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Ed Webb

Egyptian media gloats over fabricated Guardian articles | Mada Masr - 0 views

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    I know Mayton a little. He always had a bad reputation among fellow journalists in Cairo. Note how innacurate the Egyptian media reports are on this story: treating it as a propaganda gift to justify the local line that foreign media are biased against Egypt.
Ed Webb

Turkish Reforms Entangle Education - The New York Times - 0 views

  • Secularism in schools has been undergoing a transformation that signals a reticence on the part of the ruling Justice and Development Party, or A.K.P., to separate religion from politics.
  • there has been a 73 percent increase in the number of religious vocational schools, known as imam-hatip, in the country since 2010. While the schools offer a general academic curriculum, they also provide compulsory Islamic teaching, principally Sunni, which represents the majority of the country’s 77 million population.
  • nearly 40,000 of them, including some non-Muslims, found themselves automatically assigned to religious vocational schools, often against their will. Many parents have demanded transfers, a difficult bureaucratic task on several counts, but mainly because of a lack of vacancies. Some critics argue that this reflects a deliberate assimilation project aimed at nationwide Sunni indoctrination.
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  • in 2012 Mr. Erdogan overtly expressed a wish to “raise a religious youth,”
  • The European Court of Human Rights recently ruled that Turkey had violated the rights of its minorities because its mandatory religious and ethics classes were based on Sunni Islam and did not take into account other religions.
Ed Webb

ANALYSIS: Egypt's military-economic empire - 0 views

  • The roots of the military’s commercial empire go back to the 1980s, when a combination of a peace dividend after Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel and a fiscal crisis led the country to pare back its defence budget. Defence spending as a proportion of GDP fell from 6.5 percent in 1988 to 1.8 percent in 2012, according to World Bank indicators. The armed forces had to find new sources of revenue.
  • forced labour, in the form of conscripts, is almost certainly used in army-run factories. Quite apart from the ethical ramifications of this, it allows the military to undercut its competitors, since conscripts don’t have to be paid full wages
  • Businesses controlled by the military are widely dispersed. Some may come under a number of umbrella organisations, including the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation, the National Services Projects Organisation (NSPO) and the Ministry of Military Production. In addition, the EAF holds majority or minority stakes in many other semi-public or private companies, especially in the fields of infrastructure and subcontracting. EAF influence also extends to “sensitive” but nominally civilian infrastructure. Senior positions at a number of airports have for some years been reserved for retired army officers, as a sort of unofficial “pension programme.”
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  • the EAF is able, through the use of land designations and other means, to control much of the public lands (desert, agricultural and urban) that comprise 94 percent of Egypt’s area, through the use of land designations, the ability to auction such lands and to receive compensation from the state treasury when military zones are rezoned to civilian purposes. The army also controls the coastline (officially classed as border territory) and is thus able to profit from tourist developments. As such, the EAF wields enormous influence over the real estate market and the country’s development structure
  • Estimates as to how much of the total economy is controlled by the EAF range from 40 percent, according to telecoms billionaire Naguib Sawiris (in comments to local media last March) to somewhere between 45 percent and 60 percent, according to Transparency International
  • the consensus among those asked by Middle East Eye as to the size of the military-economic complex is that the EAF’s reach extends into virtually every economic sector, from foodstuffs like tomato paste and olive oil, to consumer electronics to real estate, construction, transport and services
  • since the military’s budget - and by extension, its economic fiefdom – is kept secret, EAF-controlled businesses can benefit from subsidies that are kept off the books, as well as having more freedom of manoeuvre amid the lack of oversight.  One example was the decision under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to slash fuel subsidies for industrialists. Since the military’s budget (and therefore, its energy costs) are off the books, the rising energy prices disproportionately affected EAF competitors, but not the forces themselves
  • military involvement in the political economy generally leads to worse performance. Within the region, the examples of Iran and Algeria point to this, while China has taken steps to reduce its armed forces’ commercial exposure over the past few years precisely for this reason
  • A further effect of the EAF’s economic dominance is a lack of growth opportunities for SMEs, since only favoured insiders can win lucrative contracts and deal with the permit system. In turn, this leads to a large informal economy of insiders, leaving many Egyptians outside, in poverty
  • While patronage is nothing new in Egyptian politics, since President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power the top brass has expanded intra-military patronage to the extent that they are crowding out other economic actors and failing to bring in key constituencies such as opposition groups, the private sector bourgeoisie and the urban poor. The EAF has expanded its reach so fast that now it has to defend its empire against these groups, sowing seeds of further strife in future.
Ed Webb

The danger of majority tyranny | openDemocracy - 1 views

  • The “yes”’ to banning minarets has brought these limits to mind, causing a real shock and deep disappointment for many people. I cannot remember any referendum that has divided our country both politically and ethically in a similar manner.
  • Democratically reached decisions reflect the will of the people in a given moment, though, not necessarily a superior wisdom or power. Democratic decisions can be wrong, unjust and impractical, violate the country’s constitution and even violate basic human rights. They can even relate to issues for which the democratic system is quite simply inadequate.
  • The debate about the limits of popular sovereignty will surely go on in Switzerland for some time to come. We need to make sure that the discussion is characterized by clarity of analysis, precision in drawing these borders and public education. An absolutized concept of democracy can threaten freedom and is susceptible to misuse. An enlightened people recognizes and acknowledges the limits of its sovereignty and knows that these limitations are what strengthen democracy and freedom.
Ed Webb

From journalists to generals, Algeria cracks down on dissent | Middle East Eye - 0 views

  • While the economic crisis related to the fall of oil revenues has caused political and social tensions, the Algerian authorities are showing increasing intolerance towards criticism, already under attack since the start of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s fourth term in April 2014.
  • Hassina Oussedik, director of Amnesty International’s chapter in Algeria, says the attacks on freedom of expression have been "constant". "In 2015, not a month has passed without witnessing cases of people being oppressed as they try to express themselves peacefully. The authorities rely on poorly formulated or ambiguous laws to arrest people," she told Middle East Eye. "They use provisions of the penal code that criminalise 'contempt', 'insult' or 'defamation' aimed against representatives of the state and other institutions in order to restrict freedom of expression, including humour, expression on the internet and on the street."
  • But an Algerian police officer, in charge of monitoring public demonstrations, said claims of repression were excessive and defended his activities."Repression? Dictatorship? Censorship? All of this is much exaggerated and is far from the truth," he told MEE. "If we did not do our job of monitoring and surveillance, Islamists and terrorists would feel omnipotent. In the 90s, this led us to chaos! Is it normal to insult the state, the president, the police or the army with impunity?"
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  • A former minister also defends the state’s repressive policy: "Newspapers, with their criticisms and caricatures that spare no one, even the president and the army chief, aren’t they free? But the law will remain strict against those who attack the institutions and the nation; we are not a gang of criminals who must be denounced all the time. We are servants of the state and those who criticise the government are attacking Algeria."
  • In the former minister's view, the majority of social opposition movements, jobless in the south, anti-shale gas activists, subversive artists and independent publishers, are simply “naive people manipulated by forces hostile to Algeria and its government’s patriotic choices".
  • Minister of Communications Hamid Grine, described by the Workers Party leader Louisa Hanoune as the “propaganda minister”.Regularly, the minister threatens journalists, independent media, foreign press correspondents and activists on social media in the name of "ethics". He imposed the closure of two private TV channels, Atlas TV and El Watan El Djazairia TV, and publicly refused to grant accreditation to foreign press correspondents, including a journalist from the London-based daily Asharq Al Awsat, demanding that they "toe the line".
Ed Webb

There is Nothing Inevitable About Dictatorships in Muslim States | Opinion - 0 views

  • former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, who ruled Egypt as an autocrat for three decades, appeared as a witness against imprisoned former Egyptian president, Mohammed Morsi, who was Egypt’s first freely elected leader. Besides being former Egyptian presidents, they had something else in common: their religious supporters both considered revolting against them to be a forbidden form of "khuruj ‘ala al-hakim" – "withdrawing from the ruler." This wasn’t just an idle sentiment; it was expressed by Ali Gomaa’, the-then Mufti of Egypt whose words I heard when in Cairo during the revolutionary uprising of 2011. “Khuruj ‘ala al-shar’iyya haram, haram, haram” – ‘exiting’ from [political] legitimacy is religiously forbidden, forbidden, forbidden.”
  • Supporters of Arab autocratic regimes of Mubarak and others that faced the Arab uprisings were not the only ones to use this tool
  • much—if not all—of the region has since been shaped by a new trauma in post-colonial states. That trauma is what results in much of the autocracy that we now take for granted
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  • Pre-modern Muslim communities were governed by far more libertarian systems—systems that were underpinned by social institutions, rather than the crippling and coercive powers of the modern state
  • it is undeniable that the world has changed a great deal since the concept had widespread currency among Muslims and was applied to pre-modern modes of government. Whether Muslim religious establishments have collectively realised this or not, the modern autocratic ‘president’ holds far more power—if only due to technology alone—than the medieval sultan. And far more destructive than that is that civil society in today’s world is far weaker—especially in the modern Arab world—than it was in pre-modern Muslim societies
  • The modern autocrat or dictator in Syria owes far more to the system of colonialism that immediately preceded it, than it does to intrinsic Arab or Muslim systems of governance from past centuries
  • the system of autocracy and dictatorship faces a deep contradiction with the internal logic of the Islamic tradition of scholasticism. Islamic religious authoritativeness depends in large part on the equivalent of academic peer review among scholars, and then upon the popularity of scholars among the wider population. How can such ‘peer review’ take place without a corresponding atmosphere of intellectual freedom and accountability?
  •  If Muslim religious scholars today seek to revive and rejuvenate religious discourse, they urgently need environments of creative and open enquiry. The ethics of the Islamic tradition cannot exist otherwise.
  • autocrats are loathe to imagine any such environments – and that is the underpinning of the counter-revolutionary waves endemic throughout much of the wider region today.
Ed Webb

Saudi 'instant visa' and the challenges of open labor markets - Al Arabiya English - 0 views

  • The Saudi government’s new “instant visa” fast tracks the process of hiring foreign workers for nascent firms, and is accompanied by a one-year grace period on Saudization requirements. Coming in the wake of aggressive moves to limit job opportunities for migrants, including sector-wide bans on the employment of migrant workers, the new policy highlights the challenges of striking the right balance between creating jobs for Saudis and supporting Saudi businesses. The debate is hindered by fundamental analytical errors that proponents of each side make when arguing their case.
  • Decades of providing Saudi businesses with an inexhaustible supply of low-cost workers has made them into primitive enterprises: their business model scarcely develops beyond importing foreign goods, putting low-cost foreign hands to work, having a couple of Saudi overseers—usually the establishment’s proprietors—and reselling the imported goods domestically with minimal value added.
  • Counterintuitively, a key flaw in this commercial model is its ability to effortlessly adapt to changes in the economic climate. When business is booming, new workers can be hired instantly at exactly the same wage as before. And when the economy contracts, such as when oil prices fall, the migrant workers on the company’s books are made redundant at the stroke of a pen, stabilizing the firm’s finances. In both cases, managers fixate on migrant workers as the primary control variable, at the expense of considerations relating to productivity and innovation.
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  • in western economies, low-cost migrant workers are largely unavailable. When the economy booms, wages rise, forcing managers to think judiciously about hiring. During a recession, employment protections for citizens mean that redundancies are complicated and sometimes impossible. Consequently, managers focus a lot more on maximizing worker productivity through investments and employee training; and on developing new technologies that are commercially valuable.
  • the Gulf countries rank below every region in the world in terms of R&D spending as a percentage of GDP, and the limited spending is almost exclusively funded by the government, and occurs in governmental organizations, such as oil giants Aramco and ADNOC.
  • the fundamental error made by proponents of restrictions on migrant workers. Rather than making the case I made above, they make the erroneous claim that if Saudi Arabia bans migrant workers, Saudi businesses will hire nationals in their stead. We know that this is false empirically because all of the Gulf countries have tried this and it has failed. The failure was also expected because national and migrant workers are imperfect substitutes. It is tempting to attribute the attractiveness of migrant workers merely to their willingness to work for a lower wage, or to domestic businesses “lacking patriotism”; but this belies the genuine superiority of migrant workers in many relevant domains, including work ethic, willingness to perform jobs that locals are averse to (waiting tables, collecting refuse, etc.), and their possession of skills that nationals often lack.
  • Saudis are too often educated in the areas that help one get a cushy public sector job, and not in those that serve the private sector needs. This is most starkly seen in the limited success of vocational training, especially when compared to advanced economies such as Germany or Switzerland.
  • for crude restrictions on the employment of migrant workers to create jobs for Saudi citizens, they must be accompanied by upgrades to the human capital of Saudis that attend to the needs of the private sector
  • while the new system makes hiring foreign workers “instant”, the results of these comprehensive reforms will be anything but “instant”, requiring many years to bear fruit
Ed Webb

Constitutional or Unconstitutional: Is That the Question? - Arab Reform Initiative - 0 views

  • This piece aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the constitutionality of the measures taken by the President of the Republic Kais Saied, by examining both the text of the Constitution and the context. This piece argues for a contextual interpretation approach in order to adjust to the dynamic nature of societies.
  • Article 80 is conditioned on the existence of an “imminent danger threatening the nation’s institutions or the security or independence of the country and hampering the normal functioning of the state.” It is worth noting that, during the Constitutive Assembly’s (NCA) voting on the above-mentioned article, concerns over the broad wording of the article were voiced, due to the absence of definition of what constitutes an ‘imminent danger’ and ‘exceptional circumstances’, those concerns were dismissed by the Rapporteur-General to the NCA, who maintained that the formulation of the article was “clear”.
  • the intent and real desire did not seem to be there from the beginning to endow the country with a constitutional court formed of competences and working to guarantee the supremacy of the Constitution. Its formation was hindered by the failure of the Assembly to elect its 4 appointees,11The President of the Republic, the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, and the Supreme Judicial Council shall each appoint four members. motivated by disagreements between parliamentary blocs. In April 2021, to unblock the situation, an amendment was proposed to the Article 10 of the Constitutional Court’s Law to cancel the order of the parties that have the authority to appoint members of the Court12The Article lists “successively the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and the President of the Republic.” . The bill was rejected by the President Kais Saed and sent back to the parliament for a second reading.13Parliament has preserved the same amendments that were proposed, allowing the Supreme Judicial Council and the Presidency of the Republic to choose 8 members of the Constitutional Court without waiting for Parliament to complete the election of 3 out of 4 members of its appointees.  His decision was motivated by the fact that the passing of the law exceeded the constitutional deadlines provided for in Paragraph 05 of Article 148 of the 2014 constitution
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  • In the midst of the current crisis, the long-delayed Constitutional Court is the missing key that could have averted the political crisis culminating in the turmoil Tunisia is currently going through.
  • Paragraph 2 of the Article 80 of the Constitution provides that “The Assembly of the Representatives of the People shall be deemed to be in a state of continuous session throughout such a period. In this situation, the President of the Republic cannot dissolve the Assembly of the Representatives of the People.” Legal experts, notably the Tunisian Association of Constitutional Law,[17] disagreed with this decision to freeze the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, explaining that the article meant that the Assembly takes part of the actual management of the state of exceptionality, and is not excluded from it.
  • other legal experts and jurists17Including Pr. Amine Mahfoudh, Me. Hedi Kerrou. have agreed with Saied’s interpretation, considering that he acted within his prerogatives under a state of exception since he simply “froze” the Parliament’s activity, rather than dissolving it
  • a study has shown that only 19% of respondents19On methodology: “these findings are based on nationally representative public opinion surveys that included approximately 1,800 respondents. Respondents were chosen randomly, meaning the results can be generalized to the broader population. The surveys were weighted to account for any random variations that may exist by gender, age, level of education, or geographic area. The margin of error for each country is less than ±3 percent.” have confidence in the legislature.  Popular demands for its dissolution have been mounting over the last few months as  violence broke out more regularly in the parliament, “despite the fact that the country’s parliament was freely elected, the institution inspires very little trust among the public. The failure of parliament to address the country’s economic challenges, combined with relatively weak attachment to political parties are major factors driving this low level of confidence.”
  • In this context, Saied and his supporters argue that the Assembly has become part of the problem.
  • Article 80 Paragraph 2 only addresses the case of removal of the Head of Government by the Assembly: “A motion of censure against the government cannot be presented”. There are no similar prerogatives granted to the President of the Republic during this state nor during normal times. Hence, to justify such a dismissal, it would have to be considered “measures necessitated by the exceptional circumstances.”
  • What happened would better fit what doctrine has termed to be a ‘constitutional dictatorship,’ legitimized by exceptional circumstances and limited in time. A ‘Constitutional Dictatorship’ is when “individuals or institutions have the right to make binding rules, directives, and decisions and apply them to concrete circumstances, unhindered by timely legal checks to their authority. Clothed with all of the authority of the state […] subject to various procedural and substantive limitations.”
  • Some of those who defend Saied’s actions have cited De Gaulle’s famous citation that " there is first France, then the State, and finally, as far as the major interests of both are safeguarded, the Law,"27Cited in Mohamed Kerrou. « Kais Saied ou la revanche légitime de l’État et de la société ». Leaders. 28/07/2021. to argue that in terms of its importance, the Constitution is superceded by national interests.
  • Tunisia has entered a period with almost no checks and balances, under ‘a constitutional dictatorship.’ In this context, a lot will depend on the person of Kais Saed and his commitment to “ethical standards or principles that are part of a political credo,” that are considered supra-constitutional principles
  • Close oversight of the situation by free media and strong watchdog organisations are the only guarantees against potential abuses
  • referrals of civilians (MPs) before the Military Court of First Instance in Tunis are causing great concern, especially with the dismissal of State Attorney General, Director of Military Justice and the Minister of National Defense without appointing replacements. These decisions are inconsistent with constitutional principles and international conventions
  • the presidential order ‘suspending the work of the Assembly and lifting of parliamentary immunity for deputies for the duration of the suspension’ was issued on the night of 30 July 2021, in the Official Gazette, stipulated for “the possibility of extending the mentioned period (ie the month) by virtue of a presidential decree,” without specifying the number of extensions, opening the door to unlimited extensions. National Organisations30The National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists, Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights, The Tunisian General Labor Union, The National Bar Association of Tunisia, Tunisian Association of Democratic Women, Tunisian Judges Association, Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights. have warned against “any illegal and unjustified extension of the disruption of state institutions, stressing the need to adhere to the declared month period stipulated in the constitution.”
  • A real impasse is looming on the horizon, however, if, thirty days after the entry into force of these measures, the “Speaker of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People or thirty of the members thereof (want) to apply to the Constitutional Court with a view to verifying whether or not the circumstances remain exceptional.”  Presidential Decree N°80 has stipulated that the extension is made possible by virtue of a presidential order, in clear contradiction of Article 80 of the Constitution, conferring the right to decide on the extension to the Constitutional Court.
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