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The morning after Iran's June 12 presidential election, Iranians booted up their computers to find Fars News, the online mouthpiece of the Islamic Republic's security apparatus, heralding the dawn of a "third revolution." Many an ordinary Iranian, and many a Western pundit, had already adopted such dramatic language to describe the burgeoning street demonstrations against the declaration by the Ministry of Interior that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the sitting president, had received 64 percent of the vote to 34 percent for his main challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi. But the editors of Fars News were referring neither to the protests, as were the people in the streets, nor to the prospect that the unrest might topple the Islamic Republic, as were some of the more wistful commentators. Rather, the editors were labeling the radical realignment of Iranian politics that they wish for. This realignment would complete the removal of the old guard, as did the "first" revolution of 1978-1979, and consolidate the rule of inflexible hardliners, as did the "second revolution" symbolized by the US Embassy takeover of 1979.

The number of deeply conservative voters, of the sort who back Ahmadinejad, has not exceeded 12 percent of the electorate since 1993. True, in 2003, these voters seized control of the city councils of major cities, not because of a surge in the popularity of their agenda, but because of the widespread abstention of those who had lost hope in the effectiveness of reformist candidates.

But instead greater mass participation in the local elections of 2007 cost the hardliners their grip upon local councils. In Tehran, Ahmadinejad's men lost two thirds of their seats and had to share power with reformists and moderate conservatives.

On Monday, June 15, in what may have appeared as a slight softening of his initial enthusiastic response to the official results of the presidential election, Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, called for a “careful” evaluation of complaints submitted by reformist challenger Mir Hussein Mousavi to the Guardian Council.  Subsequently, on Tuesday, the Speaker of the Council, after meeting with representatives of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s opponents, announced the Council’s readiness to conduct a recount of votes from any and all disputed voting districts.

“I have written a letter to the Guardian Council and described the various irregularities,” he announced, “even though I have no hope in the Council. Many of its [twelve] members did not preserve their neutrality during the election process and openly supported the incumbent candidate.” Mousavi’s proposed solution is not a recount, but a cancellation of the results and a new election altogether

For his part, Mohtashamipour proposed the formation of what he labeled a Truth-finding Committee to investigate electoral irregularities and allegations. The Committee, he insisted, would consist of three representatives of Grand Ayatollahs (maraje’ taqlid), four persons representing the candidates, one employee of the Interior Ministry who has proven his neutrality during the election, one member of the Guardian Council with similar conditions accompanied by a university law professor and an unbiased judge as recommended by the Bar Association, the Attorney General, the Head of the Judicial Branch, and the Head of Iran’s General Inspection Organization. As none of the Grand Ayatollahs have supported Ahmadinejad in the election, the arrangement would severely limit the authority of both the Council and the Interior Ministry.

Karroubi was certainly not the first senior figure to protest Mojtaba Khamenei’s intervention on behalf of the extreme right. Before him, Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, another former Speaker of the Majles and a close aid to Ayatollah Khamenei, had quietly protested the younger Khamenei’s meddling in the political process. (Nategh Nouri, a mid-rank cleric, heads the Supreme Leader’s Office of Inspection)

In the last year before the 1979 Revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei and two other clerics, Abbas Vaez Tabasi and Sayyed Abdolkarim Hasheminejad, formed a sort of leadership ring that led most of the demonstrations and political activities against the Shah in Mashhad and the Khorasan province, which was Iran’s largest province at that time.

Vaez Tabasi is now a powerful cleric who runs the shrine of Imam Reza (the Shiites’ 8th Imam), in Mashhad. He is believed to be a Rafsanjani ally.

After four years in office, Ahmadinejad has filled the Interior Ministry with cronies, many of whom have connections to the Revolutionary Guards. A source who participated in closed Interior Ministry planning sessions, speaking on condition of anonymity to EurasiaNet, says top ministry personnel openly stated during one session that a repeat of the 1997 election, in which the reformist candidate, Mohammad Khatami, scored an upset victory, would not be tolerated on June 12.

By the numbers, it would seem that the country’s vast election apparatus has the ability to guarantee a favorable outcome for Ahmadinejad. According to Kamran Daneshjoo, the Interior Ministry official responsible for overseeing the voting, there are 385,000 citizens who will be administering voting precincts. The Guardian Council is expected to deploy another 340,000 people to monitor the balloting. In addition, there will be hundreds of thousands of security personnel deployed on election day. Overall, the country has about 57 million citizens of voting age, meaning that roughly 1 in 60 Iranians of voting age will be involved in some aspect of conducting the election.

For one, they note that over 59 million ballots have been printed, far more than the number of registered voters

The harsh responses and treatment that intelligence and judiciary officials of the Islamic ‎Republic of Iran have embarked against a group of political and social activists who have ‎been promoting the idea of international monitoring of Iran’s forthcoming presidential ‎elections on June 12, 2009, indicate that they view this issue to be a red line not to be ‎crossed, and if done would not be tolerated. ‎

intelligence-judiciary agents to prevent a regular meeting of ‎the members of the Committee for Free, Healthy, and Fair Elections

ayatollah Khamenei, the leader of Iran, has directly engaged ‎himself in the issue by barring, through harsh and threatening language, presidential ‎candidates and their supporters from questioning the integrity of the elections.

Thirdly, in a departure from past practice, the Interior Ministry has changed the composition of electoral oversight committees charged with providing supervision on the electoral process. In the past, they were mostly made up of teachers, community elders and town notables. Today, a high percentage is chosen from the Basij. In small towns and communities where people know one another on a personal basis, the issue of voter intimidation can no longer be discounted. 

However, there are strong reasons to believe that these pre-8 February maneuverings, far from being serious efforts to topple Ahmadinejad, were scare tactics intended to force concessions out of the recalcitrant president. After all, the right is equally aware of the formidable array of forces ranging behind Ahmadinejad. This much was, in a rare moment of candor, admitted by one of the president's most truculent rightwing critics, Mosbahi Moghadam, the head of the parliament's economic sub-committee. "Mr Ahmadinejad already has 50 percent of the votes in his pocket," he told a newspaper reporter. 

Karoubi can appeal to many undecided voters particularly in the conservative and provincial regions

please compare the _absolute_ numbers in a graphfor example, AZARBAYJAN:2004-reform/centrist: 950,0002004-conservative: 350,0002009-reform/centrist: 837,0002009-conservative: 1,131,000so reform/centrist decreased by 10% and conservative trippled!? even as people get younger, economy worse, and achmadenijad more unpopular?

Just from a cursory glance, you can see the official poll results don't make any sense. Look at one of the third party candidates, Karoubi. He is from Lorestan. in 2005, in the first round he took 55% of the vote in Lorestan. In these results, he takes only 5%.Extraordinarily unlikely.

city-level returns posted by the Iranian Interior Ministry on their website? These were posted by "Pejman" and translated by "Shaahin" in the comments thread to your previous post: http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/statistical-evidence-does-not-prove.html#comment-672782692382259870

On the basis of what we know so far, here is the sequence of events starting on the afternoon of election day, Friday, June 12. Near closing time of the polls, mobile text messaging was turned off nationwide Security forces poured out into the streets in large numbers The Ministry of Interior (election headquarters) was surrounded by concrete barriers and armed men National television began broadcasting pre-recorded messages calling for everyone to unite behind the winner The Mousavi campaign was informed officially that they had won the election, which perhaps served to temporarily lull  them into complacency But then the Ministry of Interior announced a landslide victory for Ahmadinejad Unlike previous elections, there was no breakdown of the vote by province, which would have provided a way of judging its credibility The voting patterns announced by the government were identical in all parts of the country, an impossibility (also see the comments of Juan Cole at the title link) Less than 24 hours later, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamene`i  publicly announced his congratulations to the winner, apparently confirming that the process was complete and irrevocable, contrary to constitutional requirements Shortly thereafter, all mobile phones, Facebook, and other social networks were blocked, as well as major foreign news sources.

The willingness of the regime simply to ignore reality and fabricate election results without the slightest effort to conceal the fraud represents a historic shift in Iran’s Islamic revolution. All previous leaders at least paid lip service to the voice of the Iranian people. This suggests that Iran’s leaders are aware of the fact that they have lost credibility in the eyes of many (most?) of their countrymen, so they are dispensing with even the pretense of popular legitimacy in favor of raw power. The Iranian opposition, which includes some very powerful individuals and institutions, has an agonizing decision to make. If they are intimidated and silenced by the show of force (as they have been in the past), they will lose all credibility in the future with even their most devoted followers. But if they choose to confront their ruthless colleagues forcefully, not only is it likely to be messy but it could risk running out of control and potentially bring down the entire existing power structure, of which they are participants and beneficiaries.

At a press conference around midnight, Mousavi declared himself "definitely the winner" based on "all indications from all over Iran."

"It is our duty to defend people's votes. There is no turning back," Mousavi said, alleging widespread irregularities.

Bringing any showdown into the streets would certainly face a swift backlash from security forces. The political chief of the powerful Revolutionary Guard cautioned Wednesday it would crush any "revolution" against the Islamic regime by Mousavi's "green movement."