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The morning after Iran's June 12 presidential election, Iranians booted up their computers to find Fars News, the online mouthpiece of the Islamic Republic's security apparatus, heralding the dawn of a "third revolution." Many an ordinary Iranian, and many a Western pundit, had already adopted such dramatic language to describe the burgeoning street demonstrations against the declaration by the Ministry of Interior that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the sitting president, had received 64 percent of the vote to 34 percent for his main challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi. But the editors of Fars News were referring neither to the protests, as were the people in the streets, nor to the prospect that the unrest might topple the Islamic Republic, as were some of the more wistful commentators. Rather, the editors were labeling the radical realignment of Iranian politics that they wish for. This realignment would complete the removal of the old guard, as did the "first" revolution of 1978-1979, and consolidate the rule of inflexible hardliners, as did the "second revolution" symbolized by the US Embassy takeover of 1979.

The number of deeply conservative voters, of the sort who back Ahmadinejad, has not exceeded 12 percent of the electorate since 1993. True, in 2003, these voters seized control of the city councils of major cities, not because of a surge in the popularity of their agenda, but because of the widespread abstention of those who had lost hope in the effectiveness of reformist candidates.

But instead greater mass participation in the local elections of 2007 cost the hardliners their grip upon local councils. In Tehran, Ahmadinejad's men lost two thirds of their seats and had to share power with reformists and moderate conservatives.

n early March when parliament, in an unprecedented move in the Islamic Republic’s 30-year history, rebuffed the president’s move to lift state subsidies on essential items, including electricity and bread, and offset the higher prices with straight cash handouts to needy citizens.

When the president insisted on an "all-or-nothing" version of his subsidy plan, parliament had little choice but to reject the project, although the legislature did end up passing a $279 billion preliminary budget.

out-of-control spending has blown a gaping hole in the budget so that the country will face an estimated budget deficit of $46 billion.

As of this writing, there are at least half a dozen campaign headquarters that are currently semi-active or not active at all but are all awaiting the go-ahead from their would-be conservative candidates. Amongst them are those of the current mayor of Tehran, one that belongs to a former foreign minister, one belonging to a current cabinet minister, one to a recently fired minister and one to the former head of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohsen Rezaii. 

who has been one of the most trenchant critics of Ahmadinejad government from the right flank. A few months ago, he put forth the idea of an inclusive coalition government, one that would encompass many of the moderates and a few of the radicals. The

, that Ahmadinejad's re-election is a foregone conclusion

With the reappointment of Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaei, Hashemi Samareh and Masoud Zaribafan to several key posts in the new administration, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continued with his insistence on using close friends in the tenth administration.

hmadinejad also appointed Samareh Hashemi as his senior advisr and Masoud Zaribafan to head the Martyrs Foundation.  Previously, he had appointed Akbar Salehi to head the Atomic Energy Agency following Gholamreza Aghazadeh’s resignation. 

In another appointment, Baghaei was appointed to head the tenth administration’s Cultural Heritage Organization.  Also, it was announced that Parviz Davoudi will serve as the president’s advisor.  Mehrdad Bazrpash, who has been with Ahamdinejad since his time as Tehran’s mayor, was promoted from presidential advisor to vice president and head of the National Youth Organization.

Rafsanjani has created a multimillion-dollar electronic network under the aegis of the Expediency Council to set off alarm bells in case of suspicions of fraud, said one person close to his camp, who spoke on condition of anonymity. He's also dispatching members of his Kargozaran political party to monitor polling stations and the election desk at the Interior Ministry. He convened a regular series of meetings to alert journalists and activists to the possibility of cheating after Ahmadinejad purged longtime employees from the section of the ministry that monitors fraud about two months ago. "He has access to the intelligence systems of the government, and he can put pressure on the establishment," said Kaviani, who has attended the meetings. "The most important thing for him is to get rid of Ahmadinejad, no matter the cost, and he thinks that if there's no cheating Ahmadinejad won't win. All the efforts are to prevent Ahmadinejad to get 51%."

To help Mousavi further, Rafsanjani has thrown open the doors of the 300 branches of Azad University throughout the provinces to his supporters, allowing them to deliver speeches and organize inside their halls; they are often barred from using government facilities by local officials loyal to Ahmadinejad.

These particular opinion polls are fabrications published by supporters of the administration, aimed at assuring a presidential victory for president Ahmadinejad.

And to the question of whom would they actually vote for, 53.6 percent ticked Ahmadinejad, 21 percent Mousavi, 3.8 percent Karoubi and 1.7 percent Rezaei. Alef is managed by Ahmad Tavakoli, attributes the source of this poll to be professional centers in the country adding that it is confidential and not publishable.”

IRNA, the official news agency of the government under the control of Ahmadinejad and Saffar Herandi, which read as follows:

Political analyst Saeed Leilaz called the rebuke "unprecedented" and said it "clearly means that Khamenei doesn't insist that Ahmadinejad deserves to remain as president. That's the message."

Leilaz said Rezaei would have never entered the race without consultation with Khamenei first. His candidacy is "another indication that Khamenei is keeping his options open to deal with a president different from Ahmadinejad," he said. Notably, the largest conservative political faction, Jame-e-Rouhaniat-e-Mobarez, has not endorsed Ahmadinejad in the elections, saying it would have no preferred choice.

"Regarding the replacement in the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization, the president was strongly notified that the annexation of this organization to the tourism committee is not appropriate," the government daily Iran quoted Khamenei as saying. He ordered that the "situation remain as it was before."

He said, "I know the country's condition is better than all these gentlemen.  I know much of what they say about the condition of the country and economy is contrary to reality.  They are mistaken."

Mousavi also criticized the imbalanced competition ahead of the election, noting, "These elections are held under peculiar circumstances.  Thirty provincial and six national television channels cover the president's provincial visits, which are used for campaigning purposes. 

Last September, as the Ahmadinejad presidency entered its last year, Khamenei told Ahmadinejad and members of his cabinet, "Work as if you plan to work for another five years; imagine that this one year plus four more years are under your management.  Look at things, work, plan and act as if that is the case."

Foreign capital is fleeing to Dubai, and Tehran’s stock market has fallen by twenty per cent since May. Curiously, Ayatollah Khamenei issued an edict in October that gave sweeping new powers to Rafsanjani, who runs a government body known as the Expediency Council—a move widely seen as an effort to rein in Ahmadinejad. The new President, in other words, may be too hard-line for even the Supreme Leader.

After four years in office, Ahmadinejad has filled the Interior Ministry with cronies, many of whom have connections to the Revolutionary Guards. A source who participated in closed Interior Ministry planning sessions, speaking on condition of anonymity to EurasiaNet, says top ministry personnel openly stated during one session that a repeat of the 1997 election, in which the reformist candidate, Mohammad Khatami, scored an upset victory, would not be tolerated on June 12.

By the numbers, it would seem that the country’s vast election apparatus has the ability to guarantee a favorable outcome for Ahmadinejad. According to Kamran Daneshjoo, the Interior Ministry official responsible for overseeing the voting, there are 385,000 citizens who will be administering voting precincts. The Guardian Council is expected to deploy another 340,000 people to monitor the balloting. In addition, there will be hundreds of thousands of security personnel deployed on election day. Overall, the country has about 57 million citizens of voting age, meaning that roughly 1 in 60 Iranians of voting age will be involved in some aspect of conducting the election.

For one, they note that over 59 million ballots have been printed, far more than the number of registered voters

By official estimates, there are currently 13 million to 15 million Iranians of marrying age; to keep that figure steady, Iran should be registering about 1.65 million marriages each year. The real figure is closer to half that.

The real estate boom was a disaster for middle-income Iranians, particularly young men seeking marriage partners. And many of those who have married and moved in with in-laws are finding that inflation is eating away at their savings, meaning it will take years, rather than months, to get their own place. The resulting strains are breaking up existing marriages — this past winter, local media reported that a leading cause of Iran's high divorce rate is the husband's inability to establish an independent household. Many others are concluding that marriage is best avoided altogether. (See the Top 10 Ahmadinejad-isms.)

The gap between rural and urban incomes has been widening because the rural areas appear to have missed the recent boom or President Ahmadinejad’s redistribution.

Some of the gap is spurious because of the lower cost of living in rural areas (mainly housing), but the change is probably not.  

The rural-urban gap has been one of the main drivers of changes in inequality, especially in the last four years (more on this in a future post).     The gap narrowed under Mr. Moussavi’s watch, and widened during the Rafsanjani and Khatami’s administrations.  In the last three years of President Khatami’s government rural expenditures were rising faster than urban expenditures and the gap closed somewhat.  

Thirdly, in a departure from past practice, the Interior Ministry has changed the composition of electoral oversight committees charged with providing supervision on the electoral process. In the past, they were mostly made up of teachers, community elders and town notables. Today, a high percentage is chosen from the Basij. In small towns and communities where people know one another on a personal basis, the issue of voter intimidation can no longer be discounted. 

However, there are strong reasons to believe that these pre-8 February maneuverings, far from being serious efforts to topple Ahmadinejad, were scare tactics intended to force concessions out of the recalcitrant president. After all, the right is equally aware of the formidable array of forces ranging behind Ahmadinejad. This much was, in a rare moment of candor, admitted by one of the president's most truculent rightwing critics, Mosbahi Moghadam, the head of the parliament's economic sub-committee. "Mr Ahmadinejad already has 50 percent of the votes in his pocket," he told a newspaper reporter. 

Karoubi can appeal to many undecided voters particularly in the conservative and provincial regions

At a press conference around midnight, Mousavi declared himself "definitely the winner" based on "all indications from all over Iran."

"It is our duty to defend people's votes. There is no turning back," Mousavi said, alleging widespread irregularities.

Bringing any showdown into the streets would certainly face a swift backlash from security forces. The political chief of the powerful Revolutionary Guard cautioned Wednesday it would crush any "revolution" against the Islamic regime by Mousavi's "green movement."

Amid talk that the recent election was a silent coup carried out by elements of the hardline Revolutionary Guard after eight years of reformist rule, Western embassies have been scrambling to understand what the Hojjatieh stands for and to what extent the influence of its teachings will be felt in the new government's domestic and foreign policies.

The Islamic society he belonged to at Alm-u Sanat University where he attended was an extreme traditional and fundamentalist group that contained a large number of students from the provinces and maintained grass-roots links with the Hojjatieh. The society's anti-leftism also chimes with reports that Ahmadinejad was pushing for a takeover of the Soviet Embassy alongside or instead of the US compound in Tehran during the 1979 revolution.

Haqqani theological school

In foreign affairs, the president has already registered two negative points: the first was that he was forced to cancel his previously accepted trips to the OAU in Libya and the Non-aligned movement meeting in Egypt, both indicating a depreciation of the stature of Mr. Ahmadinejad (and the country) domestically and on the international scene as noted by observers.