"TERRA E ÁGUA:Territórios dos pescadores artesanais de São Francisco do Paraguaçu-Bahia" rabalho do Grupo GEOGRAFAR da UFBA. O objetivo do trabalho é " a análise da produção do espaço e da territorialização dos pescadores artesanais na terra e na água, focado na localidade de São Francisco do Paraguaçu, situada no município de Cachoeira, Recôncavo Baiano. Identifica "uma especificidade territorial que desencadeia um processo de formação de territórios articulados (terra e água) que é muito complexo, envolvendo uma gama muito grande de agentes, interesses e conflitos. Este recorte nos fornecerá as condições de possibilidades de reflexão dos direitos baseados no local, onde se aninha os TURFs, já que opera com um conceito que reflete uma realidade bastante complexa que transborda o universo marítimo no sentido estrito, mas em vez de nos afastar da problemática, nos apresenta novos ângulos, já que identifica processo sociais que são determinantes da relação dos pescadores artesanais com os recursos pesqueiros.

Neste trabalho do Grupo GEOGRAFAR -UFBA, Kassia Rios busca identificar e pesquisa de identificar e demarcar o território produtivo dos pescadores artesanais de Acupe, tendo em conta que estar diante de "um processo de construção, mobilização e reconhecimento da comunidade local", como uma condição para enfrentar o desafio posto pela Campanha Nacional pela Regularização dos Territórios das Comunidades Tradicionais Pesqueiras.

"Scholars of common property resource theory (CPR) have long asserted that certain kinds of institutional arrangements based on collective action result in successful environmental stewardship, but feedback and the direct link between social and ecological systems remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangements contribute to sustainable mangrove fisheries in coastal Ecuador, focusing on the fishery for the mangrove cockle (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis), a bivalve mollusk harvested from the roots of mangrove trees and of particular social, economic, and cultural importance for the communities that depend on it. Specifically, this study examines the emergence of new civil society institutions within the historical context of extensive mangrove deforestation for the expansion of shrimp farming, policy changes in the late 1990s that recognized "ancestral" rights of local communities to mangrove resources, and how custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, affect the cockle fishery. Findings from interviews with shell collectors and analysis of catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common property regimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources, mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shell sizes, but the benefits are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors feel further marginalized by the loss of gathering grounds, potentially deflecting problems of overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove fisheries are weakly managed by the State. Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, the explicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at different levels, examining the relationship between collective action and the environment through quantitative approaches at the fishery level and qualitative analysis at the level

"To halt degradation of benthic resources in Chile, management areas (MAs) were set up under the Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) framework in the late 1990s. Integrated into the global market, MAs have since expanded along the Chilean coast, involving thousands of small-scale artisanal fishers. This paper analyses how economic criteria relates to social and ecological performance of Chilean MAs, by applying TURFs, commons and co-management theory to two cases: MAs Peñuelas and Chigualoco. To collect and analyse data Participatory Rural Appraisal tools, interviews and official statistics and reports were used. Our results show that MAs' economic benefits are connected to fluctuations on the global market. Adapting to changing world market prices then becomes paramount. TURFs' main goal is ecological conservation, but achieving this seems to depend on meeting fishers' livelihoods; failure to do so likely results in failure to meet conservation objectives. A serious weakness of the Chilean TURFs system is that it does not pay enough attention to fishers' livelihoods or to the global market context. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship between good economic benefits and social sustainability. But irrespective of economic performance, fisher organizations have been empowered and gained increased resource control with the TURFs system. At policy level, a differentiated and more flexible system could be more suitable for existing heterogeneous MAs and their particular economic, social and ecological challenges. For improved economic sustainability and resource conservation, a system with multiple-species managing MAs could be promoted as well. Finally, to enhance theory of commons, co-management and TURFs, we argue for greater acknowledgement of TURFs' social benefits in addition to economic assessments. More attention should also be paid to global market conditions of which MAs are dependent and in which they are embedded: macrostructures tha

"Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) have spread in Chile, since the late 1990s, in the form of commons institutions. TURFs are presented by some scholars as a social-ecological success; by others as showing economic and compliance problems. Studies looking at the material conditions in which fishers produce and reproduce their livelihoods, and in which TURFs emerge, are scarcer. Ostrom's theory on the commons claims that certain collective action conditions have to be met to become thriving commons institutions. Our hypothesis is that while institutions are moulded by local material conditions, such as geographical location and social embeddedness, these impose challenges and constraints upon fishers influencing TURFs' long-term viability. How are collective action conditions influenced when the new TURFs commons do not emerge in tabula rasa contexts but in occupied spaces? Do material conditions influence TURFs' sustainability? This paper set out to explore these conditions. Huentelauquén's and Guayacán's TURFs (central-northern Chile) were chosen, as they represent two extremes (rural-urban; on private property-on State/municipal property; mainly diver - mainly fisher) contexts in which TURFs have emerged. We mainly used Participatory Rural Approach (PRA) tools triangulated with other qualitative methods. This study shows that both social embeddedness (private/State lands), and geographical location (rural/urban) matter, resulting in different access to the coast for different TURFs, thus determining some important differences between our cases in at least three relevant areas: entrance, social relations between the fishers' organization (entitled the TURFs) and the landowner (private or municipal/State) and the existence or absence of fishing and general infrastructure. Competition for space among key actors seems to affect the process of acquiring a TURF as well as the conditions conductive to collective action. TURFs' assessments s

"While most of the attention in the scientific and policy literature onrights-based institutions has been devoted to Individual Transferable Quotas(ITQs), there are alternatives that involve different configurations of use rights.One such alternative is a space-based option commonly referred to as Territo-rial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs). TURFs have been utilized in island fisheriesoff Southeast Asia for decades, and they have been well studied, particularly byanthropologists and sociologists. This paper discusses case studies of TURF or-ganizations in Japan and Chile from an economics perspective. We discuss thehistorical origins of each system, outline the legal and institutional structures of the systems, and then discuss how each system manages nearshore coastal re-sources. We discuss similarities and differences across the many specific collectivemanagement structures adopted by Japanese and Chilean TURF organizations.We then discuss how outcomes differ from what might emerge under ITQs"