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Abkhazia and South Ossetia are two breakaway republics in the Caucasus with disputed status over whether they are a part of Georgia or sovereign states.[1] The Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia were recognised following the 2008 South Ossetia War between Russia and Georgia

South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia during the 1991–1992 South Ossetia War on 29 May 1992, with its Constitution referring to the "Republic of South Ossetia".[6][7][8] Abkhazia declared its independence after its war with Georgia in 1992–1993. Its Constitution was adopted on 26 November 1994.[9][10

Kosovo's declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 and its divided international acceptance prompted speculation that there could be implications for the frozen South Caucasus situation.

WITH a flourish, Russia this week recognised the “independ

ence” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the enclaves that gave it a casus belli for its war on Georgia

The Russians saw it as a logical outcome of their victory, a further stage in their confrontation with the West—and a copy of what happened in Kosovo. As Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, argued, “you cannot have one rule for some and another rule for others.”

Of course, one can argue that the territorial integrity of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova has already been recognized by many international organizations and by the majority of states in the world. The UN Security Council, notably, adopted many resolutions affirming the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and Azerbaijan.47 That is why one could conclude that this standpoint reflects already the position of the international community, according to which the secession of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh has not been recognized (apart from Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru in Abkhazia’s and S. Ossetia’s case).

The Court did not state in the Opinion that Kosovo through its declaration of independence effectively seceded from Serbia and thus the new state of “Kosovo” emerged. As it did not call into question the validity of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which legitimizes the presence of international territorial administration in Kosovo, one can conclude that this resolution is still in force until a new resolution is adopted by the Council. In fact, according to this resolution, Kosovo shall only be given substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia). Hence it can be stated that, from a legal point of view, Kosovo still can be seen as part of Serbia.

Under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, Kosovo was granted the status of an autonomous province with virtually the same rights and responsibilities as the six Yugoslav republics, granting Kosovo an implied right of secession. Kosovo's autonomy included its own identity, territory, international-relations powers, and representation in all organs of the Yugoslav Federation. As a result, Serbian actions to deprive Kosovo of its autonomy, beginning in 1989, were clearly inconsistent with the existing Yugoslav Constitution and law and with accepted international practice.South Ossetia had no such right under the Soviet Union. According to Article 72 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution only the 15 republics possessed the right to secede from the union. Georgia emerged from the Soviet Union as an internationally recognized, independent state, and South Ossetia was considered part of its territory.

A second argument is that Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” declared their independence after a mass ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Georgians, and other ethnicities had artificially changed the demographic composition of the two regions. Russia’s military presence in those territories both before and after the war as well as the absence of proper international peace mechanisms have prevented the majority Georgian population from returning home. While in Kosovo the very purpose of the international mission was to help the Kosovar Albanians to return safely, hundreds of thousands of Georgians have not been allowed to go back to Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. Thus, unlike Kosovo, the de-facto authorities in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali do not represent the majority of the lawful residents in those territories but are merely puppet regimes whose declarations have no legitimacy. Recognizing the independence of the occupied territories would just legitimize the use of ethnic cleansing as a device to change international borders.The ethnic cleansing of Georgians has been officially recognized by the UN General Assembly, by the OSCE in 1994, 1996 and 1999 during its Budapest, Lisbon and Istanbul summits, and by several individual states. Paragraph 17 of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Document states: “We reiterate our strong condemnation as formulated in the Budapest and Lisbon Summit Documents of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ resulting in mass destruction and expulsion of predominantly Georgian population in Abkhazia, Georgia.”

The current situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia bears no resemblance or moral equivalence to Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008.

The near-universal support for Kosovar independence stands in sharp contrast to the unilateralism exercised by Moscow over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Kosovo's independence was gained through the U.N. process with prior consultation and widespread unity.

When the majority of the European Union and the United States recognized Kosovo's independence, they acknowledged that such independence was the result of tough, tragic, violent, and unique circumstances.

dence.

.' 'It has been India's consistent position that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries should be fully respected by all states,' the Indian government had said. According to officials, India is concerned that the Kosovo matter could set a 'dangerous precedent' for other cases around the world. India also grapples with internal secessionist issues in certain provinces. So

the country’s 1967 borders are not militarily defensible. But his use of this argum

Israel needs peace with the Palestinians, and that will likely require a return to the 1967 lines with a few adjustments. These borders can be made defensible if they come with a security package consisting of a joint Israeli-Palestinian security force along the West Bank’s border with Jordan, a demilitarized Palestinian state and a three-way Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian defense treaty. Combined with such a package, the balanced formula President Obama outlined in his May 19 speech can give Israel the security it needs and deserves.

Perhaps one would need to consider the scenario of a surprise attack against Israel, such as the 1973 war, but fought within the 1967 borders.

However, the confrontation between Russia and Georgia still remains a big issue. The diplomatic ties between the two countries have not been restored. As a matter of fact, Russia and Georgia still remain in a state of war with each other. Georgia strongly refuses to conduct any talks with S. Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Meanwhile, ignoring Russia’s warnings, western countries rushed to recognise Kosovo’s illegal declaration of independence from Serbia. We argued consistently that it would be impossible, after that, to tell the Abkhazians and Ossetians (and dozens of other groups around the world) that what was good for the Kosovo Albanians was not good for them. In international relations, you cannot have one rule for some and another rule for others.