Mr. Obama declared that the prevailing borders before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war — adjusted to some degree to account for Israeli settlements in the West Bank — should be the basis of a deal. While the 1967 borders have long been viewed as the foundation for a peace agreement, Mr. Obama’s formula of land swaps to compensate for disputed territory created a new benchmark for a diplomatic solution.

The economy would have collapsed in 1973 due to the balance of payments problem following the Yom Kippur War. Today it is still important to shoulder the economy from external shocks such as the Persian Gulf War and the massive flow of Russian immigrants to Israel in the past few years. If the aid were reduced or eliminated, a sharp reduction in government spending would be required. Sussman adds: "The $1.5 billion in emergency aid allocated to Israel in the mid-1980s was responsible for helping to stabilize the Israeli economy and stifle hyperinflation."6

In fact, American defense and aerospace firms reap substantial benefits from U.S. aid to Israel, for it guarantees them a $1.35 billion captive market each year. Out of $1.8 billion in grants, then, Israel receives about $450 million in cash that can be converted into Israeli currency and used either to purchase Israeli-made military products or develop weapons (such as the Arrow anti-missile system). Steven L. Spiegel, a professor at the University of California in Los Angeles, points out that Israel performs invaluable services by testing and developing weapon systems for the United States, improving American-made equipment, and providing crucial intelligence information.11 Moreover, Spiegel argues that Israel's use of American-made arms not only saves the United States money but earns it more: For example, after Israel's much advertised successes with U.S. weaponry in the 1969-70 War of Attrition and the 1982 war in Lebanon, U.S. arms sales worldwide in 1972-82 nearly tripled, from about $6.8 to $19.6 billion in constant 1982 dollars.12 And while of course it does not wish for wars to occur, the United States gains valuable information by seeing its arms perform against those of Israel's enemies, lessons that "cannot be purchased, developed, or simulated."13

Obama and Netanyahu, meanwhile, appear to have reached an impasse after two and a half years of rocky relations. The Obama White House was angered when Netanyahu refused a U.S. demand to halt building Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

The brewing crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations dimmed even further the prospect for resuming peace talks that collapsed late last year when Palestinians walked away in a dispute over Israeli settlement building in the West Bank.

The Democratic president has quickly come under fire from Republican critics, who accuse him of betraying Israel, the closest U.S. ally in the region. Pushing Netanyahu could alienate U.S. supporters of Israel as Obama seeks re-election.

To avert that nightmare scenario, Russia did not hesitate to use brute force to smash the Chechen independence movement. Yet the subsequent decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia might present Russia with uneasy contradictions in foreign policy.

Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia can place military bases on each other’s territories,” Lavrov said.

the Russian military contingent will consist of 3800 people in each republic.

Now, a list of 39 countries that recognize the republic is posted on the president’s website. Neither Nicaragua nor Russia is on the list. They are the only countries to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

the Chechen refugees in Georgia began to disappear, which naturally alerted the Chechen Diaspora as well as refugees from Chechnya, which by then was already a sizeable group

unanimous support for Georgia’s actions and were convinced that Georgia’s actions were provoked by Russia (Kavkazky Uzel, August 7). Moreover, the Georgians noticed that Chechens from the Vostok battalion were the ones who saved many Georgian civilians from revenge attacks by Ossetians and Russians

At the time the Russian leadership’s position on South Ossetia was probably not clear to Kadyrov. When he understood what Russia’s interest was he made a new statement offering to send 10,000 Chechen fighters (Vesti.ru, August 12). Furthermore, by then he knew that his implacable foe, Sulim Yamadaev, the Vostok battalion’s commander, was among the Russian troops in South Ossetia.

Western leaders have condemned Russia's decision, which has sparked fears of a new Cold War. U.S. President George W. Bush said in a statement on Tuesday: "Russia's action only exacerbates tensions and complicates diplomatic negotiations."

The former province of Georgia will be absorbed into Russia, declared Trazan Kokoity, deputy speaker of South Ossetia's parliament in Tskhivali, only three days after Russia recognized the Georgian breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to be independent states,

Eduard Kokoity, South Ossetia's leader, said during talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that it would become part of Russia within "several years,"