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Gomaa's fatwas were consistent with historical Sunni views that regard revolution with scepticism, if not outright terror, at the prospect of public disorder. The mufti's stance of neutrality, meanwhile, alienated significant segments of the Egyptian population who expected him to take a much stronger stance against the unlawful conduct of the regime and its security forces

The various responses by religious leaders to the events of the Arab Spring suggest three distinct issues facing the role of religion and politics (particularly, the possibility of a more democratic politics) in the Arab World. First, the lack of institutional independence from strong regimes continues to undermine scholars' legitimacy. It is hard to believe, for example, that Qaradawi's stance regarding Bahrain was not influenced by the Gulf Cooperation Council's anti-Iran policies. This failure to be consistent, meanwhile, undermines his status as a moral voice in these times of uncertainty. Second, among traditional scholars, there remains a profound failure to understand the nature of the modern state and how it differs from the personal rule that characterized pre-modern states. Third, traditionalist scholars continue to view politics as something exogenous to the religious life, as if it were something that can safely be ignored without doing any damage to one's life as a Muslim.

the desire by virtually all political parties to use the religious establishment to further their political programs contradicts the desire to have an independent religious establishment that could be faithful to its own mission

To the extent that traditional scholars still cling to a conception of political rule that identifies legitimacy in the personal attributes of the ruler, they anachronistically promote the idea that good politics is the function of the virtuous ruler, rather than the modern notion that virtuous rule is the product of the right institutions.

the Arab Spring rejected the notion that one can live a virtuous private life untouched by an unjust and corrupt political sphere

If one accepts the proposition that the character of a regime profoundly affects everything produced within its domain, then it is no surprise that the authoritarianism of the last 50 years in the Arab World produced sterile and decadent religious as well as secular thought

Mouldi Fehem, a member of the PDP, one of the parties present at the event, disagreed with the representatives of the coalition, stating that it was normal for parties who share similar views to gather and express their opinions, especially now with the “advent of religious extremism.” “We are all here because we want to protect people’s freedoms and rights,” he said. When asked about attendees who shared close ties with the RCD, he replied, “We should not let our desire for revenge take control over us; we should first see who really was accountable for the crimes committed by the former regime.”

The transitional justice system is not working well, and unless something is done the previous clan will take over again.

there are no established voting patterns to base predictions

On one side of the battle will be the military, state institutions including the courts that are still controlled by Mubarak-era personnel, the business community, other people who thrived under the old regime, and ordinary Egyptians who want order restored. On the other side will be the Muslim Brothers, most Islamists, and the Egyptians who rose up in January 2011 and do not want to see the regime they thought they had defeated make a comeback.

The Supreme Constitutional Court (whose president, not incidentally, is also the head of the presidential election commission) will soon rule whether the election law used in the parliamentary election was constitutional. If it decides it was not, it is possible the court will disband the parliament, depriving the Muslim Brotherhood of the only center of power it, rather than the old regime, controls

Should Ahmed Shafiq win the presidential vote and the court finds the parliament was unconstitutionally elected, Islamists will have lost the battle with the old regime

In the short run, these are the battles that will determine the winners, and the old regime appears to be better armed, controlling the institutions and the security forces. In the long run, the outcome is much less predictable because the majority of Egyptians have rejected both the Islamist candidate and the one from the old regime

Intellectuellement, idéologiquement et conjoncturellement, je me situe et me positionne à l’antipode des thèses, des projets et des «normes» islamistes que je considère à la fois archaïques, dangereuses, porteuses de graves risques sociaux, économiques et politiques.

Ceux qui ont manifesté ce 9 août 2012 à Sidi Bouzid en criant «Thawretna thawrat zawali, lé Sebsi we lé Jbali (Notre révolution est une révolution des pauvres, ni Essebsi ni Jebali), m’ont semblé demander autre chose: en finir avec la pauvreté, l’exclusion et la misère. En finir avec le chômage, le mal développement, le manque d’accès aux ressources (l’eau en particulier)

Incontestablement, Caïd Essebsi s’est donné la mission de «sauver» le pays contre le risque islamiste

Laïc convaincu, ancien compagnon de Bourguiba et défenseur de la modernité telle qu’elle est conçue en Occident mais avec une forte dose de conservatisme social, Caïd Essebsi n’est de toute évidence pas moins légitime que l’un ou l’autre. Une large partie des Tunisiens partagent, à quelques nuances près, ses convictions.

Je garde aussi les mêmes distances politiques, intellectuelles et idéologiques vis-à-vis des libéraux et du libéralisme économique comme une idéologie qui nourrit les processus d’appauvrissement et d’exclusion qu’on connaît en Tunisie et partout dans le monde libéral et dont les victimes se comptent par millions.

Mais reconnaissons que du 6 janvier 2008 à la veille du 14 janvier 2011, rares parmi celles et ceux qui se présentent aujourd’hui comme des leaders politiques, développent leurs propres stratégies pour accéder au pouvoir ou du moins en profiter directement ou indirectement et proposent initiatives et projets, peuvent se targuer d’une quelconque participation au long processus de la révolution.

Pas moins que l’islamiste Ghannouchi ou le populiste Marzouki, Caïd Essebsi s’inscrit pleinement dans le libéralisme économique dominant et ne voit le développement qu’en termes de taux de croissance économique et de balances commerciales. Modernisations techniques, investissements, tourisme, exportations, taux de croissances, agrobusiness,… sont ses créneaux et ses indicateurs. Les hommes et les femmes d’affaires, la grande bourgeoisie et le haut de la classe moyenne, les grandes fortunes et la finance sont ses amis. Ce sont ses amis, qu’il avait mobilisés pendant sa période de Premier ministre de la transition. Ce sont les mêmes qui l’entourent et le financent aujourd’hui. Et ce sont les mêmes qui seront demain aux commandes du pays si, par aventure, il gagnait son pari et accédait au pouvoir, en battant les islamistes. L’histoire et l’itinéraire politiques de l’homme le prouvent.

rien de différent par rapport aux lignes générales suivies pendant les deux présidences de Bourguiba et de Ben Ali

favoriser l’investissement privé, accélérer la libéralisation des marchés et la privatisation du secteur publique, le «retrait» de l’Etat et l’abandon de ses obligations économiques et surtout sociales et environnementales, l’accélération de l’intégration du pays dans les processus globaux de mondialisation économique, l’obéissance reconnaissante aux institutions financières mondiales et aux multinationales, l’aggravation de l’endettement du pays

ces choix économiques et sociaux n’ont fait qu’aggraver la misère d’une large partie de la population et creuser davantage l’écart, devenu de plus en plus vertigineux, entre les plus riches qui ont continué à accumuler les richesses et les pauvres et les exclus qui ont continué à s’enfoncer dans la misère et de se voir déposséder de leurs ressources, perdant à la fois les moyens de la simple survie et la dignité humaine

Caïd Essebsi au pouvoir ne sera pas notre prochain dictateur. Mais la dictature de la finance n’en sera que plus renforcée et encouragée

l’exploitation minière des ressources continuera comme avant, voire pire, les pauvres et les marginalisés de ce pays, qui ont été à l’origine de notre révolution, ne verront pas leurs situations sociales et économiques changer, comme par miracle ou magie, et les générations futures risquent de ne rien hériter des grandes ressources naturelles de ce beaux pays. Nous laisserons un désert…

une lutte féroce pour le pouvoir entre les islamistes (libéraux-religieux) et les modernistes (libéraux-laïques). Ces deux forces occupent la scène et ne laissent pas beaucoup d’espace aux autres forces politiques organisées

Géographe tunisien, chercheur enseignant. Universités Paris 8 et Paris 10 (France), Université Américaine du Caire

Seen in isolation, elections cannot provide Egyptians with the much-needed transformation they went out for in January 2011. Luckily, elections seem to be happening in parallel with other forms of political participation, including continued strikes, protests, public-campaigns, and the rise of community and workplace organizations. The challenge for Egypt's transformation now is to build bridges between emerging institutional politics as expressed in elections, and the extra-institutional politics of the street and the workplace.

I personally await his solution for the frequent breakdown of the sewage system of asking the citizens to hold it in as long as possible.

The people of the Mirage State of Egypt have just stopped being that, and started to become actual citizens. Hopefully the rest of the state will follow suit.

The Muslim Brotherhood has made inroads into some ministries (not for the first time: in the 1960s, some members had been allowed, as individuals, ministerial positions). It should be of little surprise that these include the ministries of housing and education - institutions whose role is to provide services, something in which the Brotherhood has some experience.

the beginning of a shake-up of the manner in which politics have been codified for the past 60 years, with myriad actors trying to adapt to this change - and salvage what they can from the old power structure at the same time

blame falls first and foremost to the military's handling of the post-Mubarak period, the greed and other failings of his Muslim Brothers and other political parties, and the inability of revolutionaries to turn their symbolic capital into a political vision. The present situation is also a reminder of how "sticky" bad old habits of governance in Egypt are, and the extent to which the question of why the country was so badly run for so many years extended far beyond the dull rule of Hosni Mubarak.

a Brother now heads the information ministry, a costly behemoth whose reform is one of the biggest headaches of post-Mubarak Egypt. That the media is on a warpath against the Brotherhood has been a refrain of its members; perhaps they hope to better control it. But the loyalties of Egypt's state media are divided; its multiple organs now have different masters. And, for the printed press in particular, the new minister will have to face the politically influential Journalists' Syndicate

There will not be a political Islamist in control of either endowments or state mosques

In a sense we've now seen a return of real politics, unmediated by the micromanagement of security officials