Iran’s economy is facing at least three large imbalances. The most acute is in the balance of payments.
Already some candidates are whispering that they favor lowering the exchange rate (increasing the value of the rial relative to other currencies) in order to fight inflation. These candidates would lead voters to believe that they can have their cake and eat it too
In these times of frozen international credit markets and economic sanctions against Iran, the second option of foreign borrowing is less likely than it was in the 1990s, but the risk of state-owned enterprises racking up foreign debts using short-term credit from eager overseas suppliers is not altogether gone. This is precisely what they did in the early 1990s, which deepened the post-oil boom slump and halted Rafsanjani’s reforms. Anticipating devaluation and government bailout, these enterprises incurred $10 billion in new short term debt alone between 1991 and 1993. Their actions forced the highly anticipated devaluation of the rial by a factor of 27 during the same period and forced the government to accept this debt as its own.
Repeating the past is more likely to come in the form of the politically more palatable option of simply cutting imports. Such a policy will be costly in terms of jobs and growth, but will unfortunately appeal to any one of the current leading candidates (Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Moussavi, and Ahmadinejad), all of whom have strong dirigiste tendencies and would welcome the power over the private sector which comes with overseeing the allocation of the anticipated $40 billion of oil earnings to industries and individuals.
The second imbalance is in the government budget.
if the past is any guide, investment will take the biggest hit.
This pattern has been repeated during Ahmadinejad's term. Soft loans were given out in order to spur the construction of new businesses, but investment levels fell as the new money was either consumed (from imports) or poured into the real estate bubble.
The third imbalance is in the country’s financial markets
I think that both Mr. [Mehdi] Karroubi and Mr. [Mohammad] Khatami, when he was running, and the new entrant, Mr. [Mir-Hossein] Mussavi, have not been very specific about what is wrong with the economy and how they would fix it. When asked by an interviewer, Mr. Mussavi singled out the dismantling of the Management and Planning Organization as the major problem. But it is way down on the list of problems that I would consider serious.
American-Iranian Economist lays into economic policy.
Points out that none of the reformists have offered any realistic plan as to how they would resolve matters
The gap between rural and urban incomes has been widening because the rural areas appear to have missed the recent boom or President Ahmadinejad’s redistribution.
Some of the gap is spurious because of the lower cost of living in rural areas (mainly housing), but the change is probably not.
The rural-urban gap has been one of the main drivers of changes in inequality, especially in the last four years (more on this in a future post). The gap narrowed under Mr. Moussavi’s watch, and widened during the Rafsanjani and Khatami’s administrations. In the last three years of President Khatami’s government rural expenditures were rising faster than urban expenditures and the gap closed somewhat.
He said, "I know the country's condition is better than all these gentlemen. I know much of what they say about the condition of the country and economy is contrary to reality. They are mistaken."
Mousavi also criticized the imbalanced competition ahead of the election, noting, "These elections are held under peculiar circumstances. Thirty provincial and six national television channels cover the president's provincial visits, which are used for campaigning purposes.
Last September, as the Ahmadinejad presidency entered its last year, Khamenei told Ahmadinejad and members of his cabinet, "Work as if you plan to work for another five years; imagine that this one year plus four more years are under your management. Look at things, work, plan and act as if that is the case."
Speaking to an audience of elite young people at a conference organized by the Pro-Reza’i People Foundation, he said: “I have several slogans, one of which is ‘vitality, tranquility and stability for progress’.”
“If our statesmen act with humility and altruism, put sincerity first, and do not compete for power, morality will be strengthened in the country.”
But our major problem is that while we have had managers who have acted as models the political, defense, and security sectors, ... the managers of culture and the economy have not yet been able to train our heroic youth.”
We must preserve this ethic, but it must be in the hearts of our women; because if we force it on [them], it may turn into a societal battle.”
“There is freedom even now, [but]…there are some who want to negate it, and these people must be stopped; there are [others] who exploit freedoms, and they too must be stopped.” He named “people who insult religion” as part of the latter group.
“My main rival is poverty, unemployment and high prices in the country.”
Davoud Daneshja’fari, who last year resigned as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s finance minister, has been appointed to head the Reza’i election campaign headquarters.
please compare the _absolute_ numbers in a graphfor example, AZARBAYJAN:2004-reform/centrist: 950,0002004-conservative: 350,0002009-reform/centrist: 837,0002009-conservative: 1,131,000so reform/centrist decreased by 10% and conservative trippled!? even as people get younger, economy worse, and achmadenijad more unpopular?
In My Humble Opinion...
This is a more important point than Mousavi being an Azeri.
Azeris do not (by my understanding) vote on as dependably ethnic lines as people in Lorestan. They do however, dependably vote reformist.
The numbers highlighted here show a huge and very unlikely swing not from one ethnicity to another, but from one political ideology to another.
Fraud.
city-level returns posted by the Iranian Interior Ministry on their website? These were posted by "Pejman" and translated by "Shaahin" in the comments thread to your previous post: http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/statistical-evidence-does-not-prove.html#comment-672782692382259870
Just from a cursory glance, you can see the official poll results don't make any sense. Look at one of the third party candidates, Karoubi. He is from Lorestan. in 2005, in the first round he took 55% of the vote in Lorestan. In these results, he takes only 5%.Extraordinarily unlikely.
I took a look at the spreadsheet another commenter linked to with the city reports and checked the frequency of all the last digits. In the Vietnam war, they faked body counts and this was statistically noticeable. Here are the counts:Last Count Normal Cummulative Distribution0 215 99.04%1 189 66.98%2 185 55.82%3 191 72.10%4 183 50.00%5 170 17.05%6 169 15.26%7 173 23.20%8 174 25.49%9 181 44.18%0 is the most popular last digit, and it is more than 2 standard deviations above the mean. It is less than 1% likely this would naturally happen.