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allieggg

The U.S. Is Giving Up on Middle East Democracy-and That's a Mistake - The Atlantic - 0 views

  • democracy assistance to the region, which will drop from $459.2 million to $298.3 million
  • Today’s Middle East is a product, at least in part, of failed democratization, and one of the reasons it failed was the timid, half-hearted support of the Obama administration.
  • the significant impact Western leverage and “linkage” can have on democratic transitions.
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  • “it was an externally driven shift in the cost of suppression, not changes in domestic conditions, that contributed most centrally to the demise of authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s.” They find that “states’ vulnerability to Western democratization pressure… was often decisive.”
  • it is also worth noting that President Bush acknowledged the existence of a “tyranny-terror” link—the notion that the root causes of extremism and terrorism can be found in the region’s enduring lack of democracy.
  • the administration’s approach to the region is characterized almost entirely by ad-hoc crisis management and traditional counterterrorism approaches. Its one larger-scale reform initiative—a half-hearted proposal for a
  • We argue that the U.S. and its partners now need to consider a very different approach to Middle East democracy assistance.
  • Conventional democracy promotion activities tend to focus on the process and “retail” aspects of democratic politics—things like elections, political party training, get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns, and civil society enhancement. While these are undoubtedly important, they are insufficient to deliver lasting reforms. Authoritarianism in the Arab world has proven time and time again—even in supposedly post-revolutionary settings such as Egypt today—that it can weather the annoyances of elections and civil society.
  • What is needed are more systematic reforms focused on fundamental institutions. These include things like constraining the military’s role in civilian domains of governance, deep reform in the security and justice sectors including law enforcement and policing, and comprehensive “renovation” of the civil service sector. These are large-scale, long-term, and expensive undertakings that far transcend the modest parameters of most U.S. democracy promotion programs.
  • we make the case for a new Multilateral Endowment for Reform (MER) that would tie significant levels of financial assistance—in the billions of dollars—to reform commitments and benchmarked implementation performance by partner nations.
  • provide a real incentive for countries to embark down a path to deeper and more enduring political reforms while retaining the ability to pull back funding if they do not deliver.
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    This article begins by illuminating the regional democracy assistance cuts that are dropping from $459.2 million to $298.3 million It explains that the Bush Administration began the quest for democracy in the Middle East, and the Obama administration has only continued in his footsteps. The author presents the viewpoint that the U.S. approach to Arab democratization has been in the form of "ad-hoc crisis management" rather than "large scale reform initiatives." Promoting democracy in the form of democratic politics are insufficient, elections and political parties have consistently proved to weather away and fester further civil strife. Consequently, the article proposes a new approach to the region conflict. This approach calls for "systematic reforms" focusing on basic institutions such as the civil service sector, justice and law enforcement, and the military's role in governance. The idea is that addressing these lacking departments in the arab world will eventually pave the way to a smoother democratic transition. 
amarsha5

How long can Saudi Arabia afford Yemen war? - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East - 14 views

  • long history of political animosity; this is a history that continues until our present day.
    • joepouttu
       
      "However, as Saleh continued to kill, these countries had no choice but to issue a forceful declaration to show that they were not in favor of Saleh's relentless, murderous campaign to ignore a civil war in Yemen." pg 128
  • Yemen's treasury was burdened by the costs of unification such as paying for southern civil servants to move to the new capital, Sanaa, and paying interest on its massive debt. On top of its other economic challenges, Yemen was to absorb the shock of 800,000 returnees and their pressure on the already weak job market. With their return, the estimated $350 million a month in remittances
    • joepouttu
       
      "My father had decided to leave Eritrea and return to Yemen, his homeland, after long years of exile..." pg 110
  • Civil war broke out in the summer of 1994 in what could be interpreted as a symptom of economic failure.
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  • By 1995 the Yemeni government implemented a program of macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms with support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and reduced spending on defense and civil service and cut subsidies. The Yemeni economy started showing signs of recovery and stability.
  • Masood Ahmed, director of the IMF’s Middle East and Central Asia Department, wrote in 2012 that “fiscal sustainability will be an issue” for Gulf Cooperation Council countries. In its 2012 regional economic outlook, the IMF recommended to “curtail current expenditures while protecting the poor” as a response to the risk of declining oil prices.
  • Policies to cut spending were unlikely to be introduced in a monarchy like Saudi Arabia, especially after the Arab Spring, where tax-paying citizens along with non-tax-paying Bahrainis and next-door Yemenis went out on the streets to claim their rights in shaping the policies that govern their daily lives. The risk of people demanding more political rights was growing and cutting spending was not the optimal strategy for the kingdom.
    • joepouttu
       
      "The students of Sanaa were unique, marching straight out onto the street from their classrooms and chanting, 'The people demand the fall of the President and the regime.'" pg 126
  • As the kingdom continued its generous fiscal policy by providing more benefits to its citizens in response to the people’s dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation, it ran a deficit of 3.4% of GDP in 2014 due to a fall in oil revenues.
  • The kingdom's economic reforms of raising gas and diesel prices, cutting fuel subsidies in half and supporting the introduction of a GCC-wide value-added tax might ease the pressure of sustaining a war for nine months and perhaps longer. These structural reforms were long overdue and their introduction at this time is revealing.
    • amarsha5
       
      CIG pg. 120 -> "We live in a world with many layers of linkages between countries. Nations will exchange goods and services through trade and will engage in cross-border investments from bank loans to setting up businesses. Each of these linkages can serve as a transmission mechanism in a time of crisis."
  • the political inclusion of the taxpaying citizen. It's a price the kingdom is now willing to pay, as we have seen Saudi women not only
  • and suffered an uprising fueled by anger at economic failure. The Saudi economy is trying to absorb
  • As they introduce revenue-collecting mechanisms, they should also reform mechanisms of capital transfer to the public to minimize the gap between the rich and the poor, as it is known that the poor are the most affected by tighter revenue-collecting policies. Otherwise, the Saudi war on Yemen will mark the beginning of an economic downturn that will surely spill over onto its political system in the long run.
    • joepouttu
       
      "So the young revolutionaries fight on, until all their demands are met and they are free to build their State: a state founded on social justice and equality between all citizens where Saleh's reign is just a page in the history books." pg 129
    • amarsha5
       
      CIG pg. 116 -> "Globalization, in the shape of freer trade and multinational investments, has been generally a force for good and economic prosperity. But it has also advanced, rather than harmed, social agendas"
    • ccfuentez
       
      But it became apparent that Saleh was not going to leave me to my own devices. He declared war in mid-1994, occupying the South and defeating the Socialist Party. Everything was finished, or so I believed. Its property stolen by the regime, the paper shut down, and once more I found myself broken, defeated and without hope. Worse, I was a known employee of the Socialist Party through my work at the paper. In the region where I lived agents for the regime had been hunting down and detaining anyone who had belonged to the Socialist Party or getting them fired from their jobs. Although I had not been a party member myself, just worked at a party newspaper, the regime made no distinction. My mother intervened, however, and hid me. She wouldn't let me out of the house. My mother always protects me.   (2013-12-31). Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution: Voices from Tunis to Damascus (p. 115). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. 
    • atownen
       
      Civil War: in 1994 Jamal currently in high school, describes the times as a world, when the color of his skin would define him. The Civil War, "interpreted as a symptom of economic failure", was evident in the reading when Jamal described the lack of jobs as a college graduate, members of the socialist party were completely shut out when Saleh took the presidency, depriving hard workers the ability to integrate into the economy. 
    • ccfuentez
       
      CIG Ch. 4 -> in relation to international rulemaking on fiscal policy -> is international intervention needed to contain and reverse financial crises in countries, esp. when it comes to the human rights and economic equality of citizens
    • mcooka
       
      Relating to page 120 Sanaa could not find work after college. While his degree wasn't very fluid, he was unable to find work for about 5 years. He got into journalism which blacklisted him against the government. Now he is unemployed again. 
    • mcooka
       
      This paragraph, while not highlighted, is important to the idea of globalization and why the war is not stopping. There is a flow of revenue from these oil prices that Yemen is reliant on, but they are also competing with countries that produce higher amounts of oil. This would have happened during the time Sanaa was in College writing scathing articles
    • mcooka
       
       On page 113 around this time the author was working as a journalist for the newspaper. 
    • mcooka
       
      Related to page 129 Sanaa is still living in hiding and in poverty. The animosity keeps him in fear. 
    • csherro2
       
      Market liberalization outlook
    • csherro2
       
      When Saleh came to power he and the leader of the southern part of Yemen, Salem al-Beid, agreed to coesxist as leaders of Yemen.  WIthin weeks of this in play, Saleh began to try to make the south his and this created the civil war.  
    • csherro2
       
      Jamal notes that the standard of living in Yemen was decreasing gradually the longer Saleh stayed in power.  
    • csherro2
       
      People, including Jamal, were writing about the Saleh regime and how they were upset with them.  
    • csherro2
       
      When Saleh's son was coming into power, Jamal saw that Yemen was moving towards a monarchy, realizing that his and the country's future was in the hands of an unqualified person.  
alarsso

The Civil War Within Syria's Civil War | Foreign Policy - 0 views

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    AS teh largest ethnic minority, Syrian Kurds have now begun self-governance in northern Syria - along with some Iraqi and Turkish Kurds. However there are still blood-filled battles versus the Islamist extremists - althought both are anit-Assad.
jshnide

Hamas vs. Fatah: The Palestinian Civil War | Foundation for Defense of Democracies - 0 views

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    In 2007, the Palestinian Civil War took place and the fighting between Fatah and Hamas caused much destruction. This war makes peacemaking extremely difficult for the nation today.
alarsso

Islamist Rebels vs. Secular Rebels Is the Civil War Within Syria's Civil War | RYOT News - 0 views

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    Nearly 1,000 rebel groups exist in Syria as of 2013, none of which have the exact same motives and desires. Jabhat al-Nusra has become very effective but their ties to al-Qaeda make members and citizens weary. Is there a way to rationalize how this civil war may end?
petergrossmanseu

Syrian Civil War: New Russian Weapons Sent To Assad's Forces - 0 views

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    An article from the International Business Times discussing the involvement of Russian troops in the Syrian Civil War and a video of Russian troops "training" in Syria. I've put the word "training" because I believe that as much is I believe that as much as I believe Pres. Kennedy when he said we sent "advisers" to Vietnam.
allieggg

What Happened to the Humanitarians Who Wanted to Save Libyans With Bombs and Drones? - ... - 0 views

  • “Libya is a reminder that sometimes it is possible to use military tools to advance humanitarian causes.”
  • intervention was a matter of upholding “universal values,” which itself advanced America’s strategic goals. In justifying the war to Americans (more than a week after it started), President Obama decreed: “Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.”
  • But “turning a blind eye” to the ongoing – and now far worse – atrocities in Libya is exactly what the U.S., its war allies, and most of the humanitarian war advocates are now doing.
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  • “this was a rare military intervention for humanitarian reasons, and it has succeeded” and that “on rare occasions military force can advance human rights. Libya has so far been a model of such an intervention.”
  • But the most compelling reason to oppose such wars is that – even if it all could work perfectly in an ideal world and as tempting as it is to believe – humanitarianism is not what motivates the U.S. or most other governments to deploy its military in other nations.
  • As the country spun into chaos, violence, militia rule and anarchy as a direct result of the NATO intervention, they exhibited no interest whatsoever in doing anything to arrest or reverse that collapse. What happened to their deeply felt humanitarianism? Where did it go?
  • What’s most notable here isn’t how everything in Libya has gone so terribly and tragically wrong. That was painfully predictable: anyone paying even casual attention now knows that killing the Bad Dictator of the Moment (usually one the U.S. spent years supporting) achieves nothing good for the people of that country unless it’s backed by years of sustained support for rebuilding its civil institutions.
  • If there were any authenticity to the claimed humanitarianism, wouldn’t there be movements to spend large amounts of money not just to bomb Libya but also to stabilize and rebuild it? Wouldn’t there be just as much horror over the plight of Libyans now: when the needed solution is large-scale economic aid and assistance programs rather than drone deployments, blowing up buildings, and playful, sociopathic chuckling over how we came, conquered, and made The Villain die?
  • The way most war advocates instantly forgot Libya existed once that fun part was over is the strongest argument imaginable about what really motivates these actions. In the victory parade he threw for himself, Kristof said the question of “humanitarian intervention” will “arise again” and “the next time it does, let’s remember a lesson of Libya.”
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    This article basically lays out the faults in US intervention in Libya during the fall of Gaddafi and condemns the US officials for their lack of hindsight in their agenda. The US claimed that they could not "turn a blind eye" to atrocities and human right violations in other countries and to intervene in Libya was a matter of upholding "universal values." After the successful ousting of Gaddafi, the US hypocritically turned their back on the country as a whole, leaving them to pick up the pieces and re-build themselves in the midst of socio-political and economic chaos. The US claims that military intervention is sometimes necessary to address human right violations, but in the case of Libya more violations have occurred as a result of a fallen regime rather than because of its reign. The author basically says that the US should have predicted that short-term intervention strategies achieves nothing without years of sustained support for rebuilding the civil institutions. 
alarsso

What caused Syria's civil war? - 0 views

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    Christian Syrian Reverend Nadim Nassar (director of UK based Awareness Foundation) talks about underlying causes of the Syrian civil war and the state of Syria today.
allieggg

Mapping Libya's armed groups - Middle East - Al Jazeera English - 0 views

  • Haftar accuses Congress of allowing "terrorists" to flourish in Libya and has vowed to "wipe them out", gaining support from much of the regular armed forces and nationalist militias. Other militias have lined up to oppose him, insisting his attacks amount to a "coup".
  • 1. National Army
  • National Army is a nationalist armed group controlled by Khalifa Haftar, rather than Libya’s national army.
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  • re-formed to help fight in the uprising against Gaddafi in 2011.
  • composed of non-Islamist fighters and former soldiers
  • Haftar used it to launch Operation Libyan Dignity on May 16, saying his mission was to dissolve the General National Congress, which he labelled Islamist, and to destroy "terrorists" he said Congress had allowed to establish bases in Libya.
  • 2. Regular forces
  • small army and air force have mostly defected to Haftar. Libya’s armed forces fought on both Gaddafi and the rebel side in the 2011 uprising. Since then, the army has been rebuilding, with most of its units in training.
  • fighting a tit-for-tat battle against Islamist militias for more than a year.
  • 3. Zintan
  • Zintan's militias are the second most powerful armed force in Libya, after Misrata, and based in the Nafusa mountains 144km southwest of Tripoli.
  • Zintan formed one of the three fronts in the uprising and by the end of that uprising, Zintan brigades surged into Tripoli, with several maintaining bases in the city and holding the international airport.
  • regard themselves as opponents of both Congress and Islamists.
  • On May 18, two days after Hiftar’s forces attacked Benghazi, two Zintan militias stormed the national congress building in Tripoli.
  • 1. LROR 
  • Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room was formed in 2013 as the headquarters of the Libya Shield, an alliance of pro-Congress militias.
  • accused by opponents of being Islamist,
  • LROR led a powerful Shield force to Tripoli last year to defend Congress.
  • 3. Misrata
  • With strong affiliations with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party, LROR will have much to lose if Haftar takes power.
  • dedicated to establishing a caliphate in Libya
  • The US blamed Ansar al-Sharia for the assault on the US consulate in Benghazi that saw the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens in 2012.
  • 2. Ansar al-Sharia
  • Misrata’s 235 militia brigades are collectively the most powerful single force in Libya, fighting through a six-month siege during the uprising.
  • They are equipped with heavy weapons, tanks and truck-launched rockets and have the power to be a decisive force in any struggle between Haftar and Islamist forces.
  • Many Misratan leaders back the Islamists in Congress, and Misratan brigades once formed a key part of the Libya Shield force in Tripoli.
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    After the ousting of the Gaddafi regime the country pivoted into civil chaos. Because of the deficiency of structure and state autonomy, armed militias have become the dominant force in determining Libya's future governmental system. While the UN has internationally recognized the NTC as the interim government to ultimately turn the country into a democratic one, militias have taken things into their own hands tipping the country towards the brink of civil war. General Khalifa Haftar launched his Operation Dignity campaign accusing congress of allowing terrorists flourish in Libya and vowed to wipe them out, gaining much support from the regular armed forces and nationalist militias. The opposition to Haftar insist that his attacks are aiming for a military coup. This article was helpful in highlighting the armed groups and dividing them by Pro-Haftar and Pro-Congress sections. 
petergrossmanseu

WWII Weapons In The Syrian Civil War - The Firearm Blog - 0 views

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    An article from the firm's blog talking about World War II weapons being used in the Syrian Civil War. I found both the article and accompanying video very interesting. Besides showing a bunch of very old weapons being used and the essentially finding new life in this conflict, it also shows a government stockpile seized by rebels full of Stg 44s (assault rifles from Nazi Germany). For me this raises the question of how did they get there?
micklethwait

Libya: Where are the dividing lines? - Middle East - Al Jazeera English - 0 views

  • The House moved to Tobruk after armed groups supportive of the General National Congress began to overrun the capital.
  • Libya's new parliament, dominated by self-styled secular and nationalist candidates, was formed after the heavy defeat of Islamist candidates in June elections.
  • In the House of Representatives camp, many figures have come together in opposition to the contentious political isolation law, which banned anyone involved with the former regime from political participation.
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  • Errishi told Al Jazeera that oil revenues pass through the country's central bank. With members of Libya Dawn guarding the gates to the central bank, Errishi added that "the central bank is controlled by whomever is controlling Tripoli".
  • The UAE, which is home to Mahmoud Jibril, a leading politician opposed to Libya's Islamist groups, has been accused by the US of bombing sites held by Misrata forces with the help of Egypt.
  • t has also been alleged that Qatar, which plays host to Ali Salabi, a leading spiritual figure with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, has provided weapons and support to Brotherhood-affiliated groups battling former general Haftar.
  • With the displacement of 100,000 people due to fighting in Tripoli and Benghazi, however, the Libya crisis may not yet have taken its worst turn. "If we see more brigades going to one side over the other," said researcher Hamedi, "this will lead to civil war. The role of the regional environment is to help the domestic equation reach a deal."
    • micklethwait
       
      sghsdghsfghfgh
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    Due to Libya's lack of institutional structure and weak centralized government, rival militia violence and clashes have created constant chaos leading the country towards another civil war. After the fall of Qaddafi, who obliterated institutions necessary for a functional government, Libya has been unable to manage the state. The National Transitional Council, which replaced the Qaddafi Regime, turned into the General National Congress and was given 18 months to form a democratic constitution. When the deadline passed the constitution was incomplete, which forced Congress to organize elections to a new House of Representatives. The former GNC members declared a new self proclaimed GNC, electing Omar al-Hasi as their prime minister. The new GNC is not recognized by Libya's parliament nor is it by the international community. Al Jazeera says the country literally has two parliaments and two governments, creating inconceivable instability throughout the state. The newly elected House has moved to Tobruk after armed islamic GNC militia groups overran the capital, seizing control over the major institutions in Tripoli. Due to this lack of a functional government, the rest of the state has turned to chaos. After the civil war, anti and pro Qaddafi forces branched into militias striving for power. Without a working state and government, militias had to rely on themselves to provide security, and really have no incentive to give up arms and no true government to be a part of. General Khalifa Hifter, a former Qaddafi general who later joined the Libyan rebel army in 2011, formed an anti-militia militia, targeting islamist militias like Ansar al-Sharia. Hifter is not affiliated with either of the governments, but rather strives for a military government, and supreme control of the armed forces.
alarsso

The Baath Party and the War in Syria: An Interview With Sami Moubayed - Syria in Crisis... - 0 views

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    Syrian historian and scholar reveals his thoughts on recent actions of the Baath party in reaction to the civil war. Has the war had a significant effect on the party?
alarsso

Could Syria's Kurds Change the Course of the Civil War? - NYTimes.com - 0 views

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    Kurdish fighters in Aleppo decide to allie with the rebels and take over Sheikh Maskoud - a hilltop base and mosque. However, does this new alliance represent a shift for all Syrian Kurds? If so, the war is in for a dramatic shift
alarsso

The plight of Syria's vulnerable Christian minority - The Washington Post - 0 views

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    A brief look at Syrian Christian positions in the civil war. It is also brought to light that Christians have been attack from almost every angle, so who is there to truly trust and support?
alarsso

Syria Kurds impose military service amid civil war | The Times of Israel - 0 views

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    All Kurdish towns ban together to fight any opposition of extremists - along with Turkish Kurds. Kurdish law now requires 6 month service from each man and fighting rarely ceases. With Assad slowly gainig territory and increasing heat from extremists, will the Kurdish stand their ground?
alarsso

To end Syria civil war, West must guarantee minorities' safety with peacekeeping force ... - 0 views

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    If Western powers gaurantee support for minorites, they will no longer feel the necessity to support the Assad regime. Furthermore, if opposition agrees to allow exception to minorities supporting Assad and simply attack Assad, this could also have significant effects on the war development
alarsso

Syria's Druze between the hammer of the regime and anvil of extremism - ARA News - 0 views

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    Syrain Druze have managed to stay safe by remaining neutral thoughout the civil war; but how long can this continue? Will they eventually need to chose sides?
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