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the Arab people who were for years stuck between an authoritarian regime and a possible Islamist totalitarianism, proved, with the elections undertaken in the aftermath of the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia that “a third option” was possible

only a system in which a constitutions prepared by publicly elected representatives and approved by the public with a referendum, could be valid.

the norms of international human rights were superior to the constitutions’ and in the Turkish case, a constitution could not be drafted without being subjected to restrictions. He further emphasized that the Treaty of Lausanne, European Council membership and EU membership processes offered guidelines for constitution drafting that needed to be considered.

members left the Assembly last week for their first break since they began writing in February. Just before their departure, the publication of the first full draft of the constitution demonstrated marked progress, but the contents of the draft have caused controversy throughout the country. The draft revealed that divisive issues, such as the status of women, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and the parliamentary structure of the government, are still far from settled inside and outside of the NCA. The Assembly will reconvene in early September to negotiate these divisions, but the timeframe for the ratification of the constitution remains unclear.

This was the worst possible outcome of the elections: it is the prelude to the direct confrontation between the old regime and the Muslim Brotherhood that Mubarak warned about and used to justify—and win tacit international acceptance for—his authoritarian policies.

there is no constitution yet and nobody knows how much power the new president will have or how responsibilities will be shared between him and the parliament. The SCAF, expected to step down at the end of June after the president is elected, is now trying to issue a new, last-minute constitutional declaration to define the powers of the president, preempting the decision of the constituent assembly and the prerogatives of the elected parliament to choose who will write the constitution

in the middle will stand over 50 percent of Egyptians who did not vote for either Morsi or Shafiq, but for three candidates that represent, in their own very different fashion, an alternative

The administrative courts or the Supreme Constitutional Court might indeed refuse to honor Morsi’s addendum. But unless there is strong opposition from a powerful political force (and the most likely opponent, the SCAF itself, seems to be going along with the president instead), a court taking such a move would be bold indeed.

The same co-governance is in place, but with the president as the more powerful actor. Indeed, by cancelling the June 2012 constitutional addendum Morsi has now legally reinserted himself as chairman of the SCAF itself

Morsi’s selection of a Mahmud Makki, a prominent judge, as vice president—after selecting Mahmud’s older brother Ahmad as minister of justice—may be an attempt to outmaneuver judicial opposition. The Makki brothers were both prominent members of the 2005 judicial reform movement and thus have some credibility in circles opposed to the old regime. Both were also rumored to have mild Islamist inclinations, though such rumors are hard to evaluate since judges rarely disclose their partisan feelings even when they have them. But the placement of prominent judges in such positions—and the brief floating of a suggestion that the new justice minister draft a new judicial law to be issued by presidential decree (not waiting for the new parliament)—may be a way of signaling to the judiciary that accommodation rather than a full frontal assault may be a better strategy for those anxious about the presidency and the Islamist rise. Whether a presidency at least momentarily free of strong checks on its authority will set its sights on restructuring the judiciary is not yet clear—but judges will definitely be scouring presidential statements and decisions for indications of Morsi’s intentions

As in the country, so in the barracks. Over the past six months, more than a dozen serving or recently retired mid- and lower-ranking officers have said they and their colleagues see Egypt's revolution as their own chance to win better treatment, salaries, and improved conditions and training. They are tired, they said, of a few very top officers becoming rich while the vast majority of officers and ordinary soldiers struggle.

"Military ranks struggle like the rest of Egyptians because, like Egyptian society, the wealth of the military is concentrated at the top and does not trickle down. You have to reach a specific rank before wealth is unlocked," one major said.

say they will hold off on pushing their demands further until the ruling military council hands over power to an elected civilian government

The leftist and secular revolutionaries, particularly reform leader Mohammed ElBaradei, argued that elections supervised by the military would be a farce and any constitution would be tainted. Instead, they proposed a civilian leadership grouping the "revolutionary powers" immediately start to rule and oversee the constitution.Divided and politically inexperienced, they were resoundingly overruled. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists - who had joined the revolt against Mubarak - broke with the revolutionaries and backed the military-run transition. They had no time for worries over military rule or talk of a revolutionary government, keeping a laser-like focus on elections in which they were confident of vaulting to power on a strong popular base.Now the revolutionaries are saying: We told you so.

A turning point was a referendum in March 2011 in which the public overwhelmingly approved the military's plan for the transition. The Islamists strongly backed the plan, even proclaiming a "yes" vote to be required by God. The public trusted the military, was enamored at the promise of free elections and saw the revolutionaries' alternative as vague. The plan passed with 70 percent of the vote.From then on, the military pointed to that referendum as proof of legitimacy for whatever it did.

there was no move to dismantle the system that Egyptians had risen up against

young Africans struggling with unemployment, the difficulty of finding sustainable livelihoods, and the absence of civil liberties

Political instability, bad governance, and failed neo-liberal social and economic policies have exacerbated longstanding societal problems and diminished young people’s ability to support themselves and their families

Many are unable to attain the prerequisites of full adulthood and take their place as fully-fledged members of society. The recent wave of youth protests can best be understood in the context of this generation’s struggles for economic, social, and political emancipation

when it comes to the invocation of adjective "moderate" with respect to Tunisia or Egypt what we are really talking about is `moderation' to the extent that "the regime supporting working within the framework of US geo-strategic interests in the region is considered to be moderate-Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Hosni Mubarak's Egypt, King Abdullah's Jordan

moderate in the sense that they are working very closely with US foreign policy, but they're certainly not moderate with respect to any objective definition of what constitutes democracy and with any definition of what constitutes, you know, universal standards of human right

what needs to be celebrated is that it is for the first time in the modern history of Arab and Islamic world the people of the region are having revolutions

Article 5: Articles of the draft constitution should be reached by consensus among assembly members. If this proves impossible, articles should be determined by vote

Tunisia's president has left power for good, the president of the country's Constitutional Court said Saturday, declaring that the leader of the lower house of parliament will assume power until elections are held in two months.

Constitutional Council President Fethi Abdennadher said Saturday that Ben Ali has permanently vacated his position and lawmaker Fouad Mebazaa has up to 60 days to organize new elections.

Overnight, public television station TV7 broadcast phone calls from residents of working-class neighborhoods on the capital's outskirts, recounting attacks against their homes by knife-wielding assailants.Ghannouchi — who held power for less than 24 hours — told TV stations overnight that he had ordered the army and other security forces to intervene immediately in those neighborhoods.

quelques uns de ses collègues trichaient durant le vote électronique en appuyant sur les boutons de vote des sièges vides d’à côtés. Le président du bloc Ennahdha à l’ANC, Sahbi Atig, a confirmé les déclarations de M. Badi : «J’ai honte d’en parler. Hier on était 120 députés, or on aura compté 170 voix. Est-ce normal que les uns trichent et que les autres copient sur leurs collègues ? Serions-nous dans une école primaire ?».

Soutenu par plusieurs associations, le groupe OpenGov va adresser, le 16 mai, une missive à M. Ben Jaafer dans laquelle il lui demande solennellement la diffusion sur le site de l’ANC des rapports des commissions internes. Il va également lui demander de fournir automatiquement les PV des réunions ainsi que la liste d’absence des députés depuis leur prise de fonction. En cas de retard de réponse, le groupe va passer à l'action en déposant une plainte devant le tribunal administratif vers le 31 mai prochain.

Morsi’s victory does not mean that democracy has triumphed in Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood has already denounced the constitutional declaration, but the SCAF is unlikely to give in on that point after conceding Morsi’s triumph.

the secular parties that claimed that their past performance in the elections was poor because they did not have adequate time to organize do not appear to be making the massive effort to build their parties that they need in order to be successful the next time around