"nstitutions based on the concept"common property" have played socially beneficial roles in natural resources management from economic pre-history up to thepresent. These same institutions promisehelp in solving pressing resourcesproblems in both the devel- oped and the developing countries. It isall the more important that these institutions be the focus of an economic study because they have been misunderstood by modern day economists: We refer to the so-called "theory of common property resources" orwhat is oftentermed the "tragedy of the commons."1"

Addressing this need, we present a framework on collective action, conflict prevention, and social-ecological resilience, linking local stakeholder dynamics to the broader institutional and governance context. Accounting for both formal and informal relationships of power and influence, as well as values and stakeholder perceptions alongside material interests, the framework aims to provide insight into the problem of (re)building legitimacy of commonpool resource management institutions in conflict-sensitive environments. We outline its application in stakeholder-based problem assessment and planning, participatory monitoring and evaluation, and multi-case comparative analysis.

Tine De Moor's 'Silent Revolution'. Reconsidering her theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of institutions for the collective management of resources

: The social-ecological systems framework was designed to provide a common research tool for interdisciplinary investigations of social-ecological systems. However, its origin in institutional studies of the commons belies its interdisciplinary ambitions and highlights its relatively limited attention to ecology and natural scientific knowledge. This paper considers the biophysical components of the framework and its epistemological foundations as it relates to the incorporation of knowledge from the natural sciences.

"n response to the growing discrepancy between the steadily rising steering ambitions and theincreasing fragmentation of social and political life, governance networks are mushrooming. Gov-ernance through the formation of networks composed of public and private actors might help solvewicked problems and enhance democratic participation in public policy-making, but it may alsocreate conflicts and deadlocks and make public governance less transparent and accountable. Inorder to ensure that governance networks contribute to an effective and democratic governing of society, careful metagovernance by politicians, public managers and other relevant actors is neces-sary. In this paper, we discuss how to assess the effective performance and democratic quality of governance networks. We also describe how different metagovernance tools can be used in thepursuit of effective and democratic network governance. Finally, we argue that public metagover-nors must develop their strategic and collaborative competences in order to become able to meta-govern governance networks"

"The idea that decision-making processes andmanagement in public policy and publicadministration are complex has entered theminds of practitioners and scholars in publicadministration. Insights from theories oncomplexity, however, have hardly been usedin public administration and management. Inother social sciences, like economics forinstance, an evolutionary approach hasreceived far more attention. The questionwhether such a complexity theory approachcould help to increase our understanding ofpublic management phenomena is an intri-guing one. In this volume the reader will finda selection of articles on public managementusing insights from the complexity theory.Before we present the seven articles, whichall deal with notions from the complexitytheory and apply them to phenomena in thepublic sector, we will briefly introduce somebasic ideas concerning this theory. Key words Complexity theory, public administration,complex decision-making, complex systems Vol. 10 Issue 3 2008 287-297Public Management Review ISSN 1471-9037 print/ISSN 1471-9045 online Ó 2008 Taylor & Francishttp://www.tandf.co.uk/journalsDOI: 10.1080/14719030802002451 "

"En el capítulo primero, se definieron las redes de políticas públicas comopatrones más o menos estables de relaciones sociales entre actoresinterdependientes, que toman forma alrededor de los problemas y/o de losprogramas de políticas. Las redes de políticas públicas, forman el contexto en elque tiene lugar el proceso político."

"This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangementscontribute to sustainable mangrove sheries in coastal Ecuador, ocusing onthe shery or the mangrove cockle (  Anadara tuberculosa and  A. similis ), abivalve mollusk harvested rom the roots o mangrove trees and o particularsocial, economic, and cultural importance or the communities that dependon it. Specically, this study examines the emergence o new civil societyinstitutions within the historical context o extensive mangrove deorestationor the expansion o shrimp arming, policy changes in the late 1990s thatrecognized "ancestral" rights o local communities to mangrove resources, andhow custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, aect the cockleshery. Findings rom interviews with shell collectors and analysis o catch-per-unit-eort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common propertyregimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources,mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shellsizes, but the benets are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias and independent cockle collectors eel urther marginalized by the loss o gathering grounds, potentially defecting problems o overexploitation to "open-access" areas, in which mangrove sheries are weakly managed by the State.Using Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) ramework, theexplicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at dierent levels,examining the relationship between collective action and the environment throughquantitative approaches at the shery level and qualitative analysis at the level"

"To halt degradation o benthic resources in Chile, managementareas (MAs) were set up under the Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)ramework in the late 1990s. Integrated into the global market, MAs have sinceexpanded along the Chilean coast, involving thousands o small-scale artisanalshers. This paper analyses how economic criteria relates to social and ecologicalperormance o Chilean MAs, by applying TURFs, commons and co-managementtheory to two cases: MAs Peñuelas and Chigualoco. To collect and analyse dataParticipatory Rural Appraisal tools, interviews and ocial statistics and reportswere used. Our results show that MAs' economic benets are connected tofuctuations on the global market. Adapting to changing world market prices thenbecomes paramount. TURFs' main goal is ecological conservation, but achievingthis seems to depend on meeting shers' livelihoods; ailure to do so likely resultsin ailure to meet conservation objectives. A serious weakness o the ChileanTURFs system is that it does not pay enough attention to shers' livelihoods orto the global market context. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship betweengood economic benets and social sustainability. But irrespective o economicperormance, sher organizations have been empowered and gained increasedresource control with the TURFs system. At policy level, a dierentiated andmore fexible system could be more suitable or existing heterogeneous MAsand their particular economic, social and ecological challenges. For improvedeconomic sustainability and resource conservation, a system with multiple-species managing MAs could be promoted as well. Finally, to enhance theory o commons, co-management and TURFs, we argue or greater acknowledgement"

"During the last decade there has been increased attention to the study o social-ecological systems (SESs). Social-ecological systems link social and ecologicalsystems (Berkes and Folke 1998). The inherently transdisciplinary eld o SES-scholars has ocused on resilience o SESs and ways to govern resilience o SESs.Resilience is dened as the ability o a system to withstand perturbations andremain within the same stability regime (Holling 1973). Governance o SESsocuses on enhancing the ability o the system to remain within the desired stabilityregime, or to create opportunities to move toward a desired stability regime. Forexample, suppression o orest res lead to the accumulation o uel (the trees thatare not burned) creating conditions or later res o such intensity that the soiland seed banks are damaged. This may prevent the orest system rom recoveringrom such a re. A more appropriate policy is to use small controlled burn tomaintain the resilience o the orest system.The study o SESs was initiated by ecologists who became interested inthe social dimensions o ecosystem management (Berkes and Folke 1998). Butincreasingly we see social scientists adopting an SES approach, taking into accountmore explicit ecological dynamics o resource systems than earlier social scienceresearch. The work o Ostrom (1990) originally ocused on the dimensions o thesocial system o a common resource. In recent work the study o the commons isapproached rom an SES perspective where natural resources and social systemshave equal representation and equal detailed analysis (Anderies et al. 2004;Ostrom 2007,2009).In this special issue a series o papers has been collected to urther the rontiero the study o the governance o social-ecological systems."

Diante das múltiplas possibilidades que se abrea configuração da estrutura de governança é pertinente considerar-se a contribuiçpão da "governance network theory" , em especial sua orientação teórica e normativa, ressaltando seus conceitos chaves e suposições, além do tipo de resposta que ela oferece

O contraponto da "PATH-DEPENTE PROCESS" com as CRITICAL JUNCTURES, abre um novo universo de possibilidades no campo da politica pesqueira, já que a partir desta dicotomia é possível fazer interagir diferentes tradições analíticas, a exemplo da ciência política focada na ação política (policymaking)e a filosofia política focada no ato politico (politymaking). Atente-se que a criação dessa janela de oportunidade deve-se ao fato da inserção de uma temporalidade (ou mesmo vai acontecer quando introduzirmos a uma espacialidade). A AÇÃO POLITICA é considerada como se desdobrando ao longo do tempo, mas sempre tendo como objeto um"path-dependent process" que evolui de forma incremental, enquanto o ATO POLÍTICO é considerado como uma intervenção instituinte de um novo "PATH-DEPENDNET PROCESS e, como tal, constitui uma inflexão na trajetória, o que é nomeado como uma CRITICAL JUNCTURE. Diante deste quadro, se tomamos a realidade da Política Pesqqueira, a qual tem como objeto um processo que se projeta como uma TRAGEDIA DOS COMMONS,julgamos prudene concebermos tal polícita tanto, pela ótica da AÇÃO POLITICA, como pela perspectiva do ATO POLITICO.

Ao nos debruçarmos sobre a questão pesqueira, salta a vista a problemática associada a estrutura de governança seja ela baseada nas especies ou nos territórios. A marca distintiva é a existência de múltiplos níveis regulatórios, os quais se consideram , ora como excludente, ora como complementar. A nossa hipótese é que sua configuração deve refletir a situação e, portanto, em principio todas as alternativas combinadas ou não, são plausíveis. Este argumento ganha evidência quando consideramos a literatura que trabalha a Teoria das redes de governança, a exemplo do que se pode extrair do artigo "Governance network theory:past, present and future de Erik-Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan, disponibilizado acima. "The reallocation of authority upwards, downwards, and sideways from central states hasdrawn attention from a growing number of scholars in political science. Yet beyondagreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensusabout how it should be organized. This article draws on several literatures to distinguish twotypes of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, non-intersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of governance conceivesof task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtuesof each type of governance"

"My aim in this paper is to consider whether the relativity of title is consistent withthe idea of ownership in law", enquanto que nosso objetivo é mostrar que a propriedade no caso brasileiro, a partir do novo Código Civil nos permite relativizar seu titulo e, assim, potencializar suas possibildades regulatórias e sociais, o que ainda não foi devidamente explorado, em parte, devido a ênfase na poliymaking fundada na AÇÃO POLITICA tendo como referência empírica os "path-dependent process", deixando em segundo plano, a politymaking fundado no ATO POLITICO e tendo como referência as CRITICAL JUNCTURES, tal como posto por CAPOCCIA, The Study of Critical Junctures - Theory, Narrative, And Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism

A propriedade cada vez mais é tratada a partir das suas funções, as quais se dividem em dois grandes grupos nos quais se alojam suas funções sociais e regulativas, ambas posicionadas na interface do direito publico com o direito privado. Ao tratamos dos Sistemas Sócio-Ecológicos a exemplo das Reservas Extrativistas Marinhas e os Territórios, a partir da perspectiva da propriedade temos uma oportunidade de explorar suas possibilidades funcionais, tanto no âmbito social como regulativo. Aqui temos um ponto de partida para a exploração das suas possibilidades regulativas. Com relação aos Sistemas Sócio-Ecológico, consulte Marco A. Janssen, Resilience and adaptation in the governance of social-ecological systems