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Essebsi's movement has scared both liberal secularists and Ennahda supporters alike.  A return of the crooked, corrupt, and cruel former regime is everything that they fought against -- not just in the past 2 years, but in the last 30 years. While Ennahda will point to the abuses against Islam, and secular liberals will point to the harassment of human rights activists and infringements on freedom of expression, both will point to the ultimate failure of the Bourguiba/Ben Ali experiment to bring real progress to many parts of Tunisia. While visitors to Tunisia's coastal areas can see the development and progress of the last 50 years, it takes only a few minutes to get to villages that remain poor, backwards, and lacking in any opportunities to progress. They will point to the promises of Ben Ali to provide education and work, even while the educational system declined and job opportunities dried up. They will point to the fact that closer relations with the west only brought tighter visa restrictions and low-wage jobs.

Some have pointed to Mustapha Nabli, who has links to the former regime, but spent the last 12 years at the World Bank prior to coming back after the revolution to lead the Tunisian Central Bank. He is well respected in international circles and has already engaged in fierce debate with the coalition government over the central bank's independence, and as a result has received open calls for his sacking by President Marzouki himself. Others have cited Taieb Baccouche, a former labor and human rights leader, who most recently served with Essebsi as Minister of Education in the transition government. He has been making the rounds in Tunisian media on behalf of the Call.

the CPR and Ennahda have proposed legislation that would limit RCD participation in any future government. While political activists in Tunisia have long regretted the relative immunity granted to the former regime officials, many Tunisians continue to place the blame firmly on Ben Ali and his family. Essebsi has capitalized on this sentiment by stating that these proposals are anti-democratic and would only further polarize a society that needs unity. Nevertheless, with control over the government and the assembly, the coalition could tighten the rules to make it difficult for the Call to field candidates

The work for Essebsi's movement will be able to convince Tunisians that they can keep the gains of Tunisia's independence leaders while upholding the values of the revolution. For Tunisia's secular left, the Call represents an opportunity to join a party that may have real traction with ordinary Tunisians, but also signifies a capitulation for what many have worked so hard to change. Like in Egypt, the rise of two conservative parties (the Islamists and the Call) is a disappointment to those who fought for human rights and civil liberties. At the same time, in this conservative society it is hardly surprising that the debate is characterized by what kind of conservatism Tunisians will choose between

The US and Israel can no longer rely on dependable and friendly Arab dictators, and will finally have to take the aspirations for genuine peace with the Palestinians seriously. The Middle East may seem to be caught between a rock and a hard place – that is, between secular dictatorships and Islamic fundamentalisms. But indeed a third alternative, a secular democratic one, does exist. We must hope that the democratic forces in all these countries will eventually be able to harness both the Islamists and the militarists.

"Islam and democracy can be compatible just as you can have religious-inspired democracy you can have religious dictatorship, and you can have secular democracies and you can have secular dictatorships

In the past in the Arab world, more or less, we have had throughout the Arab world secular dictatorships

Gebril stated that in Egypt constitutions were conventionally drawn by government appointed commissions and approved by the public in a referendum. However, for this to function well today, he argued, it was crucial to inform the public. Gebril purported that Islam did not reconcile with secularism. The moderator, Huveydi, challenged Gebril’s statement and indicated that it was possible to make secularism and Islam congruent as it was the case in Turkey. Gebril argued that the principles needed to accomplish a real democracy were present in the traditions of Egypt and Islamic world.

underlining the weaknesses of the characteristics of representative democracy of the 1924 constitution stated that the tutelary approach of 1960s was fortified with the 1982 Constitution. The present constitution could not meet the demands of the society

in Egypt and what needed to be discussed today was the role of military, place of religion and especially the balance of powers.

since it could not be based on one group’s interests and opinions, it had to be structured in a way that would include and protect minorities in the political mechanism. Stating that secularism did not always bring democracy, it was argued that the important thing was the presence of democracy and that ways to reconcile universal values with local conditions had to be sought without resorting to reactionarism..

more towards strengthening the democratization process in Turkey, and he argued that this approach carried the potential to reverse the homogenous nation building process, decrease the power of tutelage regime and widen the political field. Ete concluded his analysis with two observations: 1. Turkey’s history of democracy was full of instances in which the authoritarian regime regenerated itself. 2. Decisive steps must be taken in the struggle for democracy

Abd Rabou specifically emphasized four different dimensions of the change in Egypt: democratization; institutionalization and formation of democratic organizations; free elections and the transformation of political culture

Demirel, who found the simplification of arguments to to authoritarian regime vs. democratic public problematic, argued that the authoritarian tendencies of the public also had to be heeded. Demirel argued that the advances made in civil-military relations in the recent years were not yet solidified in the political life and a regression back to military rule was still a possibility.

Reiterating that the retreat of the military did not necessarily signal the end of the tutelage regime, Demirel argued that it was still probable to regress into complete tutelage especially in the context of the Kurdish problem. He ended his speech by issuing a warning against the threats to civil rights and freedoms from the political powers.

this revolution toppled the foundations of the Sykes-Picot order. He objected the perceptions of the revolution as the new Sykes-Picot order. In other words, he opposed the idea the revolution and its aftermath were imposed on the region by external powers. He insisted the post revolution was a period in which the region decided on its own fate in accordance with the changing dynamics. In parallel to other participants, he argued this was the first time an Arab individual claimed his own destiny. He further claimed that in this process, in which the driving force is a quest for dignity, regional politics will be determined by internal dynamics and stated that the region will be changed to the extent the revolution maintains its momentum.

Iran and Turkey were the beneficiaries of this new order.

in both Turkey and Egypt an approach that perceived the making of the new constitution as an instrument to limit the power of the ruling regime instead of a process that reflected the current distribution of power in the country

such a constitutional culture and such a constitutional system that protects human rights by striking a balance between universal and local values will contribute to the resolution of minority problem in Egypt and identity issues in Turkey.

commanders of the feared security forces and intelligence agencies remained. Regime cronies kept their hold on state TV and newspapers. Mubarak-appointed judges and prosecutors made only superficial efforts to investigate or prosecute members of the regime, leaving the vast legacy of corruption and political skullduggery intact

The generals "played this well," Ashour said. As for the Brotherhood, he added, "all their gains are gone. ... Their chance of (being significant players) is very much minimum."The Brotherhood is also now largely without allies. Its former leftist and secular partners accused it of selling out the revolution. Repeatedly, it resisted concessions to work with other parties

The highly organized Islamists largely stayed out of anti-military demonstrations, isolating the revolutionaries. In turn, the military paved the way for parliamentary elections - and the Islamists won big

State TV, firmly in the generals' hands, depicted revolutionaries as troublemakers or worse - agents paid by foreign powers to spread chaos. That fueled resentment of the activists among some in the public, frustrated with the instability and an economy sliding downhill fast

Some revolutionaries joined new liberal political parties to contest elections. But their ideologies were indistinct, their efforts to build popularity fumbled, and they won no more than 6 percent of the seats in parliament.Others turned to street action and long-term organizing on the neighborhood level. Many of them feel vindicated, saying that while elections have proven futile, they have managed to mobilize some in the public against the military.

Gomaa's fatwas were consistent with historical Sunni views that regard revolution with scepticism, if not outright terror, at the prospect of public disorder. The mufti's stance of neutrality, meanwhile, alienated significant segments of the Egyptian population who expected him to take a much stronger stance against the unlawful conduct of the regime and its security forces

Reflecting on Bouazizi's death on his popular TV show, al-Shari'a wa-l-Hayat, Qaradawi affirmed that suicide was generally a major sin (kabira), but blamed the Tunisian state for Bouazizi's sin and prayed that God would absolve him of any blame for that sin. Qaradawi's sympathy for Bouazizi's otherwise sinful act was a reflection of Qaradawi's more general approach to the problem of religion and politics: that justice is a central demand of the Shari'a and that interpretations of the Shari'a that strengthen oppressors and tyrants cannot be deemed to be legitimate parts of the Shari'a.

the desire by virtually all political parties to use the religious establishment to further their political programs contradicts the desire to have an independent religious establishment that could be faithful to its own mission

To the extent that traditional scholars still cling to a conception of political rule that identifies legitimacy in the personal attributes of the ruler, they anachronistically promote the idea that good politics is the function of the virtuous ruler, rather than the modern notion that virtuous rule is the product of the right institutions.

the Arab Spring rejected the notion that one can live a virtuous private life untouched by an unjust and corrupt political sphere

If one accepts the proposition that the character of a regime profoundly affects everything produced within its domain, then it is no surprise that the authoritarianism of the last 50 years in the Arab World produced sterile and decadent religious as well as secular thought

The old regime still controls the institutions

two highly political legal suits currently pending in front of the administrative court—one seeking to ban the Muslim Brotherhood and one seeking to ban its Freedom and Justice Party. Both cases will be adjudicated in September

Morsi is the first president that came to power on the basis of a popular vote rather than by rising through the ranks of the military. But it is only one step in a process of transformation that will take time, be punctuated by many acrimonious battles, and in the end may not lead to democracy

Intellectuellement, idéologiquement et conjoncturellement, je me situe et me positionne à l’antipode des thèses, des projets et des «normes» islamistes que je considère à la fois archaïques, dangereuses, porteuses de graves risques sociaux, économiques et politiques.

Ceux qui ont manifesté ce 9 août 2012 à Sidi Bouzid en criant «Thawretna thawrat zawali, lé Sebsi we lé Jbali (Notre révolution est une révolution des pauvres, ni Essebsi ni Jebali), m’ont semblé demander autre chose: en finir avec la pauvreté, l’exclusion et la misère. En finir avec le chômage, le mal développement, le manque d’accès aux ressources (l’eau en particulier)

Incontestablement, Caïd Essebsi s’est donné la mission de «sauver» le pays contre le risque islamiste

Laïc convaincu, ancien compagnon de Bourguiba et défenseur de la modernité telle qu’elle est conçue en Occident mais avec une forte dose de conservatisme social, Caïd Essebsi n’est de toute évidence pas moins légitime que l’un ou l’autre. Une large partie des Tunisiens partagent, à quelques nuances près, ses convictions.

Je garde aussi les mêmes distances politiques, intellectuelles et idéologiques vis-à-vis des libéraux et du libéralisme économique comme une idéologie qui nourrit les processus d’appauvrissement et d’exclusion qu’on connaît en Tunisie et partout dans le monde libéral et dont les victimes se comptent par millions.

Mais reconnaissons que du 6 janvier 2008 à la veille du 14 janvier 2011, rares parmi celles et ceux qui se présentent aujourd’hui comme des leaders politiques, développent leurs propres stratégies pour accéder au pouvoir ou du moins en profiter directement ou indirectement et proposent initiatives et projets, peuvent se targuer d’une quelconque participation au long processus de la révolution.

Pas moins que l’islamiste Ghannouchi ou le populiste Marzouki, Caïd Essebsi s’inscrit pleinement dans le libéralisme économique dominant et ne voit le développement qu’en termes de taux de croissance économique et de balances commerciales. Modernisations techniques, investissements, tourisme, exportations, taux de croissances, agrobusiness,… sont ses créneaux et ses indicateurs. Les hommes et les femmes d’affaires, la grande bourgeoisie et le haut de la classe moyenne, les grandes fortunes et la finance sont ses amis. Ce sont ses amis, qu’il avait mobilisés pendant sa période de Premier ministre de la transition. Ce sont les mêmes qui l’entourent et le financent aujourd’hui. Et ce sont les mêmes qui seront demain aux commandes du pays si, par aventure, il gagnait son pari et accédait au pouvoir, en battant les islamistes. L’histoire et l’itinéraire politiques de l’homme le prouvent.

rien de différent par rapport aux lignes générales suivies pendant les deux présidences de Bourguiba et de Ben Ali

favoriser l’investissement privé, accélérer la libéralisation des marchés et la privatisation du secteur publique, le «retrait» de l’Etat et l’abandon de ses obligations économiques et surtout sociales et environnementales, l’accélération de l’intégration du pays dans les processus globaux de mondialisation économique, l’obéissance reconnaissante aux institutions financières mondiales et aux multinationales, l’aggravation de l’endettement du pays

ces choix économiques et sociaux n’ont fait qu’aggraver la misère d’une large partie de la population et creuser davantage l’écart, devenu de plus en plus vertigineux, entre les plus riches qui ont continué à accumuler les richesses et les pauvres et les exclus qui ont continué à s’enfoncer dans la misère et de se voir déposséder de leurs ressources, perdant à la fois les moyens de la simple survie et la dignité humaine

Caïd Essebsi au pouvoir ne sera pas notre prochain dictateur. Mais la dictature de la finance n’en sera que plus renforcée et encouragée

l’exploitation minière des ressources continuera comme avant, voire pire, les pauvres et les marginalisés de ce pays, qui ont été à l’origine de notre révolution, ne verront pas leurs situations sociales et économiques changer, comme par miracle ou magie, et les générations futures risquent de ne rien hériter des grandes ressources naturelles de ce beaux pays. Nous laisserons un désert…

une lutte féroce pour le pouvoir entre les islamistes (libéraux-religieux) et les modernistes (libéraux-laïques). Ces deux forces occupent la scène et ne laissent pas beaucoup d’espace aux autres forces politiques organisées

Géographe tunisien, chercheur enseignant. Universités Paris 8 et Paris 10 (France), Université Américaine du Caire