TURFs & TERRITÓRIOS PESQUEIROS

"Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) have spread in Chile, since the late 1990s, in the form of commons institutions. TURFs are presented by some scholars as a social-ecological success; by others as showing economic and compliance problems. Studies looking at the material conditions in which fishers produce and reproduce their livelihoods, and in which TURFs emerge, are scarcer. Ostrom's theory on the commons claims that certain collective action conditions have to be met to become thriving commons institutions. Our hypothesis is that while institutions are moulded by local material conditions, such as geographical location and social embeddedness, these impose challenges and constraints upon fishers influencing TURFs' long-term viability. How are collective action conditions influenced when the new TURFs commons do not emerge in tabula rasa contexts but in occupied spaces? Do material conditions influence TURFs' sustainability? This paper set out to explore these conditions. Huentelauquén's and Guayacán's TURFs (central-northern Chile) were chosen, as they represent two extremes (rural-urban; on private property-on State/municipal property; mainly diver - mainly fisher) contexts in which TURFs have emerged. We mainly used Participatory Rural Approach (PRA) tools triangulated with other qualitative methods. This study shows that both social embeddedness (private/State lands), and geographical location (rural/urban) matter, resulting in different access to the coast for different TURFs, thus determining some important differences between our cases in at least three relevant areas: entrance, social relations between the fishers' organization (entitled the TURFs) and the landowner (private or municipal/State) and the existence or absence of fishing and general infrastructure. Competition for space among key actors seems to affect the process of acquiring a TURF as well as the conditions conductive to collective action. TURFs' assessments s

"To halt degradation of benthic resources in Chile, management areas (MAs) were set up under the Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) framework in the late 1990s. Integrated into the global market, MAs have since expanded along the Chilean coast, involving thousands of small-scale artisanal fishers. This paper analyses how economic criteria relates to social and ecological performance of Chilean MAs, by applying TURFs, commons and co-management theory to two cases: MAs Peñuelas and Chigualoco. To collect and analyse data Participatory Rural Appraisal tools, interviews and official statistics and reports were used. Our results show that MAs' economic benefits are connected to fluctuations on the global market. Adapting to changing world market prices then becomes paramount. TURFs' main goal is ecological conservation, but achieving this seems to depend on meeting fishers' livelihoods; failure to do so likely results in failure to meet conservation objectives. A serious weakness of the Chilean TURFs system is that it does not pay enough attention to fishers' livelihoods or to the global market context. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship between good economic benefits and social sustainability. But irrespective of economic performance, fisher organizations have been empowered and gained increased resource control with the TURFs system. At policy level, a differentiated and more flexible system could be more suitable for existing heterogeneous MAs and their particular economic, social and ecological challenges. For improved economic sustainability and resource conservation, a system with multiple-species managing MAs could be promoted as well. Finally, to enhance theory of commons, co-management and TURFs, we argue for greater acknowledgement of TURFs' social benefits in addition to economic assessments. More attention should also be paid to global market conditions of which MAs are dependent and in which they are embedded: macrostructures tha

"Scholars of common property resource theory (CPR) have long asserted that certain kinds of institutional arrangements based on collective action result in successful environmental stewardship, but feedback and the direct link between social and ecological systems remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangements contribute to sustainable mangrove fisheries in coastal Ecuador, focusing on the fishery for the mangrove cockle (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis), a bivalve mollusk harvested from the roots of mangrove trees and of particular social, economic, and cultural importance for the communities that depend on it. Specifically, this study examines the emergence of new civil society institutions within the historical context of extensive mangrove deforestation for the expansion of shrimp farming, policy changes in the late 1990s that recognized "ancestral" rights of local communities to mangrove resources, and how custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, affect the cockle fishery. Findings from interviews with shell collectors and analysis of catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common property regimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources, mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shell sizes, but the benefits are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors feel further marginalized by the loss of gathering grounds, potentially deflecting problems of overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove fisheries are weakly managed by the State. Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, the explicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at different levels, examining the relationship between collective action and the environment through quantitative approaches at the fishery level and qualitative analysis at the level

Neste trabalho do Grupo GEOGRAFAR -UFBA, Kassia Rios busca identificar e pesquisa de identificar e demarcar o território produtivo dos pescadores artesanais de Acupe, tendo em conta que estar diante de "um processo de construção, mobilização e reconhecimento da comunidade local", como uma condição para enfrentar o desafio posto pela Campanha Nacional pela Regularização dos Territórios das Comunidades Tradicionais Pesqueiras.

"TERRA E ÁGUA:Territórios dos pescadores artesanais de São Francisco do Paraguaçu-Bahia" rabalho do Grupo GEOGRAFAR da UFBA. O objetivo do trabalho é " a análise da produção do espaço e da territorialização dos pescadores artesanais na terra e na água, focado na localidade de São Francisco do Paraguaçu, situada no município de Cachoeira, Recôncavo Baiano. Identifica "uma especificidade territorial que desencadeia um processo de formação de territórios articulados (terra e água) que é muito complexo, envolvendo uma gama muito grande de agentes, interesses e conflitos. Este recorte nos fornecerá as condições de possibilidades de reflexão dos direitos baseados no local, onde se aninha os TURFs, já que opera com um conceito que reflete uma realidade bastante complexa que transborda o universo marítimo no sentido estrito, mas em vez de nos afastar da problemática, nos apresenta novos ângulos, já que identifica processo sociais que são determinantes da relação dos pescadores artesanais com os recursos pesqueiros.

"  1 O PESCADOR ARTESANAL E A GEOGRAFIA: DIÁLOGOS POSSÍVEIS Ednizia Ribeiro Araujo Kuh"

"RIOS, Da Produção do Espaço a Construção dos Territórios Pesqueiros - Pescadores artesanais e carcinicultores no Destrito de Acupe - Santo Amaro - BA" Neste trabalho do Grupo GEOGRAFAR -UFBA, Kassia Rios busca identificar e pesquisa de identificar e demarcar o território produtivo dos pescadores artesanais de Acupe, tendo em conta que estar diante de "um processo de construção, mobilização e reconhecimento da comunidade local", como uma condição para enfrentar o desafio posto pela Campanha Nacional pela Regularização dos Territórios das Comunidades Tradicionais Pesqueiras.

DECOMMISSIONING (offshore Installations), FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE Decommissioning of offshore installations can cause problems both for the fisheries and for aquaculture industry, including fish farming, but of rather different kinds. For the fisheries, any problems are largely related to the offshore phase of decommissioning, and include restrictions on access to areas, the impacts of pollution (including noise), and interference with fishing activities if installations and pipelines are left in place. For aquaculture, potential problems are largely related to onshore activities, and include restricted access to areas and the impacts of pollution (including noise). Risks to the reputation of fish products on different markets could be a problem both for the fisheries and the aquaculture. Reputation is a sensitive factor, and easily influenced in a negative direction. Pollution incidents could have a major impact, especially at local level. Experience shows that it takes a long time to restore a good reputation. There are no special arrangements for compensating for this type of loss other than the normal compensation rules. This issue should therefore be taken into special consideration if permits are to be issued for areas where fisheries and aquaculture are important.

Aqui temos mais um desses "betas" que se multiplicam no mundo virtual. ´No caso, é um agregador que foi mobilizado para potencializar a difusão das informações sobre os TURFs $ TERRITÓRIOS PESQUEIROS. A gestão da distribuição continua sobre o comando do Diigo.

FORMS OF PROPERTY IN RIGHTS-BASED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Management measures may be classed as input and output controls.Input controls regulate fishing effort. Output controls directly controlcatch amounts. Input controls such as licensing may create limited prop-erty rights, although more sophisticated output control mechanismshave been adopted by a number of countries. These include territorialuse rights in fisheries (TURFS), stock use rights in fisheries (SURFS), andcommunity development quotas (CDQs). Increasingly common are quota based systems, such as the individual quota (IQ), the individual fishingquota (IFQ), individual vessel quotas (IVQ), the individual transferableshare quota (ITSQ), and the individual transferable quota (ITQ). Each of these approaches shall be considered in turn. DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS A number of States have implemented, in varying degrees, rights-basedfishing entitlements. These include Australia, Canada, Iceland, NewZealand, and the United States. The domestic implementation and sta-tus of these measures is considered for each country in turn. AN APPRAISAL OF RIGHTS-BASED MEASURES In light of domestic experiences of property rights-based instruments it isappropriate to remark upon the success of quota systems to date. Quotas systems have attracted critical comment in three broad areas: economic success, conservation and management effectiveness, and allocationalconcerns. At this point it is worth emphasising that because legal reason-ing is consequence sensitive, these factors have a role to play in the law-making process. These are considered in turn, before some final remarksare made on how the legal construction of property rights more generally has influenced the development and operation of rights-based fishing measures.

"This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangementscontribute to sustainable mangrove sheries in coastal Ecuador, ocusing onthe shery or the mangrove cockle (  Anadara tuberculosa and  A. similis ), abivalve mollusk harvested rom the roots o mangrove trees and o particularsocial, economic, and cultural importance or the communities that dependon it. Specically, this study examines the emergence o new civil societyinstitutions within the historical context o extensive mangrove deorestationor the expansion o shrimp arming, policy changes in the late 1990s thatrecognized "ancestral" rights o local communities to mangrove resources, andhow custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, aect the cockleshery. Findings rom interviews with shell collectors and analysis o catch-per-unit-eort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common propertyregimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources,mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shellsizes, but the benets are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors eel urther marginalized by the loss o gathering grounds, potentially defecting problems o overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove sheries are weakly managed by the State.Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) ramework, theexplicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at dierent levels,examining the relationship between collective action and the environment throughquantitative approaches at the shery level and qualitative analysis at the level"

"En el capítulo primero, se definieron las redes de políticas públicas comopatrones más o menos estables de relaciones sociales entre actoresinterdependientes, que toman forma alrededor de los problemas y/o de losprogramas de políticas. Las redes de políticas públicas, forman el contexto en elque tiene lugar el proceso político."

"The idea that decision-making processes andmanagement in public policy and publicadministration are complex has entered theminds of practitioners and scholars in publicadministration. Insights from theories oncomplexity, however, have hardly been usedin public administration and management. Inother social sciences, like economics forinstance, an evolutionary approach hasreceived far more attention. The questionwhether such a complexity theory approachcould help to increase our understanding ofpublic management phenomena is an intri-guing one. In this volume the reader will finda selection of articles on public managementusing insights from the complexity theory.Before we present the seven articles, whichall deal with notions from the complexitytheory and apply them to phenomena in thepublic sector, we will briefly introduce somebasic ideas concerning this theory. Key words Complexity theory, public administration,complex decision-making, complex systems Vol. 10 Issue 3 2008 287-297Public Management Review ISSN 1471-9037 print/ISSN 1471-9045 online Ó 2008 Taylor & Francishttp://www.tandf.co.uk/journalsDOI: 10.1080/14719030802002451 "

"n response to the growing discrepancy between the steadily rising steering ambitions and theincreasing fragmentation of social and political life, governance networks are mushrooming. Gov-ernance through the formation of networks composed of public and private actors might help solvewicked problems and enhance democratic participation in public policy-making, but it may alsocreate conflicts and deadlocks and make public governance less transparent and accountable. Inorder to ensure that governance networks contribute to an effective and democratic governing of society, careful metagovernance by politicians, public managers and other relevant actors is neces-sary. In this paper, we discuss how to assess the effective performance and democratic quality of governance networks. We also describe how different metagovernance tools can be used in thepursuit of effective and democratic network governance. Finally, we argue that public metagover-nors must develop their strategic and collaborative competences in order to become able to meta-govern governance networks"

: The social-ecological systems framework was designed to provide a common research tool for interdisciplinary investigations of social-ecological systems. However, its origin in institutional studies of the commons belies its interdisciplinary ambitions and highlights its relatively limited attention to ecology and natural scientific knowledge. This paper considers the biophysical components of the framework and its epistemological foundations as it relates to the incorporation of knowledge from the natural sciences.

Tine De Moor's 'Silent Revolution'. Reconsidering her theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of institutions for the collective management of resources

Addressing this need, we present a framework on collective action, conflict prevention, and social-ecological resilience, linking local stakeholder dynamics to the broader institutional and governance context. Accounting for both formal and informal relationships of power and influence, as well as values and stakeholder perceptions alongside material interests, the framework aims to provide insight into the problem of (re)building legitimacy of commonpool resource management institutions in conflict-sensitive environments. We outline its application in stakeholder-based problem assessment and planning, participatory monitoring and evaluation, and multi-case comparative analysis.

"To halt degradation o benthic resources in Chile, managementareas (MAs) were set up under the Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)ramework in the late 1990s. Integrated into the global market, MAs have sinceexpanded along the Chilean coast, involving thousands o small-scale artisanalshers. This paper analyses how economic criteria relates to social and ecologicalperormance o Chilean MAs, by applying TURFs, commons and co-managementtheory to two cases: MAs Peñuelas and Chigualoco. To collect and analyse dataParticipatory Rural Appraisal tools, interviews and ocial statistics and reportswere used. Our results show that MAs' economic benets are connected tofuctuations on the global market. Adapting to changing world market prices thenbecomes paramount. TURFs' main goal is ecological conservation, but achievingthis seems to depend on meeting shers' livelihoods; ailure to do so likely resultsin ailure to meet conservation objectives. A serious weakness o the ChileanTURFs system is that it does not pay enough attention to shers' livelihoods orto the global market context. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship betweengood economic benets and social sustainability. But irrespective o economicperormance, sher organizations have been empowered and gained increasedresource control with the TURFs system. At policy level, a dierentiated andmore fexible system could be more suitable or existing heterogeneous MAsand their particular economic, social and ecological challenges. For improvedeconomic sustainability and resource conservation, a system with multiple-species managing MAs could be promoted as well. Finally, to enhance theory o commons, co-management and TURFs, we argue or greater acknowledgement"