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Ten Theses on Revolutions by Mohammed A. Bamyeh - 0 views

  • As it torments what before it had appeared as solid, immovable authority, a revolution also contests established knowledge.
  • a longing is not an act, and a general condition of unhappiness does not predict any specific action
  • If revolutions could be predicted, they would never happen: the science that does this work of prediction would immediately become the science of government. The fact that regimes are always on the lookout for opposition does not mean that they know in what way they will meet their end.
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  • just like regimes, the revolutionary explosion often catches the committed revolutionary by surprise: the teeming masses rose up earlier or later than expected, they moved not by the book and not according to plan, but as a detonation in the normal flow of time.
  • In 2011, there was no plan for revolution, anywhere, when a whole world region went up in flames after a poor street vendor in a marginal town in Tunisia self-immolated. Nor was there a plan for the great Palestinian intifada of 1987, when a street collision resulted in the death of four Palestinian workers. While both spectacular revolts that followed could be explained by years of insufferable indignities preceding them, there was no specific reason that a specific indignity on a specific day would unsettle the mighty repressive norm that, by then, had seemed everlasting.
  • Like the 2011 uprisings, the 1987 intifada erupted when there was no hope, no resources at hand to encourage hope, and at a point when rational, realistic minds posited hopelessness as the solid structure of the world.
  • every revolution gives birth to its own intellectuals, especially where the existing intellectuals refuse to acknowledge its profound originality, and stick to their old system of thought that had predicted either the absence of revolution, or one of a very different character than what came to be. Thus every revolution brings its own knowledge with it; it does not follow an established science.
  • What comes out in the immediate aftermath of every revolution is not necessarily a new or better system. Before anything else, what comes out is an educational experience, even when a revolution appears to have failed.
  • Everyone is then encouraged to forget the revolution, to turn attention to what should come next, before they could reflect on how they had managed to unleash a revolution to begin with.
  • Revolutions are therefore not simply events in time. The last thing they change is the political system, the first thing they change is the culture.
  • asking questions that yesterday were not even known to be questions
  • Rare are the revolutions that do not result in books written about them; poems composed in their honor; art that provides them with continuing presence; commemoration that remind of their best hopes; interpretations that establish them as inescapable heritage
  • the less visible, but more pervasive social traces (ordinary dialogues, new friendships, ongoing thoughts), that revolutions leave behind in their aftermath.
  • a revolution proceeds as a general invitation to creativity, then lives on as emergent culture--thought, questions, arguments. As it gains expressive maturity and a self-bestowed right to presence, this culture, diverse as it may be, marks the onset of the next round of social transformation
  • The psychology of the moment is one of elevated spirit, extraordinary time, unusual solidarity, will to sacrifice, interruption of norms, license for originality that may appear unlimited. The aftermath of that moment is typically one of Realpolitik, rational calculations, instrumental thought, power struggles, more ordinary politics. And precisely in that re-emergence of quotidian time there will be much pressure to forget the revolution, long before the counter-revolution has performed any of its tricks.
  • What we call “education” flowing out of a revolutionary moment is an education that begins from the senses, is felt in the body as energy, in the mind as epiphany, in the soul as “the people”—an abstraction that for a moment becomes concrete, because it has become the person.
  • The move away from exploring the source and promise of such novelty, and back into the more ordinary, more familiar psychology of “realism,” encourages thinking of the revolutionary act as no more than means to ends.
  • Ordinarily, epistemological imperialism tends to be a practice of an established mighty authority that, by virtue of its longevity or scope of its power, has become too confident of itself. But epistemological imperialism may also be a practice of opposition that, from long life under a certain power, could only think of revolution as an expression of a right to the same power.
  • To their participants, a revolutionary gathering exceeds any single demand: it addresses a felt need for a total social renewal. The mission then seems greater than simply replacing one ruler by another. At that moment, the ordinary person is in the revolution precisely because that is where she is not being ruled. There, she finally discovers what seems like an inborn, organic capacity to act as a sovereign agent: without instructions, without authority, even without a guiding tradition.
  • This total spiritual condition suggests to everyone involved that the revolution is greater than any particularism. The consciousness of totality makes its appearance as a sudden revelation, comparable to prophetic vision: the moment when a hitherto unseen truth illuminates the whole existence
  • This explosive spirituality resides in the necessity of doing what must be done, with only imagination, rather than plan
  • another major question rears its divisive head: have we really overthrown the regime? To answer this, we realize that in our temporary unity, we avoided this question too: what was the regime? That we need now to know, because the answer will help us have some plan as to where to go from here, to determine how much of “the regime” is gone and how much still needs to be uprooted so as to arrive at the “goals of the revolution.” For some revolutionaries, the regime was simply the head of the regime. For others, it was an entire corrupt class surrounding it and benefiting from it. For others still, the regime is everyday life—the rotten head has infected all of society, and caused all society, its mores and social relations, to become equally rotten. For those, that society, too, needs to be overthrown. The old society, all of it, was “the regime.”
  • In an unjust world, there are always alternatives to revolt: the idea of fate; personal hedonism; intellectual immersions; criminality; clannish solidarity; the morality of fortitude; mind altering substances; soothing rituals; suicide; nihilism; graduate study. A revolution, therefore, is always a choice among other choices.
  • The revolutionary decision therefore is a choice to disregard reality and realism. It is a choice to act as an agent, to act freely and to feel freedom not as a theoretical principle, but as a new force that is itself creating this new person doing what a day before the revolution seemed to be outside of all realism. Revolutions, therefore, are primarily decisions against realism, and as such they create the free person who undertakes them and, in the process, empirically verifies a principle that previously had lacked credibility: that a different world is possible.
  • A common strategy of betrayal takes the form of the monopoly of memory. Monopoly of memory means that the revolution, along with its memory or heritage, has become monopolized by one faction against all others. In this case, those who see this betrayal will say that the “goals of the revolution” have been abandoned, or that the revolution has strayed from its path. But revolutions may have as many goals as they have revolutionaries, and consequently as many imagined pathways. Here, “betrayal” will be seen in someone’s choice to highlight one goal and disregard another, in someone’s feeling that a preferred path was not taken, even though it could have been, or that the revolution has stopped short, when it could have gone further.
  • the greatest enemy of all revolutions is forgetfulness, because it attacks the core of the revolutionary experience: how it defied odds, reality, rationality, and all that had seemed ordinary, solid and eternal
  • the revolutionary pattern of each era corresponds to where power has become porous then
  • The Arab uprisings of the current era, namely those of 2011 and 2019 (but not the civil wars that followed), reveal shared patterns: they all start out first in marginal, neglected areas, from which they migrate into the well-fortified center. They rely on spontaneity as their art of moving, not on organization, structure, or even a plan. They are suspicious of vanguardism, and seem to intuitively reject any strong idea of leadership. They prefer loose coordinating structures, and “coordinators” emerge as a new revolutionary species, indicating that revolutions now need sharing of information more than centralized guidance. They operate largely at a distance from political parties, and in fact give rise to no party that can claim to represent or embody the revolution. The agent of the revolution and the maker of history is the ordinary person, not the savior leader.
  • those revolutions spoke in the name of a vague and large entity called “the people,” not of any sub-group, class, tribe, sect, or even the “meek of the earth.” That generality expressed their character as a meeting place of all grievances.
  • The regime did not know any game other than that of the established system, and thought of the revolution as a passing noise that will dissipate in due time. The main mode of governing had become autocratic deafness, across the entire region.
  • the counter-revolution already knows that repression alone would be unable to save it from revolution. Thus it needs to fortify itself against the nascent revolutionary culture by promoting counter-revolutionary culture, aimed at the spirit of the revolution. For example: in place of the ordinary person, counter-revolutionary culture elevates the savior leader as the only worthy maker of history; in place of the belief that had emerged in the revolutionary moment of “the people” as an enlightened and noble body, counter-revolution fosters an image of peoplehood as a savage, illiterate mob, to be feared and policed, rather than provided with freedom and entrusted with capacity.
  • Culture and ideas, therefore, become central battlegrounds in the age of counter-revolution
  • Just as in the Arab case, where the revolutionary wave met counter-revolution, so did the global wave meet a global counter-wave. Both took place across dispersed geographies, indicating that like the revolutionary wave, the counter-revolutionary wave was inspired by a spreading feeling of threat or creeping disorder. The rise of an inter-linked right-wing populism globally after 2011 may indeed be an expression of a learning process of reaction, indicating the seriousness with which the revolutionary, or at least transformative, challenge was taken. And just as in the Arab case, the global counter-revolution learned from its encounter with revolution, real or imagined, that the old order must be defended in more authoritarian ways in the realm of policing and law, and more vigorously in the realm of ideas and culture.
  • The revolution was not just a surprising event, but an addition to the known facts of existence. And what was most certainly new here was the capacity to revolt, not what came next. That capacity was what the revolutionary moment had demonstrated.
  • The universal is always imperialistic when the only knowledge sought through it is confirmatory rather than transformative knowledge.
    • Ed Webb
       
      wow
  • Discovery, therefore, has from the point of view of epistemological imperialism only quantitative rather than qualitative promise: it adds more of what I already know, not more to what I know.
  • there was a revolutionary person residing deep inside the conformist, traditional person one had seen earlier. If we do not know how to see that hidden person, we will not see the revolution.
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Manifestation de soutien aux Tunisiens à Paris : "Il fallait que la rage sort... - 0 views

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    07/01/2011 : Place de la fontaine des Innocents, à Paris, la pluie irrégulière qui tombe en cette fin de journée, jeudi 6 janvier, n'a pas empêché environ 250 manifestants de participer à un rassemblement de soutien au peuple tunisien. "Nous sommes ici pour affirmer notre solidarité à l'égard de nos confrères en Tunisie", assure un étudiant venu ici avec son frère et un ami. "Ce qui se passe est un mal pour un bien, poursuit-il, il fallait que la rage sorte un jour."
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Pourquoi Bab el-Oued se révolte ? | The Observers - 0 views

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    06/01/2011 : Des violences ont éclaté entre jeunes manifestants et forces de police, mercredi soir, dans le quartier de Bab el-Oued à Alger. Notre Observateur sur place nous raconte les incidents et nous explique pourquoi ce quartier déshérité de la capitale s'est enflammé, encore une fois.
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'Everything is stolen from us': Tunisians fight to preserve cultural heritage | PLACE - 0 views

  • The looting of archaeological sites is a longstanding problem in Tunisia
  • Objects of significant historical and cultural value often end up on the European market and in the homes of Tunisia's rich and powerful
  • instability and chaos of conflict often provides a window for archaeological looting
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  • the authorities are getting more serious about tackling the illicit antiquities trade
  • The western region of Kasserine, where the shrine of Sidi Boughanem is located, is one of the most marginalised parts of the country - with government figures showing about one in four people unemployed, far higher than the 15% unemployment rate for the country as a whole. It is also one of the most archaeologically rich. There are four major sites located in an area of 8,000 square kilometres (3,000 square miles), and the land is peppered with architectural ruins and antique stones.
  • the sheer number of small sites makes it impossible to keep an eye on all of them
  • "There are economic reasons (for looting)," he told the Thomson Reuters Foundation in Tunis. "The blame should not be put on the people who are trying to get by day-to-day, but the persons who are furnishing these collections."
  • Ayoub Sayhi, a 22-year-old amateur filmmaker from Thala, called on the government to do more to care for the country's ancient objects. To Sayhi, the looting of Kasserine's antiquities was just another symptom of what he saw as the state's neglect of the region. "(My film) is to get the government to do something about this region because it is poor even though it is rich in natural resources," he said. "Everything is stolen from us, both in the day and in the night."
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Salafist Security Patrols Divide Tunisians - Tunisia Live : Tunisia Live - 0 views

  • The activation of such Salafist neighborhood patrols after Belaid’s assassination has sparked debate among Tunisians. Due to a perceived lack of security, patrols sprang up in areas such as Tunis’ suburbs, Sousse, Hammamet, Sfax, and Bizerte. Some media reports have claimed these groups conducted their patrols in coordination with Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and the Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution
  • Salah Edhaoui, a deputy chief of police in the Omrane Supérieure suburb of Tunis, called such efforts “parallel security” and claimed that they tarnished the image of official security institutions in Tunisia. “If such behavior is repeated, people will think that Salafist groups will take the place of policemen, which is harmful to the public image of security institutions as well as to the image of the state’s institutions,”
  • Minister of Interior Ali Laarayedh denied the existence of a coordinated Salafist security system and said an investigation into the patrols would be opened
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Can Essebsi's 'Call for Tunisia' Movement Unite the Opposition? - By Erik Churchill | T... - 0 views

  • The Call for Tunisia features a broad spectrum of former regime officials together with secular liberals. The former regime officials, or RCDists (from the Constitutional Democratic Rally), were excluded from running in the last elections and see in the new initiative a chance to revive their political prospects. (There was no such cleansing of the actual government administrations -- only positions in the Constituent Assembly). These officials and their supporters oftentimes criticize the current government as incompetent and unable to manage the complexity of government. They try to deflect criticisms of the rampant corruption and stasi-like police state of the past, by pointing to the (very real) progress achieved under Bourguiba and Ben Ali. They cite statistics on women's rights, improvements in education, and infrastructure development, and they compare Tunisia with its neighbors in the Maghreb and throughout Africa. Their motives are clear -- keep the good and throw out the bad of the former regime.
  • challenge will be to integrate their liberal values into what is at heart a conservative party
  • While Ennahda supporters talk about the extremism of Bourguiba/Ben Ali regarding Islamic practices (including banning the veil and a very liberal interpretation of Ramadan -- not to mention the systematic torture and imprisonment of Islamists themselves), many Tunisians felt comfortable being Muslim under the former regime. It is fair to say that many (though certainly not all) Tunisians did not feel that their religion was under assault under the previous secular regime
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  • Essebsi's movement has scared both liberal secularists and Ennahda supporters alike.  A return of the crooked, corrupt, and cruel former regime is everything that they fought against -- not just in the past 2 years, but in the last 30 years. While Ennahda will point to the abuses against Islam, and secular liberals will point to the harassment of human rights activists and infringements on freedom of expression, both will point to the ultimate failure of the Bourguiba/Ben Ali experiment to bring real progress to many parts of Tunisia. While visitors to Tunisia's coastal areas can see the development and progress of the last 50 years, it takes only a few minutes to get to villages that remain poor, backwards, and lacking in any opportunities to progress. They will point to the promises of Ben Ali to provide education and work, even while the educational system declined and job opportunities dried up. They will point to the fact that closer relations with the west only brought tighter visa restrictions and low-wage jobs.
  • Some have pointed to Mustapha Nabli, who has links to the former regime, but spent the last 12 years at the World Bank prior to coming back after the revolution to lead the Tunisian Central Bank. He is well respected in international circles and has already engaged in fierce debate with the coalition government over the central bank's independence, and as a result has received open calls for his sacking by President Marzouki himself. Others have cited Taieb Baccouche, a former labor and human rights leader, who most recently served with Essebsi as Minister of Education in the transition government. He has been making the rounds in Tunisian media on behalf of the Call.
  • the CPR and Ennahda have proposed legislation that would limit RCD participation in any future government. While political activists in Tunisia have long regretted the relative immunity granted to the former regime officials, many Tunisians continue to place the blame firmly on Ben Ali and his family. Essebsi has capitalized on this sentiment by stating that these proposals are anti-democratic and would only further polarize a society that needs unity. Nevertheless, with control over the government and the assembly, the coalition could tighten the rules to make it difficult for the Call to field candidates
  • The work for Essebsi's movement will be able to convince Tunisians that they can keep the gains of Tunisia's independence leaders while upholding the values of the revolution. For Tunisia's secular left, the Call represents an opportunity to join a party that may have real traction with ordinary Tunisians, but also signifies a capitulation for what many have worked so hard to change. Like in Egypt, the rise of two conservative parties (the Islamists and the Call) is a disappointment to those who fought for human rights and civil liberties. At the same time, in this conservative society it is hardly surprising that the debate is characterized by what kind of conservatism Tunisians will choose between
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Alexandria bucks national trends and Islamist reputation | Egypt Independent - 0 views

  • Behind Sabbahi, Abdel Moniem Abouel Fotouh, a moderate Islamist independent candidate followed with 387,497, or 22 percent, of the votes, while former foreign minister Amr Moussa won 291,000 votes in third place, followed by Mohamed Morsy, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate with 269,455. Ahmed Shafiq, former prime minister under Mubarak, who is leading the poll nationally, only won 212,275 votes in Egypt’s second largest city.
  • It was clear by now that people had lost trust and hope in both the ultraconservative Salafi Nour Party, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party
  • “Now, the split within the Salafis has been apparent these days, there are some who want to leave the political scene and go back to preaching and their religious roots, which was their main concern before,”
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Electing a New Libya - carnegieendowment.org - Readability - 0 views

  • there remain questions about the government’s capability to provide security at polling stations. It has “deputized” a number of militias in major cities as part of its security plan. And there have been some very vocal calls for an election boycott in the east by Islamist and pro-federalism leaders, as well as attacks on election offices. The government reportedly has a plan to “freeze” the voting at polling places where there is violence or disruption, which could result in a de-facto invalidation of the results
  • The postponement of a few weeks was simply a technical delay. Libya’s transitional authorities were behind schedule in registering voters and in other preparations for the election. According to the accounts of the United Nations and several NGO observers, the delay was fully justified and not nefarious in any way.
  • for most of the main parties, the experience of campaigning and articulating a party platform is completely new. For many, the metric of voter support is how many posters are produced or media ads are running on television.  
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  • the ideological spectrum even between Islamists and nationalist parties is quite narrow—the nationalists make frequent references to Islam as a basis for law and governance and the Islamists trumpet their nationalist credentials. There are cases where election posters from a major Islamist party show women candidates unveiled—an attempt to soften their image and appeal to women voters. All of this bodes well for consensus building and national unity once the parliament is formed.
  • local agendas will likely win the day
  • Libyans will be electing a 200-person parliament to replace the NTC, and the new assembly will need to choose its president and appoint a prime minister within its first month in operation. The next real order of business is to form a body to write Libya’s new constitution. A draft must be presented in 120 days and then needs to be approved in a national referendum.
  • On one level, Libya is transitioning effectively just by virtue of holding elections. On another, oil production is exceeding expectations by already surpassing pre-war levels, providing much-needed funds to help stabilize the economy and state
  • glaring shortfalls in the transition are the lack of development in the security sector and the continued activity of powerful militias
  • The government is working with what it has and treading very carefully. The government knows it must demobilize and integrate these militias, so there are a number of plans to register fighters and provide them with attractive options like starting a small business, continuing their education, or joining the police or military. Whether these plans can be implemented remains to be seen. Maintaining internal stability is going to be a long-term challenge
  • A Salafi group known as Ansar al-Sharia has established itself in Derna and Benghazi and recently sent armed men into Benghazi’s main square to demand the imposition of sharia. Its leader declared the elections un-Islamic. There have also been attacks on the American and British consulates and the International Committee for the Red Cross.
  • the problems are confined and the state is not about to implode
  • People do not want the breakup of the state, but don’t want a return to the completely centralized control associated with the Qaddafi era either
  • In parts of Libya, we are seeing the perfect storm of weak state control, traditional areas of smuggling and criminality, proliferation of arms, tribal discontent, ethnic unrest, and Islamist groups moving in to take advantage
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Yemen turns a page - 0 views

  • After the Yemeni Parliament began the year by passing new legislation allowing Saleh to run for the presidency ad infinitum, Saleh announced his three famous “No’s” a month later: no presidency forever, no running for elections again and no inherited presidency, meaning that his son, who was being groomed for succession, and who is the leader of the Republican Guard, will not succeed his father.   Saleh’s concessions failed to appease those itching for immediate change, however, and February 3 witnessed the first massive demonstrations. Taking place in more than 17 governates, the protests organized by the JMP called for political and economic reforms and a fair distribution of wealth. Up until this point, demands for Saleh to step down had not been made. The JMP called an end to the demonstrations but groups of young people remained in Sanaa’s squares demanding Saleh’s departure. These unknown youth were the catalyst of Yemen’s continuous uprisings for the next nine months. 
  • March 18, when the security forces’ snipers opened fire on protesters, killing more than 50 and injuring hundreds
  • due to an international cardiopulmonary resuscitation, especially at the hand of Saudi Arabia, eight months passed without a transition of power
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  • the humanitarian situation became catastrophic. Violence broke out in many governates, including clashes between government forces and tribal leaders in the capital and escalating violence between government forces and extremists in the Abyan governate. With the situation deteriorating drastically, the international community slowly ratcheted up pressure
  • on November 23, given one final ultimatum by the Security Council, Saleh signed the plan whereby he will remain honorary president but will delegate his powers to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi. Under the plan, the latter will work to form a new government with the opposition, with elections intended within three months
  • in Yemeni politics, signatures are much easier to put on paper than they are to abide by
  • the fall of a dictator is only the start of a revolution
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Tahrir's late night conversations - Opinion - Al Jazeera English - 2 views

  • the leaders of Tahrir want to institutionalise the incredible creativity of the revolution, from musical performances and film to artwork, poetry and story-telling. These activities have sustained protesters during the darkest days of violence and have helped to attract hundreds of thousands of "ordinary Egyptians" to the Meidan during each of the occupations since January. This would constitute a permanent counterpoint to the state media and other mechanisms that the government and elite have at their disposal, through which they try to convince Egyptians that the Tahriris are little more than "thugs" who don't have their interests at heart.
  • one of the major problems of Tahrir today (similar to the situation during the last major occupation, in July, and different from the January-February protests), is that it has clearly been infiltrated by the security services with provocateurs. Their job is to keep the Meidan constantly on edge, and in so doing, keep the pressure on, drive people away, and encourage the degradation of life in Tahrir to the point that it either dissolves on its own, or an be "cleaned out", Zuccotti Park-style.
  • "People have to learn for themselves," one explained to me this morning. "And they will. In the meantime, we will produce another proposal and figure out how more forcefully to deal with the infiltrators. I know who they are, after ten months of doing this, I can smell them." I have no doubt he can, but the real question is whether Egyptians more broadly can not merely smell, but root out, the precise infiltration of their embryonic democracy by the forces of crony capitalism and corruption that have for so long dominated the country. "Power is attractive and parliament comes with a lot of money," one long-time activist put it to me in justifying the anger at the betrayal of the principles and of the revolution's martyrs by the emerging political elite.
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  • "The only place the people really trust is Tahrir."
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The Morsi Maneuver: a first take - Blog - The Arabist - 0 views

  • Morsi has effectively, on paper, dictatorial powers. It will largely come down to how he uses them, especially as the last thing Egypt needs is a government unable to make decisions and address urgent problems simply because the parliament is not in place.
  • many will still wait for the Christian and female VPs he promised to appoint
  • I would not be surprised if public opinion backs not so much Morsi but the sense of things finally moving forward again
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Morsi's Ramadan Surprise - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - 0 views

  • The administrative courts or the Supreme Constitutional Court might indeed refuse to honor Morsi’s addendum. But unless there is strong opposition from a powerful political force (and the most likely opponent, the SCAF itself, seems to be going along with the president instead), a court taking such a move would be bold indeed.
  • The same co-governance is in place, but with the president as the more powerful actor. Indeed, by cancelling the June 2012 constitutional addendum Morsi has now legally reinserted himself as chairman of the SCAF itself
  • Morsi’s selection of a Mahmud Makki, a prominent judge, as vice president—after selecting Mahmud’s older brother Ahmad as minister of justice—may be an attempt to outmaneuver judicial opposition. The Makki brothers were both prominent members of the 2005 judicial reform movement and thus have some credibility in circles opposed to the old regime. Both were also rumored to have mild Islamist inclinations, though such rumors are hard to evaluate since judges rarely disclose their partisan feelings even when they have them. But the placement of prominent judges in such positions—and the brief floating of a suggestion that the new justice minister draft a new judicial law to be issued by presidential decree (not waiting for the new parliament)—may be a way of signaling to the judiciary that accommodation rather than a full frontal assault may be a better strategy for those anxious about the presidency and the Islamist rise. Whether a presidency at least momentarily free of strong checks on its authority will set its sights on restructuring the judiciary is not yet clear—but judges will definitely be scouring presidential statements and decisions for indications of Morsi’s intentions
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  • It seems likely that Egypt’s current constitutional assembly will continue in its task; indeed, Morsi’s actions may give it a strange kind of insurance policy. Any potential opponents to the assembly will have to think twice about questioning its legitimacy or its work, since the body’s failure would be followed by an assembly entirely appointed by Morsi. Similarly, non-Islamists currently sitting in the assembly may calculate that the existing membership—which has been working largely by discussion and consensus—is their best bet to produce a document they can tolerate.
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Event Summary : Second Annual Conference of Insight Turkey - 0 views

  • the Arab people who were for years stuck between an authoritarian regime and a possible Islamist totalitarianism, proved, with the elections undertaken in the aftermath of the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia that “a third option” was possible
  • only a system in which a constitutions prepared by publicly elected representatives and approved by the public with a referendum, could be valid.
  • the norms of international human rights were superior to the constitutions’ and in the Turkish case, a constitution could not be drafted without being subjected to restrictions. He further emphasized that the Treaty of Lausanne, European Council membership and EU membership processes offered guidelines for constitution drafting that needed to be considered.
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  • Gebril stated that in Egypt constitutions were conventionally drawn by government appointed commissions and approved by the public in a referendum. However, for this to function well today, he argued, it was crucial to inform the public. Gebril purported that Islam did not reconcile with secularism. The moderator, Huveydi, challenged Gebril’s statement and indicated that it was possible to make secularism and Islam congruent as it was the case in Turkey. Gebril argued that the principles needed to accomplish a real democracy were present in the traditions of Egypt and Islamic world.
  • underlining the weaknesses of the characteristics of representative democracy of the 1924 constitution stated that the tutelary approach of 1960s was fortified with the 1982 Constitution. The present constitution could not meet the demands of the society
  • in Egypt and what needed to be discussed today was the role of military, place of religion and especially the balance of powers.
  • since it could not be based on one group’s interests and opinions, it had to be structured in a way that would include and protect minorities in the political mechanism. Stating that secularism did not always bring democracy, it was argued that the important thing was the presence of democracy and that ways to reconcile universal values with local conditions had to be sought without resorting to reactionarism..
  • more towards strengthening the democratization process in Turkey, and he argued that this approach carried the potential to reverse the homogenous nation building process, decrease the power of tutelage regime and widen the political field. Ete concluded his analysis with two observations: 1. Turkey’s history of democracy was full of instances in which the authoritarian regime regenerated itself. 2. Decisive steps must be taken in the struggle for democracy
  • Abd Rabou specifically emphasized four different dimensions of the change in Egypt: democratization; institutionalization and formation of democratic organizations; free elections and the transformation of political culture
  • Demirel, who found the simplification of arguments to to authoritarian regime vs. democratic public problematic, argued that the authoritarian tendencies of the public also had to be heeded. Demirel argued that the advances made in civil-military relations in the recent years were not yet solidified in the political life and a regression back to military rule was still a possibility.
  • Reiterating that the retreat of the military did not necessarily signal the end of the tutelage regime, Demirel argued that it was still probable to regress into complete tutelage especially in the context of the Kurdish problem. He ended his speech by issuing a warning against the threats to civil rights and freedoms from the political powers.
  • this revolution toppled the foundations of the Sykes-Picot order. He objected the perceptions of the revolution as the new Sykes-Picot order. In other words, he opposed the idea the revolution and its aftermath were imposed on the region by external powers. He insisted the post revolution was a period in which the region decided on its own fate in accordance with the changing dynamics. In parallel to other participants, he argued this was the first time an Arab individual claimed his own destiny. He further claimed that in this process, in which the driving force is a quest for dignity, regional politics will be determined by internal dynamics and stated that the region will be changed to the extent the revolution maintains its momentum.
  • Iran and Turkey were the beneficiaries of this new order.
  • in both Turkey and Egypt an approach that perceived the making of the new constitution as an instrument to limit the power of the ruling regime instead of a process that reflected the current distribution of power in the country
  • such a constitutional culture and such a constitutional system that protects human rights by striking a balance between universal and local values will contribute to the resolution of minority problem in Egypt and identity issues in Turkey.
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Boston Review - Madawi Al-Rasheed: No Saudi Spring - 0 views

  • Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Saudi Arabia has no civil society of any significance. As a result, online calls to protest—beloved of so many “cyber-utopians”—had no place to take root.
  • The protests reflected a growing sense of disappointment with King Abdullah, who has failed to implement a single political demand from previous petitions. However, in spite of their disappointment, reformers from a wide range of political ideologies—Islamists, nationalists, leftists, and liberals—are being cautious because the future could be worse. Many intellectuals and professionals are haunted by the prospect of losing their positions when Crown Prince Nayif becomes king. Abdullah has developed a quasi-liberal constituency and cultivated its interest in the state, business, and media. Reformers nonetheless loyal to Abdullah fear that Nayif’s iron fist will come down on them: functionaries of the ancien régime to be replaced.
  • Another group, the National Coalition and Free Youth Movement, formed on Facebook and Twitter in spite of having no offline organizational presence. Their Web pages would disappear amid government censorship only to reappear at different addresses. Many pages gathered thousands of supporters, but it is difficult to claim that all were authentic. Cyber-warfare pitted activists and non-ideological young men and women against regime security, complicating the headcount.
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  • There are essentially no non-state institutions in the country. Saudi Arabia has not had trade unions since the 1950s, when the government banned them in the oil-rich province where the then-American oil company ARAMCO was based. Likewise, there are no legal political parties, youth associations, women’s organizations, or independent human rights organizations.
  • By intervening, the Saudis hoped not only to protect their Bahraini ally, but to split their internal opposition using sectarian politics. As the protests grew and the GCC deliberated, the Saudi official press peddled the regime’s line: an Iranian-Shia conspiracy was targeting the Sunni heartland. The champions of Sunni Islam would save the Gulf from the Iranian-Shia takeover. The Saudi regime proved not only to its subjects, but also to Western governments, a determination to crush protest and expel Iranian and Shia influence from the peninsula. The message to President Obama was to think twice before supporting democracy and human rights in the Arabian Peninsula. The message to Saudis was that critics would be tarred as traitors to the nation and enemies of the faith.
  • All local newspapers reported on it favorably.
  • Many in the younger generation are critical of the regime’s repressive gender policies, but they support its opposition to the Shia as alien, heretical, and loyal to Iran.
  • the “liberal press”—also officially controlled—published articles denouncing sectarianism. Liberal authors attacked sectarian preachers of hate and instead celebrated national unity, wataniyya. Not that these liberal authors favored political protest or close ties with the Shia. Rather, they offered Saudis an alternative discourse that still served the regime’s interests. With society divided between supposedly liberal intellectuals and hateful preachers, the regime confirms in the minds of people that it alone can broker between the fiercely opposed groups.
  • Protesters avoid arrest by supporting the king and demanding that bureaucrats respect his royal decrees. Anger is therefore channelled toward low-level civil servants without challenging the regime directly or insisting on royal intervention. As long as protests do not question the policies of senior members of the royal family, they are tolerated, perhaps to some extent welcomed as a means to vent public anger.
  • The press has dubbed the wave of small-scale demonstrations “protest fever.” Importantly, women are uniting in pursuit of their interests and rights, suggesting that this is the beginning of a civil rights movement. Saudi women have agitated before—in 1990 some were arrested for violating a driving ban—but the 2011 protests are different. At local and regional levels, women’s demands are more fundamental than before. They want employment, the right to vote in municipal elections, and freedom of speech.
  • When protesters agitate for the end of the regime, they are shown no mercy. As of this writing, seven demonstrators have been shot and killed by Saudi security forces. In the virtual world, government agents continue to use propaganda, counterarguments, and rumors against calls for protest.
  • should pressure start coming from the West, the Saudi regime knows how to exploit its allies’ weak spots: fear of terrorism and an insatiable appetite for oil and military contracts.
  • Digital activism will continue to provide an outlet to a population denied basic freedom. But with popular unrest largely under wraps and the West silent, the regime faces no threat in the short term.
  • The economic and social deprivation, political oppression, and corruption that triggered revolutions elsewhere are all present in Saudi Arabia, but these alone are not sufficient to precipitate an uprising. Saudi Arabia does not have trade unions—the majority of its working population is foreign, which has stunted the growth of organized labor—a women’s movement, or an active student population, three factors that helped to make protests in Tunis and Cairo successful. Elsewhere in the Arab world, in the absence of these important factors, revolt stumbled, turned violent, and could not progress without serious foreign intervention. Libya is a case in point.
  • where the state is the only institution that matters, effectively bringing people together offline may be impossible
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Egyptian protests: The view from the battleground. - By Sarah A. Topol - Slate Magazine - 0 views

  • "I'm not afraid. Millions of Egyptians are not afraid. I have a good job. I'm here for other people, the ones who aren't as lucky as me. If they kill me, I asked my brother to take my place,"
  • Nevine Immam, a mother of three, is one of the people gathering rocks. "All the past demonstrations had been peaceful. We had no weapons. Then they started with guns, horses, and camels. The last thing we had to defend ourselves with were stones," she says. Nevine is eager to throw some herself, but she thinks there won't be room for her to aim. "I will pass the rocks on, but if I find space to throw a rock, I will," she vows and smiles.
  • "It's like a utopia here. We're really organized. We have a self-sustaining city. At 6 a.m. there is a fuul cart, [fuul is a popular Egyptian dish], a kiosk selling cigarettes, people are passing out food and water, [there's] a night watch,"
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Egypt: Lessons from Iran | openDemocracy - 0 views

  • There is no doubt that Egypt cannot go back to what it was under Mubarak, but the shape of the future system is very much dependent upon the presence of the youth, women, and the working people in articulating and pushing for their democratic demands in the public sphere. A crucial lesson from Iran for the progressive secular forces - the left, liberals, feminists, artists and intellectuals - is to not sacrifice their secular democratic demands, and not to trust the army, the Islamists or the traditional elite. 
  • another lesson from Iran is that in the post-revolutionary anarchy there is always the danger that the reactionary forces use the religious beliefs of the masses to get the upper hand
  • The clerical/military oligarchy in Iran, with its intricate network of religious, repressive and economic institutions and multiple military and intelligence systems, is highly complex and also independent from any foreign power. It is a fascist-type system that still has millions on the payroll of the state and para-statal organizations, including religious foundations. It has also shown on numerous occasions that it does not hesitate to use extreme brutality against its opposition. In the long run, its fate will not be different from those of other dictatorships and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East or elsewhere, but the Iranian people unfortunately have a much more difficult fight ahead of them.
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  • The US and Israel can no longer rely on dependable and friendly Arab dictators, and will finally have to take the aspirations for genuine peace with the Palestinians seriously. The Middle East may seem to be caught between a rock and a hard place – that is, between secular dictatorships and Islamic fundamentalisms. But indeed a third alternative, a secular democratic one, does exist. We must hope that the democratic forces in all these countries will eventually be able to harness both the Islamists and the militarists.
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BBC News - A woman's place in the new Egypt - 0 views

  • Before the revolution, men didn't have their rights and would take out the injustice they felt on women. If all Egyptians have their human rights, women's rights will be achieved
  • As a result of taking part in the revolution, Egyptian women now see themselves as equal to men and have the confidence to demand their rights. We've proved that we can organise and effect change and the challenge for us and all Egyptians is to make sure extremists don't take control
  • All this means nothing, however, to 25-year-old Hemmat Ahmed, who sells vegetables on a wooden cart at the side of a busy Cairo road. "I stand here from 0600 every day to feed my children and I earn more money than my husband, who doesn't have a regular job. I left school and went to work when I was eight years old, but I'll make sure my children get an education, even if I have to beg for it." She has no faith in the political system and thinks that the new president, whoever it may be, will continue to steal the country's riches. "At least Hosni Mubarak was full from 30 years of robbery. "People will soon be back in Tahrir because nothing will change. There are no jobs, no good salaries, I can't even afford oil and sugar anymore. "All I dream of is to have a home and some new clothes for my children."
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CCFD - Terre Solidaire - G8 Deauville : des promesses généreuses pour la Tuni... - 0 views

  • La Déclaration du G8 sur le « Partenariat de Deauville » affirme, certes, son soutien aux « aspirations des citoyens [arabes] pour l'égalité » mais elle maintient, en lien avec le FMI, le cadre libéral qui a pourtant déjà coûté cher aux populations des ces pays.
  • Land Center For Human Rights, partenaire  égyptien du CCFD-Terre Solidaire,
  • les pays du G8, s'ils veulent aider la révolution tunisienne, commencent  par aider ses enfants, qui au péril de leur vie ont immigré vers l'Italie et la France. Ils doivent leur accorder urgemment des papiers, ce qui permettra aux 100 000 membres des familles de ces migrants tunisiens de bénéficier de revenus nouveaux »,
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  • les contours des aides promises aujourd'hui demeurent très flous, mais il est certain que ces aident engloberont  une large part d'investissements directs étrangers
  • Un nombre important de multinationales présentes dans les pays arabes ou en Afrique ne payent pas leurs impôts, et hypothèquent ainsi les chances, pour les gouvernements de ces pays, de disposer des moyens nécessaires à la mise en place des  politiques publiques (santé, éducation, infrastructures..
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Tunisia's brutal regime may be down, but it has shown it is not out « Tribune... - 0 views

  • Regueb, with 7,000 inhabitants, is one of the most fully mobilised places.
  • epresentatives of the inhabitants of Regueb attended a meeting in the provincial governorate of Sidi Bouzid calling for a regional hospital for the town; a local covered market square for the fruits and vegetables produced in Regueb; and the removal from power of all the groups of people connected to the regime of Ben Ali.
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