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Like Western investors, the kingdom’s elites are uncertain about what the new order means for the country’s economy. The new Saudi leadership has indeed created new opportunities, but many of the deep structural barriers to diversification remain unchanged. The bulk of the public sector remains bloated by patronage employment, the private sector is still dominated by cheap foreign labor, and private economic activity remains deeply dependent on state spending. Addressing these challenges could take a generation — and it will require patience, creativity, and a clearer sense of priorities.

While a band of Al Saud brothers used to rule collectively with the king as a figurehead, decision-making has now become centralized under one man

ruthlessness and willingness to take risks radically at odds with the cautious and consensual political culture of the Al Saud clan

Why did the Health Ministry prohibit the private sector from selling PCR tests to citizens? Why did it only bless one private sector company, which offered the service at double the price of its central laboratories?

The ministry had designated its central laboratories as the sole PCR test providers, charging LE1,050 per test. Then testing shortages helped foster a black market for tests, a Health Ministry official told Mada Masr. But the government has endorsed just one private company to provide testing: Prime Speed Medical, in which Tamer Wagih, a former executive of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s 2014 election campaign, is a major investor.

because the government does not recognize the reference lab’s results, its positive results are not included in Egypt’s official coronavirus numbers

The program has the ambitious objective of reducing the role of state-owned enterprises—in which the IMF includes military-owned companies—and encouraging their replacement with “inclusive private sector led growth.” Indeed, Egypt’s Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly called for just that last year, saying he is aiming for the share of private investment in Egypt’s economy to rise from 30 percent to 65 percent in the coming three years. However, when one examines the market conditions in Egypt and globally, it becomes clear that such an expansion of private investment is clearly unrealistic.

a massive parallel market for hard currency emerged, with its own exchange rate. The parallel market even operated internationally, with Egyptian expatriate workers paying their Saudi rials or Kuwaiti dinars to dealers in the countries where they worked, who then had partners in Egypt who would disburse Egyptian pounds to awaiting relatives at the black-market rate. In 2015, before new reforms were introduced, the central bank governor at the time Hisham Ramez estimated that as much as 90 percent of Egypt’s remittances were being lost to the parallel market, circumventing the country’s official banking system and starving banks of much needed hard currency liquidity. For perspective on the seriousness of this issue, remittances in recent years have brought more dollars to Egypt than Suez Canal revenue, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and tourism combined.

Inflation already pushed past 20 percent last month and this is only the beginning of a year or more of price corrections as markets absorb the latest dramatic devaluation of the country’s currency. While in 2016 and 2017 consumers cut back on beef and chicken, replacing them with eggs as a source of protein and fats, eggs today are too expensive for many, leading the government to encourage the consumption of chicken legs.

a solar mega-project that is supposedly going to end Morocco's dependency on energy imports, provide electricity to more than a million Moroccans, and put the country on a “green path.”

This analysis examines the project through the lens of the creation of a new commodity chain, revealing its effects as no different from the destructive mining activities taking place in southern Morocco.

What seems to unite all the reports and articles written about the solar plant is a deeply erroneous assumption that any move toward renewable energy is to be welcomed. And that any shift from fossil fuels, regardless of how it is carried out, will help us to avert climate chaos. One needs to say it clearly from the start: the climate crisis we are currently facing is not attributable to fossil fuels per se, but rather to their unsustainable and destructive use in order to fuel the capitalist machine. In other words, capitalism is the culprit, and if we are serious in our endeavors to tackle the climate crisis (only one facet of the multi-dimensional crisis of capitalism), we cannot elude questions of radically changing our ways of producing and distributing things, our consumption patterns and fundamental issues of equity and justice. It follows from this that a mere shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy, while remaining in the capitalist framework of commodifying and privatizing nature for the profits of the few, will not solve the problem. In fact, if we continue down this path we will only end up exacerbating, or creating another set of problems, around issues of ownership of land and natural resources.

the generals ruling Egypt since President Hosni Mubarak's overthrow were annoyed at his outspoken criticism of how they manage the media.

Egypt's January revolution has smashed the fear barrier that once forced journalists to temper their coverage of state affairs and avoid criticism of the head of state. The most outspoken were ostracized, fired and occasionally imprisoned.

The army has sent instructions to editors telling them to "refrain from publishing any items -- stories, news, announcements, complaints, advertisements, pictures -- pertaining to the Armed Forces or to commanders of the armed forces without first referring to the Morale Affairs Department and the Department of Military Intelligence and Information Gathering."

Like other Gulf states, Oman does not grant citizens freedom of expression or the right to choose their leader, but it does provide citizens a range of material advantages: public sector jobs, subsidies, free health care and education, a free plot of land, a pension and no income tax.

Oman’s public debt has skyrocketed since oil prices declined in 2014, going from less than 5% of Oman's gross domestic product to nearly 60% last year. Until 2023, annual budgets were already expected to be in the red. But the 2020 fiscal deficit is expected to be four times higher than previously forecasted because of the double shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and plunging oil prices, credit rating agency Fitch estimated.

the cash-strapped Omani government is expected to cut down on public expenditures and impose austerity measures. But such a move would revamp the model of governance that has prevailed since the late Qaboos bin Said ascended to the throne in 1970

The bread riots are symptoms of a crisis tracing back to last November, when the International Monetary Fund approved a loan of $12 billion to Sisi’s regime. The loan agreement requires Egypt to fix its chronic budget deficit through substantial cuts in subsidies and other forms of public spending. The agreement also necessitates steps to encourage the private sector to boost job creation and growth.

the Egyptian army has used the agreement to punish the lower classes while maximizing its commercial gains. The military establishment, which fully controls the economic reform plan, has selectively implemented the loan’s conditions. While it enthusiastically reduces subsidies to impoverished civilians, it has expanded its domination of many economic sectors and reaped huge profits at the expense of the private sector.

generals in uniform manage monopolistic conglomerates of unaudited, untaxed enterprises, such as commercial farms, food packaging mills, construction companies, pharmaceutical plants, gas stations, fisheries, and cement and steel factories

Oman was rocked by demonstrations as young people took to streets in cities across the country to protest a lack of jobs and economic opportunity. The unrest fell just weeks after the government, led by Oman’s new ruler, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, introduced a 5 percent value-added tax (VAT) as part of a long-delayed fiscal reform package that included other cuts to state spending and plans to introduce an income tax.

Demonstrations over economic grievances in the Gulf’s most indebted state have occurred sporadically since the 2011 “Arab Spring”. The country’s previous ruler, the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said, managed to quell protesters by offering them generous state handouts. The new sultan responded to events in May in a similar fashion, promising nearly 15,000 public-sector jobs and another 15,000 jobs in the private sector to be funded by a $500 government stipend. But that strategy will likely delay reform designed to trim bloated state budgets and jump-start the country’s private sector to generate more jobs.

While Oman has less breathing room than its wealthier neighbours to successfully reform its economy, the delicate balancing act playing out there between reining in state spending and creating economic opportunities for young people lays bare a dilemma facing other Gulf nations.

Supporters of King Abdullah argue that the attention paid to Prince Hamzah is evidence that, in contrast to the other Arab Spring movements, the protests here are essentially conservative. The wave of demonstrations that broke out last week was set off not by any expressed yearning for freedom, they say, but by the end of fuel subsidies that threatened to bankrupt the country. His loyalists also say that at its base the protest movement is driven by opposition to King Abdullah’s program of economic liberalization and privatization, a sharp break with King Hussein.

The opposition movement has directed special hatred toward King Abdullah’s glamorous Palestinian wife, Queen Rania, whose influence the organizers have cited as one of their top complaints. Tensions between East Bank natives and Palestinian immigrants, who make up about half of Jordan’s population, are the major fissure in Jordanian politics. And while East Bank natives have dominated the public sector, Palestinians have flourished in the private sector and stand to gain from liberalization.

“When the people choose their government, they will accept the government’s decisions — even a price hike — because then it is a decision of the people, too,” said Obada al-Ali, 22, a medical student at a rally in Irbid, Jordan’s second-largest city. “It is not just a matter of money. It is about the will of the people.”

Egypt's currency market reforms are inflicting a heavy toll on many private sector wheat traders struggling to secure shipments for the world's largest wheat importer.

Egypt imports over 10 million tonnes of wheat annually, mostly by the state. State grain buyer GASC told Reuters it had no payment delays as a result of the new regulation. But the private sector, responsible for about 4.5 million tonnes of imports, is hurting. "The bank lets you deposit $50,000 per month. Most of my shipments are worth $700,000. So I'm supposed to wait 14 months to pay my supplier?" asked a trader at a small wheat importer.

The currency reforms are part of Egypt's broader efforts to project an investment-friendly image ahead of an economic summit this weekend in Sharm el-Sheikh.

Tunisia has secured greater press freedom than many of the Arab Spring countries, but local journalists told CPJ that with elections slated for this year, challenges including funding, transparency, and government pressure remain

Despite a ban on foreign funding, many of the independent journalists who spoke with CPJ said they believe Gulf money is secretly pouring in to campaigns, although they often lack the means to expose it. Businessmen and politicians are also using privately owned media companies and the government is harnessing public broadcasters to further their political agendas.

Journalists speak privately of money from the United Arab Emirates flowing to establishment politicians and funds from Qatar to Islamists but there is little published evidence of this.

Due to the lockdown and curfew implemented since March 25, most businesses in Saudi Arabia are either suspended or have reduced their activities. As a result, employees have become a heavy burden for companies, as most cannot afford to pay them wages while they stay home. Several companies announced the closure of their branches, entirely, including Taiba Investments, Saudi Airlines Catering, and Al-Andalus Property Company SJSC.

The Saudi government announced the consequences of coronavirus as a force majeure. And, on April 3, the government issued a royal decree allocating $2.4 billion to compensate Saudi citizens who work in the private sector in facilities affected by the pandemic. However, such bounteous support might only reduce the problem, not solve it.

the question is how long this generous support from the Saudi government will continue. Oil prices are still lower than what the Saudis need to support Vision 2030, which is expected to have a budget of no less than $54 billion. Oil prices are currently affected because of the decline in demand due to the pandemic and the oil war with Russia, which ended on April 12, after OPEC agreed to an output cut of 9.7 million barrels per day.

A trove of emails, documents and legal filings reviewed by Bloomberg News, as well as interviews with former insiders, reveal the extent of the services Rowland and his private bank provided to one of its biggest customers, Mohammed bin Zayed, better known as MBZ, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto ruler of the United Arab Emirates. Some of the work went beyond financial advice. It included scouting for deals in Zimbabwe, setting up a company to buy the image rights of players on the Abu Dhabi-owned Manchester City Football Club and helping place the bank’s chairman at the time on the board of Human Rights Watch after it published reports critical of the Persian Gulf country.

a 2017 plan devised by the bank for an assault on the financial markets of Qatar, a country that had just been blockaded by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain for allegedly sponsoring terrorism

a coordinated attack to deplete Qatar’s foreign-exchange reserves and pauperize its government

Al Jazeera spoke to numerous affected migrant workers, including driving instructors, salon staff, baristas, chefs, private taxi drivers, small business owners, and hotel and hospitality staff. Most of them have not received any assistance from their employers and are afraid of complaining.

Qatar's labour ministry also did not respond to Al Jazeera's request for comment but the country's Government Communications Office (GCO) said, "The government has put measures in place to guarantee salaries are paid on schedule and in full."

Qatar's government said it encourages workers to lodge their complaints with the ministry via a phone call, text or email. However, to encourage workers to cast their fears aside and come forward to complain - and to ensure compliance on the employers' part - the government needs to "name and shame businesses" and "remove or reform absconding laws", according to Vani Saraswathi, director of projects at Migrant-Rights.Org.

five years in and with little progress in sight, cracks are appearing in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s flagship project to diversify the oil-driven Saudi economy. Neom’s former employees raised concerns that bringing the giga-project out of the realm of science fiction might never happen. Architecture experts have called it “insane.” Sources inside the royal circle no longer shy away from lashing out at MBS’ ever-changing ideas, “mood swings,” “terrible tempers” and fear-based leadership.

“The general concern is this will turn out like for the Shah of Iran, developing schemes that become incredibly detached from reality and no one will tell him to refocus,” a source familiar with the dynamics of Saudi Arabia’s royal family told me, on condition of anonymity

the risk of the Crown Prince ending up in an echo chamber cemented by yes-men. Power consolidation under MBS is unprecedented in Saudi Arabia’s recent history, moving the kingdom’s system from “one of consensus within the family to one-man rule.”

since the early 2000s, when Bashar al-Assad came to power and loosened the country’s restrictions on private schools and colleges, educational institutions run or influenced by the Qubaysiyat have become ubiquitous in Syria

franchises across the Middle East and even as far afield as Europe and the Americas

family members who have watched wives, mothers, sisters or daughters burrow deeper into the organization do occasionally complain openly about the group’s peculiar ideas and practices

the media has become a weapon in the war over Egypt's future, diminishing the possibility of reaching any political accommodation

Islamist-run newspapers and broadcasters, along with Muslim Brotherhood government officials, allege that secularist media moguls have put in motion a plot to topple the country's first democratically elected president

After taking office last year, he replaced many executives who served during the Mubarak era and told staff that they should include all perspectives in their coverage. He also removed a rule preventing women who wear a headscarf from appearing as presenters and focused on reducing expenditures to tackle more than 20 billion Egyptian pounds (Dh10.8bn) of debt held by the state media

This controllable prosecutor-general, against which almost the entire prosecutorial corps protested and nearly succeeded in firing, was used quite clearly at will to go after the private media and the opposition as a direct extension of Morsi and the Brotherhood, while substantially legally shielding the Brotherhood at the same time.

In another breach of revolutionary consensus, Morsi and the Brotherood tightened control over state media and retained the nationally rejected role of information minister, already abolished briefly after the toppling of Hosni Mubarak. State-owned papers and channels were subjected to appointments of allied or controllable leaderships. The media often ran familiar propaganda-esque headlines that seemed taken out of the Mubarak days. Furthermore, the press did not provide neutral and balanced coverage of events, and state TV was almost always forced to host a Brotherhood guest on every talk show, or at the very least not host an opposition figure on his own. Reports of guest blacklists also began to surface once more. Charges of “insulting the president” and “contempt of religion” began to pile up against media figures, often made by Brotherhood allies rather than directly by the Brotherhood (though the presidency did press some charges before retracting them under local and international pressure). Morsi and the Brotherhood seemed to care very little about fixing the problematic legislative framework for media, and gradually appeared to find it handy, especially with a prosecutor-general that was under full control. 

Although the original claim was that the Shura Council would only rubber stamp consensus legislation until the lower house would be elected, it was turned into a full parliament. It discussed far-reaching and controversial drafts, including: a non-governmental organization law that was widely seen as capable of stifling civil society in Egypt; divisive electoral and political rights laws that were criticized as favoring the Islamists; and even a disastrous judicial reform law that would have axed around 3,500 existing judges in an already choking legal system. The latter draft was openly seen as a move to get rid of judges that were problematic to the Brotherhood’s expansionary plans, while there were wide fears of intentions to replace them with a new generation of more sympathetic judges or outright Brotherhood members.

To understand what's happening in Egypt, it's important to distinguish between at least two separate struggles that are playing out, the outcomes of which will shape Egypt's ongoing revolution for some time to come.The first is a factional conflict within the ruling elite

another, more critical struggle unfolding too, between those fighting to destroy the old authoritarian system that for decades has denied them political and economic agency, that plunders Egypt's public wealth in the name of private profiteers and arrests, tortures and kills those daring to defy it – and those seeking to protect it.

Morsi insisted he would reach out to all political factions and heal Egypt at this turbulent time; he promised consensus not partisanship, a constitution that would reflect the national will and not the private interests of the Brotherhood, a revolutionary pursuit of social justice and an end to state violence against its citizens.It was those promises that handed him the presidency: millions reluctantly gave Morsi their vote because they believed in his commitment to the revolution. He failed on every measure, and now – despite the cries of those who believe democracy involves nothing more than a single ballot twice a decade – many Egyptians are unwilling to hang around for another three years to hold him to account and get their revolution back on track.