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Cole Blum

secession footer - 1 views

  • the Russian Federation. For that purpose it was even willing to fight a full- scale war, the first round of which (1994-96) it won, at least militarily.
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      WIlling to fight a full scale war to maintain the illusion of independene
  • All this has called for both a radical re-moulding of Chechen national identi- ty and a thorough revision of its collective past. The Chechen authorities, the national movement, and in fact all the Chechen intelligentsia – that is, both professional historians and (even more so) many other persons with higher edu- cation – have been involved in this revision of their national past and rewriting of their history on both the academic and popular levels. It all began in 1989, when Gorbachev’s glasnost reached the periphery, and has been steadily growing in momentum ever since. The main milestones in its development have been 1) in 1990, the appointment of a Chechen as republican secretary of the party for the first time since the second world war;5 2) what man
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      all good stuff
  • e new Chechen historical narrative is still strongly linked to Soviet narratives, ways of arguing and moulds of thinking. It tries to prove, for example, that its national heroes were ‘progressive’ and ‘popular’, not ‘reactionary’. It tends, like its progenitor, to be openly political, to make value judgements and moralize and to overlook facts inconsistent with its thesis. Moreover, even emo- tionally it is still very much connected to the ex-USSR, and tries, for example, to prove the Chechens’ loyalty and heroism in the ‘Great Patriotic War’, as the Sec- ond World War is still called in the ex-USSR
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      attempt to portray themselves as progressive not reactionary and its loyalty to wwII though trying to de sovietize
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • The Chechens (or the Vainakhs) are an ancient civilized nation. They are descendants of the Hurrians, the founders of the ancient Kingdoms of Mittani and Urartu15 and are, therefore, one of the civilizations of the ancient Near East. Since antiquity they were in contact with, and influ- enced, the peoples of the steppes.16 The Soviet narrative is, thus, reversed: the Chechens are the Russians’ elders in age and civilization and, by impli- cation, are also the ones who indirectly civilized them. (2) The Vainakhs have inhabited their present territory continuously since at least the 4th century BC.17 The northern districts, now populated by Rus- sians, had also been settled by the Chechens until Russian colonization dislodged them. This argument aims to counter the Soviet thesis that the Chechens migrated from the mountains into the lowlands only in the 17th and 18th centuries,18 and the possible political implications of this. (3) They have formed states and polities over the ages. A Vainakh state – Durzuketi – existed in the Northern Caucasus in the 4th and 3rd centuries BC and one of its princesses was the first queen of Georgia.19 Other states of which they were part included Serir (5th-9th centuries AD), Alaniya (10th-11th centuries) and Simsim (16t
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      ways they are re-writing history
  • Although Russian ‘robbery raids’ against peaceful Cheche
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      important wording- peacful chechnya- Chechnya says armed conflict 94-96 started three hundred years b4 at first gazavat
  • beginning with Moscow’s attempt to depose the newly elected president Jokhar Dudaev by paratroopers in November 1991, and escalating into a full-scale invasion in December 199
    • Cole Blum
       
      This is a good article about how nationalism, while it should be a good thing, can turn into something very harmful.
    • Cole Blum
       
      This is interesting how you can easily get people very excited and get them ready to fight just by getting them loyal to something, as shown in this example. Nationalism is a humongous example of this.
    • Cole Blum
       
      This is actually Mckenzies article.
Duncan Flippo

Commentary: Nasty Nationalism | The National Interest - 0 views

  • Unfortunately, Gamsakhurdia's commitment to democracy and rule of law was not as strong as his romantic Georgian nationalism, which encouraged chauvinist and intolerant tendencies among his fellow Georgians. Not only did he favor ethnic-Georgian dominance in a population composed of nearly one-third non-Georgians, he dreamed of Georgia as a regional great power, a kind of Caucasian fulcrum between Russia, Turkey and Iran.
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      shows how Gamsakhurdia favored the Georgian race and encouraged discrimination
  • Tensions increased with all the country's minorities (including Armenians, Mengrelians and Azeris), but with real ferocity in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There had been serious interethnic violence in both regions starting in 1989, which led to South Ossetia's secession in 1990.
  • Gamsakhurdia was deposed in early 1992 in favor of an unelected Shevardnadze.
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      Georgians quickly put an end to Gamsakhurdia's nationalist ideas
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • Gamsakhurdia went into exile but repeatedly tried to return to power. In response, Shevardnadze sent forces into Abkhazia in September 1992 to root out support for his rival, leading to the brutal Georgian-Abkhaz war of the following year
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      So the need to get rid of this guy leads to a "brutal" war. sounds like a bad outcome
  • Although ignored in the West, the first instances of what later was called "ethnic cleansing" did not take place in Yugoslavia, but in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and were perpetrated by radical Georgian nationalists under the slogan "Georgia for the Georgians.
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      Sounds a lot like the reading. Georgis seems no different thatn tha balkan region when it comes to nationalist ideas
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      This is the best resource I have found so far with respect to nationalism in Georgia. It has more info with less clutter than anything I have come across so far.
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      I found this
  • Many observers believed that with patience, time and wisdom, Tbilisi might have restored its authority in South Ossetia by peaceful means. Now we shall never know. President Saakashvili's almost-inexplicable decision to unleash a massive artillery bombardment of Ossetian civilians and then attempt a swift reconquest of the region has permanently altered the political landscape.
  • The key period for both South Ossetia and Abkhazia was during the Soviet breakup and subsequent emergence of an independent Georgia under the leadership of an extreme romantic nationalist, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Gamsakhurdia was a distinguished Georgian writer and a noteworthy anti-Soviet dissident. A genuine human-rights figure, he was imprisoned by then-Georgian Communist Party boss Eduard Shevardnadze. Gamsakhurdia led nationalist forces in a drive for independence during the Gorbachev years. He became Georgian-parliament chairman in 1990 and was overwhelmingly elected president in May 1991, before the Soviet collapse.
  •  
    talks about Georgian nationalism under Gamsakhurdia
Mckenzie Hudson

The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions - 0 views

  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations.
  • ...17 more annotations...
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations.
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these deva
  • flicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced mi
  • for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensio
  • Chechnya has not been continually at war since it declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • cts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • t of the RSFSR, declared a state of emergency in Chechnya in November 1991, dispatching troop
  • hat ensued was a disastrous 21-month campaign that culminated in the encirclement of several thousand Russian troops inside the capital, Grozny, by Chechen rebel forces in August 1996. That same month, a peace deal was brokered at Khasavyurt (Dagestan), which called for the withdrawal of all Russian forces from Chechnya by the end of the year and stipulated that the final status of the republic would be resolved by 2001 (Sakwa, 2005, p. 296). The period from 1996 until the resumption of hostilities in 1999 was one of de facto independence
  • presented above should permit the reader to conclude that the effects of the war in Chechnya on the North Caucasus have been uneven and diverse. Much has been written about the spread of Islamic extremism, interethnic strife, separatist movements, rampant criminality, and other negative aspects of the conflict that supposedly demonstrate the host of social, cultural, and economic cleavages that plague the region. In reality, however, it is possible to identify specific economic processes occurring in a large number of sectors at a variety of scal
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      1996...1999... de facto indepenence
  • A rash of bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow and other Russian cities in August–September 1999 helped precipitate the second Chechen war. Although doubts remain about the official blame and convictions of Chechen terrorists for the bombings, they, together with raids into Dagestan (see below), provided an opportunity for the recently appointed Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, to launch a new military campaign against the res- tive region. In August 1999, Basayev and the rebel commander Ibn al-K
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      uses "chechyan terrorist bombings as an excuse to invade chechnya
Duncan Flippo

Georgia - HISTORY - 0 views

    • Duncan Flippo
       
      this says a lot about some reasons for revs and nationalism
  • In seven decades as part of the Soviet Union, Georgia maintained some cultural independence, and Georgian nationalism remained a significant--though at times muted--issue in relations with the Russians.
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      Shows how georgian cultural things were not supressed as much as in bosnia and other soviet countries
  • Stalin and Lavrenti Beria, his chief of secret police from 1938 to 1953, were both Georgians
  •  
    this shows a lot of Georgian history including some nationalism and post soviet stuff
Kevin Gregor

14 Years After War's End, Ethnic Divisions Once Again Gripping Bosnia - 0 views

    • Kevin Gregor
       
      Serbs are trying to secede from Bosnia and undermine the gov't, but Bosnia has always been dependent on outside rule, and it would not flourish without the high rep governing them.
  • Bosnia suffers from a "dependency syndrome" that dates back centuries, to when it was part of the Ottoman Empire.
  • The Peace Implementation Council, a group of 55 nations and agencies that oversees the Dayton accords and appoints the viceroy, has been trying for years to abolish the position and restore full sovereignty to Bosnia. But foreign diplomats say they are not confident that Bosnia is ready to govern itself.
  • ...7 more annotations...
  • there have been no physically violent incidents
  • But the rhetoric, according to people who have been here, is as bad as it's been since 1991
  • Milorad Dodik, the prime minister of the Serb Republic, has hinted that it might try to secede. He has also tangled with prosecutors and diplomats who have served under the high representative, saying they are biased against Serbs.
  • Raffi Gregorian, an American who serves as the deputy high representative, said the political mood in Bosnia began to sour three years ago after Dodik's party took power in the Serb Republic. Since then, he said, many politicians have tried to win votes by fanning ethnic fears and suspicions.
  • In June, Inzko defused a much bigger crisis after lawmakers in the Serb Republic approved legislation challenging the authority of the national government in several areas, such as customs and law enforcement. Inzko nullified the legislation, ruling that it would undermine the Dayton accords, the legal framework that holds the country together.

  • Muslims represent about half of Bosnia's population, with Serbs accounting for about a third and Croats making up much of the rest. Nobody knows precise numbers, however, because the last census was taken in 1991.
  • Serb Republic lawmakers have tried to block the national government from consolidating power while effectively creating a separate state in their autonomous zone.
Caroline Yevak

Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict - ProQuest Research Library -... - 0 views

  • been wars there within the Republic of Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. There, too, occurred the RussianChechen conflict in 1994-96, which resumed in 1999 when forces from Chechnya, probably not controlled by the national leadership of the republic, attacked neighboring Dagestan.
  • been wars there within the Republic of Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
  • There, too, occurred the RussianChechen conflict in 1994-96, which resumed in 1999 when forces from Chechnya, probably not controlled by the national leadership of the republic, attacked neighboring Dagestan.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • Ethnic cleansing is scarcely a new phenomenon. Much of the story of Chechnya in the past 150 years is one of forced migration followed by the return to the Caucasus of many survivors of the migration.
  • Like the Serbs and the Kosovars (and unlike the Serbs and the Croats), the Russians and the Chechens have been at each other's throats for some while now; the first conflict per se dates from 1722 and Peter the Great's efforts to expand into the Caucasus.
  • "If we used force in Chechnya, it would . . . lead to such turmoil, so much bloodshed, that no one would forgive us afterward"
  • ended when General Alexander Lebed negotiated an agreement with the Chechens in summer 1996 that virtually recognized the de facto independence of Chechnya.
Austin Buben

Judging History: The Historical Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the F... - 0 views

  • The Judgment then turns to Bosnia and deals with the rise of ethnically-constituted parties in 1990 and the efforts of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) to achieve a Greater Serbia by annexing parts of Bosnia and Croatia where there were Serb populations.97 There is a thorough discussion of how the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which up to that point had been multi-ethnic, became 90 percent Serb. In 1991 it had become an army without a state to defend, and thus turned into an instrument of a militaristic Serb nationalism.98 War raged between the newly independent Croatia and Serb forces in late 1991, and this greatly increased tensions in Bosnia. The JNA withdrew from Croatia in early 1992 and brought 100,000 troops, airplanes, helicopters, and heavy weapons into Bosnia which further exacerbated anxiety and hostility among the population.99
  • "Arkan's Tigers.
  • "Arkan"
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • The Judgment dedicates a great deal of space to the propaganda campaign in Bosnia. By the spring of 1992, all of the media in Bosnia was Serb controlled, and was pounding out the same unrelenting message that Serbs were about to be overwhelmed by Ustasha Croats and fundamentalist Muslims, and had no choice but to join with the JNA in an all-out war to save the Serbs from genocide. Broadcasts from Belgrade featured Serb politicians such as Zeljko
  • Raznatovic who declared that the Second World War was not over and "news" reports with fictitious stories about a Croat doctor sterilizing Serb women and castrating Serb boys.100The SDS in Bosnia capitalized on the fear created by such propaganda, and began proclaiming Serb Autonomous Regions as part of creating a Greater Serbia. Crisis staffs set up in these regions carried out local government and military functions. Combining elements of the JNA, paramilitary organizations, and police units, the SDS established physical control over these areas. Since the JNA had expelled non-Serbs and was short of manpower, it relied increasingly on paramilitaries such as
  • 101 Even though the JNA was withdrawn from Bosnia in May 1992, apparently in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 752 calling for an end to outside interference,102 the Bosnian Serb army (VRS) inherited personnel and weapons from the JNA and could still count on air support from the JNA.103 Both of the last two points were essential for connecting the actions of Dusko Tadic, one small cog in the Bosnian Serb security apparatus, to the wider policies of ethnic cleansing.
    • Austin Buben
       
      Interesting how Arkan is Aelijko Raznatovic's middle name. Also, how the serbs took over the media in bosnia and spread their propaganda.
Ellen Mischinski

Ethnic nationalism: the tragic death ... - Bogdan Denis Denitch - Google Books - 0 views

    • Ellen Mischinski
       
      Since 1985 the Serbian popular press had unleashed relentless propaganda about Croatian war crimes in WWII, and that had created hostility where it had not existed before.  176
Kevin Gregor

Archived-Articles: Israel's 1967 Borders: What's The Big Fuss? - 0 views

  • According to latest statistics 304,569 Israelis live in the 121 officially-recognised settlements in the West Bank, 192,000 Israelis live in settlements in East Jerusalem and over 20,000 live in settlements in the Golan Heights. Settlements range in character from farming communities and frontier villages to urban suburbs and neighborhoods. The three largest West Bank settlements, Modi'in Illit, Maale Adumim and Betar Illit, have achieved city status, with over 30,000 residents each.Needless to say, the settlements Israel has built in the territories of Judea and Samaria since 1967 are located beyond the 1967 border prior to the Six Day War.  Retreating behind this border now would mean abandoning and uprooting over 300,000 Israelis who make their lives and raise their families there.
  • Judaism's most sacred holy shrines were cut off from the nation between 1948 and 1967. Obama's call to retreat to the pre-1967 borders now unfortunately implies that we should retreat from East Jerusalem, too, and grant the Palestinian people sovereignty in the very parts of Israel's capital that mean the most to us.  For this reason and others, the demand that Israel withdraw to pre 1967 borders is preposterous and will never be considered by any self respecting Israeli government.
Ellen Mischinski

Rebels Seize Research Team in Colombia - ProQuest Research Library - ProQuest - 0 views

  • two scientists
  • (FARC), a violent insurgency group known for ransoming abductees, has claimed responsibility.
  • prepare a biological survey of a potential national park.
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • Biologists have launched an international campaign to win the release of two scientists and their guide who were kidnapped last month by Colombian guerrillas
  • founding member of Colombia's new Ornithological Association and, although still a graduate student, is a rising star in the international bird science community.
    • Ellen Mischinski
       
      important people=more ransom $$$
miller kinlin

Drug use and drug policy - Google Books - 0 views

    • miller kinlin
       
      he organization that it has developed employs up to 120,000 people, including 2,000 to 3,000 in the us. controlled by pablo escobar, who ran it even in prison. primary target of us. Belisario Betancur in 1988: "we are up against an organization that is stronger than the state
    • miller kinlin
       
      ormed in 1982 in response to the kidnapping of a member of the ochoa family by the m-19 guerrillas. rapid increase in profits led to the cocaine wars. as the cartels became more powerful, they expanded into politics, media, private armies, real estate, and international banking
    • miller kinlin
       
      payed bribes to curropt police officials, judges were also paid as well, assassinated people, and offered to pay 10 billion to pay off national debt. and even killed the justice minister in 1984.
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    • miller kinlin
       
      argue its good for state: brings in so much money, aids development and keeps down unemployment. the cartels employed huge numbers of different types of workers, from farmers to airplane pilots, to engineers and scientists. they invested heavily in local elections and politicians, and including the presidential election.. and escobar even was elected to the comombian house of reps.
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    Miller Kinlin
Onurcan Tatman

Plan Colombia: Washington's Latest Drug War Failure | Ted Galen Carpenter | Cato Instit... - 1 views

  • Even as President Andres Pastrana and other leaders boasted of the plan's achievements, reports were leaking out that a new study, funded by the United Nations, indicated that there were more than 340,000 acres under cultivation.
  • hat Plan Colombia has done is increase the animosity of farmers toward the Pastrana government and, indirectly, toward the
  • When Pastrana recently traveled to one drug-producing region to sell the "soft side" of Plan Colombia (economic development), he received a harsh reception. At stop after stop he was greeted by angry demonstrators. And their message ought to trouble U.S. leaders as well as Pastrana. Many of the demonstrators waved signs showing a Colombian flag being subsumed by the Stars and Stripes, with the caption "Plan Colombia's Achievements." Other protestors greeted the president with chants of "Pastrana subservient to the gringos."
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  • The Pastrana government already confronts a three-decade-old insurgency being waged by two left-wing guerrilla armies
  • Plan Colombia is ineffectual in achieving its stated objectives, and it produces a number of highly undesirable side effects. The brutal reality is that, as long as drugs are illegal, there will be a huge black-market premium-a lucrative potential profit that will attract producers. Plan Colombia cannot repeal the economic laws of supply and demand. In attempting to do so, the United States is creating even more trouble for an already troubled neighbor.
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    This article shows the failure of president Andres Pastrana and his efforts to end the drug war. It also talks about the misconseption of the whole idea that Plan Colombia actually worked.
Mckenzie Hudson

Violence, Organized Crime And The Criminal Justice System In Colombia - Research and Re... - 1 views

  • One of the concerns of the economic theory of crime has been the effect of the justice system on criminal activities
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      The justice system in Colombia, through corruption, police ignorance and a lack of manpower, might as well not be there. In fact, it facilitiates more violence when drug dealers can pay off the police to become personal Sicarios
  • At the national level, statistics show a negative relationship between violence, using as an indicator the homicide rate, the presence of armed groups, and various performance indicators for the criminal justice system. In the last two decades, the Colombian homicide rate has more than quadrupled. In a parallel fashion, the influence of the principle armed organizations - the guerrilla, the drag mafia (or narco-traffickers), and paramilitary groups - has increased [Thoumi 1994]. During the same period, the capacity of the justice system to investigate homicides has been considerably reduced. The proportion of homicide cases that reach the courts, which in the 1960s was above 35 percent, today is less than 6 percent. In 1975, for every 100 homicides, more than 60 suspects were captured; in 1994, this figure had been reduced to 20. Conviction rates, which in the 1960s reached 11 percent of the total number of homicides committed, have dropped to barely 4 percent today [Ruhio 1996a].
  • . It is also possible to argue that one of the factors that contributed to the paralysis of the criminal justice system in Colombia was precisely this violence and in particular that exercised by private protection services and extra-judicial prosecution.
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      Early drug war and "private army" violence may have contributed to the modern inefficiency of the Colombian Justice System.
Neha Kukreja

Colombia's Child Drug Assassins - 2 views

  • but also in the society that continues to produce them. Before juvenile violence became so widespread, many dramatic changes had occurred in Colombia. First of all, there are historical factors. The gangs emerged in areas characterized by massive rural migration. By and large, the state had completely forgotten these areas by the 1970s. Residents were condemned to the world of "informality"--a world in which the rights and obligations of citizenship were lacking. The sons of these migrants from the Colombian countryside grew up on the edge of legality. They were treated as second-class citizens, to be dealt with only by the police.
    • Neha Kukreja
       
      Mhmm.... "the state forgot about them." No wonder the youth have gotten involved in Colombia's drug trafficking activities. 
  • The killing of high officials highlights the role of the young paid assassins. Most are just like Chucho--from poor neighborhoods, abandoned by their fathers, school dropouts, and unemployed. Young boys with similar social profiles have assassinated newspaper editors, leftist politicians and state functionarie
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      The inablities of the Colombian Government has allowed Drug Cartels to enforce their own brand of Justice with Sicarios, with almost no fear of consequences
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      This is Neha's article by the way... just says i shared it for some reason.
  • In a poll conducted last year in the schools of the Northeastern District, students were asked whom they considered the most important person in the country. Pablo Escobar was named by 21 percent of those surveyed; 19.6 percent chose President César Gaviria; and 12.6 percent named the goalkeeper of the national soccer team, René Higuita.
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  • efficacy.
    • Neha Kukreja
       
      Look Mrs. Field.... It's yo favorite word!!!!
  • In 1990, after the assassination of Liberal presidential candidate Luís Carlos Galán, the government launched a frontal attack on the Medellín cartel. The security forces began by attacking the youth gangs considered to be the reserve army of the narcotraffickers. This offensive took place without the least respect for human rights. It used the same logic as the counterinsurgency war: classifying entire communities as enemies of society. To be an adolescent in a poor neighborhood meant to be classified as a sicario.
Eric Wineteer

NICARAGUA: ORTEGA GRANTS ASYLUM TO 2 WOMEN FROM FARC CAMP - ProQuest Research Library -... - 0 views

  • Four other Mexican students and former students of the Autonomous National University of Mexico were killed in the cross-border incursion ordered by Colombian President lvaro Uribe. The attack triggered a major diplomatic crisis, with Ecuador breaking off ties with Colombia, and Venezuela mobilizing troops to its border.
    • Eric Wineteer
       
      This is definitely an effect of the clash between FARC/Colombia/US on other countries.
  • In the past, [Daniel Ortega] has referred to the members of FARC as "brothers."
    • Eric Wineteer
       
      This shows that America and Colombia don't represent the world's opinions on FARC (no surprise there)
  • The right-wing opposition criticized Ortega for granting asylum to the three women, complaining that the move made Nicaragua "a sanctuary for terrorists."
    • Eric Wineteer
       
      Civil war in Colombia leading to political conflict in Nicaragua
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  • Pallais argued that "they were involved in drug trafficking and guerrilla activities and belonged to the FARC, and the FARC are considered terrorist forces by Colombia, the United States and the European Union.
    • Eric Wineteer
       
      This mention of the EU also demonstrates FARC's effect on countries outside of Colombia
William Fromm

UN raises Colombia's internally displaced figure to 3.6M - Colombia news | Colombia Rep... - 1 views

  • The U.N.'s refugee agency (UNHCR) has increased the figure of officially recognized internally displaced people in Colombia from 3.4 to 3.67 million, maintaining its undesired position as the first in the world, Caracol Radio reported Monday. UNHCR explains that in 2010 there were 57 "massive displacements," up from 42 the year before, while indigenous communities and Afro-Colombians continue to be the most prominently victimized by forced displacements, who tend to be concentrated in the areas that have witnessed intensified conflict in recent years such as the Pacific coastal regions. The latest U.N. report claimed that ethnic groups have been further affected by the development of illegal mining as a source of finance for illegal armed groups in the country, while inter-city displacement continues to rise, particularly in the Antioquian capital of Medellin. The U.N. agency noted concern for the situation of young people affected by the country's ongoing armed conflict and the emergence of criminal organizations following the 2006 demobilization process that have largely continued the narco-trafficking work of the paramilitaries. The figure of 3.6 million internally displaced people contrasts strikingly with that of Colombian non-governmental organization CODHES, which released a report earlier this year citing 5.2 million displaced Colombians, over 11% of the population, evidently using different criteria with which to classify what constitutes a "forcibly displaced" person. The government's figure by the close of 2010 rested closer to that of the U.N. with around 3.6 million people. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), however, indicates that "the rates of under-registration are substantially high."
  • "The national-survey by the Civil Society Follow-up Commission showed that 65,7% of IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons] are registered," the IDMC explains, while the remaining 34.3% are not. The Colombian government puts the percentage of unregistered IDPs at 21%. The IDMC notes that many people remain outside of the government's official registry "as IDPs did not come forward out of fear or ignorance of procedures, and because many who requested it were denied registration."
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    Colombian Internally displaced figures have been increasing instead of decreasing.
Shana Thomas

About Georgia : History : Georgia under the Soviet Union (1921-1990) - 0 views

  • the powers, struggling for the independence, finally divided into two camps. The most popular in the public was the political block "The Round Table". The famous leader of this block was the former dissident, philologist, Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1938-1993). Exactly his personal popularity conditioned the victory (62% votes) of "The Round Table" after October 28, 1990 elections (the first many-partied elections in Georgia since 1921). Thus, it was a peaceful end of the Communist governance in Georgia. Z. Gamsakhurdia soon became the president of the country, and during the period of his reign, the inner political situation in the Republic aggravated. Because of the inflexible, ambitious policy of Gamsakhurdia, the relations between the governing "The Round Table" and the rest opposite part, became bitter. The condition in Autonomies was strained too, especially in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Gamsakhurdia's nationalistic phraseology disturbed the ethnic minorities. If in 1981 the partial compromise with Abkhazia was managed, the conflict with Ossetia became the armed opposition. The reason of this was the abolishment of Autonomous Region of Ossetia by the Parliament of Georgia. This solution was provoked by Ossetians, declaring the Autonomous Region as the Sovereign Republic. It must also be notified that in Georgia of this period, one of the reasons of existing ethnical conflicts (and also the split in Georgian national movement), except the local radical actions, was, as it seemed, the hidden activity of SSC of the Union, which used the tried imperial methods - "separate and dominate".
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    the fall of soviet union
Mckenzie Hudson

secession footer - 0 views

  • hich was the only autonomous republic (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic or ASSR) w
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      Russian Fed didn't want them to split
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