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These particular opinion polls are fabrications published by supporters of the administration, aimed at assuring a presidential victory for president Ahmadinejad.

And to the question of whom would they actually vote for, 53.6 percent ticked Ahmadinejad, 21 percent Mousavi, 3.8 percent Karoubi and 1.7 percent Rezaei. Alef is managed by Ahmad Tavakoli, attributes the source of this poll to be professional centers in the country adding that it is confidential and not publishable.”

IRNA, the official news agency of the government under the control of Ahmadinejad and Saffar Herandi, which read as follows:

The morning after Iran's June 12 presidential election, Iranians booted up their computers to find Fars News, the online mouthpiece of the Islamic Republic's security apparatus, heralding the dawn of a "third revolution." Many an ordinary Iranian, and many a Western pundit, had already adopted such dramatic language to describe the burgeoning street demonstrations against the declaration by the Ministry of Interior that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the sitting president, had received 64 percent of the vote to 34 percent for his main challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi. But the editors of Fars News were referring neither to the protests, as were the people in the streets, nor to the prospect that the unrest might topple the Islamic Republic, as were some of the more wistful commentators. Rather, the editors were labeling the radical realignment of Iranian politics that they wish for. This realignment would complete the removal of the old guard, as did the "first" revolution of 1978-1979, and consolidate the rule of inflexible hardliners, as did the "second revolution" symbolized by the US Embassy takeover of 1979.

The number of deeply conservative voters, of the sort who back Ahmadinejad, has not exceeded 12 percent of the electorate since 1993. True, in 2003, these voters seized control of the city councils of major cities, not because of a surge in the popularity of their agenda, but because of the widespread abstention of those who had lost hope in the effectiveness of reformist candidates.

But instead greater mass participation in the local elections of 2007 cost the hardliners their grip upon local councils. In Tehran, Ahmadinejad's men lost two thirds of their seats and had to share power with reformists and moderate conservatives.

Rafsanjani has created a multimillion-dollar electronic network under the aegis of the Expediency Council to set off alarm bells in case of suspicions of fraud, said one person close to his camp, who spoke on condition of anonymity. He's also dispatching members of his Kargozaran political party to monitor polling stations and the election desk at the Interior Ministry. He convened a regular series of meetings to alert journalists and activists to the possibility of cheating after Ahmadinejad purged longtime employees from the section of the ministry that monitors fraud about two months ago. "He has access to the intelligence systems of the government, and he can put pressure on the establishment," said Kaviani, who has attended the meetings. "The most important thing for him is to get rid of Ahmadinejad, no matter the cost, and he thinks that if there's no cheating Ahmadinejad won't win. All the efforts are to prevent Ahmadinejad to get 51%."

To help Mousavi further, Rafsanjani has thrown open the doors of the 300 branches of Azad University throughout the provinces to his supporters, allowing them to deliver speeches and organize inside their halls; they are often barred from using government facilities by local officials loyal to Ahmadinejad.

The Iranian website Balatarin posted an email said to be from an internet inspector in charge of six polling stations. It alleged that software had been rigged to register ineligible votes, including ones cast by children, dead people or by the same individual several times.

please compare the _absolute_ numbers in a graphfor example, AZARBAYJAN:2004-reform/centrist: 950,0002004-conservative: 350,0002009-reform/centrist: 837,0002009-conservative: 1,131,000so reform/centrist decreased by 10% and conservative trippled!? even as people get younger, economy worse, and achmadenijad more unpopular?

city-level returns posted by the Iranian Interior Ministry on their website? These were posted by "Pejman" and translated by "Shaahin" in the comments thread to your previous post: http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/statistical-evidence-does-not-prove.html#comment-672782692382259870

Just from a cursory glance, you can see the official poll results don't make any sense. Look at one of the third party candidates, Karoubi. He is from Lorestan. in 2005, in the first round he took 55% of the vote in Lorestan. In these results, he takes only 5%.Extraordinarily unlikely.

On the basis of what we know so far, here is the sequence of events starting on the afternoon of election day, Friday, June 12. Near closing time of the polls, mobile text messaging was turned off nationwide Security forces poured out into the streets in large numbers The Ministry of Interior (election headquarters) was surrounded by concrete barriers and armed men National television began broadcasting pre-recorded messages calling for everyone to unite behind the winner The Mousavi campaign was informed officially that they had won the election, which perhaps served to temporarily lull  them into complacency But then the Ministry of Interior announced a landslide victory for Ahmadinejad Unlike previous elections, there was no breakdown of the vote by province, which would have provided a way of judging its credibility The voting patterns announced by the government were identical in all parts of the country, an impossibility (also see the comments of Juan Cole at the title link) Less than 24 hours later, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamene`i  publicly announced his congratulations to the winner, apparently confirming that the process was complete and irrevocable, contrary to constitutional requirements Shortly thereafter, all mobile phones, Facebook, and other social networks were blocked, as well as major foreign news sources.

The willingness of the regime simply to ignore reality and fabricate election results without the slightest effort to conceal the fraud represents a historic shift in Iran’s Islamic revolution. All previous leaders at least paid lip service to the voice of the Iranian people. This suggests that Iran’s leaders are aware of the fact that they have lost credibility in the eyes of many (most?) of their countrymen, so they are dispensing with even the pretense of popular legitimacy in favor of raw power. The Iranian opposition, which includes some very powerful individuals and institutions, has an agonizing decision to make. If they are intimidated and silenced by the show of force (as they have been in the past), they will lose all credibility in the future with even their most devoted followers. But if they choose to confront their ruthless colleagues forcefully, not only is it likely to be messy but it could risk running out of control and potentially bring down the entire existing power structure, of which they are participants and beneficiaries.