Skip to main content

Home/ authoritarianism in MENA/ Group items tagged Switzerland

Rss Feed Group items tagged

Ed Webb

The danger of majority tyranny | openDemocracy - 1 views

  • The “yes”’ to banning minarets has brought these limits to mind, causing a real shock and deep disappointment for many people. I cannot remember any referendum that has divided our country both politically and ethically in a similar manner.
  • Democratically reached decisions reflect the will of the people in a given moment, though, not necessarily a superior wisdom or power. Democratic decisions can be wrong, unjust and impractical, violate the country’s constitution and even violate basic human rights. They can even relate to issues for which the democratic system is quite simply inadequate.
  • The debate about the limits of popular sovereignty will surely go on in Switzerland for some time to come. We need to make sure that the discussion is characterized by clarity of analysis, precision in drawing these borders and public education. An absolutized concept of democracy can threaten freedom and is susceptible to misuse. An enlightened people recognizes and acknowledges the limits of its sovereignty and knows that these limitations are what strengthen democracy and freedom.
Ed Webb

Suisse Secrets - OCCRP - 0 views

  • When corrupt politicians or organized criminals turn to Switzerland to keep their money safe from prying eyes, the victims of their crimes will likely never see it again. And once dirty money makes it into a Swiss bank account, it's free to go anywhere.
  • Through our partner, German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, OCCRP obtained leaked records on more than 18,000 Credit Suisse accounts, the largest leak ever from a major Swiss bank. This is just a small subset of the bank's overall holdings, but we still found dozens of dubious characters in the data, including an Algerian general accused of torture, the children of a brutal Azerbaijani strongman, and even a Serbian drug lord known as Misha Banana.
Ed Webb

Saudi 'instant visa' and the challenges of open labor markets - Al Arabiya English - 0 views

  • The Saudi government’s new “instant visa” fast tracks the process of hiring foreign workers for nascent firms, and is accompanied by a one-year grace period on Saudization requirements. Coming in the wake of aggressive moves to limit job opportunities for migrants, including sector-wide bans on the employment of migrant workers, the new policy highlights the challenges of striking the right balance between creating jobs for Saudis and supporting Saudi businesses. The debate is hindered by fundamental analytical errors that proponents of each side make when arguing their case.
  • Decades of providing Saudi businesses with an inexhaustible supply of low-cost workers has made them into primitive enterprises: their business model scarcely develops beyond importing foreign goods, putting low-cost foreign hands to work, having a couple of Saudi overseers—usually the establishment’s proprietors—and reselling the imported goods domestically with minimal value added.
  • Counterintuitively, a key flaw in this commercial model is its ability to effortlessly adapt to changes in the economic climate. When business is booming, new workers can be hired instantly at exactly the same wage as before. And when the economy contracts, such as when oil prices fall, the migrant workers on the company’s books are made redundant at the stroke of a pen, stabilizing the firm’s finances. In both cases, managers fixate on migrant workers as the primary control variable, at the expense of considerations relating to productivity and innovation.
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • in western economies, low-cost migrant workers are largely unavailable. When the economy booms, wages rise, forcing managers to think judiciously about hiring. During a recession, employment protections for citizens mean that redundancies are complicated and sometimes impossible. Consequently, managers focus a lot more on maximizing worker productivity through investments and employee training; and on developing new technologies that are commercially valuable.
  • the Gulf countries rank below every region in the world in terms of R&D spending as a percentage of GDP, and the limited spending is almost exclusively funded by the government, and occurs in governmental organizations, such as oil giants Aramco and ADNOC.
  • the fundamental error made by proponents of restrictions on migrant workers. Rather than making the case I made above, they make the erroneous claim that if Saudi Arabia bans migrant workers, Saudi businesses will hire nationals in their stead. We know that this is false empirically because all of the Gulf countries have tried this and it has failed. The failure was also expected because national and migrant workers are imperfect substitutes. It is tempting to attribute the attractiveness of migrant workers merely to their willingness to work for a lower wage, or to domestic businesses “lacking patriotism”; but this belies the genuine superiority of migrant workers in many relevant domains, including work ethic, willingness to perform jobs that locals are averse to (waiting tables, collecting refuse, etc.), and their possession of skills that nationals often lack.
  • Saudis are too often educated in the areas that help one get a cushy public sector job, and not in those that serve the private sector needs. This is most starkly seen in the limited success of vocational training, especially when compared to advanced economies such as Germany or Switzerland.
  • for crude restrictions on the employment of migrant workers to create jobs for Saudi citizens, they must be accompanied by upgrades to the human capital of Saudis that attend to the needs of the private sector
  • while the new system makes hiring foreign workers “instant”, the results of these comprehensive reforms will be anything but “instant”, requiring many years to bear fruit
Ed Webb

Reading the Black Sea Tea Leaves: Post-Referendum Analysis - Reuben Silverman - 0 views

  • appeals to nationalism and the worst inclinations among voters are precisely what worry so many of Erdoğan’s critics. Not only is the country in an official state of emergency marked by sweeping purges and vicious terrorist attacks, but the president is also using the sort of violent rhetoric one expects to hear from would-be authoritarians in countries like the Philippines or United States. It is this tendency to dismiss or demonize opponents in conjunction with the new powers the referendum gives Erdoğan that have led so many commentators in America and Europe to prophesy the “end” of democracy in Turkey. Others point out the that electoral campaign has not been “free or fair,” which suggests that the victory was largely preordained, merely a reflection of a “slide” into dictatorship already occurring.[3]
  • since taking office, and despite terrorism and coup attempts, President Erdoğan has been unable to mobilize some of his most vocal supporters to grant him greater powers.
  • As for the provinces where the YES vote was higher than the November 2015 AKP vote or the 2014 Erdoğan vote, these occurred almost entirely in the southeast. While it is possible that voters in this region have grown sick and tired of PKK militants using urban areas as a base and provoking government reprisals, the numbers suggest an alternative: namely, that two years of violence and the government’s crackdown on regional political organizations have made mobilization difficult.
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • Some of the most significant gains came in Europe where the bulk of Turkey’s 2,929,389-stong diaspora lives. Voting from abroad has only been possible since 2013 and the low turnout among diasporic citizens in 2014 suggests that politicians had not yet worked to mobilize them. In Holland, for example, where 8.6% of diasporic voters were registered at the time of the referendum, turnout was only 7.2% in 2014, but rose to 46.7% and 46.8% in November 1, 2015 and April 16, 2017, respectively. Though Erdoğan’s share of the vote in 2014 (78%) was higher than in either the AKP (69.7%) or the YES vote (70.9) received, the difference in turnouts makes comparison difficult. Moreover, Holland was part of a larger trend in 2017: of European countries with more than 10,000 diasporic voters only voters in Switzerland registered a decline in support for Erdoğan’s priorities.
  • a fractional number of voters who were willing to vote for the AKP over other parties and Erdoğan over other candidates were unwilling to give him sweeping powers.
  • Overall, the YES vote was 3.7 percentage points higher than the vote for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in its November 2014 election. At the same time, the YES vote was 0.4 points lower than in the 2014 presidential election. Though Erdoğan achieved his goal of winning the election and securing additional powers, this feat may be pyrrhic: it was achieved with the help of an MHP leadership that has been shown to be out of touch with its own voters; it was achieved with diminished support in key regions like the Black Sea; it was achieved with increased support in southeast regions where tens of thousands of citizens did not reach the voting booth. President Erdoğan has successfully cobbled together a coalition of voters sizeable enough to win, but governing will be the greater challenge.
1 - 5 of 5
Showing 20 items per page