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Mckenzie Hudson

The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions - 0 views

  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations.
  • ...17 more annotations...
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations.
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these deva
  • flicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced mi
  • for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensio
  • Chechnya has not been continually at war since it declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • cts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • t of the RSFSR, declared a state of emergency in Chechnya in November 1991, dispatching troop
  • hat ensued was a disastrous 21-month campaign that culminated in the encirclement of several thousand Russian troops inside the capital, Grozny, by Chechen rebel forces in August 1996. That same month, a peace deal was brokered at Khasavyurt (Dagestan), which called for the withdrawal of all Russian forces from Chechnya by the end of the year and stipulated that the final status of the republic would be resolved by 2001 (Sakwa, 2005, p. 296). The period from 1996 until the resumption of hostilities in 1999 was one of de facto independence
  • presented above should permit the reader to conclude that the effects of the war in Chechnya on the North Caucasus have been uneven and diverse. Much has been written about the spread of Islamic extremism, interethnic strife, separatist movements, rampant criminality, and other negative aspects of the conflict that supposedly demonstrate the host of social, cultural, and economic cleavages that plague the region. In reality, however, it is possible to identify specific economic processes occurring in a large number of sectors at a variety of scal
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      1996...1999... de facto indepenence
  • A rash of bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow and other Russian cities in August–September 1999 helped precipitate the second Chechen war. Although doubts remain about the official blame and convictions of Chechen terrorists for the bombings, they, together with raids into Dagestan (see below), provided an opportunity for the recently appointed Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, to launch a new military campaign against the res- tive region. In August 1999, Basayev and the rebel commander Ibn al-K
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      uses "chechyan terrorist bombings as an excuse to invade chechnya
Caroline Yevak

Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya: The Role of Memorial... - 0 views

  • The collapse of Communism in Eurasia has led to many events that few analysts in the West could have predicted during the Cold War. One of the most improbable of these events was the stunning military victory of the tiny autonomous republic of Chechnya in the 1994-1996 war for independence against the Russian Federation.
  • While the Chechens can officially claim to be victors in the first Russo-Chechen war of the 1990s, there was in actuality no winner in this bloody conflict. Scores of Chechen villages were destroyed, the Chechen capital of Grozny was bombed to rubble in the heaviest bombardment in Europe since the bombing of Dresden, tens of thousands of Chechens and Russians living in Chechnya lost their lives, hundreds of thousands more were made refugees, and the economy of the independent statelet of Ichkeria, as Chechnya is now known, lies in utter ruin.
  • Rather than accepting autonomy within the Russian Federation, as the Republic of Tatarstan has, for example, the Chechen people rallied behind such leaders as Dzhokhar Dudaev, Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basaev, and chose to fight the might of transcontinental Russia in a bitter struggle for total freedom. The heavy cost of this independence for the Chechen people has been incalculable in socioeconomic terms.
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  • If the destruction from the first post-Soviet invasion was not sufficient, the majority of the tiny Chechen RepubliCs infrastructure which was rebuilt after 1996 was totally obliterated by Russian bombing raids and artillery bombardments in late 1999 and early 2000 that surpassed even those of the previous war in their intensity.
  • the Russian government seems determined to avenge its defeat in the previous Chechen War
  • the second Chechen War has all the logic of an American invasion of Vietnam to avenge its defeat at the hands of the Viet Cong.
  • While much has been written on the Russian government's reasons for launching the second post-Soviet Chechen War
  • ndeed, historically, no ethnic group on the north Caucasus flank has had as violent a history of conflict with the Russians as the Chechens.
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      Russians determined to beat Chechnya, but they lose
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      Chechnya and Russia have a history of conflict-- 1st and 2nd Chechen Wars. Wars hurt both economies 
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      ethnic & religious conflict (roots of conflict)
Caroline Yevak

THE CHECHEN WARS: WILL RUSSIA GO THE WAY OF THE SOVIET UNION? - ProQuest Research Libra... - 0 views

  • At the time of writing of this review of Matthew Evangelista's clearly written book on the wars between Russia and Chechnya, there are reports of several people being killed in an explosion on a commuter train in south Russia, close to Chechnya.
  • The Russian authorities immediately blamed "Chechen terrorists.
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      history of conflict
  • ...17 more annotations...
  • If this incident is connected with the war in Chechnya
  • civilian targets
  • The Russian authorities and many commentators explain that the two invasions of Chechnya in the 1990s were primarily necessary to prevent the Russian Federation from unravelling like the Soviet Union did.
  • in late 1996, the social, economic, political and security situation in this small and relatively resource-poor part of the world deteriorated.
  • "No War, No Peace."
  • The rise of the incidence of kidnappings for cash and extremist Islamist infiltrations did not help. Money allocated by Moscow for reconstruction was channelled into corrupt hands. A power struggle developed in Chechnya.
  • rovides many good reasons why the Russians should intensify their efforts to find a non-violent solution to the situation. There are some provoking sections on the question of whether war crimes are being committed, and how Russia may be exposing itself to increasing attention on this issue.
  • In August 1999, armed forces (apparently acting in the cause of Wahabiism, an extremist Islamic movement) based in Chechnya attacked targets in Dagestan, Chechnya's eastern neighbour. Putin was appointed prime minister by Yeltsin days after this event. Four months later, Yeltsin resigned.
  • Blaming Chechens,
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      Russia blames Chechnya
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      wealth
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      elite leaders not controlling conflict
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in December 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites.
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in December 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites.
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in December 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites.
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in Decembe
  • 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites
Caroline Yevak

Mexico - ProQuest Research Library - ProQuest - 0 views

  • IV. Mexico's Drug War Mexico continued its war on drug trafficking that Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched against drug cartels in 2006.
  • President Calderón announced that his administration would reform civilian law enforcement and the courts, and that "the Mexican army would continue to lead the fight until local and state police forces are free of corruption."20
  • These are but a handful of die murders reported in Mexico's drug wars. The level of violence attributable to die war on drugs and die organized criminal activity that precipitated it cannot, however, be measured simply by counting corpses. Kidnappings, carjackings, extortion, and other forms of crime and aggression infect the quality of daily life.
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  • Local and state politicians have increasingly become targets of violence by the drug cartels, which have also attacked rival gangs. Some murders are particularly vicious, intended to gain media attention and frighten both rival drug gangs and law enforcement officers. "Prosecutors, police chiefs, and thousands of others have been killed," and entire families sometimes come under attack.
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      Similar to what the journalist wrote in the article about Columbia.
  • Mexico's drug cartels started recruiting more teenagers and young people to replace those killed or arrested.40 These young people serve as "expendable foot soldiers" for the cartels in battles over drug trafficking routes to the United States and local drug using markets in Mexico.
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      Child Soldiers
  • Oil revenue accounts for more than one -third of die Mexican government's annual income.1 In 2009, after oil revenues declined during the recession, Mexican lawmakers looked for alternative revenue sources.2 As part of the 2010 budget, Mexican legislators increased several taxes in 2009:
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      *Class discussion about how drop in oil value caused gov debt & made the poor poorer etc.
  • In the past two years, at least eighty U.S. border officers have been convicted of corruption and it is estimated that there are almost as many investigations each year involving border officers who have accepted bribes so diat illegal drugs could be trafficked into the United States.
Cole Blum

secession footer - 1 views

  • the Russian Federation. For that purpose it was even willing to fight a full- scale war, the first round of which (1994-96) it won, at least militarily.
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      WIlling to fight a full scale war to maintain the illusion of independene
  • All this has called for both a radical re-moulding of Chechen national identi- ty and a thorough revision of its collective past. The Chechen authorities, the national movement, and in fact all the Chechen intelligentsia – that is, both professional historians and (even more so) many other persons with higher edu- cation – have been involved in this revision of their national past and rewriting of their history on both the academic and popular levels. It all began in 1989, when Gorbachev’s glasnost reached the periphery, and has been steadily growing in momentum ever since. The main milestones in its development have been 1) in 1990, the appointment of a Chechen as republican secretary of the party for the first time since the second world war;5 2) what man
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      all good stuff
  • e new Chechen historical narrative is still strongly linked to Soviet narratives, ways of arguing and moulds of thinking. It tries to prove, for example, that its national heroes were ‘progressive’ and ‘popular’, not ‘reactionary’. It tends, like its progenitor, to be openly political, to make value judgements and moralize and to overlook facts inconsistent with its thesis. Moreover, even emo- tionally it is still very much connected to the ex-USSR, and tries, for example, to prove the Chechens’ loyalty and heroism in the ‘Great Patriotic War’, as the Sec- ond World War is still called in the ex-USSR
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      attempt to portray themselves as progressive not reactionary and its loyalty to wwII though trying to de sovietize
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  • The Chechens (or the Vainakhs) are an ancient civilized nation. They are descendants of the Hurrians, the founders of the ancient Kingdoms of Mittani and Urartu15 and are, therefore, one of the civilizations of the ancient Near East. Since antiquity they were in contact with, and influ- enced, the peoples of the steppes.16 The Soviet narrative is, thus, reversed: the Chechens are the Russians’ elders in age and civilization and, by impli- cation, are also the ones who indirectly civilized them. (2) The Vainakhs have inhabited their present territory continuously since at least the 4th century BC.17 The northern districts, now populated by Rus- sians, had also been settled by the Chechens until Russian colonization dislodged them. This argument aims to counter the Soviet thesis that the Chechens migrated from the mountains into the lowlands only in the 17th and 18th centuries,18 and the possible political implications of this. (3) They have formed states and polities over the ages. A Vainakh state – Durzuketi – existed in the Northern Caucasus in the 4th and 3rd centuries BC and one of its princesses was the first queen of Georgia.19 Other states of which they were part included Serir (5th-9th centuries AD), Alaniya (10th-11th centuries) and Simsim (16t
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      ways they are re-writing history
  • Although Russian ‘robbery raids’ against peaceful Cheche
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      important wording- peacful chechnya- Chechnya says armed conflict 94-96 started three hundred years b4 at first gazavat
  • beginning with Moscow’s attempt to depose the newly elected president Jokhar Dudaev by paratroopers in November 1991, and escalating into a full-scale invasion in December 199
    • Cole Blum
       
      This is a good article about how nationalism, while it should be a good thing, can turn into something very harmful.
    • Cole Blum
       
      This is interesting how you can easily get people very excited and get them ready to fight just by getting them loyal to something, as shown in this example. Nationalism is a humongous example of this.
    • Cole Blum
       
      This is actually Mckenzies article.
Caroline Yevak

NO MAN'S LAND: The Mystery of Mexico's Drug Wars - ProQuest Research Library - ProQuest - 0 views

  • "It's looking more and more like Colombia looked twenty years ago," she said, "where the narco-traffickers control certain parts of the country."
  • Mexico doesn't even have a viable proclaimed guerrilla force aiming to topple the government. Instead, Mexico has labyrinthine drug gangs murderously fighting it out against each other-while they extort, intimidate, massacre, and conduct firefights with the government.
  • There is no law there," he warned. "They are the law."
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  • By "they," he meant an irregular army of drug traffickers, who had created a no-man's-land in a grim little slice of Mexico.
  • Mexico's low-intensity "narco-war" has cast a daunting shadow over many of its backcountry areas, some of them wedged disconcertingly against the 2,000-mile-long border with the United States. The border's southern side is dotted with mysterious conflict zones, emitting rumors of burned houses, fleeing residents, and shadowy pseudo-armies of drug traffickers clashing by night.
  • Beltrán Leyva Cartel, El Gilo, the Zetas, El Chapo and his Sinaloa Cartel, the New Federation . . . This one little postage stamp of desert soil sounds like a package tour of "Narco-Mexico."
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      Beltrán-Leyva Cartel is one of the biggest in Mexico
  • There, a rival of the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, reportedly runs two large militia camps in the mountains, each with about three hundred men. The Sinaloa Cartel's own force there, orbiting the same general area, is said to number four hundred, in fifty-man squads.
  • Over on the other side of the country, the greener side by the Gulf of Mexico, south of Texas, three of the cartel gunmen arrested in the August massacre were reportedly aged fourteen, seventeen, and eighteen.
  • Such is the typical age spread for an expedition like this: a not-so-clandestine grupo de limpieza, a "cleanup squad" sent by one drug cartel to quash another.
  • Interestingly, no Mexican police or army troops spotted the cleanup caravan that brought Ramón Mesa, though it frightened various small towns en route. The forty-five hundred Mexican Army troops deployed across the country in the drug war have struck some heavy blows against the cartels, and the troops are often more professional than some outsiders might imagine, but mysteries still abide.
Austin Buben

Timeline: America's War on Drugs : NPR - 0 views

  • October 1986: Reagan signs the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which appropriates $1.7 billion to fight the drug war. The bill also creates mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses, which are increasingly criticized for promoting significant racial disparities in the prison population because of the differences in sentencing for crack and powder cocaine. Possession of crack, which is cheaper, results in a harsher sentence; the majority of crack users are lower income.
  • Mid-1980s: Because of the South Florida Drug Task Force's work, cocaine trafficking slowly changes transport routes. The Mexican border becomes the major point of entry for cocaine headed into the United States. Crack, a cheap, addictive and potent form of cocaine, is first developed in the early '80s; it becomes popular in the New York region, devastating inner-city neighborhoods.
  • Nixon creates the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to coordinate the efforts of all other agencies.
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  • In the United States, Vice-President George H.W. Bush combines agents from multiple agencies and military branches to form the South Florida Drug Task Force, Miami being the main entry point at the time.
  • January 2006: Authorities announce the discovery of the longest cross-border tunnel in U.S. history, the work of what they call a well-organized and well-financed drug-smuggling group. The half-mile long tunnel links a warehouse in Tijuana, where about two tons of marijuana were seized, to a warehouse in the United States, where 200 pounds of the drug were found.
  • November 1993: President Clinton signs the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which increases the amount of trade and traffic across the U.S.-Mexican border. This makes it more difficult for U.S. Customs to find narcotics moving across the border.
    • Austin Buben
       
      This is a giant summary and the history of the DEA and War on Drugs.
    • Austin Buben
       
      Austin Found This First
Caroline Yevak

Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya: The Role of Memorial... - 0 views

  • The collapse of Communism in Eurasia has led to many events that few analysts in the West could have predicted during the Cold War. One of the most improbable of these events was the stunning military victory of the tiny autonomous republic of Chechnya in the 1994-1996 war for independence against the Russian Federation.
Katy Field

Can Mexico learn from Colombia's drug war? - SignOnSanDiego.com - 1 views

  • A decade ago, before Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez and other Mexican cities became bloody front lines, the biggest battles in the drug war were taking place 3,000 miles to the south.
Stuart Algood

CSA - 0 views

  • ts in the war, namely the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs, are the focus of the study. The level o
  • influence
  • influence
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • bstraction at which these rival ethnic groups were sensitive to demographic trends, and therefore the level at which that rivalry played out, was the local municipality, the opstina where competition over jobs and political power was manifest. It is at this level that basic tenets of ethnic competition theory are considered to have been at work. An index of ethnic competition is introduced to measure competition in terms of the relative balance of ethnic populations. This index is complemented by analysis of the trend of relative ethnic population numbers over the two decades prior to the war. Data from the Yugoslavian census show how the demographic position of the Bosnian Serbs declined dramatically in over 90% of the opstinas throughout the country. These population trends are translated into an index of demographic disadvantage.
  • ds, and therefore the level at which that rivalry played out, was the local municipality, the opstina where competition over jobs and political power was manifest. It is at this level that basic tenets of ethnic competition theory are considered to have been at work. An index of ethnic competition is introduced to measure competition in terms of the relative balance of ethnic populations. This index is complemented by analysis of the trend of relative ethnic population numbers over the two decades prior to the war. Data from the Yugoslavian census show how the demographic position of the Bosnian Serbs declined dramatically in over 90% of the opstinas throughout t
    • Stuart Algood
       
      This is helpful to answering why genocide took place in curtain areas of Bosnia.
Austin Buben

Judging History: The Historical Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the F... - 0 views

  • The Judgment then turns to Bosnia and deals with the rise of ethnically-constituted parties in 1990 and the efforts of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) to achieve a Greater Serbia by annexing parts of Bosnia and Croatia where there were Serb populations.97 There is a thorough discussion of how the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which up to that point had been multi-ethnic, became 90 percent Serb. In 1991 it had become an army without a state to defend, and thus turned into an instrument of a militaristic Serb nationalism.98 War raged between the newly independent Croatia and Serb forces in late 1991, and this greatly increased tensions in Bosnia. The JNA withdrew from Croatia in early 1992 and brought 100,000 troops, airplanes, helicopters, and heavy weapons into Bosnia which further exacerbated anxiety and hostility among the population.99
  • "Arkan's Tigers.
  • "Arkan"
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  • The Judgment dedicates a great deal of space to the propaganda campaign in Bosnia. By the spring of 1992, all of the media in Bosnia was Serb controlled, and was pounding out the same unrelenting message that Serbs were about to be overwhelmed by Ustasha Croats and fundamentalist Muslims, and had no choice but to join with the JNA in an all-out war to save the Serbs from genocide. Broadcasts from Belgrade featured Serb politicians such as Zeljko
  • Raznatovic who declared that the Second World War was not over and "news" reports with fictitious stories about a Croat doctor sterilizing Serb women and castrating Serb boys.100The SDS in Bosnia capitalized on the fear created by such propaganda, and began proclaiming Serb Autonomous Regions as part of creating a Greater Serbia. Crisis staffs set up in these regions carried out local government and military functions. Combining elements of the JNA, paramilitary organizations, and police units, the SDS established physical control over these areas. Since the JNA had expelled non-Serbs and was short of manpower, it relied increasingly on paramilitaries such as
  • 101 Even though the JNA was withdrawn from Bosnia in May 1992, apparently in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 752 calling for an end to outside interference,102 the Bosnian Serb army (VRS) inherited personnel and weapons from the JNA and could still count on air support from the JNA.103 Both of the last two points were essential for connecting the actions of Dusko Tadic, one small cog in the Bosnian Serb security apparatus, to the wider policies of ethnic cleansing.
    • Austin Buben
       
      Interesting how Arkan is Aelijko Raznatovic's middle name. Also, how the serbs took over the media in bosnia and spread their propaganda.
Shana Thomas

War in Abkhazia (1992-1993) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia - 0 views

  • The War in Abkhazia from 1992 to 1993 was waged chiefly between Georgian government forces on one side and Abkhaz separatist forces supporting independence of Abkhazia from Georgia on the other side. Ethnic Georgians, who lived in Abkhazia fought largely on the side of Georgian government forces. Ethnic Armenians and Russians[2] within Abkhazia's population, largely supported Abkhazians[3][4][5] and many fought on their side
Onurcan Tatman

Plan Colombia: Washington's Latest Drug War Failure | Ted Galen Carpenter | Cato Instit... - 1 views

  • Even as President Andres Pastrana and other leaders boasted of the plan's achievements, reports were leaking out that a new study, funded by the United Nations, indicated that there were more than 340,000 acres under cultivation.
  • hat Plan Colombia has done is increase the animosity of farmers toward the Pastrana government and, indirectly, toward the
  • When Pastrana recently traveled to one drug-producing region to sell the "soft side" of Plan Colombia (economic development), he received a harsh reception. At stop after stop he was greeted by angry demonstrators. And their message ought to trouble U.S. leaders as well as Pastrana. Many of the demonstrators waved signs showing a Colombian flag being subsumed by the Stars and Stripes, with the caption "Plan Colombia's Achievements." Other protestors greeted the president with chants of "Pastrana subservient to the gringos."
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  • The Pastrana government already confronts a three-decade-old insurgency being waged by two left-wing guerrilla armies
  • Plan Colombia is ineffectual in achieving its stated objectives, and it produces a number of highly undesirable side effects. The brutal reality is that, as long as drugs are illegal, there will be a huge black-market premium-a lucrative potential profit that will attract producers. Plan Colombia cannot repeal the economic laws of supply and demand. In attempting to do so, the United States is creating even more trouble for an already troubled neighbor.
  •  
    This article shows the failure of president Andres Pastrana and his efforts to end the drug war. It also talks about the misconseption of the whole idea that Plan Colombia actually worked.
Maddie McFeeley

Mexico Drug War: Facts About 'Los Zetas' Drug Cartel (PHOTOS) - 1 views

  •  
    More information about the Los Zetas in Mexico
Neha Kukreja

youth involvement in colombian drug trafficking - Google Search - 0 views

shared by Neha Kukreja on 16 Sep 11 - No Cached
    • Neha Kukreja
       
      This first PDF has some INSANE statistics regarding the Colombian Youth Involvement in Drug Trafficking. Unfortunately, Diigolet won't let me highlight or "sticky-note" in the PDF!! Example of statistic:"It is estimated that 40,000 young people between the ages of 14 and 25 have died violently in the past twenty years in Medellín." Holy crap. The War in Colombia is a War on the Youth.....
alessandro Lannes

Drugs, Violence, and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia/Drogas, ... - 2 views

    • alessandro Lannes
       
      Alessandro Lannes
  • Some authors have argued that high violence was the result of Escobar's excessive political ambition (Camacho and López 2001), which made traffickers unnecessarily visible
  • Colombian traffickers faced in penetrating and making stable connections with the political establishment, the event does not by itself explain the highly violent methods of Escobar's organization, which preceded his brief transit through Congress and persisted well after it. The relative centralization and coherence of Escobar's organization were also crucial factors that help explain its employment of highly organized and brutally violent methods.
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  • Pablo Escobar was arrested for the first time for drug trafficking. By 1978 Carlos Lehder had consolidated a network of cocaine trafficking both with us and Colombian citizens, and by the early 1980s two organizations, based in the cities of Medellin and Cali, controlled most cocaine exports (Camacho and López 2001). Since the early 1980s the Medellin traffickers began to employ increasingly violent methods. This violence was the result of three interrelated factors: (1) the inability of Medellin traffickers to successfully penetrate the political establishment, (2) the government's decision to confront traffickers by approving an extradition treaty with the United States, and (3) the relative centralization and internal coherence of Medellin traffickers under the leadership of Pablo Escobar.
  • Escobar was elected to represent Medellin in the Lower Chamber of Congress. Escobar's election generated a strong negative reaction among a wide range of political elites, who opposed the public presence of a trafficker in Congress and successfully pushed for Escobar's loss of political immunity and expulsion from Congress in 1983 (Camacho and López 2001). These events motivated Escobar to react violently against political "oligarchs", who in turn publicly declared war on traffickers by approving an extradition treaty with the us that included narcotics offences. As a reaction to this policy, traffickers led by Escobar created the group "Los Extraditables," responsible for initiating the period of "narco-terrorism" by engaging in strategic violence against the state, targeting high level politicians and carrying out terrorist attacks against the civilian population in an effort to push the government to refrain from making extradition effective
  • sign of Escobar's war against the state was the assassination of the Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in 1984, and, as of 1990, the violence of Medellin traffickers had claimed the lives of some 500 police officers in Medellin, hundreds of civilians in terrorist attacks in Bogota and Medellin, and prominent politicians, including presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galá
    • alessandro Lannes
       
      Pablo Escobar was desperate to get into Congress, when he was kicked out he took drastic measures to get revenge on the people responsible
Onurcan Tatman

The Relationship Between PTSD Symptoms and Attention Problems in Children Exposed to th... - 1 views

  •  
    The authors examined the mediating role of posttraumatic stress symptoms in the relationship between traumatic event exposure and attention problems in a sample of 791 Sarajevan children exposed to the Bosnian war.
Duncan Flippo

Commentary: Nasty Nationalism | The National Interest - 0 views

  • Unfortunately, Gamsakhurdia's commitment to democracy and rule of law was not as strong as his romantic Georgian nationalism, which encouraged chauvinist and intolerant tendencies among his fellow Georgians. Not only did he favor ethnic-Georgian dominance in a population composed of nearly one-third non-Georgians, he dreamed of Georgia as a regional great power, a kind of Caucasian fulcrum between Russia, Turkey and Iran.
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      shows how Gamsakhurdia favored the Georgian race and encouraged discrimination
  • Tensions increased with all the country's minorities (including Armenians, Mengrelians and Azeris), but with real ferocity in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There had been serious interethnic violence in both regions starting in 1989, which led to South Ossetia's secession in 1990.
  • Gamsakhurdia was deposed in early 1992 in favor of an unelected Shevardnadze.
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      Georgians quickly put an end to Gamsakhurdia's nationalist ideas
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  • Gamsakhurdia went into exile but repeatedly tried to return to power. In response, Shevardnadze sent forces into Abkhazia in September 1992 to root out support for his rival, leading to the brutal Georgian-Abkhaz war of the following year
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      So the need to get rid of this guy leads to a "brutal" war. sounds like a bad outcome
  • Although ignored in the West, the first instances of what later was called "ethnic cleansing" did not take place in Yugoslavia, but in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and were perpetrated by radical Georgian nationalists under the slogan "Georgia for the Georgians.
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      Sounds a lot like the reading. Georgis seems no different thatn tha balkan region when it comes to nationalist ideas
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      This is the best resource I have found so far with respect to nationalism in Georgia. It has more info with less clutter than anything I have come across so far.
    • Duncan Flippo
       
      I found this
  • Many observers believed that with patience, time and wisdom, Tbilisi might have restored its authority in South Ossetia by peaceful means. Now we shall never know. President Saakashvili's almost-inexplicable decision to unleash a massive artillery bombardment of Ossetian civilians and then attempt a swift reconquest of the region has permanently altered the political landscape.
  • The key period for both South Ossetia and Abkhazia was during the Soviet breakup and subsequent emergence of an independent Georgia under the leadership of an extreme romantic nationalist, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Gamsakhurdia was a distinguished Georgian writer and a noteworthy anti-Soviet dissident. A genuine human-rights figure, he was imprisoned by then-Georgian Communist Party boss Eduard Shevardnadze. Gamsakhurdia led nationalist forces in a drive for independence during the Gorbachev years. He became Georgian-parliament chairman in 1990 and was overwhelmingly elected president in May 1991, before the Soviet collapse.
  •  
    talks about Georgian nationalism under Gamsakhurdia
jake Chandler

http://selenasol.com/selena/struggle/bosnia_timeline.html - 1 views

Good timeline on the affect of the Bosnian War on Bosniaks

War

started by jake Chandler on 26 Oct 11 no follow-up yet
Caroline Yevak

Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict - ProQuest Research Library -... - 0 views

  • been wars there within the Republic of Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. There, too, occurred the RussianChechen conflict in 1994-96, which resumed in 1999 when forces from Chechnya, probably not controlled by the national leadership of the republic, attacked neighboring Dagestan.
  • been wars there within the Republic of Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
  • There, too, occurred the RussianChechen conflict in 1994-96, which resumed in 1999 when forces from Chechnya, probably not controlled by the national leadership of the republic, attacked neighboring Dagestan.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • Ethnic cleansing is scarcely a new phenomenon. Much of the story of Chechnya in the past 150 years is one of forced migration followed by the return to the Caucasus of many survivors of the migration.
  • Like the Serbs and the Kosovars (and unlike the Serbs and the Croats), the Russians and the Chechens have been at each other's throats for some while now; the first conflict per se dates from 1722 and Peter the Great's efforts to expand into the Caucasus.
  • "If we used force in Chechnya, it would . . . lead to such turmoil, so much bloodshed, that no one would forgive us afterward"
  • ended when General Alexander Lebed negotiated an agreement with the Chechens in summer 1996 that virtually recognized the de facto independence of Chechnya.
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