Arab-spring

«Thawretna Thawrat Zawali, Lé Sebsi we Lé Jebali»

leur choix de rejoindre le nouveau parti ne correspond pas aux espérances créées par le soulèvement qui a mis fin à la dictature de la bande de Ben Ali

Caïd Essebsi a déjà réussi à créer une rupture politique au sein même du large conglomérat imprécis qualifié de laïque par les médias et par certains intellectuels

“I can’t really tell if the Tunisian youth are satisfied or not. However, I can tell you about the youth around me. They are trying to be as involved as possible. Tunisian youth are active with many associations like I Watch, and JVT (Tunisian NGOs). All these are young people who are trying to sensitize other people to our political situation,”

Houssem Eddine Trabelsi, the coordinator of Ekbes, told Tunisia Live, “This was a way of protesting the government’s performance. We are young members of  Ennahdha with different opinions and positions than those of the government.” Trabelsi said that he and the campaign members have been connecting with ministers and plan to hold more events, as well as conduct their own investigations into how the government can do better.

Farah Labidi, a Constituent Assembly representative and member of Ennahdha said that the criticism of Ekbes was good for the accountability of leaders. “This is a very healthy initiative as they are asking for daring decisions to fight corruption, and immediate execution of plans. It is a plus for us as they are pointing to our weaknesses. Their criticism is a right.”

The administrative courts or the Supreme Constitutional Court might indeed refuse to honor Morsi’s addendum. But unless there is strong opposition from a powerful political force (and the most likely opponent, the SCAF itself, seems to be going along with the president instead), a court taking such a move would be bold indeed.

The same co-governance is in place, but with the president as the more powerful actor. Indeed, by cancelling the June 2012 constitutional addendum Morsi has now legally reinserted himself as chairman of the SCAF itself

Morsi’s selection of a Mahmud Makki, a prominent judge, as vice president—after selecting Mahmud’s older brother Ahmad as minister of justice—may be an attempt to outmaneuver judicial opposition. The Makki brothers were both prominent members of the 2005 judicial reform movement and thus have some credibility in circles opposed to the old regime. Both were also rumored to have mild Islamist inclinations, though such rumors are hard to evaluate since judges rarely disclose their partisan feelings even when they have them. But the placement of prominent judges in such positions—and the brief floating of a suggestion that the new justice minister draft a new judicial law to be issued by presidential decree (not waiting for the new parliament)—may be a way of signaling to the judiciary that accommodation rather than a full frontal assault may be a better strategy for those anxious about the presidency and the Islamist rise. Whether a presidency at least momentarily free of strong checks on its authority will set its sights on restructuring the judiciary is not yet clear—but judges will definitely be scouring presidential statements and decisions for indications of Morsi’s intentions