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the judiciary does have incomplete but real institutional guarantees of independence: It has a long history; a sense of mission to the rule of law; an impressive and well-developed legal framework; considerable autonomy in personnel and budgetary matters; constitutional guarantees of independence and due process; and rulers who routinely pledge fealty to the rule of law. But six problems have been on full display in recent years – and while the first three are likely to get slowly better, the other three might even get a bit worse.

Perhaps the most important official was the prosecutor general – responsible for deciding whom to investigate and prosecute and whom to ignore. (For that reason, much of the judicial tussling among various political forces after the 2011 uprising has focused on this post.)

the judges generally have a very strong sense of loyalty to the Egyptian state and supporters of political and social order. As suspicious as they may sometimes be of executive influence, Egyptian judges tend not to behave as freestanding actors mediating between the state and the society or among various social actors, but as enforcers of the law and interests of the state, standing above and guiding the society in what they see as a principled fashion

many of the non-oil exporting nations in the Middle East and North Africa are undergoing a process of redefinition of how they are linked with the global economy. It is not going well.

Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan are becoming more dependent on external borrowing than on foreign direct investments compared to the pre-2008 period. This is visible with declining ratios of FDIs to GDP, in contrast with increasing ratios of foreign debt to GDP and total exports

The relative political stabilization in all four countries as of 2014/2015 did not allow them much room for full-fledged recovery due to the global economic slowdown. This made it harder for all of them to achieve export-led growth and attract FDI, leaving them with foreign borrowing as the only viable option. Foreign debt accounts for much of the apparent recovery, as expressed in growth rates.

With the start of the Lebanese Revolution on October 17th, young feminists were an integral part of an unprecedented social movement in Lebanon.  In fact, young feminists have been engaged in formulating the revolution’s demands pertaining to equality, justice, inclusion, dignity, rights, and the rule of law in our country.   Feminist demands during the revolution included but were not limited to calls for an egalitarian family code, an end to violence against women, call out against sexual harassment, the abolishment of the Kafala system - which holds migrant workers in a servile relationship with their employers - inclusion of all women and girls, rights for LGBTQI, rights for individuals with disabilities and special needs, dignity, as well as freedom from oppression and violence for all.  Young feminists emphasized the right to individual freedoms and bodily integrity. These demands were beautifully and intelligently framed in an analysis of patriarchy and how it is reproduced by within the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres

the patriarchal/confessional system has affected all aspects of life, in both the private and public spheres

the social movement of 2015 revealed signs of misogyny and hostility especially with the brutal attacks against trans-women who were exercising their rights to participate in public mobilization.

“We are victims of a campaign of arrests because we are an organization that has invested and contributed a lot to Hirak,” a member of RAJ’s executive board told Al-Monitor, speaking on the condition of anonymity following Fersaoui’s arrest. “Yet, RAJ is not the only target of these arbitrary arrests, but rather the civil society as a whole.”

an upsurge of repression against prominent leaders and other activists with Hirak, including large-scale arbitrary arrests

escalation is taking place two months before presidential elections called for Dec. 12 by the interim president, Abdelkader Bensalah, and pushed for by the army.

Egyptian activist Sarah Hegazi died on June 13, 2020 in Toronto, Canada. In life, Sarah was compelled to revolt. More accurately, society revolted against her, and she had no choice but to respond. Sarah was arrested on October 2, 2017 after raising the rainbow flag at a Mashrou’ Leila concert in Cairo, Egypt. She was accused of inciting debauchery and joining an illegal group offending public stability and social coexistence. During three months in prison, Sarah was tortured with electric shocks. Other prisoners were informed she was homosexual, putting her at risk of sexual assault.

Sarah knew that she could not return to Egypt and felt alienated. Her mother's death made it worse. She told me, “I was arrested in Egypt and now I am arrested in Canada as I can do nothing for my family in the midst of this disaster.”  In exile, she could not even say goodbye to her mother, who left the world without seeing her daughter one last time.

Sarah regarded Canadian psychiatry as an insensitive machine ignorant of the Middle Eastern problems and which treated refugees with pity, which she considered an insult.

Under pressure from armed militias, Libya's parliament passed a sweeping law Sunday that bans anyone who served as a senior official under Moammar Gadhafi during his 42 year-long rule from working in government.

likely to further stall the country's already rocky transition to democracy by ousting elected lawmakers

critics say that the law was passed at gunpoint. Militias had surrounded several government buildings in Tripoli last week barring officials from work. Their vehicles mounted with rocket-propelled grenades kept watch on the street during the vote

a solar mega-project that is supposedly going to end Morocco's dependency on energy imports, provide electricity to more than a million Moroccans, and put the country on a “green path.”

This analysis examines the project through the lens of the creation of a new commodity chain, revealing its effects as no different from the destructive mining activities taking place in southern Morocco.

What seems to unite all the reports and articles written about the solar plant is a deeply erroneous assumption that any move toward renewable energy is to be welcomed. And that any shift from fossil fuels, regardless of how it is carried out, will help us to avert climate chaos. One needs to say it clearly from the start: the climate crisis we are currently facing is not attributable to fossil fuels per se, but rather to their unsustainable and destructive use in order to fuel the capitalist machine. In other words, capitalism is the culprit, and if we are serious in our endeavors to tackle the climate crisis (only one facet of the multi-dimensional crisis of capitalism), we cannot elude questions of radically changing our ways of producing and distributing things, our consumption patterns and fundamental issues of equity and justice. It follows from this that a mere shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy, while remaining in the capitalist framework of commodifying and privatizing nature for the profits of the few, will not solve the problem. In fact, if we continue down this path we will only end up exacerbating, or creating another set of problems, around issues of ownership of land and natural resources.

The security logic seems to suggest that one cannot be sure that a researcher working on Islamic endowments in the 15th century isn’t really a spy — he might be looking for maps of Siwa, Halayib and Shalatin, the Yaghbub Oasis, or Tiran and Sanafir. Since we have border disputes with all our neighbors, not only can you not copy maps related to any border issue, you can’t conduct research on any topic vaguely connected to borders.

The security logic doesn’t stop at maps and borders. It casts suspicion on every topic. An Egyptian colleague working on Mamluk history was denied a research permit. An American colleague was denied a permit for a project on the history of private presses in the 19th century. A student of mine studies the history of the Labor Corps during World War I; his permit was also rejected

The official’s response (I paraphrase) was:Here’s someone studying the history of irrigation, and we have a dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile waters. We have no doubt that this student is honest and isn’t a spy, but how can we be sure that his thesis won’t fall into malicious hands, that it won’t contain information that could harm us — for example, info about Ethiopia’s right to the Nile waters? Such details could damage our negotiating position. Of course, we know employees at the National Archives are sincere patriots, and the same is true of most professors and students doing research there, but we have considerations that no one understands but us.

The new governor of the Bank of Israel, Karnit Flug, reckons that without successful integration of Arab workers, Israel’s GDP would contract by 1.3% annually.

srael's equality legislation is largely unenforced. Parliamentarians sought to circumvent it last year by backing legislation giving those who have served in the military—obligatory for Jews but not for Arabs—preferential treatment for government jobs.  UPS, a courier company, reportedly does not employ Arab drivers because they cannot get security clearance to enter the airport. In 2009, the national railway company sacked most of its Arab workers as part of a policy against hiring those without permits to carry weapons. “While Jews work in hi-tech, Arabs more often than not are day labourers,” says Muhammed Darawshe of the Abraham Fund, an Israeli NGO.

Dictators watch Al Jazeera too

The region’s rulers have gone through an accelerated process of authoritarian learning,

Regimes have adapted tactics,

The almost 11,000 square mile total project is to be designed and supervised by US, German, Japanese and possibly other western experts. It represents the largest single component of the Saudi Crown Prince's "Vision 2030", by which he intends his country to diversify its economy away from dependence upon oil. Egypt, in other words, is being harnessed to Prince Mohammad bin Salman's project to consolidate his personal political power, transform the Kingdom into a centre of high tech development in what heretofore has been a relatively peripheral region within the Middle East, and exert yet greater Saudi influence over both Jordan and Egypt.

The most immediate, tangible potential benefits are to lend support to the effort to convert the Suez Canal Zone into a globally important logistics hub, combined with opening up the Red Sea and Gulfs of Suez and Aqaba to a new surge of tourist development.

Suez Canal revenues and numbers of ships transiting have been essentially flat since the parallel channel was opened amidst great fanfare in February 2016 following a two-year, $8.4 billion upgrade

The Tunisian General Union of Labour (UGTT) said it has issued a series of questions to be addressed to political parties and candidates for the upcoming legislative and presidential elections, aiming to identify their electoral programmes and assist voters in their choice.

10 major themes, serving to identify the programmes and ideas of political parties “in excruciating details in the political, security, economic and social fields,"

The answers will be collected by UGTT to be analysed and integrated into an electronic platform, through which voters can inspect the programmes of the parties and candidates and identify their convergences and divergences.

This is the first program to be hit with a gag order by the US government, but it likely will not be the last. Instead, this gag order hopes to stimulate a programmatic shift in the way all Middle East studies programs who utilize Title VI funds teach about the Middle East and Islam.

As graduate students involved in the Duke-UNC Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies, we will not kowtow to the state—this state or any other. Our first preoccupation is critical thinking and academic freedom, which is integrally linked to the pursuit of justice. We reject the premise of this gag order and its underlying intentions. We stand against all forms of discrimination—racial, religious, gender, sexuality, class, age, ability, and otherwise—in particular as a result of state vision and rhetoric. We will not support imperialism, jingoism, and military hegemony, and we do not support the idea that these are necessary for maintaining peace in any nation, including the US.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has rolled the dice with a US$ 374 million bid to acquire storied British soccer club Newcastle United. If approved by Britain’s Premier League that nominally maintains a high bar for the qualification of aspiring club owners, Prince Mohammed would have demonstrated that he has put behind him an image tarnished by Saudi conduct of a five-year long war in Yemen, the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, systematic abuse of human rights and, more recently, the kingdom’s badly-timed oil price war with Russia.

the kind of financial muscle that allows it to acquire trophies that enable it to project itself in a different light and garner soft power rather than financial gain at a time of a pandemic and global economic collapse.

Aramco, the Saudi national oil company, was reported to be talking to banks about a US$10 billion loan to help finance its acquisition of a 70% stake in Saudi Basic Industries Corp (SABIC). The deal would pour money into the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund.

Qaboos wielded an exceptional degree of autonomy and authority within the Omani power structure, grounded in his historic role as the unifier and builder of the modern Omani state. It is doubtful that the new sultan, Haitham bin Tariq al-Said, will be able to monopolize power to the same degree, especially given Oman’s economic challenges, which will require buy-in and collaboration to be met successfully

In the rest of the Gulf monarchies, the establishment of the modern bureaucratic state was accompanied by the formation of dynastic rule, as members of the ruling house were integrated into the governing structure as ministers holding key portfolios. This power sharing didn’t happen in Oman, or not to the same extent. At the time of his passing, Qaboos not only ruled, but ran the government as prime minister, maintaining almost all of the sovereign portfolios – defense minister, foreign minister, and supreme commander of the armed forces – while also holding the reins of the economy as finance minister and head of the board of governors of the central bank. The main theorist of dynastic monarchy, Michael Herb, has stated: “While the Al Saud rule Saudi Arabia, and the Al Sabah Kuwait, Qabus rules Oman.”

It is particularly noteworthy that the ruling family council declined to exercise its constitutional power to select the next ruler, instead deferring to the will of Qaboos as expressed in a letter opened before the public. This implies that the new sultan is not indebted to his family for his position

The uncertainty and high stakes involved in the election confirms the importance of genuine electoral competition within the bounds of the Iranian political system and the serious role given to popular input and participation — as opposed to other Muslim states in the Middle East.

The degree of mobilization, campaigning, investment and consensus-building within the conservative camp was unprecedented in the past two decades

While Rouhani had relied on the reformists since his 2013 election, he adopted their rhetoric in the final stretch of the campaign to a degree above and beyond his prior bounds.

Al Hirak al Chaabi, or the Popular Movement, is an independent, popular movement that was started in the northern Moroccan city of Al Hoceima in October 2016 by local inhabitants who were fed up with the status quo. The protests have grown significantly in the last months, despite numerous attempts by authorities to quell the movement, which has now spread throughout the country. Although it is not associated with any political party or organization, a number of political and civil society groups have expressed their solidarity with the movement. Between October 2016 and May 2017, the protesters’ demands evolved from mainly socioeconomic grievances into a more potent political message; slogans used in the protests virulently denouncing the Makhzen’s rampant corruption, poor governance, and outright appropriation of the nation’s resources

Demonstrations were initially confined to the Rif, which is an Amazigh-majority region that has been marked by persistent social marginalization and economic deprivation ever since the establishment of Morocco’s territorial borders. Yet, they have now boiled over. The country is now witnessing a spate of violence in Al Hoceima and the Rif region, as well as in the country’s largest cities of Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakech, Meknes and others

the Makhzen’s bare, yet sophisticated, politics of repression throughout the kingdom, and more specifically in the Rif

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) is worried about the way Egyptian media outlets are being taken over by businessmen linked to the government and intelligence services. The regime’s domination of the media continues to grow and is even affecting pro-government media.

Al Hayat was quietly taken over at the end of August. The new owner’s identity has not yet been officially announced but several Egyptian media outlets have reported that it was acquired by Falcon, a successful Egyptian security company whose CEO is a former senior military intelligence officer and a former head of the radio and TV regulatory agency.

the financial pressure came shortly after Al Wafd’s representatives in parliament expressed their opposition to the government’s controversial plan to hand over two strategic islands, Tiran and Sanafir, to Saudi Arabia

Tunisia’s Amazigh-speaking population, estimated to be less than 1 percent of the country’s population of 11 million, is much smaller. Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, and his successor, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, both intent on forging national unity around the identity of the majority Arab population, pursued policies that oppressed and marginalized the group. So it should come as little surprise that Tunisia’s Amazigh saw the 2011 revolution as a chance to speak up about their grievances, revive their heritage, and preserve it from extinction.

Since 2011, many Amazigh have organized to push for more cultural and historical recognition. Houcine Belghith is a member of the Club of Amazigh Culture, a civil society that has taken advantage of post-revolutionary freedoms to overcome the long years of silence. “In the past, we were stripped of our right to be who we are, to protect our identity, and to speak our language,” he said. “They excluded us, marginalized us.”

Bourguiba’s strategy for marginalizing the Amazigh included resettlement plans aimed at pushing them to integrate with their Arab neighbors — a policy that succeeded to a considerable degree. Even so, though, a few isolated communities survived