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While the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and others adhere to a rigid “neoliberal” ideology that favors deregulation, privatization, and the interests of the global North and the private sector over the poor, UNCTAD has a rich history of favoring people-centered development, promoting interests of the global South, and being a voice of the poor majority in international forums.

It is despicable that in a conference focused on trade and development, rich countries successfully prevented UNCTAD from calling for changes to the WTO, to allow more flexibility for development in poor countries. They even successfully blocked a call for a resolution to trade-distorting subsidies in agriculture that damage developing countries every day.

The EU and US even opposed inclusion of “Special and Differential Treatment” — the simple historical recognition of the fact that rich and poor countries have different economic capacities and need different rules to promote prosperity — although this was finally included.

Developing countries are also fighting to be permitted by WTO rules to invest in their own agricultural production and strengthen domestic food security programs that are currently permitted for rich but not developing countries, not even for Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

it seems that developed countries never intended to deliver on those development and agricultural reform promises, and have spent the last 14 years of the Doha Round sidelining development issues and instead working to expand the WTO’s neoliberal dictates on services, goods, agriculture and other issues. At the same time, they have taken their corporate wish lists to other forums, concluding the TPP and negotiating the TTIP, TiSA, ITA and EGA mentioned above.

This effort, which is the main fight in Nairobi, is even more pernicious because their goal is two-fold: abandon the development mandate, and then open up space to introduce all the new corporate issues they have been negotiating in the TPP, TTIP and other deals into the WTO, including investment, government procurement, disciplining state owned enterprises, and others. Many of these issues are not permitted to be on the agenda in the WTO while Doha is still being negotiated.

The HKMD reads: "We agree to ensure the parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect to be completed by the end of 2013. This will be achieved in a progressive and parallel manner, to be specified in the modalities, so that a substantial part is realized by the end of the first half of the implementation period. We note emerging convergence on some elements of disciplines with respect to export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes with repayment periods of 180 days and below. We agree that such programmes should be self-financing, reflecting market consistency, and that the period should be of a sufficiently short duration so as not to effectively circumvent real commercially- oriented discipline."

In sharp contrast to the joint proposal, the US maintained that the deadline for phasing out export subsidies must remain the same for both industrialized and developing countries. Under Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture, the developing countries are provided a longer duration as part of special and differential treatment flexibility. But the US wants to deny that flexibility and by suggesting the same time period for everyone, the US is disregarding the existing WTO provisions and the ministerial mandates, developing country agriculture negotiators maintained.

In a nutshell, the developed countries have resorted to an unprecedented form of cherry-picking to suit their interests by altering the existing ministerial decisions and mandates underpinning the four elements in the export competition pillar. But the same developed countries along with some developing country allies have launched a war-like effort to deny minimal credible developmental outcomes such as the permanent solution for public stockholding programs for food security and the special safeguard mechanism for developing countries, trade envoys argued.

This event raises several political questions for progressives: what type of ‘bank’ do the BRICS leaders propose; why is it needed; are these the appropriate leaders to organise and control the new institution; and is it something progressives should view favourably?

An international ‘development’ bank is a non-profit, cross-country, public sector institution that makes loans to governments for long-term projects, either directly productive ones (e.g., a hydro-electric dam) or supportive of productive activities (e.g., roads and highways).  A development bank's sine qua non lies in offering loans at more favourable terms than private banks.

For example, in place of a requirement that US$ 200 million to Zambia be used to build a hydro-electric damn, conditions would require the government to privatize public enterprises, savagely cut government employment, and drastically slash public spending.

For some, Brexit has called into question the purpose of the EU and for some white liberals it has sparked concern over the possibility that it marks the end of internationalism.

The 1993 formalizing of the EU was for Africa no different than the 1884 Berlin Conference where Europe united to regulate and cooperate in its Scramble for Africa during heightened colonial activity by European powers. This predecessor union of Europe eliminated or overrode most existing forms of African autonomy and self-governance. Today in Africa the EU plays the role of enforcing neo-colonialism through its Africa Working Party (COAFR) and so-called Africa-EU Strategic Partnership that ensure neo-liberal economic policies dominate Africa. We can be sure that when the partnership claims to cooperate on issues like governance and human rights it is not talking about how European countries are governed or human rights abuses in those countries. It is based on the paternalistic premise that Africa is inherently savage and contemporarily corrupt and naturally prone to abusing human rights.

elieving Brexit could represent the beginning of the end for international cooperation, as some have put it, is to believe that the world does or should revolve around Europe. The late Pan-Africanist Kwame Ture (aka Stokely Carmichael) pointed out that those whose thinking is dominated by Euro-centrism and white supremacy often mistakenly “make the particular history of Europe the general history of the world.”

During the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, when middle-income countries were hard hit by big capital outflows, there was an effort by China, Japan, Taiwan and other countries to put together an Asian Monetary Fund to offer balance of payments support. Washington vetoed the idea, insisting that all assistance had to go through the International Monetary Fund. The result was a mess, including an unnecessarily deep regional recession, as the IMF failed to act as a lender of last resort and then attached all kinds of harmful and unnecessary conditions to its lending.

Western media coverage of these developments has been mostly dismissive, but that primarily reflects the concerns of Washington and its allies. They have had unchallenged sway over the decision-making institutions of global financial governance for 70 years, and the last thing they want to see is competition. But competition is exactly what the world needs here.

Just look at Ukraine, where the economy is shrinking by 5 percent this year and the IMF is imposing austerity that will prolong and possibly deepen the recession.

In fact, in a private meeting between U.S. civil society and Robert Gerber, the Deputy Head of the U.S. delegation, he told us that he thought that analyzing “the global economic crisis” itself was outside of UNCTAD’s mandate, which was to focus on trade and development. I’m not sure how to make an argument that these things are not related, but I guess when you’re the United States at the United Nations, you don’t have to have a logical argument.

He also said the language in the text that was most important to the United States was on UNCTAD’s efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability; we’re looking forward to seeing the U.S. push hard for similar issues regarding the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and U.S. aid in Haiti, among other places.

the non-EU bloc of developed countries) was asked directly at one point during the negotiations why he did not want this language included, the representative responded gruffly, “we don’t want any competition in intellectual thinking!”

Since the mid-1970s, once the first post-war capitalist phase ended (with the collapse of the New Deal-inspired Bretton Woods system), those relying on wage income to live have fallen off the escalator. Most of the gains from technology, productivity, globalisation, have gone to the top 1% and none to the bottom 80%. People can put up with poverty, but not with humiliation – not with having their noses rubbed in their poverty by people in yachts, golf clubs and Mercedes Benzes, telling them that their poverty is self-inflicted.

But Piketty advances such an argument without breaking completely with the architecture of neoclassical economics. His theory thus suffers from the same kind of internal incoherence and incompleteness as that of Keynes, whose break with neoclassical economics was also partial. Deeply concerned with issues of inequality, just as Keynes was with unemployment, Piketty demonstrates the empirical inapplicability over the course of capitalist development of the main conclusions of neoclassical marginal productivity theory. His work has thus served to highlight the near-complete unraveling of orthodox economics—even while staying analytically within the fold.28

This overall incoherence, as we shall see, ultimately overwhelms Piketty’s argument. He is unable to explain why capitalist economies tend to grow so slowly as to generate such a divergence between wealth and income (and between capital and labor). Hence, while his analysis sees slow growth or relative stagnation as endemic to this system, he neither explains this nor is concerned directly with it. Significantly, he replaces more traditional notions of capital as a social and physical phenomenon with one that equates it with all wealth.29

Nor does he address the relations of power—principally class power—that lie behind the inequality that he delineates. His analysis is confined largely to distribution rather than production. He neither follows nor (by his own admission) understands Marx, though at times clearly draws inspiration from him.31