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Jukka Peltokoski

Europe's Left after Brexit | Yanis Varoufakis - 0 views

  • This article
  • addresses left-wing critics of DiEM25 claiming that DiEM25 is pursuing the wrong objective (to democratise the EU) by means of a faulty strategy (focusing at the European rather than at the national level).
  • The question is not whether the Left must clash with the EU’s establishment and current practices. The question is in what context, and within which overarching political narrative, this confrontation should take place. Three are the options on offer.
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  • Option 1: Euro-reformism
  • One (fast receding) option is the standard variety of euro-reformism, practised typically by social democrats who argue for ‘more democracy’,
  • dynamic analyses
  • The EU’s institutions are incapable of being reformed through the standard process of inter-governmental deliberations and gradual treaty changes.
  • Option 2: Lexit
  • This (Lexit) option raises concerns regarding its realism and probity. Is its agenda feasible? In other words, is it a realistic prospect that, by (in Kouvelakis’ words) calling for referenda to leave the EU, the Left can block “the forces of the xenophobic and nationalist Right from winning hegemony and diverting the popular revolt”? And, is such a campaign consistent with the Left’s fundamental principles?
  • the EU was constructed intentionally as a democracy-free zone designed to keep the demos out of decision-making
  • Given that the EU has established free movement, Lexit involves acquiescence to (if not actual support for) its ending and for the re-establishment of national border controls
  • the Left should demand common minimum wages in exchange for its support for the Single Market
  • xenophobic Right
  • do they truly believe that the Left will win the discursive and policy war against the fossil fuel industry by supporting the re-nationalisation of environmental policy?
  • Option 3: DiEM25’s proposal for disobedience
  • Instead, DiEM25 proposes a pan-European movement of civil and governmental disobedience with which to bring on a surge of democratic opposition to the way European elites do business at the local, national and EU levels.
  • national parliaments and governments have power
  • a progressive national government can only use this power if it is prepared for a rupture with the EU troika.
  • a clash with the EU establishment is inescapable.
  • wilfully disobeying the unenforceable EU ‘rules’ at the municipal, regional and national levels while making no move whatsoever to leave the EU.
  • Undoubtedly, the EU institutions will threaten us
  • Consider the profound difference between the following two situations: The EU establishment threatening progressive Europeanist governments with ‘exit’ when they refuse to obey its authoritarian incompetence, and Progressive national parties or governments campaigning alongside the xenophobic Right for ‘exit’.
  • It is the difference between: (A) Clashing against the EU establishment in a manner that preserves the spirit of internationalism, demands pan-European action, and sets us fully apart from the xenophobic Right, and (B) Walking hand-in-hand with nationalisms that will, inescapably, reinforce the xenophobic Right while allowing the EU to portray the Left as populists insufficiently distinguishable from Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen etc.
  • The Left’s traditional internationalism is a key ingredient of DiEM25, along with other constituent democratic traditions from a variety of political projects (including progressive liberalism, feminist and ecological movements, the ‘pirate’ parties etc.).
  • DiEM25 proposes a rebellion to deliver authentic democracy at the levels of local government, national governments and the EU.
  • This leftwing objection to DiEM25’s call for a pan-European movement is interesting and puzzling. In effect, it argues that democracy is impossible on a supranational scale because a demos must be characterised by national and cultural homogeneity.
  • The Left, lest we forget, traditionally opposed the bourgeois belief in a one-to-one relationship between a nation and a sovereign parliament. The Left counter-argued that identity is something we create through political struggle (class struggle, the struggle against patriarchy, the struggle for smashing gender and sexual stereotypes, emancipation from Empire etc.).
  • in order to create the European demos that will bring about Europe’s democracy
  • Only through this pan-European network of rebel cities, rebel prefectures and rebel governments can a progressive movement become hegemonic in Italy, in Greece, in England, indeed anywhere.
  • The question for Europe’s Left, for progressive liberals, Greens etc. is, now, whether this struggle, this project, should take the form of a campaign to leave the EU (e.g. Lexit) or, as DiEM25 suggests, of a campaign of civil, civic and governmental disobedience within but in confrontation with the EU
  • to those who berate DiEM25 and its call for a pan-European democratic movement as utopian, our answer is that a transnational, pan-European democracy remains a legitimate, realistic long-term goal, one that is in concert with the Left’s time honoured internationalism. But this objective must be accompanied by pragmatism and a precise plan for immediate action:
  • Oppose any talk of ‘more Europe’ now
  • Present Europeans with a blueprint (a comprehensive set of policies and actions) of how we plan to re-deploy Europe’s existing institutions
  • ensure that the same blueprint makes provisions for keeping internationalism alive in the event that the EU establishment’s incompetent authoritarianism causes the EU’s disintegration
  • “The EU will be democratised. Or it will disintegrate!”
  • We cannot predict which of the two (democratisation or disintegration) will occur. So, we struggle for the former while preparing for the latter.
  • DiEM25’s Progressive Agenda for Europe will be pragmatic, radical and comprehensive. It will comprise policies that can be implemented immediately to stabilise Europe’s social economy, while:
  • affording more sovereignty to city councils, prefectures and national parliaments, proposing institutional interventions and designs that will reduce the human cost in case the euro collapses and the EU fragments, and setting up a democratic Constitution Assembly process that enables Europeans to generate a European identity with which to bolster their reinvigorated national cultures, parliaments and local authorities.
  • Conclusion:
  • The EU is at an advanced stage of disintegration. There are two prospects. The EU is not past the point of no return (yet) and can, still, be democratised, stabilised, rationalised and humanised The EU is beyond the point of no return and incapable of being democratised. Therefore, its disintegration is certain, as is the clear and present danger of Europe’s descent into a postmodern version of the deflationary 1930s
  • So, what should progressives do?
  • Campaign vigorously along internationalist, cross-border, lines all over Europe for a democratic Union – even if we do not believe that the EU can, or ought to, survive in its current form Expose the EU Establishment’s authoritarian incompetence Coordinate civil, civic and governmental disobedience across Europe Illustrate through DiEM25’s own transnational structure how a pan-European democracy can work at all levels and in all jurisdictions Propose a comprehensive Progressive Agenda for Europe which includes sensible, modest, convincing proposals for ‘fixing’ the EU (the euro even) and for managing progressively the EU’s and the euro’s disintegration if and when the Establishment brings it on.
Jukka Peltokoski

Herätkää vallankumoukseen: älykkäät koneet vievät työt, mullistavat yhteiskun... - 0 views

  • Automatisaatio ja koneoppiminen ei lähivuosina mullista vain työelämäämme, vaan koko elämäntapamme ja yhteiskuntamme.
  • MIT:n professori Erik Brynjolfssonin pääviesti
  • kirjanThe Second Machine Age.
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  • Kaikessa yksinkertaisuudessaan Brynjolfssonin teesi on se, että teollinen vallankumous muutti maailman perusteellisesti.
  • höyry ja sähkö toivat ihmisen käyttöön tuhansia kertoja enemmän voimaa
  • yhteiskuntarakenne mullistui ja luotiin demokratian, sosiaaliturvan ja työttömyyskorvauksen kaltaisia innovaatioita.
  • Teollinen vallankumous korvasi fyysistä, mekaanista työtä. Nyt ensimmäistä kertaa koneet ovat alkaneet laajassa mitassa korvata ajattelutyötä. Kaikenlainen rutiinitietotyö postin lajittelusta röntgenkuvien analyysiin on siirtymässä koneille.
  • Ensimmäisessä vaiheessa koneet oppivat tekemään rutiinitietotyötä. Sellaista joka pystytään koodaamaan yksiselitteisiksi käskyiksi. Tämä vallankumous on ollut käynnissä jo pari vuosikymmentä.
  • Toinen vaihe on iskenyt toden teolla lävitse vasta aivan viime vuosina. Se perustuu koneoppimiseen, joka tarkoittaa sitä että emme opeta koneelle valmiita sääntöjä. Vaan annamme koneelle tietynlaisen hermoverkoston ja sen jälkeen laitamme sen opettelemaan jotakin asiaa antaen jatkuvaa palautetta onnistumisesta.
  • jatkuvan palautteen ansiosta se kehittyy huimaa vauhtia
  • itseoppivat verkostot avaavat koneille aivan uusia maailmoja kasvojentunnistuksesta itsenäiseen autolla ajamiseen
  • Robotti osaa nykyään ajaa myös polkupyörää
  • Kokeilemalla ja kaatumalla tarpeeksi monta kertaa.
  • Yhä useammat ihmistoiminnot tulevat korvautumaan koneilla ja ohjelmilla lähivuosina etenkin länsimaissa, joissa ihmistyö on kallista.
  • 1) Opetusjärjestelmä pitää uudistaa. Työ ja elämä tulee jatkossa muuttumaan sellaista vauhtia että koulu ei kykene opettamaan niitä taitoja mitä kahdenkymmen vuoden tai edes kymmenen vuoden päästä työelämässä tarvitaan. Siksi koulun kannattaa keskittyä metataitoihin: Luovuuden ja yrittäjämäisen asenteen opettamiseen sekä itse oppimiskyvyn vahvistamiseen, jotta ihminen kykenee elämänmittaiseen oppimiseen.
  • 2) Yrittäjyyteen tulee panostaa. Murros tulee kadottamaan ison osan vanhoista työpaikoista. Yhdysvalloissa arviolta puolet nykyisistä työtehtävistä on vaarassa seuraavan kahdenkymmenen vuoden aikana ja Etlan selvityksen mukaan Suomessakin kolmasosa on vaarassa kadota. Toisaalta murros synnyttää myös uusia mahdollisuuksia ja työtehtäviä. Valtion tai muun tahon on kuitenkin vaikea keskusjohtoisesti keksiä mitä uusia ammatteja voi murroksen myötä syntyä. Parhaiten ne löytyvät ruohonjuuritason kokeiluilla eli sillä että ihmiset ryhtyvät yrittäjinä kokeilemaan jotakin uutta ja sitten parhaat kokeilut kasvavat ja alkavat työllistää ihmisiä.
  • 3) Resurssien tehokkaampi uudelleenjako. Automatisaatio johtaa hyvin helposti ’winner takes all’ -tyyppiseen talouteen, jossa marginaalinen joukko yritysten omistajia nousee miljardööreiksi, mutta keskipalkkaista ja matalapalkkaista työtä on yhä vähemmän tarjolla.
  • työn osuus BKT:stä ja yritysten voittojen osuus BKT:stä kehittyivät jokseenkin tasatahtia toisesta maailmansodasta lähtien, mutta vuodesta 2002 jälkimmäinen on lähtenyt hurjaan nousuun ja edellinen laskuun.
  • nykyisen yhteiskuntajärjestelmän puitteissa automatisaation taloudelliset hyödyt valuvat harvalukuisen joukon taskuun, kun taas isoa osaa erityisesti vähänkoulutetusta työvoimasta uhkaa työttömyys.
  • Miten sitten huolehditaan tasaisemmasta tulonjaosta ja siitä, että kaikilla on mielekästä tekemistä myös tulevaisuudessa?
  • perustulokokeilusta
  • Valitettavasti vaikka tietoisuus murroksesta on lisääntynyt, ei selkeitä ratkaisuja tai politiikkasuosituksia tunnu vielä olevan hirveästi tarjolla.
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    Teollinen vallankumous korvasi fyysistä, mekaanista työtä. Nyt ensimmäistä kertaa koneet ovat alkaneet laajassa mitassa korvata ajattelutyötä. Kaikenlainen rutiinitietotyö postin lajittelusta röntgenkuvien analyysiin on siirtymässä koneille. Koska ne tekevät sen tehokkaammin ja varmemmin kuin ihmiset. Koneet alkavat muodostaa itseoppivia verkostoja, jotka kehittyvät kokeilemalla ja epäonnistumalla. Uudet ratkaisut tilanteeseen kehittyvät ennen kaikkea kokeellisen yrittäjyyden kautta. Tällä hetkellä tilanne uhkaa kuitenkin johtaa prekariaatin ja köyhälistön kasvamiseen. Siksi olisi luotava uudenlainen koulutus- ja tulonjakojärjestelmä. Perustulon toteuttaminen on avainasia.
Jukka Peltokoski

The incomplete, true, authentic and wonderful history of May Day - Peter Linebaugh - 0 views

  • Indeed, the native Americans whom Captain John Smith encountered in 1606 only worked four hours a week. The origin of May Day is to be found in the Woodland Epoch of History.
  • people honored the woods
  • Trees were planted. Maypoles were erected. Dances were danced. Music was played. Drinks were drunk, and love was made. Winter was over, spring had sprung.
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  • Monotheism arose
  • Merry Mount became a refuge for Indians, the discontented, gay people, runaway servants, and what the governor called "all the scume of the countrie."
  • it was always a celebration of all that is free and life-giving in the world. That is the Green side of the story. Whatever else it was, it was not a time to work.
  • Therefore, it was attacked by the authorities. The repression had begun with the burning of women and it continued in the 16th century when America was "discovered," the slave trade was begun, and nation-states and capitalism were formed.
  • The people resisted the repressions. Thenceforth, they called their May sports, the "Robin Hood Games." Capering about with sprigs of hawthorn in their hair and bells jangling from their knees, the ancient charaders of May were transformed into an outlaw community, Maid Marions and Little Johns.
  • Thus began in earnest the Red side of the story of May Day. The struggle was brought to Massachusetts in 1626.
  • Thomas Morton settled in Passonaggessit which he named Merry Mount. The land seemed a "Paradise"
  • With the proclamation that the first of May At Merry Mount shall be kept holly day
  • The Puritans
  • the Puritans were the imperialist, not Morton, who worked with slaves, servants, and native Americans
  • May Day became a day to honor the saints, Philip and James, who were unwilling slaves to Empire.
  • The Maypole was cut down. The settlement was burned.
  • On 4 May 1886
  • In England the attacks on May Day were a necessary part of the wearisome, unending attempt to establish industrial work discipline. The attempt was led by the Puritans with their belief that toil was godly and less toil wicked. Absolute surplus value could be increased only by increasing the hours of labor and abolishing holydays.
  • Two bands of that rainbow came from English and Irish islands. One was Green. Robert Owen, union leader, socialist, and founder of utopian communities in America, announced the beginning of the millennium after May Day 1833. The other was Red. On May Day 1830, a founder of the Knights of Labor, the United Mine Workers of America, and the Wobblies was born in Ireland, Mary Harris Jones, a.k.a., "Mother Jones." She was a Maia of the American working class.
  • The history of the modern May Day originates in the center of the North American plains, at Haymarket, in Chicago
  • in May 1886.
  • Virgin soil, dark, brown, crumbling, shot with fine black sand
  • a green perspective
  • The land was mechanized. Relative surplus value could only be obtained by reducing the price of food.
  • It became "Hello" to the hobo. "Move on" to the harvest stiffs. "Line up" the proletarians. Such were the new commands of civilization.
  • Thousands of immigrants, many from Germany, poured into Chicago after the Civil War. Class war was advanced
  • Nationally, May First 1886 was important because a couple of years earlier the Federation of Organized Trade and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada, "RESOLVED... that eight hours shall constitute a legal day's labor, from and after May 1, 1886.
  • Haymarket Square
  • Thomas Morton was a thorn in the side of the Boston and Plymouth Puritans, because he had an alternate vision of Massachusetts. He was impressed by its fertility; they by its scarcity. He befriended the Indians; they shuddered at the thought. He was egalitarian; they proclaimed themselves the "Elect". He freed servants; they lived off them. He armed the Indians; they used arms against Indians.
  • 176 policemen charged the crowd that had dwindled to about 200. An unknown hand threw a stick of dynamite, the first time that Alfred Nobel's invention was used in class battle.
  • All hell broke lose, many were killed, and the rest is history.
  • May Day, or "The Day of the Chicago Martyrs" as it is still called in Mexico "belongs to the working class and is dedicated to the revolution," as Eugene Debs put it in his May Day editorial of 1907.
Jukka Peltokoski

From the Idea of a basic income to the political movement in Europe | Rosa Luxemburg St... - 0 views

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    Rosa Luxemburg Säätiön tuore julkaisu eurooppalaisesta perustuloliikkeestä. Myös Suomen tilanne mukana kartoituksessa. Julkaisu on ladattavissa pdf:nä tämän linkin takaa. Sisällys: - Short history of the idea of a basic income in Europe and the US - The idea of a basic income becomes the political call of a wide, but politically differently coined movement in Germany - The European Basic Income Movement - Market liberal and emancipatory approaches to reasoning for and design of a basic income - Occupation, welfare state and radical democratisation of society and economy - Public goods, infrastructure and services - Redistribution - Gender equality - Reduction in use of natural resources - Global Social Rights - The European Basic Income Movement - Questions
Jukka Peltokoski

Connecting the Dots 8: The Commons as the Response to the Structural Crises of the Glob... - 0 views

  • In our contribution, we want to stress the key importance of what we call a “value regime,” or simply put, the rules that determine what society and the economy consider to be of value. We must first look at the underlying modes of production — i.e. how value is created and distributed — and then construct solutions must that help create these changes in societal values. The emerging answer for a new mode of value creation is the re-emergence of the Commons.
  • In our view, the dominant political economy has three fatal flaws.
  • Pseudo-Abundance
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  • “Intellectual property”
  • continuous capital accumulation
  • overuse and depletion of natural resources
  • Scarcity Engineering
  • Scarcity engineering is what we call this continuous attempt to undo natural abundance where it occurs.
  • We could call this pseudo-abundance,
  • the ability of this privatized knowledge to create profits
  • A good recent example of this “patent lag” effect is the extraordinary growth of 3D printing, once the technology lost its patents.
  • Perpetually Increasing Social Injustice
  • The global open design communities engaging in peer production and mutualization of productive knowledge have no such perverse incentives. These communities design to ensure participation and are “naturally” inclined to design sustainable products and services.
  • To what degree does the Commons and peer-to-peer production function as a potential solution for these three interrelated structural crises of capitalism?
  • Digital networks (such as the internet) have recently enabled a new type of Commons where the knowledge required for human action and value creation has been mutualized. This has led to global open design communities, which jointly create open knowledge pools (e.g. Wikipedia), free software (e.g. the Linux Operating System) or open designs to enable physical production
  • Commons-based peer production emerges when technology enables the creation of open, contributory systems that create Commons.
  • more and more wealth into fewer hands through compound interest, rent seeking, purchasing legislation, etc.
  • The privatization and patenting of knowledge and technical solutions hampers the widespread distribution of necessary innovations. No such impediments exist in the open contributory systems of peer production communities, where innovation anywhere in the network is instantly available to the whole.
  • Peer production, independent of the profit motive, invites and facilitates the creation of solidarity-based forms of economic entities. Being generative towards human communities, these entities are more likely based on socially just forms of value sharing.
  • The Revolution Is Already Happening
  • responses take three forms:1. The sustainability and ecological/environmental movements, attempting to find solutions for the planet’s survival;2. The “Open,” “Commons” and “Sharing” movements, stressing the need for shareable knowledge and mutualized physical resources;3. The cooperative and solidarity economy, focusing on fairness.
  • The good news is that Commons-based peer production is the best way to bring these three necessary aspects together into one coherent system. However, for this to happen, the various movements need enabling tools and capacities. An example is the open source circular economy
  • Similarly, open and platform cooperativism — the convergence of socially just forms of production with shareable knowledge — allows all contributing citizens to create fair, generative livelihoods around the shared resources they need and co-create.
  • We’ve seen post-capitalist practices emerging since the late 20th century — for example, the 1983 invention of the universally available browser. Citizens have been empowered to create value through open contributory systems; these create universally available knowledge, which in turn can be used for material production.
  • emerging globally
Jukka Peltokoski

Europe's Ugly Future: A review of Varoufakis, Galbraith & Stiglitz - Foreign ... - 0 views

  • Fifteen years ago, when the EU established its single currency, European leaders promised higher growth due to greater efficiency and sounder macroeconomic policies, greater equality between rich and poor countries within a freer capital market, enhanced domestic political legitimacy due to better policies, and a triumphant capstone for EU federalism. Yet for nearly a decade, Europe has experienced just the opposite.
  • Since 2008, inflation-adjusted GDP in the eurozone has stagnated, compared with an expansion of more than eight percent in European countries that remain outside.
  • In this situation, a lost decade may well become a lost generation.
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  • Nor has the euro reduced inequality among European countries.
  • The prolonged depression has helped fuel the rise of right-wing nationalists and Euroskeptics. In Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, radical right-wing parties now enjoy more success at the polls than at any time since the 1930s.
  • Trust in EU institutions,
  • has fallen through the floor.
  • The reason currency pegs often depress economic growth lies in the essential nature of monetary arrangements.
  • Varoufakis
  • Galbraith
  • Stiglitz
  • All three would prefer that the system be reformed.
  • Galbraith offers the most succinct explanation of why the system has benefited Germany at the expense of weaker economies:
  • The Greek story is properly a European story in which, as in all European stories, Germany takes the leading role.
  • Varoufakis, Galbraith, and Stiglitz differ on the details, but they all blame the euro system and, especially, Germany.
  • Stiglitz shows that international systems of pegged currencies, of which Europe’s single currency represents only an extreme example, “have long been associated with recessions and depressions.”
  • Most observers now attribute these troubles to the euro.
  • In the real world, however, countries have diverse market positions and domestic institutions, which means that macroeconomic convergence is hard to come by.
  • a currency peg prevents the governments of countries that run trade deficits and incur debt from pursuing healthy economic policies to correct the problem.
  • normally loosen domestic monetary policy (thereby lowering interest rates and stimulating investment), let its currency depreciate (thereby boosting exports, reducing imports, and transferring income to the sector of the economy that produces competitive goods), and increase government spending (thereby stimulating consumption and investment).
  • Deficit countries are thus left with only one way to restore their competitiveness: “internal devaluation,” the politically correct term for austerity
  • permanent austerity becomes the only way to maintain international equilibrium.
  • Citizens grasp at increasingly radical new parties and lack the faith in Europe required to enact needed reforms.
  • Germany has emerged almost unscathed—at least so far.
  • Yet the costs of a flawed monetary system may eventually boomerang and depress growth even in Germany. Austerity is slowly reducing Germany’s ability to sell its goods to other European countries,
  • Despite the EU principle of free movement, many informal barriers to mobility still protect special interests.
  • to force the German economy into line
  • the EU could discourage trade surpluses by imposing a tax on them
  • Another set of structural policies would encourage large fiscal transfers and migration in order to offset the inequities that the euro has induced. In essence, this would replicate the movements of capital and people that make single currencies viable within individual countries.
  • fiscal transfers from creditor countries such as Germany to deficit countries such as Greece and Italy.
  • Stiglitz proposes, Germany and other surplus countries could do more to accept and encourage continuous migration flows from deficit countries.
  • Germans are unlikely to renounce the export-led growth that has stemmed from their 60-year tradition of high savings, low inflation, and modest labor contracts. They are even less likely to accept massive fiscal transfers to other countries.
  • Stiglitz offers the most thorough evaluation of the possible options. There are three. The first entails reforming the fundamental structure of the euro system so that it generates growth and distributes the benefits fairly. Stiglitz details how the EU and the European Central Bank might rewrite tax laws, loosen monetary policy, and change corporate governance rules in order to boost wage growth, consumer spending, and investment.
  • Political opposition to immigration is already strong in Austria, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, and these countries would not tolerate many millions of additional foreigners.
  • a second policy option: muddling through. In this scenario, member states would strengthen the EU’s ability to manage the crisis.
  • European Stability Mechanism,
  • The burden of the current system on deficit countries must also be eliminated—a change that requires far more serious reform. Eventually, Europe would have to restructure its debt,
  • GDP-indexed bonds
  • eurobonds
  • the solvency of national banks,
  • Yet Germany and other creditor governments are naturally hesitant to accept financial responsibility for debtor countries.
  • Such reforms would also require the EU to massively expand its oversight over national financial systems,
  • If neither of the two options to save the single currency and restart growth is viable, this leaves only a third option: abolishing the euro.
  • Although Stiglitz would prefer that the euro be reformed, he admits that “there is more than a small probability that it will not be done” and therefore argues for breaking up the system.
  • from Grexit to his preferred alternative of breaking the eurozone into several subgroups, each with its own currency.
  • Yet even the radical step of breaking up the eurozone, Stiglitz makes clear, would probably help deficit countries only if Germany agreed to increase domestic spending, rein in speculation, and reduce deficits.
  • Abolishing the euro might slightly improve the options for deficit countries, but absent deeper structural reforms, it would not eliminate the underlying problem.
  • depressing reading, because in the end, they suggest that there is no easy way out of Europe’s predicament, given the current political constraints. In the long run, muddling through may be the worst outcome, and yet it is the most likely.
  • In response to such a bleak prognosis, many European federalists, particularly on the left, contend that Europe’s real problem is its “democratic deficit.” If only EU institutions or national governments were more representative, they argue, then they would enjoy sufficient legitimacy to solve these problems. The EU needs more transparency in Brussels, more robust direct elections to the European Parliament, a grand continent-wide debate, and political union, the argument runs, so that the resulting European superstate would be empowered to impose massive fiscal transfers and macroeconomic constraints on surplus countries. Alternatively, if more radical alternatives could be fully debated in national elections, then member states might muster the power to pull out of the eurozone or renegotiate their terms in it.
  • everything comes down to choices made by self-interested sovereign states. Governments have little incentive to make charitable and risky concessions, even in a united Europe with economic prosperity on the line. Politicians simply lack the strength and courage to make a genuine break with the status quo, either toward federalism or toward monetary sovereignty.
Jukka Peltokoski

Winning Power, Not Just Government | Jacobin - 0 views

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    Keskusta vai kamppailu? Jutun mukaan vain kamppailujen rakentaminen on kestävä vasemmistostrategia. Ilman sitä pelkkä hallitusvaikuttaminen kompastuu kompromisseihinsa.
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