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Mckenzie Hudson

The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions - 0 views

  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations.
  • ...17 more annotations...
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations.
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these deva
  • flicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced mi
  • for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensio
  • Chechnya has not been continually at war since it declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • cts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • t of the RSFSR, declared a state of emergency in Chechnya in November 1991, dispatching troop
  • hat ensued was a disastrous 21-month campaign that culminated in the encirclement of several thousand Russian troops inside the capital, Grozny, by Chechen rebel forces in August 1996. That same month, a peace deal was brokered at Khasavyurt (Dagestan), which called for the withdrawal of all Russian forces from Chechnya by the end of the year and stipulated that the final status of the republic would be resolved by 2001 (Sakwa, 2005, p. 296). The period from 1996 until the resumption of hostilities in 1999 was one of de facto independence
  • presented above should permit the reader to conclude that the effects of the war in Chechnya on the North Caucasus have been uneven and diverse. Much has been written about the spread of Islamic extremism, interethnic strife, separatist movements, rampant criminality, and other negative aspects of the conflict that supposedly demonstrate the host of social, cultural, and economic cleavages that plague the region. In reality, however, it is possible to identify specific economic processes occurring in a large number of sectors at a variety of scal
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      1996...1999... de facto indepenence
  • A rash of bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow and other Russian cities in August–September 1999 helped precipitate the second Chechen war. Although doubts remain about the official blame and convictions of Chechen terrorists for the bombings, they, together with raids into Dagestan (see below), provided an opportunity for the recently appointed Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, to launch a new military campaign against the res- tive region. In August 1999, Basayev and the rebel commander Ibn al-K
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      uses "chechyan terrorist bombings as an excuse to invade chechnya
Caroline Yevak

Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya: The Role of Memorial... - 0 views

  • The collapse of Communism in Eurasia has led to many events that few analysts in the West could have predicted during the Cold War. One of the most improbable of these events was the stunning military victory of the tiny autonomous republic of Chechnya in the 1994-1996 war for independence against the Russian Federation.
  • While the Chechens can officially claim to be victors in the first Russo-Chechen war of the 1990s, there was in actuality no winner in this bloody conflict. Scores of Chechen villages were destroyed, the Chechen capital of Grozny was bombed to rubble in the heaviest bombardment in Europe since the bombing of Dresden, tens of thousands of Chechens and Russians living in Chechnya lost their lives, hundreds of thousands more were made refugees, and the economy of the independent statelet of Ichkeria, as Chechnya is now known, lies in utter ruin.
  • Rather than accepting autonomy within the Russian Federation, as the Republic of Tatarstan has, for example, the Chechen people rallied behind such leaders as Dzhokhar Dudaev, Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basaev, and chose to fight the might of transcontinental Russia in a bitter struggle for total freedom. The heavy cost of this independence for the Chechen people has been incalculable in socioeconomic terms.
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  • If the destruction from the first post-Soviet invasion was not sufficient, the majority of the tiny Chechen RepubliCs infrastructure which was rebuilt after 1996 was totally obliterated by Russian bombing raids and artillery bombardments in late 1999 and early 2000 that surpassed even those of the previous war in their intensity.
  • the Russian government seems determined to avenge its defeat in the previous Chechen War
  • the second Chechen War has all the logic of an American invasion of Vietnam to avenge its defeat at the hands of the Viet Cong.
  • While much has been written on the Russian government's reasons for launching the second post-Soviet Chechen War
  • ndeed, historically, no ethnic group on the north Caucasus flank has had as violent a history of conflict with the Russians as the Chechens.
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      Russians determined to beat Chechnya, but they lose
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      Chechnya and Russia have a history of conflict-- 1st and 2nd Chechen Wars. Wars hurt both economies 
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      ethnic & religious conflict (roots of conflict)
Caroline Yevak

Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict - ProQuest Research Library -... - 0 views

  • been wars there within the Republic of Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. There, too, occurred the RussianChechen conflict in 1994-96, which resumed in 1999 when forces from Chechnya, probably not controlled by the national leadership of the republic, attacked neighboring Dagestan.
  • been wars there within the Republic of Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
  • There, too, occurred the RussianChechen conflict in 1994-96, which resumed in 1999 when forces from Chechnya, probably not controlled by the national leadership of the republic, attacked neighboring Dagestan.
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  • Ethnic cleansing is scarcely a new phenomenon. Much of the story of Chechnya in the past 150 years is one of forced migration followed by the return to the Caucasus of many survivors of the migration.
  • Like the Serbs and the Kosovars (and unlike the Serbs and the Croats), the Russians and the Chechens have been at each other's throats for some while now; the first conflict per se dates from 1722 and Peter the Great's efforts to expand into the Caucasus.
  • "If we used force in Chechnya, it would . . . lead to such turmoil, so much bloodshed, that no one would forgive us afterward"
  • ended when General Alexander Lebed negotiated an agreement with the Chechens in summer 1996 that virtually recognized the de facto independence of Chechnya.
Shana Thomas

The Russia-Georgia conflict: Going nowhere fast | The Economist - 0 views

  • Georgia contends that its primary conflict is with Russia, which has supported separatism in Georgia's breakaway regions since the early 1990s. Russia, conversely, insists that the conflict is between Georgia on one hand and South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other; its own role is simply that of a mediator. As a result, Russia’s lawyers argued in court, it could not be in dispute with Georgia in this case. The judges disagreed. Russia’s claim to third-party status, Ms Kalandadze insisted, is now untenable.
  • South Ossetia and Abkhazia tend to defer to their Russian sponsors. Talks failed to prevent Russian vetoes from hastening the departure of OSCE and UN missions from both territories, where Russia has stationed overwhelming military forces.
  • Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, made a unilateral declaration to that effect at the European Parliament last November. The authorities in the two breakaway provinces followed suit. But Moscow then insisted that the three parties should put their pledges in writing, while refusing to commit itself to such an agreement. Georgia objects to the implicit legitimacy this would lend South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and instead wants a bilateral agreement with Russia. The result: stalemate.
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  • Russia, reckons Mr Haber, lost its leverage over Georgia when it recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, Georgia’s tendency to seek short-term diplomatic victories—over Russia’s bid to join the World Trade Organisation,
William Fromm

UN raises Colombia's internally displaced figure to 3.6M - Colombia news | Colombia Rep... - 1 views

  • The U.N.'s refugee agency (UNHCR) has increased the figure of officially recognized internally displaced people in Colombia from 3.4 to 3.67 million, maintaining its undesired position as the first in the world, Caracol Radio reported Monday. UNHCR explains that in 2010 there were 57 "massive displacements," up from 42 the year before, while indigenous communities and Afro-Colombians continue to be the most prominently victimized by forced displacements, who tend to be concentrated in the areas that have witnessed intensified conflict in recent years such as the Pacific coastal regions. The latest U.N. report claimed that ethnic groups have been further affected by the development of illegal mining as a source of finance for illegal armed groups in the country, while inter-city displacement continues to rise, particularly in the Antioquian capital of Medellin. The U.N. agency noted concern for the situation of young people affected by the country's ongoing armed conflict and the emergence of criminal organizations following the 2006 demobilization process that have largely continued the narco-trafficking work of the paramilitaries. The figure of 3.6 million internally displaced people contrasts strikingly with that of Colombian non-governmental organization CODHES, which released a report earlier this year citing 5.2 million displaced Colombians, over 11% of the population, evidently using different criteria with which to classify what constitutes a "forcibly displaced" person. The government's figure by the close of 2010 rested closer to that of the U.N. with around 3.6 million people. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), however, indicates that "the rates of under-registration are substantially high."
  • "The national-survey by the Civil Society Follow-up Commission showed that 65,7% of IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons] are registered," the IDMC explains, while the remaining 34.3% are not. The Colombian government puts the percentage of unregistered IDPs at 21%. The IDMC notes that many people remain outside of the government's official registry "as IDPs did not come forward out of fear or ignorance of procedures, and because many who requested it were denied registration."
  •  
    Colombian Internally displaced figures have been increasing instead of decreasing.
Shana Thomas

About Georgia : History : Georgia under the Soviet Union (1921-1990) - 0 views

  • the powers, struggling for the independence, finally divided into two camps. The most popular in the public was the political block "The Round Table". The famous leader of this block was the former dissident, philologist, Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1938-1993). Exactly his personal popularity conditioned the victory (62% votes) of "The Round Table" after October 28, 1990 elections (the first many-partied elections in Georgia since 1921). Thus, it was a peaceful end of the Communist governance in Georgia. Z. Gamsakhurdia soon became the president of the country, and during the period of his reign, the inner political situation in the Republic aggravated. Because of the inflexible, ambitious policy of Gamsakhurdia, the relations between the governing "The Round Table" and the rest opposite part, became bitter. The condition in Autonomies was strained too, especially in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Gamsakhurdia's nationalistic phraseology disturbed the ethnic minorities. If in 1981 the partial compromise with Abkhazia was managed, the conflict with Ossetia became the armed opposition. The reason of this was the abolishment of Autonomous Region of Ossetia by the Parliament of Georgia. This solution was provoked by Ossetians, declaring the Autonomous Region as the Sovereign Republic. It must also be notified that in Georgia of this period, one of the reasons of existing ethnical conflicts (and also the split in Georgian national movement), except the local radical actions, was, as it seemed, the hidden activity of SSC of the Union, which used the tried imperial methods - "separate and dominate".
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    the fall of soviet union
Caroline Yevak

THE CHECHEN WARS: WILL RUSSIA GO THE WAY OF THE SOVIET UNION? - ProQuest Research Libra... - 0 views

  • At the time of writing of this review of Matthew Evangelista's clearly written book on the wars between Russia and Chechnya, there are reports of several people being killed in an explosion on a commuter train in south Russia, close to Chechnya.
  • The Russian authorities immediately blamed "Chechen terrorists.
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      history of conflict
  • ...17 more annotations...
  • If this incident is connected with the war in Chechnya
  • civilian targets
  • The Russian authorities and many commentators explain that the two invasions of Chechnya in the 1990s were primarily necessary to prevent the Russian Federation from unravelling like the Soviet Union did.
  • in late 1996, the social, economic, political and security situation in this small and relatively resource-poor part of the world deteriorated.
  • "No War, No Peace."
  • The rise of the incidence of kidnappings for cash and extremist Islamist infiltrations did not help. Money allocated by Moscow for reconstruction was channelled into corrupt hands. A power struggle developed in Chechnya.
  • rovides many good reasons why the Russians should intensify their efforts to find a non-violent solution to the situation. There are some provoking sections on the question of whether war crimes are being committed, and how Russia may be exposing itself to increasing attention on this issue.
  • In August 1999, armed forces (apparently acting in the cause of Wahabiism, an extremist Islamic movement) based in Chechnya attacked targets in Dagestan, Chechnya's eastern neighbour. Putin was appointed prime minister by Yeltsin days after this event. Four months later, Yeltsin resigned.
  • Blaming Chechens,
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      Russia blames Chechnya
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      wealth
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      elite leaders not controlling conflict
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in December 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites.
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in December 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites.
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in December 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites.
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in Decembe
  • 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites
Caroline Yevak

NO MAN'S LAND: The Mystery of Mexico's Drug Wars - ProQuest Research Library - ProQuest - 0 views

  • "It's looking more and more like Colombia looked twenty years ago," she said, "where the narco-traffickers control certain parts of the country."
  • Mexico doesn't even have a viable proclaimed guerrilla force aiming to topple the government. Instead, Mexico has labyrinthine drug gangs murderously fighting it out against each other-while they extort, intimidate, massacre, and conduct firefights with the government.
  • There is no law there," he warned. "They are the law."
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • By "they," he meant an irregular army of drug traffickers, who had created a no-man's-land in a grim little slice of Mexico.
  • Mexico's low-intensity "narco-war" has cast a daunting shadow over many of its backcountry areas, some of them wedged disconcertingly against the 2,000-mile-long border with the United States. The border's southern side is dotted with mysterious conflict zones, emitting rumors of burned houses, fleeing residents, and shadowy pseudo-armies of drug traffickers clashing by night.
  • Beltrán Leyva Cartel, El Gilo, the Zetas, El Chapo and his Sinaloa Cartel, the New Federation . . . This one little postage stamp of desert soil sounds like a package tour of "Narco-Mexico."
    • Caroline Yevak
       
      Beltrán-Leyva Cartel is one of the biggest in Mexico
  • There, a rival of the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, reportedly runs two large militia camps in the mountains, each with about three hundred men. The Sinaloa Cartel's own force there, orbiting the same general area, is said to number four hundred, in fifty-man squads.
  • Over on the other side of the country, the greener side by the Gulf of Mexico, south of Texas, three of the cartel gunmen arrested in the August massacre were reportedly aged fourteen, seventeen, and eighteen.
  • Such is the typical age spread for an expedition like this: a not-so-clandestine grupo de limpieza, a "cleanup squad" sent by one drug cartel to quash another.
  • Interestingly, no Mexican police or army troops spotted the cleanup caravan that brought Ramón Mesa, though it frightened various small towns en route. The forty-five hundred Mexican Army troops deployed across the country in the drug war have struck some heavy blows against the cartels, and the troops are often more professional than some outsiders might imagine, but mysteries still abide.
Daniel Holtzschue

Colombian Criminal Justice in Crisis: Fear and Distrust - ProQuest Research Library - P... - 1 views

  • Colombian criminal jurisdiction not only-and not mainly-as an inefficient and corrupt system but rather as a system driven by fear and distrust.
  • fear also affects the performance of justice by inhibiting and discouraging judges from administering justice
  • These effects of fear relate closely both to a more or less generalized distrust of the Colombia juridical system and state justice and, alternatively, to the prevalence of private justice.
    • Daniel Holtzschue
       
      The main reason why people take matters into their own hands
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • This is so because, on the one hand, high levels of fear and distrust inhibit the state's capability to provide justice to its citizens. On the other hand, private justice appears as a somehow logical response to the failure of the Colombian state to provide justice. In reality, private justice becomes the main source to further violence and increase people's distrust in the administration of justice
    • Daniel Holtzschue
       
      never-ending cycle
  • The state's failure to provide justice to its citizens and the lack of a reliable criminal jurisdiction are frequent descriptions of the exercise of justice in contemporary Colombia.
    • Daniel Holtzschue
       
      This sums up the entire judiciary problem in Colombia
  • the generalized use of violence has become a powerful way of subverting criminal jurisdiction.
  • Intimidation through violence ensures that the "request" or impositions of these groups are effectively and rapidly carried out. The constant competition within and among these groups and the increasing inability of the state to control them has meant that "private justice" is now available as any other market commodity, and can be bought by most ordinary people, not just those who are involved in armed conflict or drug trafficking
    • Daniel Holtzschue
       
      Daniel Holtzschue
Ellen Mischinski

Ingrid Betancourt: The Story that was Not - 1 views

  • She was the presidential candidate of the Green Oxygen Party - a group that she had created after leaving the Liberal Party in 1998
  • San Vicente de Caguan was also one of the most dangerous areas in Colombia, as it was considered one of the strongholds of the guerrillas protected, forming part of the demilitarized zone of the army.
  • political kidnapping for extortion that are used purely as a means of financing at this stage of the life of the guerrillas
  • ...7 more annotations...
    • Ellen Mischinski
       
      FARC=anti-government. Betancourt=government.
    • Ellen Mischinski
       
      Money=objective. 
  • But although the government warned repeatedly that there was fighting in Saint Vincent and the strong presence of guerrillas, Betancourt departed the area, but by land, since not been allowed to travel on a military helicopter that was moving place. Along the way, his convoy was stopped by two army checkpoints and warned that there were guerrillas later everywhere. Betancourt ordered his driver to continue driving, but at the last checkpoint bodyguards (the army) said you could not accompany more. She, however, continued the journey to San Vicente and was kidnapped by the FARC, along with Clara Rojas, the number two of his party.
  • It is in this context that the kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt in 2002 moved to Colombia's internal conflict at a global level
  • On the one hand, if there had been no such kidnapping would not have much interest in what happened and is currently in Colombia.
  • the balance of kidnapping has more positives than negatives in terms of Realpolitik, because it weakened the position of the FARC to the world.
    • Ellen Mischinski
       
      found by Ellen
Neha Kukreja

Dwellers of memory: youth and ... - Google Books - 0 views

shared by Neha Kukreja on 14 Sep 11 - No Cached
    • Cole Blum
       
      Sicarios originally started out working only for the drug cartels, but they have gotten so much more diversified. The business people who were not drug cartels to hire sicarios.
    • Cole Blum
       
      This is something that I mentioned in my video that I found very important. The fact that youth were starting to get involved in the violence in Colombia shows how bad off the country really is and how everyone there is attached to the violence.
    • Cole Blum
       
      These sticky notes are all for page 46 but since this is on Google books, it looks like I have the same sticky notes on every page.
  • ...3 more annotations...
    • Cole Blum
       
      As stated in my other article, the government is at fault somewhat for the killings of these high officials. Over the years, the killing of high officials has become the trademark of the sicarios.
    • Neha Kukreja
       
      I'd argue that since the idea of "private justice and revenge became accepted as legitimate means of dealing with conflicts at any level or realm of society (pg. 46)," the youth have known no better than to participate than an idea that's become so commonplace. If people older than them/ the whole entire rest of society has turned a blind eye to the institution of sicaros and the horridness of the practice, how can you expect the youth to know right from wrong?? You can't....
    • Neha Kukreja
       
      THIS IS COLE'S ARTICLE BUT IT KEEPS SAYING THAT IVE ADDED IT!!!
William Fromm

http://watchlist.org/reports/files/colombia.report.php - 0 views

  • Causes of Displacement Young people's vulnerability to abuses is the motivating factor for fleeing in many cases. The UNHCHR reports that threats by guerrillas and paramilitaries are the primary reasons for families to seek refuge elsewhere. According to CODHES, in 1998, 36 percent of families fled with their children because of direct threats; 25 percent because of fear; 22 percent because of massacres and killings; 8 percent because of battles; 4 percent because of "disappearances"; 3 percent because of armed attacks; and 2 percent because of torture. According to the ICG, armed conflict accounted for 66 percent of displacement cases in Putumayo in 2002. Families regularly cited fear of forced recruitment of children into armed forces as a reason for fleeing from their homes. For example, 60 families fled from their homes in the municipality of Cunday, in Tolima department in August 2002, following the announcement of a recruitment order by the FARC-EP for everyone over the age of 12, according to the UNHCHR (E/CN.4/2003/13, Annex). In 2002, fighting for territorial control between guerrillas and paramilitaries in western Urabá forced a group of 64 civilians, including 36 children, to flee to the Punusa area of the Darién jungle in Panama, near the Colombian border (UNHCR). World Vision Colombia reports in Victimas Civiles en Medio del Conflicto Armado, 2002, that paramilitary forces committed six massacres during the last quarter of 2002 that provoked displacements of at least 170 people each in Antioquia, Chocó and Córdoba departments. The report also cites 11 massacres by unidentified forces committed during the same period that also forced residents to flee. No specific locations or dates of these events are provided.
  •  
    Helpful Website on Colombian history with drug trafficking and the reactions of its citizens.
Eric Wineteer

The FARC's Fifth Column; Pastrana issues an ultimatum, but rebels from Colombia have al... - 0 views

  • Their arrival may be one of the predictable spillover effects of Plan Colombia
    • Eric Wineteer
       
      Both the spillover of fighting and poppy planting are effects of the conflict in Colombia.
Eric Wineteer

NICARAGUA: ORTEGA GRANTS ASYLUM TO 2 WOMEN FROM FARC CAMP - ProQuest Research Library -... - 0 views

  • Four other Mexican students and former students of the Autonomous National University of Mexico were killed in the cross-border incursion ordered by Colombian President lvaro Uribe. The attack triggered a major diplomatic crisis, with Ecuador breaking off ties with Colombia, and Venezuela mobilizing troops to its border.
    • Eric Wineteer
       
      This is definitely an effect of the clash between FARC/Colombia/US on other countries.
  • In the past, [Daniel Ortega] has referred to the members of FARC as "brothers."
    • Eric Wineteer
       
      This shows that America and Colombia don't represent the world's opinions on FARC (no surprise there)
  • The right-wing opposition criticized Ortega for granting asylum to the three women, complaining that the move made Nicaragua "a sanctuary for terrorists."
    • Eric Wineteer
       
      Civil war in Colombia leading to political conflict in Nicaragua
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • Pallais argued that "they were involved in drug trafficking and guerrilla activities and belonged to the FARC, and the FARC are considered terrorist forces by Colombia, the United States and the European Union.
    • Eric Wineteer
       
      This mention of the EU also demonstrates FARC's effect on countries outside of Colombia
Cole Blum

secession footer - 1 views

  • the Russian Federation. For that purpose it was even willing to fight a full- scale war, the first round of which (1994-96) it won, at least militarily.
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      WIlling to fight a full scale war to maintain the illusion of independene
  • All this has called for both a radical re-moulding of Chechen national identi- ty and a thorough revision of its collective past. The Chechen authorities, the national movement, and in fact all the Chechen intelligentsia – that is, both professional historians and (even more so) many other persons with higher edu- cation – have been involved in this revision of their national past and rewriting of their history on both the academic and popular levels. It all began in 1989, when Gorbachev’s glasnost reached the periphery, and has been steadily growing in momentum ever since. The main milestones in its development have been 1) in 1990, the appointment of a Chechen as republican secretary of the party for the first time since the second world war;5 2) what man
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      all good stuff
  • e new Chechen historical narrative is still strongly linked to Soviet narratives, ways of arguing and moulds of thinking. It tries to prove, for example, that its national heroes were ‘progressive’ and ‘popular’, not ‘reactionary’. It tends, like its progenitor, to be openly political, to make value judgements and moralize and to overlook facts inconsistent with its thesis. Moreover, even emo- tionally it is still very much connected to the ex-USSR, and tries, for example, to prove the Chechens’ loyalty and heroism in the ‘Great Patriotic War’, as the Sec- ond World War is still called in the ex-USSR
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      attempt to portray themselves as progressive not reactionary and its loyalty to wwII though trying to de sovietize
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • The Chechens (or the Vainakhs) are an ancient civilized nation. They are descendants of the Hurrians, the founders of the ancient Kingdoms of Mittani and Urartu15 and are, therefore, one of the civilizations of the ancient Near East. Since antiquity they were in contact with, and influ- enced, the peoples of the steppes.16 The Soviet narrative is, thus, reversed: the Chechens are the Russians’ elders in age and civilization and, by impli- cation, are also the ones who indirectly civilized them. (2) The Vainakhs have inhabited their present territory continuously since at least the 4th century BC.17 The northern districts, now populated by Rus- sians, had also been settled by the Chechens until Russian colonization dislodged them. This argument aims to counter the Soviet thesis that the Chechens migrated from the mountains into the lowlands only in the 17th and 18th centuries,18 and the possible political implications of this. (3) They have formed states and polities over the ages. A Vainakh state – Durzuketi – existed in the Northern Caucasus in the 4th and 3rd centuries BC and one of its princesses was the first queen of Georgia.19 Other states of which they were part included Serir (5th-9th centuries AD), Alaniya (10th-11th centuries) and Simsim (16t
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      ways they are re-writing history
  • Although Russian ‘robbery raids’ against peaceful Cheche
    • Mckenzie Hudson
       
      important wording- peacful chechnya- Chechnya says armed conflict 94-96 started three hundred years b4 at first gazavat
  • beginning with Moscow’s attempt to depose the newly elected president Jokhar Dudaev by paratroopers in November 1991, and escalating into a full-scale invasion in December 199
    • Cole Blum
       
      This is a good article about how nationalism, while it should be a good thing, can turn into something very harmful.
    • Cole Blum
       
      This is interesting how you can easily get people very excited and get them ready to fight just by getting them loyal to something, as shown in this example. Nationalism is a humongous example of this.
    • Cole Blum
       
      This is actually Mckenzies article.
Neha Kukreja

Preventing Genocide - Who is at Risk? - Chechnya, Russia - 0 views

  • The Russian republic of Chechnya suffered two conflicts in the recent past: 1994-6 and 1999-2000.
  • The demonization of Chechens as a group within Russian society
    • Neha Kukreja
       
      This follows right alongside our definition of Genocide : an attempt to exterminate a particular group of people
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • but he also voiced concerns about ongoing violations of human rights, including extra-judicial detention centres, disappearances, pressure on witnesses, and house burnings. The U.S. State Department’s 2010 annual human rights report reached similar conclusions.
Neha Kukreja

Crisis in Chechnya - Global Issues - 0 views

  • Chechens are predominantly Sunni Muslim.
  • As well as different cultural and religious beliefs, as for any group of people throughout history subdued by external rule or empire,
  • With the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, a number of regions managed to break away and gain independence.
  • ...11 more annotations...
  • became an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation the following year.
  • , Boris Yeltsin, refused Chechnya's declaration of independence, sending in troops instead,
  • The resulting anarchy in Chechnya strengthened Russian belief that the region should not become independent and undermine its territorial integrity;
  • Furthermore, oil is a significant factor
    • Neha Kukreja
       
      This is a major difference---Milosevic wanted to keep Bosnia not so much for economic reasons as for wanting to make a predominantly ethnic Serb state.
    • Neha Kukreja
       
      Russians= predominantly Russian Orthodox Chechens= predominantly Muslim This is similar to religious differences leading to genocide in the Balkans--- Serbs (Orthodox) were pitted against both Catholic Croats and Muslims in Bosnia.
  • After the 1917 Russian Revolution, a declaration of independence by the Chechens was met with occupation from the Bolsheviks who later established the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Region in 1924.
  • At the beginning of 1999, Maskhadov declared Islamic Shari'ah law, to be phased in over the next three years.
    • Neha Kukreja
       
      This only worsened the conflict against the Russians.......
  • Russia' full scale war with Chechnya led to many bombing raids by Russian forces. Some one third to half of the 1.3 million Chechen people are said to have fled from Chechnya.
  • 70-80,000 people died, mostly Chechen civilians, and in 1996, Russia withdrew defeated.
Caroline Yevak

Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya: The Role of Memorial... - 0 views

  • The collapse of Communism in Eurasia has led to many events that few analysts in the West could have predicted during the Cold War. One of the most improbable of these events was the stunning military victory of the tiny autonomous republic of Chechnya in the 1994-1996 war for independence against the Russian Federation.
Shana Thomas

Georgia - 0 views

  • Georgia became a Soviet Socialist Republic
  • During the Soviet period, Georgia was one of the wealthiest and most privileged republics, and its Black Sea coastline was a popular holiday destination for the Soviet elite. On April 9, 1991, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia declared independence from the U.S.S.R.
  • Secessionists took control of parts of South Ossetia and most of Abkhazia prior to cease-fire agreements brokered in 1992 and 1994, respectively. Georgia began to stabilize in 1995. However, the separatist conflicts in Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain unresolved.
  •  
    use for the economic part- relating to wealth disparities; wealth disparities didnt play a huge role but there were some issues with wealth once the soviet union brokw apart
Shana Thomas

THE DYNAMICS AND CHALLENGES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING: THE GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA CASE - 0 views

    • Shana Thomas
       
      collapse of soviet union has effects on georgia -> abkhazia wanting to rebel/ be independent country?  ultimately leads to the georgian- Abkhaz war/ conflict which = the genocide
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