«Thawretna Thawrat Zawali, Lé Sebsi we Lé Jebali»

leur choix de rejoindre le nouveau parti ne correspond pas aux espérances créées par le soulèvement qui a mis fin à la dictature de la bande de Ben Ali

Caïd Essebsi a déjà réussi à créer une rupture politique au sein même du large conglomérat imprécis qualifié de laïque par les médias et par certains intellectuels

“I can’t really tell if the Tunisian youth are satisfied or not. However, I can tell you about the youth around me. They are trying to be as involved as possible. Tunisian youth are active with many associations like I Watch, and JVT (Tunisian NGOs). All these are young people who are trying to sensitize other people to our political situation,”

Houssem Eddine Trabelsi, the coordinator of Ekbes, told Tunisia Live, “This was a way of protesting the government’s performance. We are young members of  Ennahdha with different opinions and positions than those of the government.” Trabelsi said that he and the campaign members have been connecting with ministers and plan to hold more events, as well as conduct their own investigations into how the government can do better.

Farah Labidi, a Constituent Assembly representative and member of Ennahdha said that the criticism of Ekbes was good for the accountability of leaders. “This is a very healthy initiative as they are asking for daring decisions to fight corruption, and immediate execution of plans. It is a plus for us as they are pointing to our weaknesses. Their criticism is a right.”

The administrative courts or the Supreme Constitutional Court might indeed refuse to honor Morsi’s addendum. But unless there is strong opposition from a powerful political force (and the most likely opponent, the SCAF itself, seems to be going along with the president instead), a court taking such a move would be bold indeed.

The same co-governance is in place, but with the president as the more powerful actor. Indeed, by cancelling the June 2012 constitutional addendum Morsi has now legally reinserted himself as chairman of the SCAF itself

Morsi’s selection of a Mahmud Makki, a prominent judge, as vice president—after selecting Mahmud’s older brother Ahmad as minister of justice—may be an attempt to outmaneuver judicial opposition. The Makki brothers were both prominent members of the 2005 judicial reform movement and thus have some credibility in circles opposed to the old regime. Both were also rumored to have mild Islamist inclinations, though such rumors are hard to evaluate since judges rarely disclose their partisan feelings even when they have them. But the placement of prominent judges in such positions—and the brief floating of a suggestion that the new justice minister draft a new judicial law to be issued by presidential decree (not waiting for the new parliament)—may be a way of signaling to the judiciary that accommodation rather than a full frontal assault may be a better strategy for those anxious about the presidency and the Islamist rise. Whether a presidency at least momentarily free of strong checks on its authority will set its sights on restructuring the judiciary is not yet clear—but judges will definitely be scouring presidential statements and decisions for indications of Morsi’s intentions

blame falls first and foremost to the military's handling of the post-Mubarak period, the greed and other failings of his Muslim Brothers and other political parties, and the inability of revolutionaries to turn their symbolic capital into a political vision. The present situation is also a reminder of how "sticky" bad old habits of governance in Egypt are, and the extent to which the question of why the country was so badly run for so many years extended far beyond the dull rule of Hosni Mubarak.

the Brotherhood and the generals do have some power, but far more significant is their lack of power and legitimacy in imposing themselves against each another, and upon society

the Brotherhood and the generals do have some power, but far more significant is their lack of power and legitimacy in imposing themselves against each another, and upon society

members left the Assembly last week for their first break since they began writing in February. Just before their departure, the publication of the first full draft of the constitution demonstrated marked progress, but the contents of the draft have caused controversy throughout the country. The draft revealed that divisive issues, such as the status of women, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and the parliamentary structure of the government, are still far from settled inside and outside of the NCA. The Assembly will reconvene in early September to negotiate these divisions, but the timeframe for the ratification of the constitution remains unclear.

Morsi has effectively, on paper, dictatorial powers. It will largely come down to how he uses them, especially as the last thing Egypt needs is a government unable to make decisions and address urgent problems simply because the parliament is not in place.

many will still wait for the Christian and female VPs he promised to appoint

I would not be surprised if public opinion backs not so much Morsi but the sense of things finally moving forward again

The problem isn’t that the revolution created this Mirage State, but rather that it has always existed from the days of Mubarak, which we always suspected but never believed, because things used to function due to informal structure that we created without noticing. The state used to function based on a network of connections; the economy used to and still functions based on an informal sector that no one can either measure or penetrate; the policing used to be carried out away from the law or true investigative work and more reliant on torture and jailing; politics used to be the domain of one party that would insist that it believes in democratic transition and values while always rigging elections; and the president used to do anything he wanted in the country no matter what the constitution or the laws stated

The illusion was so strong that they thought it was real even after it was destroyed.

Instead of resolving the issues that exist between the governorates and the trash collection companies, or using the help of the zabaleen community, who have been doing a remarkable job of being the informal trash collectors of Egypt, President Morsy asked the people to simply resolve the trash problem by picking up the trash. Fine, but take it where? No answer. Would that mean that we no longer have to pay the trash collection money added to our electricity bill, since we are the ones collecting the trash? No answer. Is this part of maybe some sweeping recycling initiative, where we create a huge recycling industry and quite possibly create hundreds of thousands of jobs in the process? Nope. The plan is simply to pick up the trash and for Egyptians to engage in their civic duty in collecting trash that they pay to be collected for them in order to… eh… nothing.

Ennahdha members have consistently argued for a parliamentary system of governance, where the president would be appointed by the Constituent Assembly and would have limited powers. Conversely, CPR supports a semi-presidential system, where a president would be chosen through a general election.

Ladhari clarified that defining Tunisia’s future political system as either parliamentary or presidential is not within the purview of his committee, which is limited to determining how the president will be elected.  However, this technicality means little on a practical level, given that the issue of presidential vs. parliamentary governance is at the core of the division within the committee

Samia Abbou, a representative of CPR, stated that Ennahdha representatives chose to vote for their proposal on a day when most of the committee members were not present, including the president of the committee, Amor Chtioui

I understand that every generation has to deal with its own time spirit and the will linked to it.