (Boria et al, 2008). The article also mentions that retailers could misjudge available tools. This to me expresses the uncertainty that many had and might still have in jumping into these technologies and that there may be a general notion of not understanding their real value. Overall the shift in power from the organisation to the consumer is evident and the ubiquitous nature of the Internet through mobile usage adds to this shift. Crowd sourcing here plays a part because consumers have access to other consumers' opinions and recommendations. Web 2.0 is key, when a consumer has a question others can answer it, instead of the business itself, consumers trust other consumers. An attempt of crowd sourcing by retailers is also is evident here, examples are shown where retailers have tried to get customers to become co-producers or creative contributors, this also serves as a way to create stronger customer engagement. Additional referenc

You Tube Need to Know | Crisis mappers: Mobile technology helps disaster victims worldwide | Uploaded by PBS . Retrieved 20 March 2012 http://www.youtube.com/​watch?v=xW7Vt5iunWE This YouTube presentation tells the story of how crisis mapping came to be a source of critical and timely support to Haitians requiring aid following the 2010 devastating earthquake. It is a remarkable example of resourcefulness, voluntary collaboration and use of social media to assist with the humanitarian aid response. The video includes a live interview with, Patrick Meier, head of Ushahidi, a not-for-profit organisation, who explains that within hours of the news of the quake reaching the world, he knew that it would be a real challenge to get information from people on the ground in Haiti. Based on the Haitians high mobile ownership (85%) he worked out that texting a message would be the best way to find out who needed help. He arranged for a local phone company to provide a number for emergency texts. The number is advertised on the radio as 90% of the population has radio access. A call was put out on Facebook to locate volunteers who could translate messages from Haitian Kreyol to English. These messages are then forwarded to Boston where a voluntary group of students plot the location on an online map. The online location is then forwarded to the US response group coordinating the distribution of aid. Within hours help is sent. I came across this video when sourcing materials and was impressed with the professional presentation, the inclusion of a Haitian recipients experience of receiving aid after texting the number he heard on the radio, and interviews with major stakeholders. Further searches of Patrick Meier verified the story. Crisis mapping was also used during the Libyan crisis to bring aid to victims. Crisis locations were extracted from posts for help on Facebook and Twitter and plotted by volunteers

(My commentary is actually against the PDF that's linked to, rather than the YouTube video. Reference at the end). This report, commissioned by the United States Institute of Peace, examines the role of Ushahidi, a crisis-mapping platform, in the relief effort following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. It highlights the ability of crowd-sourcing to provide a more reliable account of what's happening in a disaster situation than traditional intelligence gathering means which don't engage the local population. It begins by describing the challenge that rescuers faced when sourcing their intelligence from media reports, which tended to focus on isolated incidents of violence, wrongly spreading the idea that violence was commonplace and leading the rescue teams to delay their rescue efforts. The report accuses the media of deliberately producing exaggerated reports, which may be true, but even the most ethical journalist can only report on what he or she experiences - if he or she sees or hears about a violent incident, the resulting report will almost certainly give the impression of violence. For the most objective and detailed picture of the state of a crowd, the largest possible portion of that crowd needs to have a voice - something an individual journalist could never facilitate. That's where Ushahidi proved a valuable tool. By aggregating SMS messages, email and social media communications from those in distress, it allowed rescuers to direct assistance appropriately. In addition to crowd-sourcing the conditions of those in distress, Ushahidi also incorporated other forms of crowd-sourcing - maps were sourced from the World Bank, Yahoo!, GeoEye and the U.S. government to provide geographic information, and staffing power was provided by a vast team of volunteers. This gives the case study a lot of depth. Heinzelman, J. and Waters, C. (2010) Crowdsourcing Crisis Information in Disaster-Affected Haiti Retrieved 2 April 2012 from http://www.us