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allieggg

http://mgt.guc.edu.eg/wpapers/005mohamed_hamdy2008.pdf - 2 views

  • Jordanian survey, 87% of the respondents wanted to eradicate wasta.
  • Cunnigham and Sarayrah (1994) suggest that the modern oil boom in the Arab world may have perpetuated wasta by reducing the need for hard work.
  • human resource departments in the Arab world depend heavily on subjective assessment tools such as unstructured interviews.
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  • most Arab economies suffer from very high levels of unemployment. Good jobs are scarce. This motivates applicants to use every mean possible to improve their chances of being hired.
  • For example, sons of police and military officers are given preference in admission to the Egyptian police academy or military college, respectively.
  • study conducted by Whiteoak, Crawford and Mapstone (2006) showed the young UAE citizens believed that wasta is more useful than do their older citizens. This finding may imply that wasta is strengthening rather than diminishing in Arab societies. Commenting on the spread of wasta in Egypt, a senior bank official told one of the authors that up to 25% of his staff were hired only because of their wasta.
  • many top governmental positions are reserved for members of the ruling families or members of their supporting tribes
  • First, to maintain their grip on authority, Arab political regimes tend to place close confidants in key positions even if they are not the most qualified for such positions.
  • In Syria, the key argument made in favor of selecting Basher Al Asad as the country’s president was that he was the son of the late president Hafez Al Asad.
  • study conducted by Kilani and Sakija in Jordan showed that 90% of the respondents believed that they would use wasta in the future.
  • In the Quran, Muslims are instructed that “the best that you can hire employee is one who is competent and trustworthy” (Quran, 28, 26). Prophet Mohamed is also reported to have said “He who is in a leadership position and appoints knowingly a person who is not qualified to manage, than he violates the command of God and His messenger”. He also stated “when a person assumes an authority over people and promotes one of them because of personal preferences, God will curse him for ever”.
  • Rising to high levels requires important connections. Receiving important privileges or benefits is contingent upon using the right connections.
  • Intercessory wasta on the other hand, involves someone intervening on behalf of a client to obtain an advantage or 2overcome a barrier from an authority figure. It is this type of wasta that affects hiring decisions.
  • Those who are supported by strong others will not be put down or rejected. Only the unconnected or unsupported are punished.
  • people who are related to important others (especially in government) are fortunate as they will have their demands or needs fulfilled. People serve those that are related to important people.
  • People tend to serve those that they know. Without knowing anybody, you will have difficulty getting the service you want.
  • The turban symbolizes a senior respected person. If you know a senior person, your demands will be meet. Similar to the second proverb
  • Intermediary wasta is utilized to facilitate the resolution of intergroup or interpersonal conflicts. In this system, wasta improves human relations and reinforces social norms.
  • Intermediary wasta is utilized to facilitate the resolution of intergroup or interpersonal conflicts. In this system, wasta improves human relations and reinforces social norms. Intercessory wasta on the other hand, involves someone intervening on behalf of a client to obtain an advantage or 2overcome a barrier from an authority figure. It is this type of wasta that affects hiring decisions.
  • feed feelings of injustice and frustration among those who are qualified for the job but do not have a wasta. Wasta is also different from the more popular nepotism and cronyism. While nepotism involves hiring of relatives and friends, wasta is not restricted to such groups and may involve strangers
  • may lead to poor job performance and economic decline.
  • Indeed, wasta is blamed for Arab world’s poor economic performance and brain drain (Al Maeena, 2003; Cunnigham & Sarayrah, 1994). Kilani and Sakijha (2002) stress that wasta is becoming a burden on its seeker, its granter and the government.
  • Arab wasta has been compared to the Chinese concept of guanxi. Both wasta and guanxi use social networks to influence the distribution of advantages and resources. However, while guanxi is based on Confucian ethics which focus on strengthening collective ties (Hutchings & Weir, 2006a; Hutchings & Weir, 2006b); wasta violates Muslim ethics which prescribe hiring the most qualified.
  • Wasta plays a critical role in hiring and promotion decisions in Arab organizations. Before applying to a position, applicants may seek out a wasta to improve their chances of being hired. A person with poor qualifications but a strong wasta will be favored over a person who is more qualified but does not have a wasta. Because many people may apply with wasta, the applicant with the most important wasta often gets the position.
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    Compiled by faculty members at the German University in Cairo, this working paper series addresses the effect that watsa has on competence and morality in Middle Eastern economics and society. The authors define watsa as, "the intervention of a patron in favor of a client to obtain benefits and/or resources from a third party." In simpler terms it is a system of social networking in Arab culture in which family and social ties play a significant role in the attainment of economic advantages and resources, largely in the hiring process in businesses and organizations. A person applying for a job seeks out watsa to increase their chances of getting hired. Comparable to nepotism and cronyism, but is not restricted to friends and associates, watsa can also involve strangers linked through some social web of people. Watsa runs somewhat parallel to a Chinese concept of guanxi, based on Confucian ethics and focusing on strong collective ties. While guanxi is a part of Chinese ethics it actually defies Muslim ethical values, which advocates hiring the person most capable. In a Jordanian survey, 87% of respondents want watsa eradicated. While we know that unemployment in the Arab region is widespread, we can assume that this motivates people to do anything they can to improve their chances of obtaining a job. However, the practice of watsa as a whole is actually degrading the economic systems in the Arab sates even further. The article explains the linkage between watsa and poor job performance, economic decline, and the festering of injustice and frustration among the masses in Arab countries.
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    This looks super interesting, but I can't get the link to open. Thanks for writing a thorough summary of it!
allieggg

Arab states offer to help attack Isis, diplomats say | World news | theguardian.com - 0 views

  • Several Arab states, believed to include the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have offered to help attack Islamic State (Isis) targets in Syria and Iraq,
  • US officials declined to say which countries had offered help, but one appeared to be the UAE, whose aircraft recently bombed Islamist militia targets in Libya from bases in Egypt.
  • Saudi Arabia felt so threatened by Isis that it was prepared to act in a frontline role. "There is a very real possibility that we could have the Saudi air force bombing targets inside Syria. That is a remarkable development, and something the US would be very pleased to see."
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  • direct threat to Saudi Arabia. "They actually see themselves as the real target.
  • France has indicated that it will back US air strikes against Isis after its president,
  • expressed support for the Iraqi prime minister, Haider al-Abadi,
  • But Turkey, which borders on both Iraq and Syria, has quietly made clear that it would not take part or allow its bases to be used for combat operations – a disappointment coming from Nato's only Muslim membe
  • Syrian ministers have repeated calls for Damascus to join the coalition, though the US and Britain – backed by their Gulf allies – have insisted president Bashar al-Assad cannot take part because he has "lost all legitimacy" in the course of a war that has cost 200,000 lives
  • Details of how the anti-Isis campaign will be waged are still sketchy, though the US reportedly discussed basing and overflight rights at talks in Jeddah last week with the Saudis and the other Gulf states as well as Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. All expressed support for a "coordinated military campaign".
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    Arab states have began to jump on board offering support to the coalition against ISIS. UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon have recently voiced their support. Turkey, the only Arab member of NATO has voiced their lack of support in the coalition thus far. Saudi, the home to major religious cities, feels like a direct threat to ISIS and have made it clear that they will be playing a major role in the war against the Islamic State. UAE allegedly initiated bombings from Egyptian bases on Libya due to islamic militia takeovers of major cities and institutions. Arab states along with France, Germany, and Britain have agreed to form a "coordinated military campaign." Bringing in Assad from Syria is somewhat crucial, but the coalition is hesitant due to the loss of the Assad Regime's legitimacy over the past years of civil strife. Official plans of attack are still sketchy, but are definitely in the works. The coalition of states have made it clear that in order to tackle this ISIS threat, they must band together to dynamically exterminate the Islamic State from all angles.
allieggg

Wasta, Work and Corruption in Transnational Business | CONNECTED in CAIRO - 0 views

  • Girgis worked for a company that insisted as part of their global corporate culture that there be no “corruption.” Six years after opening its office in Egypt, they continued to be plagued by behaviors they understood to be “corrupt.”
  • I explained that wasta referred to a network of informal loans and favors traded by Arab men in order to move up in the world.
  • Encouraged by my open, neutral tone, Girgis opened up further. “My father mortgaged family lands to pay for my college,” Girgis said. “I owe him everything. If he asks me to find a job for his brother’s son, how can I say no?”
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  • families are economic units.
  • “You can send me anywhere else in the world and I’ll run the office by the book,” Girgis told his supervisor. “But I can’t do that here.”
  • any Egyptian man they hired to run the office would be equally suspended in webs of wasta obligations
  • “investment and return” frame I created for understanding, emphasizing the economic parallels between Arab families and running a business
  • , I’ve known several Egyptian businessmen who thought wasta was an improvement on Western models of hiring.
  • Net result: greater loyalty, less likelihood of theft, less likelihood of negotiating for new jobs behind your back and leaving you in the lurch, etc, he claimed.
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    This article is from the point of view of an anthropologist who was brought in as a cultural consultant to mediate an issue of "watsa" for a corporation in the Middle East. The company prides itself on its lack of internal corruption, and in turn hired a man named Girgis who grew up in the Middle East but lived and received an education in the US. In Girgis's first year he hired one of his cousins, which the supervisors saw as corrupt hiring practice. The author, and hired consultant, explained to the company supervisors that watsa was an "investment and return" framework in Arab culture, and that there are economic parallels between Arab families and businesses, families existing as economic units. Girgis conveyed that anywhere else in the world he would run the office by the book, but in the Arab world he must also adhere to social norms. The result of watsa through Arab eyes leads to greater loyalty, and less likelihood for deception and theft. The article basically introduces the idea that while in the Western world this may be seen as corruption, it is an embedded part of culture in the Middle East. 
wmulnea

Libya's civil war: That it should come to this | The Economist - 3 views

  • It is split between a government in Beida, in the east of the country, which is aligned with the military; and another in Tripoli, in the west, which is dominated by Islamists and militias from western coastal cities
  • Benghazi is again a battlefield.
  • The black plumes of burning oil terminals stretch out over the Mediterranean.
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  • Libya looked like the latest fragile blossoming of the Arab spring
  • Army commanders, mostly of Arab Bedouin origin, refused orders to shoot the protesters
  • the revolutionaries cobbled together a National Transitional Council (NTC) claiming to represent all of Libya
  • Volunteers from students to bank managers took up arms, joining popular militias and only sometimes obeying the orders of defecting army commanders trying to take control
  • In August Western bombing of government bases surrounding Tripoli cleared an avenue for the revolutionaries to take the capital.
  • Recognised abroad, popular at home and enjoying the benefits of healthy oil revenues—97% of the government’s income—the NTC was well placed to lay the foundations for a new Libya
  • he judges, academics and lawyers who filled its ranks worried about their own legitimacy and feared confrontation with the militias which, in toppling Qaddafi, had taken his arsenals for their own.
  • militia leaders were already ensconced in the capital’s prime properties
  • The NTC presided over Libya’s first democratic elections in July 2012, and the smooth subsequent handover of power to the General National Congress (GNC) revived popular support for the revolution.
  • Islamist parties won only 19 of 80 seats assigned to parties in the new legislature, and the process left the militias on the outside
  • The Homeland party, founded by Abdel Hakim Belhad
  • tried to advertise its moderation by putting an unveiled woman at the head of its party list in Benghazi
  • The incumbent prime minister, Abdurrahim al-Keib, a university professor who had spent decades in exile, fretted and dithered
  • He bowed to militia demands for their leaders to be appointed to senior ministries, and failed to revive public-works programmes
  • which might have given militiamen jobs
  • Many received handouts without being required to hand in weapons or disband, an incentive which served to swell their ranks
  • the number of revolutionaries registered with the Warriors Affairs Commission set up by the NTC was about 60,000; a year later there were over 200,000. Of some 500 registered militias, almost half came from one city, Misrata.
  • In May 2013 the militias forced parliament to pass a law barring from office anyone who had held a senior position in Qaddafi’s regime after laying siege to government ministries.
  • In the spring of 2014, Khalifa Haftar, a retired general who had earlier returned from two decades of exile in America, forcibly tried to dissolve the GNC and re-establish himself as the armed forces’ commander-in-chief in an operation he called Dignity
  • The elections which followed were a far cry from the happy experience of 2012. In some parts of the country it was too dangerous to go out and vote
  • Such retrenchment has been particularly noticeable among women. In 2011 they created a flurry of new civil associations; now many are back indoors.
  • Turnout in the June 2014 elections was 18%, down from 60% in 2012, and the Islamists fared even worse than before
  • Dismissing the results, an alliance of Islamist, Misratan and Berber militias called Libya Dawn launched a six-week assault on Tripoli. The newly elected parliament decamped to Tobruk, some 1,300km east
  • Grasping for a figleaf of legitimacy, Libya Dawn reconstituted the pre-election GNC and appointed a new government
  • So today Libya is split between two parliaments—both boycotted by their own oppositions and inquorate—two governments, and two central-bank governors.
  • The army—which has two chiefs of staff—is largely split along ethnic lines, with Arab soldiers in Arab tribes rallying around Dignity and the far fewer Misratan and Berber ones around Libya Dawn.
  • Libya Dawn controls the bulk of the territory and probably has more fighters at its disposal.
  • General Haftar’s Dignity, which has based its government in Beida, has air power and, probably, better weaponry
  • the Dignity movement proclaims itself America’s natural ally in the war on terror and the scourge of jihadist Islam
  • Libya Dawn’s commanders present themselves as standard-bearers of the revolution against Qaddafi now continuing the struggle against his former officers
  • Ministers in the east vow to liberate Tripoli from its “occupation” by Islamists, all of whom they denounce as terrorists
  • threatens to take the war to Egypt if Mr Sisi continues to arm the east. Sleeping cells could strike, he warns, drawn from the 2m tribesmen of Libyan origin in Egypt.
  • Yusuf Dawar
  • The struggle over the Gulf of Sirte area, which holds Libya’s main oil terminals and most of its oil reserves, threatens to devastate the country’s primary asset
  • And in the Sahara, where the largest oilfields are, both sides have enlisted ethnic minorities as proxies
  • ibya Dawn has drafted in the brown-skinned Tuareg, southern cousins of the Berbers; Dignity has recruited the black-skinned Toubou. As a result a fresh brawl is brewing in the Saharan oasis of Ubari, which sits at the gates of the al-Sharara oilfield, largest of them all.
  • Oil production has fallen and become much more volatile
  • oil is worth half as much as it was a year ago
  • The Central Bank is now spending at three times the rate that it is taking in oil money
  • The bank is committed to neutrality, but is based in Tripoli
  • Tripoli may have a little more access to cash, but is in bad shape in other ways
  • Fuel supplies and electricity are petering out
  • Crime is rising; carjacking street gangs post their ransom demands on Twitter
  • In Fashloum
  • residents briefly erected barricades to keep out a brigade of Islamists, the Nuwassi
  • “No to Islamists and the al-Qaeda gang” reads the roadside graffiti
  • Libya’s ungoverned spaces are growing,
  • Each month 10,000 migrants set sail for Europe
  • On January 3rd, IS claimed to have extended its reach to Libya’s Sahara too, killing a dozen soldiers at a checkpoint
  • The conflict is as likely to spread as to burn itself out.
  • the Western powers
  • have since been conspicuous by their absence. Chastened by failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, they have watched from the sidelines
  • Obama washed his hands of Libya after Islamists killed his ambassador
  • Italy, the former colonial power, is the last country to have a functioning embassy in Tripoli.
  • Even under Qaddafi the country did not feel so cut off
  • Dignity is supported not just by Mr Sisi but also by the United Arab Emirates, which has sent its own fighter jets into the fray as well as providing arms
  • The UAE’s Gulf rival, Qatar, and Turkey have backed the Islamists and Misratans in the west
  • If oil revenues were to be put into an escrow account, overseas assets frozen and the arms embargo honoured he thinks it might be possible to deprive fighters of the finance that keeps them fighting and force them to the table
  • Until 1963 Libya was governed as three federal provinces—Cyrenaica in the east, Fezzan in the south and Tripolitania in the west
  • The old divisions still matter
  • the marginalised Cyrenaicans harked back to the time when their king split his time between the courts of Tobruk and Beida and when Arabs from the Bedouin tribes of the Green Mountains ran his army
  • Tensions between those tribes and Islamist militias ran high from the start.
  • July 2011 jihadists keen to settle scores with officers who had crushed their revolt in the late 1990s killed the NTC’s commander-in-chief, Abdel Fattah Younis, who came from a powerful Arab tribe in the Green Mountains. In June 2013 the Transitional Council of Barqa (the Arab name for Cyrenaica), a body primarily comprised of Arab tribes, declared the east a separate federal region, and soon after allied tribal militias around the Gulf of Sirte took control of the oilfields.
  • In the west, indigenous Berbers, who make up about a tenth of the population, formed a council of their own and called on larger Berber communities in the Maghreb and Europe for support
  • Port cities started to claim self-government and set up their own border controls.
  • Derna—a small port in the east famed for having sent more jihadists per person to fight in Iraq than anywhere else in the world
  • opposed NATO intervention and insisted that the NTC was a pagan (wadani) not national (watani) council
  • Some in Derna have now declared their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq.
  • In December the head of America’s Africa command told reporters that IS was training some 200 fighters in the town.
katelynklug

We Were Born From the Womb of the Revolution - 0 views

  • 25 January 2011
  • energy of a struggle
  • thanks to the youths
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  • feelings of social injustice
  • biased toward the rich
  • millions of Egyptians live in slums
  • mansions and resorts
  • collapse of educational and public health services
  • stealing of pension
  • reduction of all social safety nets
  • unemployment
  • risk death
  • fleeing an inhuman life
  • culture and art were turned into commodities
  • transferring power to a temporary, civil government
  • ignite sectarian strife
  • isolate Christians from political action
  • Tahrir Square
  • inspiring example
  • face of Fighting Egypt
  • forces of the Egyptian Left
  • equal
  • socialism
  • will to change
  • met with the powers of the Egyptian Left
  • distortion of consciousness and existence
  • We insist upon the realization of all the demands related to democracy and political reform
  • “Popular Alliance” party is born from the womb of the revolution
  • revoking Emergency Law
  • releasing all prisoners
  • new constitution
  • separation of powers
  • social change
  • human rights
  • plan for growth
  • rights to food, shelter, education, work, fair wages, and health care must be guaranteed
  • Minimum and maximum wage
  • Progressive taxes
  • subordination to Zionism
  • must be opposed
  • resistance to normalization with Israel
  • supporting instead the Arab people
  • Palestinian people’s struggle to achieve their freedom and establish a state
  • civil state
  • oppose all forms of discrimination
  • separation of religion from politics
  • opposed to capitalist exploitation
  • supports the interest of the poor
  • open, democratic party
  • diversity of platforms
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    This article describes the position and demands of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party of Egypt. The relationship of the youth protesters with the Egyptian Left was solidified when the Left provided the youth with the political power to make their revolution successful. The Socialist Popular Alliance demands a new constitution and a new government structure that is based on democracy, human rights, and freedoms. Their political position and ideal social structure are very similar to typical American ideals, especially those of the American left political parties. However, the Public Alliance seems very angered over Mubarak's previous friendly relations with Israel. This population feels as though they were forced to abandon the Arab people and support Israel instead of Palestine. This is interesting because Egypt's relations with Israel has garnered tremendous political and economic support from the United States. Having an Arab ally has been an advantageous point of negotiation for Israel and the US. With the Popular Alliance in severe opposition to this position of Israeli sympathy, it is a surprise that they seem to embrace "Americanized" ideas. In addition, it is worth noting that the youth finds a great identity with the Arab culture, although not so much with a specific religion.
ajonesn

Egypt- Worst country for women in all 22 Arab Nations - 0 views

  • Egypt 'worst for women' out of 22 countries in Arab world
  • There are whole villages on the outskirts of Cairo and elsewhere where the bulk of economic activity is based on trafficking in women and forced marriages
  • high rates of female genital mutilation and a growth in conservative Islamist groups contributed to the low ranking.
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  • Iraq ranked second-worst after Egypt, followed by Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.
  • Egypt is now the worst country for women's rights in the Arab world, according to a poll of gender experts
  • sexual harassment was cited as the main factor.
  • A UN report in April said 99.3% of women and girls in Egypt had been subjected to sexual harassment.
  • Iraq was now more dangerous for women than under Saddam Hussein, with women disproportionately affected by the violence of the past decade.
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    A study found that 99.3% of women were subjected to sexual harassment in Egypt. Forced marriages and human trafficking were also stated to highly affect the women.
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    Egypt is said to be one of the worst places for women. Women experience everyday harassment including sexual harassment.
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    Egypt is now the worst country for women's rights in the Arab world, according to a poll of experts on gender issues in 22 Arab states.
csherro2

Tunisia Arab Spring - 0 views

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    Read More: Video, Tunisia, Tunisia Elections, Tunisia Revolution, Tunisia Arab Spring, Tunisia Ennahda, Ennahda, Ennahda Party, Tunisia Ben Ali, Beji Caid Essebssi, Beji Caid Essebsi, Beji Caïd Essebsi, Moncef Marzouki, Arab Spring, Obama Arab Spring, John Kerry, World News
mcooka

The kingdom is king | The Economist - 0 views

  • But Saudi Arabia is gaining an unlikely reputation for learning in the Middle East. Earlier this year it gained three of the top four spots in an annual ranking of Arab universities by Times Higher Education (THE), a British weekly magazine. Topping the chart was King Abdulaziz University in the western city of Jeddah, which was founded only in 1967.
  • The kingdom rarely pulls things off as well as, let alone better than, its more savvy fellow Gulf states.
  • ut by world standards, Arab universities do not offer students a very good deal. King Abdulaziz only just made it into the global top 300. Teaching in the Arab world tends to emphasise rote learning rather than developing analytical skills.
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  • who are assigned to subjects according not to their own choice, but to their school grades. Medicine, engineering and political science require high results. Low-scorers are concentrated in arts, business and education courses.
  • The very wealthy send their sons and daughters abroad. Many never come back, contributing to a brain drain in the Arab world.
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    In Egypt there is a university which has been promoted as the ebst school in the Middle East. Except, it is very limited. It does not offer a reason to develop analytical skills, so often their students do poorly in the job world. in Egypt students are assigned a major and classes based off of their grades, they do not get to pursue what they want. 
allieggg

The U.S. Is Giving Up on Middle East Democracy-and That's a Mistake - The Atlantic - 0 views

  • democracy assistance to the region, which will drop from $459.2 million to $298.3 million
  • Today’s Middle East is a product, at least in part, of failed democratization, and one of the reasons it failed was the timid, half-hearted support of the Obama administration.
  • the significant impact Western leverage and “linkage” can have on democratic transitions.
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  • “it was an externally driven shift in the cost of suppression, not changes in domestic conditions, that contributed most centrally to the demise of authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s.” They find that “states’ vulnerability to Western democratization pressure… was often decisive.”
  • it is also worth noting that President Bush acknowledged the existence of a “tyranny-terror” link—the notion that the root causes of extremism and terrorism can be found in the region’s enduring lack of democracy.
  • the administration’s approach to the region is characterized almost entirely by ad-hoc crisis management and traditional counterterrorism approaches. Its one larger-scale reform initiative—a half-hearted proposal for a
  • We argue that the U.S. and its partners now need to consider a very different approach to Middle East democracy assistance.
  • Conventional democracy promotion activities tend to focus on the process and “retail” aspects of democratic politics—things like elections, political party training, get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns, and civil society enhancement. While these are undoubtedly important, they are insufficient to deliver lasting reforms. Authoritarianism in the Arab world has proven time and time again—even in supposedly post-revolutionary settings such as Egypt today—that it can weather the annoyances of elections and civil society.
  • What is needed are more systematic reforms focused on fundamental institutions. These include things like constraining the military’s role in civilian domains of governance, deep reform in the security and justice sectors including law enforcement and policing, and comprehensive “renovation” of the civil service sector. These are large-scale, long-term, and expensive undertakings that far transcend the modest parameters of most U.S. democracy promotion programs.
  • we make the case for a new Multilateral Endowment for Reform (MER) that would tie significant levels of financial assistance—in the billions of dollars—to reform commitments and benchmarked implementation performance by partner nations.
  • provide a real incentive for countries to embark down a path to deeper and more enduring political reforms while retaining the ability to pull back funding if they do not deliver.
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    This article begins by illuminating the regional democracy assistance cuts that are dropping from $459.2 million to $298.3 million It explains that the Bush Administration began the quest for democracy in the Middle East, and the Obama administration has only continued in his footsteps. The author presents the viewpoint that the U.S. approach to Arab democratization has been in the form of "ad-hoc crisis management" rather than "large scale reform initiatives." Promoting democracy in the form of democratic politics are insufficient, elections and political parties have consistently proved to weather away and fester further civil strife. Consequently, the article proposes a new approach to the region conflict. This approach calls for "systematic reforms" focusing on basic institutions such as the civil service sector, justice and law enforcement, and the military's role in governance. The idea is that addressing these lacking departments in the arab world will eventually pave the way to a smoother democratic transition. 
allieggg

Islamists Aren't the Obstacle | Foreign Affairs - 0 views

  • A minority of the population -- 26 percent of Tunisians and 28 percent of Egyptians -- believes that Islam should play a large role in government.
  • Both secularists and Islamists associate democracy with economic prosperity
  • Islamist parties received considerable support in both countries' recent elections -- not only because there is a broad ideological affinity for Islamism among the population but also because of Islamist parties' effective campaigning.
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  • When asked about the most important feature of a democracy, 69 percent of Egyptians and 32 percent of Tunisians put providing people with basic necessities or narrowing the gap between rich and poor at the top of their lists.
  • On a related note, Islamist parties have shown a remarkable ability to maintain their base.
  • Tunisia has fared better than Egypt so far in the post-Arab Spring transition, with less violence, fewer demonstrations, and greater political stability. This is in part because challenges are easier to confront in a country of only 11 million, 98 percent of whom are Sunni Muslim, compared to the more diverse and populous Egypt. But Tunisia's success is primarily a result of its stronger institutions, which provide a conduit for political debate.
  • Many onlookers claim that Egypt's more tumultuous post-revolution trajectory is because of the country's legacy of religiosity and Islamism.
  • Egyptians, in fact, are no more religious than Tunisians.
  • Egypt's institutions are weak and have been routinely undermined by entrenched interests. The countries' different geopolitical situations play a role here. Tunisia's minimal strategic importance means that foreign countries have less reason to intervene. But Egypt's proximity to Israel and the Palestinian territories, its 1979 peace treaty with Israel, and its role as an intermediary between Israel and Hamas make its political developments important to Israel and the United States. Consequently, Egypt is vulnerable to foreign interference, particularly to attempts to prop up its military. Furthermore, beyond serving as a pillar to Egypt's authoritarian regimes, the Egyptian military has significant business interests and accounts for ten to 30 percent of Egypt's gross domestic product.
  • Egypt's judicial branch, which is also more powerful than Tunisia's, has at times undermined democratic processes.
  • Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the Islamist-dominated parliament and the Constituent Assembly it elected were unconstitutional, because Islamist parties contested seats intended for independent candidates. The move polarized the country and pushed the executive branch to take extreme measures.
  • Egyptian democracy is undermined by the inability of institutions to address citizens' demands and the impulse of powerful actors to interfere, not by the divide between Islamists and secularists. Institutions in Egypt fail to provide a meaningful forum for debate. As a result, violent street protesters and extremist sheiks are gaining power.
  • U.S. policy must support institutions rather than actors, and processes rather than outcomes, in order to help Egypt and Tunisia achieve their democratic potential.
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    The Council on Foreign Relations published an article about democratization in the middle east and the major obstacles that are present in the process. While most assume Islamists and Islamic embedded institutions are the root of the delayed democratic transition, the problems are much bigger than that. While Islamist regimes do indeed stunt the growth of democratic progress in terms of creating a stable government, Arab countries struggle with economic and social factors as well. The Arab Spring Revolutions have caused economic and social degradation across the region, resulting in a road block of political leadership. Without a reliable and capable government structure, the states are unable to progress economically. However, in order to have a stable government, social and economic institutions must be in place to create this capitalist economy that they strive for. Because most wealth resides in oil, the revenue that the states bring in isn't distributed properly throughout society and is concentrated within few business elites. The article stresses that instead of foreign aid going into the hands of an unstable leader or regime, it should be invested in institutions in order to spur economic growth and eliminate corruption. Rather than focusing on the Islamist-secularist divide, the world should be working towards the strengthening of institutions to create a stable foundation for governance. 
kristaf

Jordan Arrests Muslim Brotherhood Official Over Criticism of United Arab Emirates - NYT... - 0 views

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    According to the article "Mr. Bani Rushaid was arrested on charges of harming relations with a friendly country." The arrest of Mr. Bani Rushaid took place in Jordan because the Muslim Brotherhood's senior leader criticized the United Arab Emirates. Rushaid, had apparently stated that the United Arab Emirates had been "sponsoring terrorism" and "questioned the legitimacy of its rulers." 
yperez2

Women have emerged as key players in the Arab spring | World news | The Guardian - 0 views

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    Women's rights are still on the path to improvement. Many wonder what will happen. In this article this is discussed along with other important points about women being involved in the Arab Spring and still not given equality.
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    Women's rights are still on the path to improvement. Many wonder what will happen. In this article this is discussed along with other important points about women being involved in the Arab Spring and still not given equality.
yperez2

Womens Voices on the Arab Spring: Marianne Ibrahim | Vital Voices - 0 views

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    This is a blog which consists of women speaking about the Arab Spring. The women talk about what they see and hope for the future.
  •  
    This is a blog which consists of women speaking about the Arab Spring. The women talk about what they see and hope for the future.
sheldonmer

Can the Arab revolutions survive Syria and Egypt? - Opinion - Al Jazeera English - 0 views

    • sheldonmer
       
      This article provides a great overview of the "Arab Revolutions". This article covers the uprisings in Oman, Yemen, Egypt, Syria and Morocco. This article compares all of this in light, but mainly focuses on the carnage inside Syria. This articles questions whether or not the Middle East will crumble under the Egyptian and Syrian Revolutions.
allieggg

Proxy War Feared in Libya as UN Envoy Warns Against Foreign Intervention | VICE News - 0 views

  • US officials accused the United Arab Emirates and Egypt of secretly conducting air strikes on Islamist militias who have seized control of Tripoli airport.
  • US officials reportedly said they were not consulted over the strikes, which threaten to turn the already disintegrating country into a battleground for a regional proxy war.
  • Islamist groups — from Misrata and other cities wrested Tripoli's airport from the rival Zintan militia, loosely allied with the rogue General Khalifa Hifter, that controlled it since 2011.
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  • The Misrata alliance — operating under the banner Libya Dawn — is now said to be in de facto control of the entire capital after their opponents abandoned their positions.
    • allieggg
       
      Tripoli-- occupied by Misrata and other islamic groups Tobruk-- new house of reps. / interim gov. / recognized by the UN
  • The old General National Congress reconvened in Tripoli on Monday following calls from the Misrata alliance and voted to disband Libya's interim government, while the new House of Representatives, based in Tobruk, has branded those in control of the capital "terrorist groups and outlaws".
  • analysts fear Libya could become an arena for a battle between regional rivals, as countries such as the UAE and Egypt attempt to crush the threat from Islamist fighters backed by Qatar.
  • US officials told the New York Times that the UAE had provided the military aircraft and crews for two sets of air strikes
  • conducted by the two US allies without the knowledge of the US.
  • "outside interference" in Libya, which they said "exacerbates current divisions and undermines Libya's democratic transition."
  • power vacuum that allowed rival militias to thrive
  • after the previous Islamist-dominated parliament refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new assembly elected
  • "It's clear there is a proxy war in Libya between Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Algeria on one side and Qatar and Turkey on the other side,"
  • the country needs "real engagement from the international community" to defeat the Islamist militias.
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    After the fall of Gaddafi a power vacuum allowed rival militias to thrive. Now, Libya has become a proxy war for other Arab nations. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Algeria on one side and Qatar and Turkey on the other. 
nfyffe

Difference Between Kurds and Arabs | Difference Between | Kurds vs Arabs - 0 views

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    Cultural differences between the Kurds and the Arabs
allieggg

Can Libya Rebuild Itself After 40 Years of Gaddafi? - 0 views

  • the man has hollowed out the Libyan state, eviscerated all opposition in Libyan society, and, in effect, created a political tabula rasa on which a newly free people will now have to scratch out a future.
  • Jamahiriya, a political system that is run directly by tribesmen without the intermediation of state institutions
  • the problem is, of course, that much like in the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, virtually everyone at one point or another had to deal with the regime to survive.
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  • Libya is truly a case apart.
  • the disastrous Italian legacy in Libya, has been a constant element in Gaddafi’s speeches since he took power
  • inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser, neighboring Egypt’s president, whose ideas of Arab nationalism and of the possibility of restoring glory to the Arab world, would fuel the first decade of Gaddafi’s revolution.
  • he was unimpressed with the niceties of international diplomacy,
  • In a brilliant move that co-opted tribal elders, many of whom were also military commanders, he created the Social Leadership People’s Committee, through which he could simultaneously control the tribes and segments of the country’s military.
  • When it turned out that Libya, which was still a decentralized society in 1969, had little appetite for his centralizing political vision and remained largely indifferent to his proposals, the young idealist quickly turned activist.
  • Green Book, a set of slim volumes published in the mid-1970s that contain Gaddafi’s political philosophy, a blueprint is offered for a dramatic restructuring of Libya’s economy, politics, and society. In principle, Libya would become an experiment in democracy. In reality, it became a police state where every move of its citizens was carefully watched by a growing number of security apparatuses and revolutionary committees that owed loyalty directly to Gaddafi.
  • Having crushed all opposition by the mid-1970s, the regime systematically snuffed out any group that could potentially oppose it—any activity that could be construed as political opposition was punishable by death, which is one reason why a post-Gaddafi Libya, unlike a post-Mubarak Egypt, can have no ready-made opposition in a position to fill the vacuum.
  • The tribes—the Warfalla, the Awlad Busayf, the Magharha, the Zuwaya, the Barasa, and the smallest of them all, the Gadafa, to which he belonged—offered a natural form of political affiliation, a tribal ethos that could be tapped into for support. And perhaps, in the aftermath of Gaddafi, they could serve as a nucleus around which to build a new political system.
  • Gaddafi feared they might coalesce into groups opposing his rule. So, during the first two decades after the 1969 coup, he tried to erase their influence, arguing that they were an archaic element in a modern society.
  • comprehensive reconstruction of everything civic, political, legal, and moral that makes up a society and its government.
  • After systematically destroying local society, after using the tribes to cancel each other out, after aborting methodically the emergence of a younger generation that could take over Libya’s political life—all compounded by the general incoherence of the country’s administrative and bureaucratic institutions—Gaddafi will have left a new Libya with severe and longstanding challenges.
  • the growing isolation of Libya as international sanctions were imposed.
  • Lockerbie was the logical endpoint for a regime that had lost all international legitimacy.
  • while the regime still had the coercive power to put down any uprisings that took place in the 1990s, it became clear to Gaddafi’s closest advisers that the potential for unrest had reached unprecedented levels.
  • way out was to come to an agreement with the West that would end the sanctions, allow Libya to refurbish an aging oil infrastructure, and provide a safety valve by permitting Libyans to travel abroad once more.
  • intent to renounce weapons of mass destruction in December 2003—after a long process of behind-the-scenes diplomacy initially spearheaded by Britain
  • “The Revolution Everlasting” was one of the enduring slogans of his Libya, inscribed everywhere from bridges to water bottles.
  • regime that had, for four decades, mismanaged the country’s economy and humiliated its citizens
  • country was split in half, with eastern Cyrenaica and its main city Benghazi effectively independent—a demonstration of the kind of people’s power Gaddafi had always advocated. Reality, in effect, outgrew the caricature.
  • used a set of divide-and-rule policies that not only kept his opponents sundered from each other, but had also completely enfeebled any social or political institution in the country.
  • Beyond Gaddafi, there exists only a great political emptiness, a void that Libya somehow will need to fill.
  • the creation of a modern state where Libyans become true citizens, with all the rights and duties this entails.
  • the terrorist incidents
  • Regimes can use oil revenues strategically to provide patronage that effectively keeps them in power.
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    This article from News Week basically paints a picture of Libyan history and how Gaddafi's reign devastated the state economically, socially, and politically. Author Dirk Vandewalle uses the phrase "a political tabula rasa" which in Latin means a blank slate, to describe the fate of Libya after Gaddafi's rule and convey the extent to which the country has to literally reconstruct every component that makes up a society and its government. He highlights major events that led to the downfall of both the Gaddafi regime and the Libyan state as a whole such as Arab nationalism, Jamahiriya, the Green Book, security apparatuses snuffing all opposition, terrorist incidents, isolation and international sanctions, the Lockerbie bombing, weapons of mass destruction, human right violations, divide and rule policies, and his use of oil revenue to fuel his insurgency. Vandewalle concludes the article with uncertain ideas thoughts towards Libya's future and the way the state is going to literally rebuild themselves from this "blank slate" that Gaddafi left behind. 
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