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The basic story on automation, trade and jobs is fairly straightforward. "Automation" is also known as "productivity growth," and it is not new. We have been seeing gains in productivity in manufacturing ever since we started manufacturing things. Productivity gains mean that we can produce more output with the same amount of work. Before the trade deficit exploded in the last decade, increases in productivity were largely offset by increases in output, making it so the total jobs in manufacturing did not change much.

The extraordinary plunge in manufacturing jobs in the years 2000 to 2007 was due to the explosion of the trade deficit, which peaked at just under 6 percent of GDP ($1.2 trillion in today's economy) in 2005 and 2006. This was first and foremost due to the growth of imports from China during these years, although we ran large trade deficits with other countries as well.

An emphasis on debt could be politically promising -- particularly as it helps people understand the trap of capitalism, the way the system feeds off them, the way it relies on debt at multiple levels and establishes terms of credit and debit for the benefit of the capitalist class. A politics of debt seems especially posed to reach a middle class that compensated for its declining income with credit (that said, household indebtedness has declined since the beginning of the great recession even as part of that decline can be attributed to mortgage defaults). 

there seem to be some challenges or potential drawbacks to a political strategy based on debt:

It is difficult to overcome the individual dimension of debt: the individual quality of debt (credit card, mortgage, student loan) presents a collective action problem.

But Piketty advances such an argument without breaking completely with the architecture of neoclassical economics. His theory thus suffers from the same kind of internal incoherence and incompleteness as that of Keynes, whose break with neoclassical economics was also partial. Deeply concerned with issues of inequality, just as Keynes was with unemployment, Piketty demonstrates the empirical inapplicability over the course of capitalist development of the main conclusions of neoclassical marginal productivity theory. His work has thus served to highlight the near-complete unraveling of orthodox economics—even while staying analytically within the fold.28

This overall incoherence, as we shall see, ultimately overwhelms Piketty’s argument. He is unable to explain why capitalist economies tend to grow so slowly as to generate such a divergence between wealth and income (and between capital and labor). Hence, while his analysis sees slow growth or relative stagnation as endemic to this system, he neither explains this nor is concerned directly with it. Significantly, he replaces more traditional notions of capital as a social and physical phenomenon with one that equates it with all wealth.29

Nor does he address the relations of power—principally class power—that lie behind the inequality that he delineates. His analysis is confined largely to distribution rather than production. He neither follows nor (by his own admission) understands Marx, though at times clearly draws inspiration from him.31

As those spread, what began as protests over insecurity were overshadowed by cryptic calls for La Salida—The Exit—spearheaded by radical sectors of the opposition that have long been involved in efforts to oust the government, constitutionally or otherwise. In response, the government of Nicolás Maduro, whose leadership after edging a narrow victory last April remains unsteady amid worsening social and economic conditions, responded aggressively against what it saw as an attempt at destabilization at a time of fragility in the heart of the Bolivarian Revolution. 

a weak government confronting major social and economic crises that even officials and supporters acknowledge. Fifty six percent inflation, worsening shortages, a sinking currency, and insecurity rates that are by all accounts severe—even if the precise figures are a matter of debate—have plagued Nicolás Maduro’s fledging administration. Accounts of course vary on their depth and causes. Opponents blame mismanagement, corruption, and too great an emphasis on social spending over investments in the productive apparatus. Government officials point to speculation, hoarding, and currency manipulation—part of a broader program of economic warfare by saboteurs at home and abroad. Analysts have instead drawn attention to the distortions of a mixed socialist and capitalist economy where, despite strategic expropriations and increased social spending by the state, most industry and business remains in private sector hands.

But it would be a mistake to see the latest unrest as another blip in a now-longstanding pattern of tense stalemate punctuated by periods of violent upheaval. Instead, two intersecting elements should raise alarms about Venezuela’s near-term political future.    The first is a weak government confronting major social and economic crises that even officials and supporters acknowledge. Fifty six percent inflation, worsening shortages, a sinking currency, and insecurity rates that are by all accounts severe—even if the precise figures are a matter of debate—have plagued Nicolás Maduro’s fledging administration. Accounts of course vary on their depth and causes. Opponents blame mismanagement, corruption, and too great an emphasis on social spending over investments in the productive apparatus. Government officials point to speculation, hoarding, and currency manipulation—part of a broader program of economic warfare by saboteurs at home and abroad. Analysts have instead drawn attention to the distortions of a mixed socialist and capitalist economy where, despite strategic expropriations and increased social spending by the state, most industry and business remains in private sector hands.

Globalization and technology are routinely cited as drivers of inequality over the last four decades. While the relative importance of these causes is disputed, both are often viewed as natural and inevitable products of the working of the economy, rather than as the outcomes of deliberate policy. In fact, both the course of globalization and the distribution of rewards from technological innovation are very much the result of policy. Insofar as they have led to greater inequality, this has been the result of conscious policy choices.

As it stands, almost nothing has been done to remove the protectionist barriers that allow highly-educated professionals in the United States to earn far more than their counterparts in other wealthy countries.

doctors in the United States earn an average of more than $250,000 a year, more than twice as much as their counterparts in other wealthy countries.

If its effects are at best debatable and at worst laying the ground for the next round of financial crises, why has there been so much QE? It is because it has been the only weapon that the rich country governments have been willing to deploy in order to generate an economic recovery.

QE has become the weapon of choice by these governments because it is the only way in which recovery – however slow and anaemic – could be generated without changing the economic model that has served the rich and powerful so well in the past three decades.

This model is propelled by a continuous generation of asset bubbles, fuelled by complex and opaque financial instruments created by highly leveraged banks and other financial institutions. It is a system in which short-term financial profits take precedence over long-term investments in productive capabilities, and over the quality of life of employees. If the rich countries had tried to generate recovery through any other means than QE, they would have to seriously challenge this model.

This event raises several political questions for progressives: what type of ‘bank’ do the BRICS leaders propose; why is it needed; are these the appropriate leaders to organise and control the new institution; and is it something progressives should view favourably?

An international ‘development’ bank is a non-profit, cross-country, public sector institution that makes loans to governments for long-term projects, either directly productive ones (e.g., a hydro-electric dam) or supportive of productive activities (e.g., roads and highways).  A development bank's sine qua non lies in offering loans at more favourable terms than private banks.

For example, in place of a requirement that US$ 200 million to Zambia be used to build a hydro-electric damn, conditions would require the government to privatize public enterprises, savagely cut government employment, and drastically slash public spending.

The first is that, beyond a point export-driven growth has a way of running into internally generated constraints.  Second, that among the factors that can undermine a country’s growth prospects, even at relatively higher income levels, is excessive liberalisation, especially financial liberalisation. Possibly most countries, whether poor, rich or in some ‘middle income’ range, find their growth has stalled for reasons such as these.

The IMF’s latest regional outlook on Asia for example suggests that these economies need to pay attention to “institutions” and infrastructure and exploit the “ample room for easing stringent regulations in product and, in some cases, labor markets.” Institutional strength is seen as reflected in higher political stability, better bureaucratic capability, fewer conflicts and less corruption. Whether weakness in this are is the result of underdevelopment or a cause of it is open to discussion.

Consider what is happening in the most dynamic countries of developing Asia, where the increase in bank lending has been most evident since 2008. It turns out that a large part of the expansion in domestic credit has actually been directed to households, for consumption purposes. And the businesses that have gained from that (such as construction and real estate as well as some consumer durables) are the ones that have been disproportionately getting bank loans for their own productive activity.

The result has been an explosion in heavily leveraged consumption as well as in residential real estate activity,. And the impact has been most strongly felt in the housing market. So house prices increased rapidly between 2007 and 2011 – by around 70 per cent in China and Hong Kong China, and by 30-50 per cent in Taiwan China and Malaysia. Even economies where wage incomes barely increased, like South Korea, witnessed big increases in house prices.

There have been even larger increases in household debt than corporate debt in most of Asia – for automobiles, for student debt, for credit cards purchases, for other consumption based on EMIs.

Without a currency that could appreciate against those of her trading partners, German productivity increased and its technical excellence produced a declining real cost of exports, while in its European trading partners, deprived of currencies that could depreciate, stable purchasing power and easy credit produced a corresponding increase in demand for German goods.

Stiglitz concedes that austerity may eventually work, but he argues that even if it does, the cost is too high. Better to allow countries to declare bankruptcy and start over, just as individuals and firms can do in a domestic economy. Varoufakis and Galbraith dismiss austerity as flatly self-defeating, because low growth simply ends up increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio.

Germany has emerged almost unscathed—at least so far. Berlin has preserved the existing euro system, which advantages it as an international creditor, an exporter of high-quality goods, and a country that suppresses wage increases. It has enjoyed lower interest rates and higher growth than the rest of Europe, which has depressed the real cost of its exports, resulting in a trade surplus larger in absolute terms than China’s.

Since the mid-1970s, once the first post-war capitalist phase ended (with the collapse of the New Deal-inspired Bretton Woods system), those relying on wage income to live have fallen off the escalator. Most of the gains from technology, productivity, globalisation, have gone to the top 1% and none to the bottom 80%. People can put up with poverty, but not with humiliation – not with having their noses rubbed in their poverty by people in yachts, golf clubs and Mercedes Benzes, telling them that their poverty is self-inflicted.

The last bastion of the historic reforms of 1945, the National Health Service, has been so subverted by Tory and Labour-supported privateers it is fighting for its life.

A forewarning came when the Treasurer, George Osborne, the embodiment of both Britain’s ancient regime and the banking mafia in Europe, threatened to cut £30 billion from public services if people voted the wrong way; it was blackmail on a shocking scale.

The most effective propagandists of the “European ideal” have not been the far right, but an insufferably patrician class for whom metropolitan London is the United Kingdom. Its leading members see themselves as liberal, enlightened, cultivated tribunes of the 21st century zeitgeist, even “cool”. What they really are is a bourgeoisie with insatiable consumerist tastes and ancient instincts of their own superiority. In their house paper, the Guardian, they have gloated, day after day, at those who would even consider the EU profoundly undemocratic, a source of social injustice and a virulent extremism known as “neoliberalism”.

Now it seems Morsy and his new cabinet, in consultation with the IMF team, are modifying the Ganzouri’s program, according to Finance Minister Momtaz Saeed who served in both cabinets and helped draw up the original plan. Morsy’s economic advisor Abdullah Shehata has dismissed this claim, suggesting the Ganzouri proposal is not a baseline for present deliberations. But there is yet no evidence the government has produced an alternative that is genuinely different. In the absence of an elected parliament that can put the reform program up for public debate, the government may imagine it will be easier to push the reforms through.

If the government’s concern is to improve Egyptians’ productive livelihoods and their ability to meet basic needs then none of the official reform proposals so far pass muster. The loan is really about boosting investor confidence and attracting foreign capital, a top priority for the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party.

The public consciousness is, at last, aware of the issues of financial regulation, wealth distribution and the means of production. But questions relating to religion regularly push these into the background (1).

Nikos Filis, editor of Avgi, a newspaper with, as main shareholder, the radical left coalition Syriza (2), came to a different conclusion: “The attack may orientate Europe’s future: either towards Le Pen and the far right, or towards a more reasoned approach to the problem. Because security needs cannot be met by the police alone.”

“If Syriza had been less intransigent on standing for the rights of immigrants, we would already have 50% of the votes. But this choice is one of the few points on which we all agree.”

The first of many clashes between Alexis Tsipras and the status-quo powers concerns not debt restructuring and structural reforms but EU-Russian relations. A statement published on the January 27, 2015, claimed all twenty-eight leaders of the EU agreed that Russia bears responsibility for the rocket attack on Mariupol. The attack killed thirty people.

In this context, Alexis Tsipras’ expression of “discontent” at not having been consulted may have been justified. “The aforementioned statement was released without the prescribed procedure to obtain consent by the member states and particularly without ensuring the consent of Greece” the Greek government noted. “It is underlined that Greece does not consent to this statement”. Whether the oversight was intentional or a mix-up resulting from the transition of power in Greece remains unclear. That the new government of Greece will exert pressure in order to realign EU policies towards Russia should not however be in doubt.

What is more, EU pressure contributed to the failure in the privatisation process of one of Greece’s state-owned energy companies to a Russian-backed consortium. Subsequent criticism to the effect that Greece is not privatising assets at sufficient speed have sounded hollow as a result. EU sanctions on Russia are thus directly affecting some of the few dynamic segments of the Greek economy and have contributed, albeit indirectly, to SYRIZA’s victory in these elections.

Developing countries are also fighting to be permitted by WTO rules to invest in their own agricultural production and strengthen domestic food security programs that are currently permitted for rich but not developing countries, not even for Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

it seems that developed countries never intended to deliver on those development and agricultural reform promises, and have spent the last 14 years of the Doha Round sidelining development issues and instead working to expand the WTO’s neoliberal dictates on services, goods, agriculture and other issues. At the same time, they have taken their corporate wish lists to other forums, concluding the TPP and negotiating the TTIP, TiSA, ITA and EGA mentioned above.

This effort, which is the main fight in Nairobi, is even more pernicious because their goal is two-fold: abandon the development mandate, and then open up space to introduce all the new corporate issues they have been negotiating in the TPP, TTIP and other deals into the WTO, including investment, government procurement, disciplining state owned enterprises, and others. Many of these issues are not permitted to be on the agenda in the WTO while Doha is still being negotiated.

Whole sections of the 'west' are in recession or near zero growth. This was not caused by some kind of mass activity by working people. It wasn't caused by governments in one or several countries spending too much. What has caused the recession in the first instance is that the financial sector ran up huge debts, far, far in excess of public debts and deficits, as it went in for some wild speculative behaviour - a good deal of which involved them selling debts to each other!

So, the speculative bubble which burst in 2010, was in essence an attempt by financial capitalists to find more and more profitable opportunities. In the anarchic lunacy which is called 'good business', more and more of them borrowed money to buy debts which they thought would be profitable for them.

What has happened this time round in the boom bust cycle is that the capitalists have a huge great brake on the system: their own debts. However, as you know, the big lie - no The Big Lie - that has been put about for the last two years is that the big brake is government debts, ie the money and the interest payments that are paid out for our benefit on education, health, welfare - and, though I don't agree with it - defence, because theoretically it's there to defend us.