Arab-spring

The Muslim Brotherhood has made inroads into some ministries (not for the first time: in the 1960s, some members had been allowed, as individuals, ministerial positions). It should be of little surprise that these include the ministries of housing and education - institutions whose role is to provide services, something in which the Brotherhood has some experience.

the beginning of a shake-up of the manner in which politics have been codified for the past 60 years, with myriad actors trying to adapt to this change - and salvage what they can from the old power structure at the same time

blame falls first and foremost to the military's handling of the post-Mubarak period, the greed and other failings of his Muslim Brothers and other political parties, and the inability of revolutionaries to turn their symbolic capital into a political vision. The present situation is also a reminder of how "sticky" bad old habits of governance in Egypt are, and the extent to which the question of why the country was so badly run for so many years extended far beyond the dull rule of Hosni Mubarak.

a Brother now heads the information ministry, a costly behemoth whose reform is one of the biggest headaches of post-Mubarak Egypt. That the media is on a warpath against the Brotherhood has been a refrain of its members; perhaps they hope to better control it. But the loyalties of Egypt's state media are divided; its multiple organs now have different masters. And, for the printed press in particular, the new minister will have to face the politically influential Journalists' Syndicate

There will not be a political Islamist in control of either endowments or state mosques

In a sense we've now seen a return of real politics, unmediated by the micromanagement of security officials

I personally await his solution for the frequent breakdown of the sewage system of asking the citizens to hold it in as long as possible.

The people of the Mirage State of Egypt have just stopped being that, and started to become actual citizens. Hopefully the rest of the state will follow suit.

the ideological spectrum even between Islamists and nationalist parties is quite narrow—the nationalists make frequent references to Islam as a basis for law and governance and the Islamists trumpet their nationalist credentials. There are cases where election posters from a major Islamist party show women candidates unveiled—an attempt to soften their image and appeal to women voters. All of this bodes well for consensus building and national unity once the parliament is formed.

local agendas will likely win the day

Libyans will be electing a 200-person parliament to replace the NTC, and the new assembly will need to choose its president and appoint a prime minister within its first month in operation. The next real order of business is to form a body to write Libya’s new constitution. A draft must be presented in 120 days and then needs to be approved in a national referendum.

the problems are confined and the state is not about to implode

glaring shortfalls in the transition are the lack of development in the security sector and the continued activity of powerful militias

The government is working with what it has and treading very carefully. The government knows it must demobilize and integrate these militias, so there are a number of plans to register fighters and provide them with attractive options like starting a small business, continuing their education, or joining the police or military. Whether these plans can be implemented remains to be seen. Maintaining internal stability is going to be a long-term challenge

A Salafi group known as Ansar al-Sharia has established itself in Derna and Benghazi and recently sent armed men into Benghazi’s main square to demand the imposition of sharia. Its leader declared the elections un-Islamic. There have also been attacks on the American and British consulates and the International Committee for the Red Cross.

On one level, Libya is transitioning effectively just by virtue of holding elections. On another, oil production is exceeding expectations by already surpassing pre-war levels, providing much-needed funds to help stabilize the economy and state

People do not want the breakup of the state, but don’t want a return to the completely centralized control associated with the Qaddafi era either

In parts of Libya, we are seeing the perfect storm of weak state control, traditional areas of smuggling and criminality, proliferation of arms, tribal discontent, ethnic unrest, and Islamist groups moving in to take advantage

Essebsi's movement has scared both liberal secularists and Ennahda supporters alike.  A return of the crooked, corrupt, and cruel former regime is everything that they fought against -- not just in the past 2 years, but in the last 30 years. While Ennahda will point to the abuses against Islam, and secular liberals will point to the harassment of human rights activists and infringements on freedom of expression, both will point to the ultimate failure of the Bourguiba/Ben Ali experiment to bring real progress to many parts of Tunisia. While visitors to Tunisia's coastal areas can see the development and progress of the last 50 years, it takes only a few minutes to get to villages that remain poor, backwards, and lacking in any opportunities to progress. They will point to the promises of Ben Ali to provide education and work, even while the educational system declined and job opportunities dried up. They will point to the fact that closer relations with the west only brought tighter visa restrictions and low-wage jobs.

Some have pointed to Mustapha Nabli, who has links to the former regime, but spent the last 12 years at the World Bank prior to coming back after the revolution to lead the Tunisian Central Bank. He is well respected in international circles and has already engaged in fierce debate with the coalition government over the central bank's independence, and as a result has received open calls for his sacking by President Marzouki himself. Others have cited Taieb Baccouche, a former labor and human rights leader, who most recently served with Essebsi as Minister of Education in the transition government. He has been making the rounds in Tunisian media on behalf of the Call.

the CPR and Ennahda have proposed legislation that would limit RCD participation in any future government. While political activists in Tunisia have long regretted the relative immunity granted to the former regime officials, many Tunisians continue to place the blame firmly on Ben Ali and his family. Essebsi has capitalized on this sentiment by stating that these proposals are anti-democratic and would only further polarize a society that needs unity. Nevertheless, with control over the government and the assembly, the coalition could tighten the rules to make it difficult for the Call to field candidates

The work for Essebsi's movement will be able to convince Tunisians that they can keep the gains of Tunisia's independence leaders while upholding the values of the revolution. For Tunisia's secular left, the Call represents an opportunity to join a party that may have real traction with ordinary Tunisians, but also signifies a capitulation for what many have worked so hard to change. Like in Egypt, the rise of two conservative parties (the Islamists and the Call) is a disappointment to those who fought for human rights and civil liberties. At the same time, in this conservative society it is hardly surprising that the debate is characterized by what kind of conservatism Tunisians will choose between