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"n response to the growing discrepancy between the steadily rising steering ambitions and theincreasing fragmentation of social and political life, governance networks are mushrooming. Gov-ernance through the formation of networks composed of public and private actors might help solvewicked problems and enhance democratic participation in public policy-making, but it may alsocreate conflicts and deadlocks and make public governance less transparent and accountable. Inorder to ensure that governance networks contribute to an effective and democratic governing of society, careful metagovernance by politicians, public managers and other relevant actors is neces-sary. In this paper, we discuss how to assess the effective performance and democratic quality of governance networks. We also describe how different metagovernance tools can be used in thepursuit of effective and democratic network governance. Finally, we argue that public metagover-nors must develop their strategic and collaborative competences in order to become able to meta-govern governance networks"

Ao nos debruçarmos sobre a questão pesqueira, salta a vista a problemática associada a estrutura de governança seja ela baseada nas especies ou nos territórios. A marca distintiva é a existência de múltiplos níveis regulatórios, os quais se consideram , ora como excludente, ora como complementar. A nossa hipótese é que sua configuração deve refletir a situação e, portanto, em principio todas as alternativas combinadas ou não, são plausíveis. Este argumento ganha evidência quando consideramos a literatura que trabalha a Teoria das redes de governança, a exemplo do que se pode extrair do artigo "Governance network theory:past, present and future de Erik-Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan, disponibilizado acima. "The reallocation of authority upwards, downwards, and sideways from central states hasdrawn attention from a growing number of scholars in political science. Yet beyondagreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensusabout how it should be organized. This article draws on several literatures to distinguish twotypes of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, non-intersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of governance conceivesof task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtuesof each type of governance"

"During the last decade there has been increased attention to the study o social-ecological systems (SESs). Social-ecological systems link social and ecologicalsystems (Berkes and Folke 1998). The inherently transdisciplinary eld o SES-scholars has ocused on resilience o SESs and ways to govern resilience o SESs.Resilience is dened as the ability o a system to withstand perturbations andremain within the same stability regime (Holling 1973). Governance o SESsocuses on enhancing the ability o the system to remain within the desired stabilityregime, or to create opportunities to move toward a desired stability regime. Forexample, suppression o orest res lead to the accumulation o uel (the trees thatare not burned) creating conditions or later res o such intensity that the soiland seed banks are damaged. This may prevent the orest system rom recoveringrom such a re. A more appropriate policy is to use small controlled burn tomaintain the resilience o the orest system.The study o SESs was initiated by ecologists who became interested inthe social dimensions o ecosystem management (Berkes and Folke 1998). Butincreasingly we see social scientists adopting an SES approach, taking into accountmore explicit ecological dynamics o resource systems than earlier social scienceresearch. The work o Ostrom (1990) originally ocused on the dimensions o thesocial system o a common resource. In recent work the study o the commons isapproached rom an SES perspective where natural resources and social systemshave equal representation and equal detailed analysis (Anderies et al. 2004;Ostrom 2007,2009).In this special issue a series o papers has been collected to urther the rontiero the study o the governance o social-ecological systems."

This publication is an important step to enhance governancecapacities for the world's protected area systems. Part 1 provides an overview of the four different protected area governance types recognised by the IUCN, with plenty of examples of what they are, why they are important and howthey might be integrated into coherent and effective protectedarea systems. It also addresses the complex question of what constitutes good governance in various circumstances. Part 2 offers practical guidance for a multi-stakeholder group willing to embark on the process of assessing, evaluating and improving governance for a given system

Um ponto de partida de Ostrom é sua condenação as panaceias, em especial " Those researchers and practitioners who propose panaceas for solving complex environmental problems make two false assumptions. First they assume that all problems of a general type, such as air pollution or maintaining species diversity, are similar; and second, all of the people involved have the same preferences, information, and authority to act. Neither is true [...] . Mas, não cai no outro extremo, onde admite-se que "Sustaining natural resource systems is far too important a problem for scholars to espouse "doing nothing." We must make every effort to cope with these really wicked problems involved in avoiding ecological disasters." Sua posição é proativa, ainda que precavida: " But, we also need to recommend caution about overusing simple blueprints and to develop diagnostic theories drawing on the lessons that can be learned from theoretical and empirical research on why some governance systems lead to improved performance of social-ecological systems and others lead to failures (Ostrom 1990). " E apoiada em evidências, tal como as sistematizadas por Brock and Carpenter (2007) illustrate how models of adaptive control processes in the Northern Highlands Lake District of Wisconsin are prone to panacea traps [...] . We will continue doing more harm than good if panaceas are recommended to solve resource problems rather than learning how to match potential solutions to a serious diagnosis of specific problems in the ecological and social context in which they are nested. Similarly, assuming that effective property-rights systems will simply evolve as resource units become more valuable (e.g., Demsetz 1967) is not an adequate understanding of the challenge of matching property rights and governance systems to particular ecological systems (Fitzpatrick 2006) O desafio portanto, segundo ela é Moving beyond panaceas to develop a cumulative capacity to dia

O artigo de Andres Thiel e sus companheiros segue em anexo. É do tipo um "achado". De um lado, a questão, Como as características dos recursos naturais renováveis e o framework regulatório (no caso o europeu) explica a infraestrutura institucional local (a estrutura de governança) ? Do outro o referencial neoinstitucionalista é usado com a precisão de um artesão, sem afetação, para develarmos como as características dos recursos afeta a transação, e, em seguida juntar com os condicionantes da regulação para enquadrar as instituições locais (a estrutura de governança). E como se não bastasse, faz uso do ABDUCTIVE APPROACH de forma criativa e com excelente resultado. "This paper scrutinizes determinants of regional-level institutions regulating the provisionof biodiversity and ecosystem services. Two cases of maintaining ecosystem services,provided by quite different resource systems, are compared: the protection of wolvesand the management of a high nature value agroforestry system, scattered fruit treemeadows. Taking an abductive approach, we suggest that the distinct characteristicsof resources - in particular the mobility of resource units - and differences in theoverarching European regulatory framework - the obligation to protect wolves versusvoluntary compensation payments to maintain scattered fruit tree meadows - largelyexplain the existing institutional structures at regional level. Cost-effectiveness considera-tions concerning the transaction costs of governance seem to act as determinants for thedesign and implementation of regional institutions. Livestock depredated by wolves isprotected by a liability rule and hierarchical governance structures. In turn, maintenance of scattered fruit trees is subject to a property rule and voluntary long-term agreements."

Aqui a Elinor Ostrom ressalta as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is difficult and costly to design institutions that successfully exclude some potential beneficiaries from access to CPRs, many CPRs are in fact open-access resources where anyone who wishes can gain access and appropriate resource units. Given that

Evidenciada a natureza hibrida (nem mercado, nem estado) dos recursos de propriedade comum, Elinor Ostrom considera as instituições como um capital social que evolui ao longo do tempo: "[....] institutions are a form of social capital resulting from the time and effort invested by their creators in improving their productivity. The institutions, of course, have not remained entirely fixed over their lifetimes. Ali of them are complex and have had to change over time", mas chama atenção para sua relativa estabilidde, já que para ela as " institutions are, however "robust" or in "institutional equilibrium" in the sense defined by Shepsle (1989, 143), who regards "an institution as 'essentially' in equilibrium if changes transpired according to an ex ante plan (and hence part of the original institution) for institutional change." Esta estabilidade associa as rules-in-use (mas não associa a um conjunto de regras particlares) que se origina dos "[....] the appropriators (users) designed their own rules, created organizations to undertake the day-to-day management of their resources, and modified their own rules over time in light of past experience. The specific rules-in-use, however, differ markedly from one case to the next. Given the great variation in rules-in-use, the sustainability of these resources and their institutions cannot be cxplained by the presence or absence of particular rules. That the rules do differ partly explains the sustainability of these systems. By differing, the rules take into account specific attributes of the physical systems, cultural views of the world, and the economic and politicai relationships that exist in the setting. Without different rules, appropriators could not take advantage of the positive features of a local CPR or avoid potential pitfalls that could occur in one setting but not in others.

Diante das múltiplas possibilidades que se abrea configuração da estrutura de governança é pertinente considerar-se a contribuiçpão da "governance network theory" , em especial sua orientação teórica e normativa, ressaltando seus conceitos chaves e suposições, além do tipo de resposta que ela oferece

This presentation will: Discuss challenges faced in protected area management in the Caribbean Explore why a rights-based approach to conservation is critical Address transparency of government and corporate actors in relation to the use of natural resources in protected areas Address rights of the public to participate in protected area management Address accountability of government actions to stated policy goals Present case studies about the Portland Bight Protected Area in Jamaica , la Reserva de Biosfera Jaragua-Bahoruco-Enriquillo in Dominican Republic, and Caracol Bay in Haiti

Fundamental. The term "common-property resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policy analysis. In this paper we develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.

Em Neither Market nor State - Governance of Common-Pool Resource in the Twenty-First Century, Elinor Ostrom volta a problemática semantica dos recursos de propriedade comum, tendo como base uma distinção entre estoque e fluxo do recurso natural renovavel, ressaltando as implicações econômica da distinção entre o estoque e fluxo de recursos de propriedade comum. O estoque ela associa a um bem público e o fluxo a um bem privado, mas dado os custos de estabelecer uma propriedade muitos dos recursos de propriedade comum são de fato de acesso livre. Para ela é, portanto necessário que, c.p, é necessário dar-se um tratamento institucional distinto ao estoque e ao fluxo (pode ser agasalhadas institucionalmente no direito de propriedade (ITQs,TURFs, e, em decorrência comprado e vendido), mas chama atenção que o mero estabelecimento de um direito de propriedade sobre o fluxo pode não ser suficiente para assegurar a sustentabilidade da exploração do estoque, por meio do que chama atenção para a relevância da de estrutura de governança por meio da qual se revela toda a hibridez das organizações e instituições necessárias . Ihering Guedes Alcolforado "Let me now provide some definitions, so we can share a common language for analysis. First, let us define common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable resource units over time. CPRs share two characteristics: (1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units harvested by one individual are not available to others (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990). The first characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as public goods. The second characteristic is held in common with those goods and services referred to as private goods in the economics literature. Given that it is diff

Ontem na Banca de Jéssica Cruz, no Instituto de Biologia da UFBA inciamos uma interloculação em torno da institucionalização das funções ecosistêmicas embutidas nos Sistemas Socioecológico. O ponto de partida da discussão foi a instrumentalização e problematização da tipologia de funções ecosistêmicas proposta por DE GROOT et al A typology for the clasification, description and valuation of ecosystems functions, goods and services in Ecological Economics, 2002. v.42, pp. 393-408. A problematização foi feita por um dos orientadores, em cuja tese de doutoramento descontrói a compreensão vigente da função ecosistêmica da biodiversidade e da especie, ancorando-a no organismo (Ver NUNES-NETO, Function in Ecology: an organizational approach in Biol. PHilophy, 2013 (no prelo). A partir da sua reconstrução das funções ecosistêmicas, chamamos atenção para a possibilidade de considerar, do ponto de vista do policymaking, os diferentes tipos de funções, não como concorrentes, mas como complementar, e assim poder considerá-las com funções associadas aos estoques e as funções vinculadas ao fluxo, integrando no programa de pesquisa dos sistemas socioecológicos a Teoria das Funções Ecosistêmicos. Resultado: ponto de pauta para um grupo em processo de articulação que deverá tratar da relação da Economia Ecológica com a Teoria da Funções Ecosistêmicas.

Addressing this need, we present a framework on collective action, conflict prevention, and social-ecological resilience, linking local stakeholder dynamics to the broader institutional and governance context. Accounting for both formal and informal relationships of power and influence, as well as values and stakeholder perceptions alongside material interests, the framework aims to provide insight into the problem of (re)building legitimacy of commonpool resource management institutions in conflict-sensitive environments. We outline its application in stakeholder-based problem assessment and planning, participatory monitoring and evaluation, and multi-case comparative analysis.

Este artigo faz, na primeira parte, uma sistematização do que se produziu recentemente sobre Governança Ambiental (GA) e (detalhe) insere no conjunto a contribuição de Transition Management de Kemp, Loorbach &, Rotmans ( 2007), sua velha conhecida. Em função disso pode funcionar como a ponte, por meio da qual se pode deslizar para as múltiplas manifestações da Governança Ambiental e não necessariamente climática e global,o foco do artigo.

O ponto de partida do artigo é a constatação que "Privatization is often viewed to provide positive stimulus for the economy that can lead to the better-ment of society", o que se pode complementar, com a constatação de E Ostrom, segundo a qual, em algumas situações o regime privado se coloca como uma panancéia. Naste mesma linha, os autores chamam atenção que que qando " the appropriate governance systems are not functionally in place, the unwanted effects of privatization can have deleterious consequences." "This paper highlights the conse-quences of undesirable privatization and the emergent unwanted privatization tendencies of the coastal commons, particularly in the developing countries such as the Philippines. The lack of coherent policies,standards, and weak enforcement of policies in leasing the coastal commons (e.g. various unregulatedaqua culture) in the Philippines in particular, have resulted to alarming displacement, deprivation and marginalization of fishing and farming communities and have degraded many coastal zone areas. Os autores tratam do usos multiplos do solo, In addition, poorly planned coastal tourism and housing development projects in the foreshore areas,inappropriate reclamation of coastal areas, illegal usurpation of indigenous peoples rights over ancestral domain areas, and conversion of fishing and fish farming zones into ecotourism zones further aggravated this scenario. Equitable access to resources is of paramount importance to afford concerned stakeholders greater participation in terms of developing greater capacity for coastal communities to engage and demand for improved coastal governance e an important facet of public dministration often identifiedas one of the challenges in managing the commons. Co-management with an Ecosystem-Based Management approach as core operational mechanism provides opportunities to enhance policy formulation and implementation, secure community safety nets, and facilitate the crea

A propriedade cada vez mais é tratada a partir das suas funções, as quais se dividem em dois grandes grupos nos quais se alojam suas funções sociais e regulativas, ambas posicionadas na interface do direito publico com o direito privado. Ao tratamos dos Sistemas Sócio-Ecológicos a exemplo das Reservas Extrativistas Marinhas e os Territórios, a partir da perspectiva da propriedade temos uma oportunidade de explorar suas possibilidades funcionais, tanto no âmbito social como regulativo. Aqui temos um ponto de partida para a exploração das suas possibilidades regulativas. Com relação aos Sistemas Sócio-Ecológico, consulte Marco A. Janssen, Resilience and adaptation in the governance of social-ecological systems

Fisheries collapse can be prevented by expanding the reach of accords among artisanal fishermenand exclusive marine reserves to include a system of environmental services payments and self-monitoring for avoided overfishing, especially in critical reproductive periods. The case of theArraial do Cabo Marine Extractive Reserve in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is explored, identifying theinstitutional features of an appropriate set of contracts in this direction. Extending the concept of environmental service payments (PES) to fisheries is a logical approach in Brazil, where thefederal government already makes regular compensatory payments to fishermen during the "defeso" period of highest reproductive activity. Unfortuna tely, this system is fraught with free-ridership since there is little effective monitoring and in many fishing areas, limited collectiveresource management restraint. PES for the Arraial do Cabo RESEX goes beyond a strictly fishingorientation to include the closely linked marine tourism sector. In studies to gauge the importanceto fishermen, local residents and tourists of the marine reserve and its environmental attributes,tourists were found more likely to express willingness to contribute toward the RESEX‟ protection, at a higher per visit amount than were either fishermen or their neighbors. Payments bytourists would complement funds obtained from compensation and royalties from conflictingactivities such as port operations and petroleum exploration, together with value-added taxrevenues (ICMS-Ecológico) to finance the structuring of the RESEX management capacity toeffectively monitor and control overfishing and external incursions

Este livro tem uma característica impar, a despeito de tratar de uma questão bem específica, tem a estrutura de um manual, pavimentando a estrada para quem queira entrar no campo. "This book presents alternative concepts, tools, methods, and conservation strategies, many of which were developed with IDRC support. It shows how to use these methods in a practical way and places a strong emphasis on ecosystem management and participatory decision-making. Natural resource managers, particularly of fisheries and aquatic resources, in developing countries, will find this book very useful, as will managers in other sectors because of the increasing spillover of management approaches across resource sectors. This book will also be of use to representatives from all government agencies, development institutions, nongovernmental organizations, international executing agencies, and donor agencies that are involved in fisheries management, particularly for the small-scale sector."