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This was the worst possible outcome of the elections: it is the prelude to the direct confrontation between the old regime and the Muslim Brotherhood that Mubarak warned about and used to justify—and win tacit international acceptance for—his authoritarian policies.

there is no constitution yet and nobody knows how much power the new president will have or how responsibilities will be shared between him and the parliament. The SCAF, expected to step down at the end of June after the president is elected, is now trying to issue a new, last-minute constitutional declaration to define the powers of the president, preempting the decision of the constituent assembly and the prerogatives of the elected parliament to choose who will write the constitution

in the middle will stand over 50 percent of Egyptians who did not vote for either Morsi or Shafiq, but for three candidates that represent, in their own very different fashion, an alternative

there remain questions about the government’s capability to provide security at polling stations. It has “deputized” a number of militias in major cities as part of its security plan. And there have been some very vocal calls for an election boycott in the east by Islamist and pro-federalism leaders, as well as attacks on election offices. The government reportedly has a plan to “freeze” the voting at polling places where there is violence or disruption, which could result in a de-facto invalidation of the results

The postponement of a few weeks was simply a technical delay. Libya’s transitional authorities were behind schedule in registering voters and in other preparations for the election. According to the accounts of the United Nations and several NGO observers, the delay was fully justified and not nefarious in any way.

for most of the main parties, the experience of campaigning and articulating a party platform is completely new. For many, the metric of voter support is how many posters are produced or media ads are running on television.  

quelques uns de ses collègues trichaient durant le vote électronique en appuyant sur les boutons de vote des sièges vides d’à côtés. Le président du bloc Ennahdha à l’ANC, Sahbi Atig, a confirmé les déclarations de M. Badi : «J’ai honte d’en parler. Hier on était 120 députés, or on aura compté 170 voix. Est-ce normal que les uns trichent et que les autres copient sur leurs collègues ? Serions-nous dans une école primaire ?».

Soutenu par plusieurs associations, le groupe OpenGov va adresser, le 16 mai, une missive à M. Ben Jaafer dans laquelle il lui demande solennellement la diffusion sur le site de l’ANC des rapports des commissions internes. Il va également lui demander de fournir automatiquement les PV des réunions ainsi que la liste d’absence des députés depuis leur prise de fonction. En cas de retard de réponse, le groupe va passer à l'action en déposant une plainte devant le tribunal administratif vers le 31 mai prochain.

After the Yemeni Parliament began the year by passing new legislation allowing Saleh to run for the presidency ad infinitum, Saleh announced his three famous “No’s” a month later: no presidency forever, no running for elections again and no inherited presidency, meaning that his son, who was being groomed for succession, and who is the leader of the Republican Guard, will not succeed his father.   Saleh’s concessions failed to appease those itching for immediate change, however, and February 3 witnessed the first massive demonstrations. Taking place in more than 17 governates, the protests organized by the JMP called for political and economic reforms and a fair distribution of wealth. Up until this point, demands for Saleh to step down had not been made. The JMP called an end to the demonstrations but groups of young people remained in Sanaa’s squares demanding Saleh’s departure. These unknown youth were the catalyst of Yemen’s continuous uprisings for the next nine months. 

March 18, when the security forces’ snipers opened fire on protesters, killing more than 50 and injuring hundreds

due to an international cardiopulmonary resuscitation, especially at the hand of Saudi Arabia, eight months passed without a transition of power

the leaders of Tahrir want to institutionalise the incredible creativity of the revolution, from musical performances and film to artwork, poetry and story-telling. These activities have sustained protesters during the darkest days of violence and have helped to attract hundreds of thousands of "ordinary Egyptians" to the Meidan during each of the occupations since January. This would constitute a permanent counterpoint to the state media and other mechanisms that the government and elite have at their disposal, through which they try to convince Egyptians that the Tahriris are little more than "thugs" who don't have their interests at heart.

one of the major problems of Tahrir today (similar to the situation during the last major occupation, in July, and different from the January-February protests), is that it has clearly been infiltrated by the security services with provocateurs. Their job is to keep the Meidan constantly on edge, and in so doing, keep the pressure on, drive people away, and encourage the degradation of life in Tahrir to the point that it either dissolves on its own, or an be "cleaned out", Zuccotti Park-style.

"People have to learn for themselves," one explained to me this morning. "And they will. In the meantime, we will produce another proposal and figure out how more forcefully to deal with the infiltrators. I know who they are, after ten months of doing this, I can smell them." I have no doubt he can, but the real question is whether Egyptians more broadly can not merely smell, but root out, the precise infiltration of their embryonic democracy by the forces of crony capitalism and corruption that have for so long dominated the country. "Power is attractive and parliament comes with a lot of money," one long-time activist put it to me in justifying the anger at the betrayal of the principles and of the revolution's martyrs by the emerging political elite.

Morsi has effectively, on paper, dictatorial powers. It will largely come down to how he uses them, especially as the last thing Egypt needs is a government unable to make decisions and address urgent problems simply because the parliament is not in place.

many will still wait for the Christian and female VPs he promised to appoint

I would not be surprised if public opinion backs not so much Morsi but the sense of things finally moving forward again

The administrative courts or the Supreme Constitutional Court might indeed refuse to honor Morsi’s addendum. But unless there is strong opposition from a powerful political force (and the most likely opponent, the SCAF itself, seems to be going along with the president instead), a court taking such a move would be bold indeed.

The same co-governance is in place, but with the president as the more powerful actor. Indeed, by cancelling the June 2012 constitutional addendum Morsi has now legally reinserted himself as chairman of the SCAF itself

Morsi’s selection of a Mahmud Makki, a prominent judge, as vice president—after selecting Mahmud’s older brother Ahmad as minister of justice—may be an attempt to outmaneuver judicial opposition. The Makki brothers were both prominent members of the 2005 judicial reform movement and thus have some credibility in circles opposed to the old regime. Both were also rumored to have mild Islamist inclinations, though such rumors are hard to evaluate since judges rarely disclose their partisan feelings even when they have them. But the placement of prominent judges in such positions—and the brief floating of a suggestion that the new justice minister draft a new judicial law to be issued by presidential decree (not waiting for the new parliament)—may be a way of signaling to the judiciary that accommodation rather than a full frontal assault may be a better strategy for those anxious about the presidency and the Islamist rise. Whether a presidency at least momentarily free of strong checks on its authority will set its sights on restructuring the judiciary is not yet clear—but judges will definitely be scouring presidential statements and decisions for indications of Morsi’s intentions

Article 5: Articles of the draft constitution should be reached by consensus among assembly members. If this proves impossible, articles should be determined by vote

The leftist and secular revolutionaries, particularly reform leader Mohammed ElBaradei, argued that elections supervised by the military would be a farce and any constitution would be tainted. Instead, they proposed a civilian leadership grouping the "revolutionary powers" immediately start to rule and oversee the constitution.Divided and politically inexperienced, they were resoundingly overruled. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists - who had joined the revolt against Mubarak - broke with the revolutionaries and backed the military-run transition. They had no time for worries over military rule or talk of a revolutionary government, keeping a laser-like focus on elections in which they were confident of vaulting to power on a strong popular base.Now the revolutionaries are saying: We told you so.

A turning point was a referendum in March 2011 in which the public overwhelmingly approved the military's plan for the transition. The Islamists strongly backed the plan, even proclaiming a "yes" vote to be required by God. The public trusted the military, was enamored at the promise of free elections and saw the revolutionaries' alternative as vague. The plan passed with 70 percent of the vote.From then on, the military pointed to that referendum as proof of legitimacy for whatever it did.

there was no move to dismantle the system that Egyptians had risen up against

Tunisia's president has left power for good, the president of the country's Constitutional Court said Saturday, declaring that the leader of the lower house of parliament will assume power until elections are held in two months.

Constitutional Council President Fethi Abdennadher said Saturday that Ben Ali has permanently vacated his position and lawmaker Fouad Mebazaa has up to 60 days to organize new elections.

Overnight, public television station TV7 broadcast phone calls from residents of working-class neighborhoods on the capital's outskirts, recounting attacks against their homes by knife-wielding assailants.Ghannouchi — who held power for less than 24 hours — told TV stations overnight that he had ordered the army and other security forces to intervene immediately in those neighborhoods.

without extreme vigilance on the part of the Tunisian public, the country might find itself, a few months from now, with another RCD president and a parliament still dominated by Ben Ali's party. Tunisians are going to have to remain very watchful, and keep up the pressure for change.

a Western instinct to personalize and, in the process, trivialize the Tunisian revolution – only to ignore it as the focus moved on to later rebellions in countries deemed more important

"Now they are offering all kinds of help to Libya, which is already a rich country. Here, we get nothing. The economic situation just gets worse, and we wonder why we risked so much in rising up against Ben Ali and his gangsters."

They are angry because things are not improving fast