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the powers, struggling for the independence, finally divided into two camps. The most popular in the public was the political block "The Round Table". The famous leader of this block was the former dissident, philologist, Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1938-1993). Exactly his personal popularity conditioned the victory (62% votes) of "The Round Table" after October 28, 1990 elections (the first many-partied elections in Georgia since 1921). Thus, it was a peaceful end of the Communist governance in Georgia. Z. Gamsakhurdia soon became the president of the country, and during the period of his reign, the inner political situation in the Republic aggravated. Because of the inflexible, ambitious policy of Gamsakhurdia, the relations between the governing "The Round Table" and the rest opposite part, became bitter. The condition in Autonomies was strained too, especially in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Gamsakhurdia's nationalistic phraseology disturbed the ethnic minorities. If in 1981 the partial compromise with Abkhazia was managed, the conflict with Ossetia became the armed opposition. The reason of this was the abolishment of Autonomous Region of Ossetia by the Parliament of Georgia. This solution was provoked by Ossetians, declaring the Autonomous Region as the Sovereign Republic. It must also be notified that in Georgia of this period, one of the reasons of existing ethnical conflicts (and also the split in Georgian national movement), except the local radical actions, was, as it seemed, the hidden activity of SSC of the Union, which used the tried imperial methods - "separate and dominate".

Georgia became a Soviet Socialist Republic

During the Soviet period, Georgia was one of the wealthiest and most privileged republics, and its Black Sea coastline was a popular holiday destination for the Soviet elite. On April 9, 1991, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia declared independence from the U.S.S.R.

Secessionists took control of parts of South Ossetia and most of Abkhazia prior to cease-fire agreements brokered in 1992 and 1994, respectively. Georgia began to stabilize in 1995. However, the separatist conflicts in Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain unresolved.

Georgia contends that its primary conflict is with Russia, which has supported separatism in Georgia's breakaway regions since the early 1990s. Russia, conversely, insists that the conflict is between Georgia on one hand and South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other; its own role is simply that of a mediator. As a result, Russia’s lawyers argued in court, it could not be in dispute with Georgia in this case. The judges disagreed. Russia’s claim to third-party status, Ms Kalandadze insisted, is now untenable.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia tend to defer to their Russian sponsors. Talks failed to prevent Russian vetoes from hastening the departure of OSCE and UN missions from both territories, where Russia has stationed overwhelming military forces.

Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, made a unilateral declaration to that effect at the European Parliament last November. The authorities in the two breakaway provinces followed suit. But Moscow then insisted that the three parties should put their pledges in writing, while refusing to commit itself to such an agreement. Georgia objects to the implicit legitimacy this would lend South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and instead wants a bilateral agreement with Russia. The result: stalemate.

Unfortunately, Gamsakhurdia's commitment to democracy and rule of law was not as strong as his romantic Georgian nationalism, which encouraged chauvinist and intolerant tendencies among his fellow Georgians. Not only did he favor ethnic-Georgian dominance in a population composed of nearly one-third non-Georgians, he dreamed of Georgia as a regional great power, a kind of Caucasian fulcrum between Russia, Turkey and Iran.

Tensions increased with all the country's minorities (including Armenians, Mengrelians and Azeris), but with real ferocity in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There had been serious interethnic violence in both regions starting in 1989, which led to South Ossetia's secession in 1990.

Gamsakhurdia was deposed in early 1992 in favor of an unelected Shevardnadze.

In seven decades as part of the Soviet Union, Georgia maintained some cultural independence, and Georgian nationalism remained a significant--though at times muted--issue in relations with the Russians.

Stalin and Lavrenti Beria, his chief of secret police from 1938 to 1953, were both Georgians

was a change of power in Georgia in November 2003

, President Eduard Shevardnadze was forced to resign

Mikheil Saakashvili claimed that he had won the election

South Ossetia, where Russia accused Georgia of genocide, citing the murder of more than 1,500 civilians for a humanitarian invasion of Georgia.

regard Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili as reckless, irrational, and megalomaniacal.

attack look well pre-planned, not spontaneous. And the authentic death toll makes the justification appear to be a pretext for that attack.

been wars there within the Republic of Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. There, too, occurred the RussianChechen conflict in 1994-96, which resumed in 1999 when forces from Chechnya, probably not controlled by the national leadership of the republic, attacked neighboring Dagestan.

been wars there within the Republic of Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.

There, too, occurred the RussianChechen conflict in 1994-96, which resumed in 1999 when forces from Chechnya, probably not controlled by the national leadership of the republic, attacked neighboring Dagestan.

The War in Abkhazia from 1992 to 1993 was waged chiefly between Georgian government forces on one side and Abkhaz separatist forces supporting independence of Abkhazia from Georgia on the other side. Ethnic Georgians, who lived in Abkhazia fought largely on the side of Georgian government forces. Ethnic Armenians and Russians[2] within Abkhazia's population, largely supported Abkhazians[3][4][5] and many fought on their side

the Russian Federation. For that purpose it was even willing to fight a full- scale war, the first round of which (1994-96) it won, at least militarily.

All this has called for both a radical re-moulding of Chechen national identi- ty and a thorough revision of its collective past. The Chechen authorities, the national movement, and in fact all the Chechen intelligentsia – that is, both professional historians and (even more so) many other persons with higher edu- cation – have been involved in this revision of their national past and rewriting of their history on both the academic and popular levels. It all began in 1989, when Gorbachev’s glasnost reached the periphery, and has been steadily growing in momentum ever since. The main milestones in its development have been 1) in 1990, the appointment of a Chechen as republican secretary of the party for the first time since the second world war;5 2) what man

e new Chechen historical narrative is still strongly linked to Soviet narratives, ways of arguing and moulds of thinking. It tries to prove, for example, that its national heroes were ‘progressive’ and ‘popular’, not ‘reactionary’. It tends, like its progenitor, to be openly political, to make value judgements and moralize and to overlook facts inconsistent with its thesis. Moreover, even emo- tionally it is still very much connected to the ex-USSR, and tries, for example, to prove the Chechens’ loyalty and heroism in the ‘Great Patriotic War’, as the Sec- ond World War is still called in the ex-USSR