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At a press conference around midnight, Mousavi declared himself "definitely the winner" based on "all indications from all over Iran."

"It is our duty to defend people's votes. There is no turning back," Mousavi said, alleging widespread irregularities.

Bringing any showdown into the streets would certainly face a swift backlash from security forces. The political chief of the powerful Revolutionary Guard cautioned Wednesday it would crush any "revolution" against the Islamic regime by Mousavi's "green movement."

The morning after Iran's June 12 presidential election, Iranians booted up their computers to find Fars News, the online mouthpiece of the Islamic Republic's security apparatus, heralding the dawn of a "third revolution." Many an ordinary Iranian, and many a Western pundit, had already adopted such dramatic language to describe the burgeoning street demonstrations against the declaration by the Ministry of Interior that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the sitting president, had received 64 percent of the vote to 34 percent for his main challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi. But the editors of Fars News were referring neither to the protests, as were the people in the streets, nor to the prospect that the unrest might topple the Islamic Republic, as were some of the more wistful commentators. Rather, the editors were labeling the radical realignment of Iranian politics that they wish for. This realignment would complete the removal of the old guard, as did the "first" revolution of 1978-1979, and consolidate the rule of inflexible hardliners, as did the "second revolution" symbolized by the US Embassy takeover of 1979.

The number of deeply conservative voters, of the sort who back Ahmadinejad, has not exceeded 12 percent of the electorate since 1993. True, in 2003, these voters seized control of the city councils of major cities, not because of a surge in the popularity of their agenda, but because of the widespread abstention of those who had lost hope in the effectiveness of reformist candidates.

But instead greater mass participation in the local elections of 2007 cost the hardliners their grip upon local councils. In Tehran, Ahmadinejad's men lost two thirds of their seats and had to share power with reformists and moderate conservatives.

As of this writing, there are at least half a dozen campaign headquarters that are currently semi-active or not active at all but are all awaiting the go-ahead from their would-be conservative candidates. Amongst them are those of the current mayor of Tehran, one that belongs to a former foreign minister, one belonging to a current cabinet minister, one to a recently fired minister and one to the former head of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohsen Rezaii. 

who has been one of the most trenchant critics of Ahmadinejad government from the right flank. A few months ago, he put forth the idea of an inclusive coalition government, one that would encompass many of the moderates and a few of the radicals. The

, that Ahmadinejad's re-election is a foregone conclusion

Tehran Bureau: Faulty Election Data The best evidence for the validity of the arguments of the three opponents of the President for rejecting the results declared by the Interior Ministry is the data the Ministry itself has issued. In the chart below, compiled based on the data released by the Ministry and announced by Iran’s national television, a perfect linear relation between the votes received by the President and Mir Hossein Mousavi has been maintained, and the President’s vote is always half of the President’s…. Statistically and mathematically, it is impossible to maintain such perfect linear relations between the votes of any two candidates in any election — and at all stages of vote counting. This is particularly true about Iran, a large country with a variety of ethnic groups who usually vote for a candidate who is ethnically one of their own.

But, just a few hours later, a center that had been set up by Mr. Mousavi in Gheytarieh (in northern Tehran) for monitoring the election and vote counting, was attacked by armed security agents. They ransacked the center, destroyed computers, and attacked the staff. Supporters of Mr. Mousavi intervened and arrested 8 security agents. The police was called to take them to prison, but the police released the attackers.

Mr. Makhbalbaf then declared that, “I have been authorized by Mr. Mousavi’s campaign to officially declare that a political coup has taken place, in order to declare Mr. Ahmadinejad the victor.”

On the basis of what we know so far, here is the sequence of events starting on the afternoon of election day, Friday, June 12. Near closing time of the polls, mobile text messaging was turned off nationwide Security forces poured out into the streets in large numbers The Ministry of Interior (election headquarters) was surrounded by concrete barriers and armed men National television began broadcasting pre-recorded messages calling for everyone to unite behind the winner The Mousavi campaign was informed officially that they had won the election, which perhaps served to temporarily lull  them into complacency But then the Ministry of Interior announced a landslide victory for Ahmadinejad Unlike previous elections, there was no breakdown of the vote by province, which would have provided a way of judging its credibility The voting patterns announced by the government were identical in all parts of the country, an impossibility (also see the comments of Juan Cole at the title link) Less than 24 hours later, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamene`i  publicly announced his congratulations to the winner, apparently confirming that the process was complete and irrevocable, contrary to constitutional requirements Shortly thereafter, all mobile phones, Facebook, and other social networks were blocked, as well as major foreign news sources.

The willingness of the regime simply to ignore reality and fabricate election results without the slightest effort to conceal the fraud represents a historic shift in Iran’s Islamic revolution. All previous leaders at least paid lip service to the voice of the Iranian people. This suggests that Iran’s leaders are aware of the fact that they have lost credibility in the eyes of many (most?) of their countrymen, so they are dispensing with even the pretense of popular legitimacy in favor of raw power. The Iranian opposition, which includes some very powerful individuals and institutions, has an agonizing decision to make. If they are intimidated and silenced by the show of force (as they have been in the past), they will lose all credibility in the future with even their most devoted followers. But if they choose to confront their ruthless colleagues forcefully, not only is it likely to be messy but it could risk running out of control and potentially bring down the entire existing power structure, of which they are participants and beneficiaries.

Mr Mousavi applied to authorities for his own newspaper licence after his self-nomination in March, but he has yet not been awarded one.

At 25 rials (one fils) per copy, Andishe Nou costs much less than the cheapest newspaper in circulation. State-sponsored papers cost about 500 rials while privately produced publications can cost up to 5,000 rials.

Despite his new methods, Mr Mousavi’s campaign mainly relies on support from ordinary individuals and does not have a big campaign operation.

On Monday, June 15, in what may have appeared as a slight softening of his initial enthusiastic response to the official results of the presidential election, Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, called for a “careful” evaluation of complaints submitted by reformist challenger Mir Hussein Mousavi to the Guardian Council.  Subsequently, on Tuesday, the Speaker of the Council, after meeting with representatives of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s opponents, announced the Council’s readiness to conduct a recount of votes from any and all disputed voting districts.

“I have written a letter to the Guardian Council and described the various irregularities,” he announced, “even though I have no hope in the Council. Many of its [twelve] members did not preserve their neutrality during the election process and openly supported the incumbent candidate.” Mousavi’s proposed solution is not a recount, but a cancellation of the results and a new election altogether

For his part, Mohtashamipour proposed the formation of what he labeled a Truth-finding Committee to investigate electoral irregularities and allegations. The Committee, he insisted, would consist of three representatives of Grand Ayatollahs (maraje’ taqlid), four persons representing the candidates, one employee of the Interior Ministry who has proven his neutrality during the election, one member of the Guardian Council with similar conditions accompanied by a university law professor and an unbiased judge as recommended by the Bar Association, the Attorney General, the Head of the Judicial Branch, and the Head of Iran’s General Inspection Organization. As none of the Grand Ayatollahs have supported Ahmadinejad in the election, the arrangement would severely limit the authority of both the Council and the Interior Ministry.

6.15pm: Iranian filmmakers Marjane Satrapi and Mohsen Makhmalbaf just held a press conference in Brussels to say they have a document proving election fraud, Adnkronos news agency reports.The document, seen here, says that Mousavi won the election with 19m votes, with cleric Mehdi Karroubi coming in second and Ahmadinejad coming in third. Satrapi and Makhmalbaf said the document had come from the Iranian electoral commission, and is dated June 13, the day after the election.

Saeed reports that Mousavi's wife Zahra Rahnavard today joined injured students at Tehran University, and condemened violence by the government and riot police.

A friend of the Guardian in Tehran writes that her Gmail account has been filtered, and that her internet service provider said it has been ordered to cut all emails, messaging software and many websites, especially foreign news outlets.

Strangers chatted about what Rafsanjani might say and expressed happiness at the turnout. The non-religious asked the religious about how to execute namaz (prayers). For many, it was their first time at this decades-long public ritual.

Some in the crowd, obviously novices unfamiliar with the conventions of Friday Prayer, began applauding and whistling. Pro-Mousavi unity aside, I feared that the religious men and women sitting nearby would take offense at this inappropriate behavior. But they merely tittered — and astonishingly, the cleric was clapping along!

Another phenomenal spectacle, a first in the history of Friday Prayers in Iran (and perhaps in a large part of the Muslim world), men and women were not segregated. Thy prayed side by side. This did not appear to offend the religious-minded; they seemed to accept the situation. Women and girls who by Sharia law can pray only when covered with a prayer-chador were doing so in short manteaux, and this too did not upset the religious-minded. In fact, they were probably happy to see non-religious girls and women praying at all.

working hard to establish a public profile apart from hardliners led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and from progressives led by aggrieved presidential challenger Mir Hussein Mousavi.

The Larijani coalition is also gaining the backing of so-called traditionalists among the Islamic clergy. So far, the new faction has not enunciated a philosophical platform,

Ali Larijani is emerging as the public face of the faction, but behind him stand his very influential brothers and other relatives, according to a well-connected source. One of Larijani’s brothers is Sadegh, who is one of the 12 members of the powerful Guardian Council. Another is Mohammad Javad, a physicist and prominent political strategist. The Larijanis’ cousin, Ahmad Tavakoli, a prominent rightist politician and a member of parliament, is also believed to be an important player in the faction, as is Ali Motahari, another prominent rightist political operator who is Ali Larijani’s son-in-law.

Rafsanjani has created a multimillion-dollar electronic network under the aegis of the Expediency Council to set off alarm bells in case of suspicions of fraud, said one person close to his camp, who spoke on condition of anonymity. He's also dispatching members of his Kargozaran political party to monitor polling stations and the election desk at the Interior Ministry. He convened a regular series of meetings to alert journalists and activists to the possibility of cheating after Ahmadinejad purged longtime employees from the section of the ministry that monitors fraud about two months ago. "He has access to the intelligence systems of the government, and he can put pressure on the establishment," said Kaviani, who has attended the meetings. "The most important thing for him is to get rid of Ahmadinejad, no matter the cost, and he thinks that if there's no cheating Ahmadinejad won't win. All the efforts are to prevent Ahmadinejad to get 51%."

To help Mousavi further, Rafsanjani has thrown open the doors of the 300 branches of Azad University throughout the provinces to his supporters, allowing them to deliver speeches and organize inside their halls; they are often barred from using government facilities by local officials loyal to Ahmadinejad.

hundreds of activists, journalists and intellectuals

concerted campaign to link the protests with foreign intervention

With the exception of Yazdi, the arrests appeared to bypass political leaders and focus on their lieutenants.

He said, "I know the country's condition is better than all these gentlemen.  I know much of what they say about the condition of the country and economy is contrary to reality.  They are mistaken."

Mousavi also criticized the imbalanced competition ahead of the election, noting, "These elections are held under peculiar circumstances.  Thirty provincial and six national television channels cover the president's provincial visits, which are used for campaigning purposes. 

Last September, as the Ahmadinejad presidency entered its last year, Khamenei told Ahmadinejad and members of his cabinet, "Work as if you plan to work for another five years; imagine that this one year plus four more years are under your management.  Look at things, work, plan and act as if that is the case."

These particular opinion polls are fabrications published by supporters of the administration, aimed at assuring a presidential victory for president Ahmadinejad.

And to the question of whom would they actually vote for, 53.6 percent ticked Ahmadinejad, 21 percent Mousavi, 3.8 percent Karoubi and 1.7 percent Rezaei. Alef is managed by Ahmad Tavakoli, attributes the source of this poll to be professional centers in the country adding that it is confidential and not publishable.”

IRNA, the official news agency of the government under the control of Ahmadinejad and Saffar Herandi, which read as follows:

The harsh responses and treatment that intelligence and judiciary officials of the Islamic ‎Republic of Iran have embarked against a group of political and social activists who have ‎been promoting the idea of international monitoring of Iran’s forthcoming presidential ‎elections on June 12, 2009, indicate that they view this issue to be a red line not to be ‎crossed, and if done would not be tolerated. ‎

intelligence-judiciary agents to prevent a regular meeting of ‎the members of the Committee for Free, Healthy, and Fair Elections

ayatollah Khamenei, the leader of Iran, has directly engaged ‎himself in the issue by barring, through harsh and threatening language, presidential ‎candidates and their supporters from questioning the integrity of the elections.

please compare the _absolute_ numbers in a graphfor example, AZARBAYJAN:2004-reform/centrist: 950,0002004-conservative: 350,0002009-reform/centrist: 837,0002009-conservative: 1,131,000so reform/centrist decreased by 10% and conservative trippled!? even as people get younger, economy worse, and achmadenijad more unpopular?

Just from a cursory glance, you can see the official poll results don't make any sense. Look at one of the third party candidates, Karoubi. He is from Lorestan. in 2005, in the first round he took 55% of the vote in Lorestan. In these results, he takes only 5%.Extraordinarily unlikely.

city-level returns posted by the Iranian Interior Ministry on their website? These were posted by "Pejman" and translated by "Shaahin" in the comments thread to your previous post: http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/statistical-evidence-does-not-prove.html#comment-672782692382259870