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Kurz: The United States and Israel—at Israel's initiative—have already developed a plan to gradually eliminate U.S. economic aid to Israel. There is an understanding that Israel's economy is doing better, its debt repayments (the justification for economic aid in the first place) are going down. If Israel had had its debt forgiven, as Egypt did, after the Gulf war, it wouldn't need economic aid at all. But that couldn't happen because of technical budgetary reasons; so instead of forgiving the debt, the United States is essentially giving Israel the money it needs to pay back its American loans. That will end in seven years. On the military side, it's anybody's guess. If the conflict ends tomorrow, if there is a real peace treaty with Syria, if Iran becomes a moderate force in the region, if Iraq no longer is a threat to Israel, if Israel is finally accepted as a permanent, legitimate state in the Middle East, then Israel will not need to spend huge sums of money for her defense and will no longer need U.S. help in doing so.

We give aid to Israel to maintain its security in a very tough region and a very important part of the world in order to advance critical U.S. interests. If that aid were reduced to a point that Israel couldn't buy the equipment it needs to defend itself and maintain the peace, that would be dangerous to us.

I do, but just as Israel's economy is doing much better, the military threats against her are much greater. Look at what's happening in the region: the nuclear threat, the missile threat, where they are coming from, the distances involved from rogue regimes like Iran and Iraq.

However, the confrontation between Russia and Georgia still remains a big issue. The diplomatic ties between the two countries have not been restored. As a matter of fact, Russia and Georgia still remain in a state of war with each other. Georgia strongly refuses to conduct any talks with S. Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia are two breakaway republics in the Caucasus with disputed status over whether they are a part of Georgia or sovereign states.[1] The Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia were recognised following the 2008 South Ossetia War between Russia and Georgia

South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia during the 1991–1992 South Ossetia War on 29 May 1992, with its Constitution referring to the "Republic of South Ossetia".[6][7][8] Abkhazia declared its independence after its war with Georgia in 1992–1993. Its Constitution was adopted on 26 November 1994.[9][10

Kosovo's declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 and its divided international acceptance prompted speculation that there could be implications for the frozen South Caucasus situation.

The Justice Policy Institute argues that locking up drug offenders is an ineffective and inefficient way to address drug abuse

With 2,310,984 people being held in local, state, and federal prisons in 2008, the “number of people in prison is nearly 5 times what it was 30 years ago, despite crime rates being at historic lows

drug possession is the sole reason 83% of those arrested for drug offenses are charged with a crime and thrown into prison.

Mr. Obama declared that the prevailing borders before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war — adjusted to some degree to account for Israeli settlements in the West Bank — should be the basis of a deal. While the 1967 borders have long been viewed as the foundation for a peace agreement, Mr. Obama’s formula of land swaps to compensate for disputed territory created a new benchmark for a diplomatic solution.

the country’s 1967 borders are not militarily defensible. But his use of this argum

Israel needs peace with the Palestinians, and that will likely require a return to the 1967 lines with a few adjustments. These borders can be made defensible if they come with a security package consisting of a joint Israeli-Palestinian security force along the West Bank’s border with Jordan, a demilitarized Palestinian state and a three-way Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian defense treaty. Combined with such a package, the balanced formula President Obama outlined in his May 19 speech can give Israel the security it needs and deserves.

A peace agreement, he said, must assure Israel's security: "Israel cannot return to the indefensible 1967 borders," he declared, rekindling the dispute with Obama in a possible effort to placate territorial hardliners in his government.

Obama and Netanyahu, meanwhile, appear to have reached an impasse after two and a half years of rocky relations. The Obama White House was angered when Netanyahu refused a U.S. demand to halt building Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

The brewing crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations dimmed even further the prospect for resuming peace talks that collapsed late last year when Palestinians walked away in a dispute over Israeli settlement building in the West Bank.

The Democratic president has quickly come under fire from Republican critics, who accuse him of betraying Israel, the closest U.S. ally in the region. Pushing Netanyahu could alienate U.S. supporters of Israel as Obama seeks re-election.

] is a real benefit to the United States and Israel. We give aid to Israel to maintain its security in a very tough region and a very important part of the world in order to advance critical U.S. interests. If that aid were reduced to a point that Israel couldn't buy the equipment it needs to defend itself and maintain the peace, that would be dangerous to us."

"As Israel is continually attacked by ongoing Palestinian terrorist assaults, aid to Israel is more important than ever. Foreign aid presents many benefits to Israel’s safety and security and to Middle East stability.

Finally, in the context of a discussion over classic conventional war, there is one further consequence to consider from a full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines: after such a withdrawal the chances of war would actually increase, as Israel's ability to deter war would be eroded. A post-withdrawal Israel would offer a very tempting target, since it would be a narrow country with no strategic depth whose main population centers and strategic infrastructure would be within tactical range of forces deployed along the commanding heights of the West Bank. Whoever believes that war is impossible does not have to take this consideration into account; but all who think that it is possible, even if unlikely right now, must then understand that by returning to the 1967 lines, Israel increases the chances that such a scenario of renewed hostilities may actually materialize.

"I'm ready to make painful compromises"

Hamas is not a partner for peace," Netanyahu said to one of 26 standing ovations. Hamas' charter calls for the destruction of Israel, the killing of Jews around the globe - and its leader recently bemoaned the killing of Osama bin Laden.

Last Friday at the White House, Netanyahu scolded Obama on how unrealistic it was for the administration to push 1967 borders as a starting point for negotiations with Palestinians.

the Chechen refugees in Georgia began to disappear, which naturally alerted the Chechen Diaspora as well as refugees from Chechnya, which by then was already a sizeable group

unanimous support for Georgia’s actions and were convinced that Georgia’s actions were provoked by Russia (Kavkazky Uzel, August 7). Moreover, the Georgians noticed that Chechens from the Vostok battalion were the ones who saved many Georgian civilians from revenge attacks by Ossetians and Russians

At the time the Russian leadership’s position on South Ossetia was probably not clear to Kadyrov. When he understood what Russia’s interest was he made a new statement offering to send 10,000 Chechen fighters (Vesti.ru, August 12). Furthermore, by then he knew that his implacable foe, Sulim Yamadaev, the Vostok battalion’s commander, was among the Russian troops in South Ossetia.

A second argument is that Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” declared their independence after a mass ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Georgians, and other ethnicities had artificially changed the demographic composition of the two regions. Russia’s military presence in those territories both before and after the war as well as the absence of proper international peace mechanisms have prevented the majority Georgian population from returning home. While in Kosovo the very purpose of the international mission was to help the Kosovar Albanians to return safely, hundreds of thousands of Georgians have not been allowed to go back to Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. Thus, unlike Kosovo, the de-facto authorities in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali do not represent the majority of the lawful residents in those territories but are merely puppet regimes whose declarations have no legitimacy. Recognizing the independence of the occupied territories would just legitimize the use of ethnic cleansing as a device to change international borders.The ethnic cleansing of Georgians has been officially recognized by the UN General Assembly, by the OSCE in 1994, 1996 and 1999 during its Budapest, Lisbon and Istanbul summits, and by several individual states. Paragraph 17 of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Document states: “We reiterate our strong condemnation as formulated in the Budapest and Lisbon Summit Documents of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ resulting in mass destruction and expulsion of predominantly Georgian population in Abkhazia, Georgia.”