Author Heba Elsayed gives a preview of the study she conducted to observe the lower middle class in Cairo. Elsayed describes Cairo as a microcosm of globalization in urban centers. She describes the unique role of Cosmopolitanism in analyzing trends of globalization. She focuses on the lower middle class who, she says, plays the biggest role in incorporating multiple viewpoints in daily life rather than practicing exclusivity like the upper middle class. In addition, she describes cosmopolitanism in terms of internal heterogeneity, describing an 'onion model' of the world, in which the local and national form the core and inner layers and the international and global form the outer layers. She also mentions that nation-states can no longer be regarded as the primary reference point for global citizenry.

A former senior official at the U.S. embassy in Cairo describes how Sisi's background is shaping his approach to domestic politics, counterterrorism, Israel, and other issues. From the way Sisi is described, his main priority is the domestic economy. He knows that without creating domestic stability through lowering unemployment and generating more capital, he cannot remain in power. In addition, it appears that Sisi is a strong believer of military influence. He has a strategic plan of cooperating with great powers to grow Egypt's reputation. Sisi's plan to create a strong state, while cooperating with other strong states and focusing on military power are all evidence of his political realist tendencies.

Oct. 22. As the Egyptian government's crackdown on dissent broadened over the last year, university campuses have increasingly been in the crosshairs as one of the last remaining spaces for dissent. Despite efforts to quell political activity on college campuses, there have been at least 58 protests on college campuses since the first week of classes at the beginning of October. As campuses like Cairo University crack down on security and bans on political activity, Egyptian authorities are also attempting to control the activities of the youth. Sisi reinstated the law of appointing university presidents. The administration knows its weakness is the youth population, since all its support comes from the older generation of Egyptians. However, although he acknowledges there grievances, he basically tells them to stay out of the politics that should be reserved for the older generation. By taking this tone with the Egyptian youth, Sisi risks alienating the population and pushing them to join back in alliances between secular and religous groups.

On Sunday, Sept. 28, President Sisi made a speech at Cairo University, declaring his affection and support for the Egyptian youth. He also warned the students against "malicious" activities and that universities were "solely for education." The speech followed the draft of a new controversial law allowing for the arbitrary firing of faculty members. Sisi pledged to dedicate state resources like special councils and scholarship funds to the cause of the youth demographic.

Activists who led the 2011 revolt reflect on growing disillusionment with prospects for positive social change. A vast majority of the youth have become apathetic toward any political policies. In the vote for the constitutional referendum, the youth mainly acted in boycott and did not participate in the voting. In addition, the Egyptian media outlets have been accused of participating in a smear campaign against the activists that led the 2011 revolution. Wael Ghonim, for example, has had to handle his public image as he has been accused of benefiting from the revolt that he helped to orchestrate. A blogger, who goes by the name "Sandmonkey" accused the older generations of resisting change. He claims they act on their own accord even when they have no plausible or other alternative solutions. He points out that the youth represents 70% of the population but receives no official representation and only pity from the older generation who continues to make decisions on their behalf.

Egypt's 2011 uprising was often referred to as a youth revolution, but two years after longtime President Hosni Mubarak was forced out of office, many in the younger generation say that they are not represented by the Brotherhood or any other oppositional forces. The demands of the revolution the youth led have not been met. Conditions are worsening. The youth are increasingly disillusioned with the idea of political hope and feel like leaving the country may be their best option for fulfillment. The youth feel their is a large disparity between their ideas and demands and the political desires of the older generation who is favored for their wisdom, experience, and resources. Although the youth have popular support, they lack the resources to successfully run a political race and are therefore left out of the process of change. This means it is left up to the older generation of politicians to appease their demands, if only to prevent more protests.

This week, the country's judicial system came under fresh scrutiny after refusing to reinstate 138 state prosecutors who recently graduated from law school, but whose parents lacked university degrees. The September 2013 ruling is an example of the institutionalized classism in Egypt that many are unhappy with. Due to the policies of Sisi, the Dhank movement arose in protest by the poor who demand to be heard. Although this movement has been previously associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and thus not very popular, it could be the beginning of a broader mobilization of the poor in Egyptian politics. The head of the Garbage Collector's Union warned that if the president ignores these movements, there could be a "revolution of the hungry."

Though many of the youth leaders who participated in the 2011 revolution are in prison, youth-driven political campaigns will continue under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. A new movement that has risen, called the "We have had enough" campaign has several demands from the Egyptian youth. These include holding accountable anyone who was involved in killing any Egyptian, a debate about implementing separation of powers, setting minimum and maximum wages, and amending the protest law. These demands have led the state to release some of the prisoners of conscience, in an attempt to prevent any chaos before parliamentary elections. A similar movement, called the Dhank movement, arose in protest of the living conditions for the poorest Egyptians. The leaders of this movement encourage protests like refusing to pay electric bills because of a lack of service. The activists describe the need for the Dhank movement coming from Sisi's poor treatment of the lower class that included removal of subsidies and raising prices of commodities. The "We have had enough" campaign spokesman says they insist on the implementation of 14 human rights amendments. He ends by reiterating the consistent suspicion the youth groups have of the state and a lack of confidence that their demands will be met. This shows that there is no clear strategy or realistic possibility to ending the tension between youth groups and the state.

Suleiman al-Hout was refused a license for his food cart in 2007. In retaliation, Hout acted the opposite of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia. He went directly to Mubarak's former party headquarters and told them they had an opportunity to gain his vote by helping him on his food cart license. Since then, Hout was a proud supporter of the National Democratic Party and spent many years growing his business network and promoting the party. Through these tactics, Hout gained political clout and support. He did not benefit from the youth revolution because he was still unable to gain employment and a livelihood. The way Hout runs his political campaign is similar to Mubarak-era tactics. Although Hout was an early supporter of Sisi, he quickly changed his position when he was not given a job in the regime and did not gain any other employment. Now he is running for a seat in parliament, and because of his business connections, he may be successful.

Political parties are demanding payments of up to $28,000 for candidates to be included in their electoral lists. This is prohibiting youth groups from having an active role in the formation of the new government. Although the new electoral law gave Copts, women, and people with disabilities the right to be a part of parties' electoral lists, splits and conflicts between parties interferes with the process. There is a consensus in the higher order of politicians that the youth are not prepared to be a part of the political process. Others believe this is an unfair statement. However, the mistake of the youth in the revolution was that they did not take part in the government process at the beginning. They missed their opportunity to fulfill their demands by only aiming to overthrow the regime.

This article provides an analysis of the role in religion moving forward from the revolution. While some groups promote a totally secular state, others are encouraging a system of government that is dictated by Sharia law. Some articles have been passed in the new constitutional referendum that are very controversial. The articles (2, 54, and 219) were an attempt to establish Islamic authority in rule, as well as the authority of other groups like Coptic Christians and Jews. In short, the identity of the Egyptian state is being defined by these political moves. Although different Islamic groups try to distinguish themselves politically, other leaders have tried to present the issue as a dichotomy between and Islamic state and a secular state. In reality, the political diversity is better represented by a spectrum. However, these groups must find enough popular and physical support to enact policies. Any policies enacted will be too much for one group, and not enough imposition for another.

Journalist Charles Sennott recently returned from Tahrir Square, where he was filming a documentary on the revolution for PBS's Frontline. He describes how various groups of the youth came together to support a common cause. The Muslim Brotherhood had a very strategic role in the revolution. They hesitated to join in the beginning, and then the youth in their group pushed for greater involvement. The Brotherhood brought a lot of organization to the revolution. They positioned themselves as a central force of the revolution rather than a leading player in the uprising. They did not want Mubarak to pin the revolution on them. And it was not their revolution--it was a revolution of all Egyptians. Although the Muslim Brotherhood is aiming toward more of a social movement toward Islamic incorporation into the structure of society, they also want to establish themselves on the political playing field.

In accordance with the new anti-protest law, three of the leaders in Egypt's revolution were sentenced to three years in prison. The new law is aimed at Morsi's Islamist supporters after he was removed from office. More recently, officials have seen the law as protecting against the threat of the youth activists who led Mubarak's overthrow. The activists and other supporters call the law and the imprisonment revenge against their former actions. This sentencing followed new charges against Morsi implicating him in conspiracies to destabilize the country. From prison, one of the activists wrote a letter describing police stations as still torturous, suspicion against the Ministry of Interior, and the return of oppression of freedoms.

Both the current Egyptian authorities and the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to attract the support of the youth, while women participated in the recent referendum to support stability. The youth see the remnants of Mubarak's administration through the government structure. The revolution wouldn't be important without changes to the government. Many political groups are trying to coax the youth to being on "their side," and meanwhile, the Egyptian youth are struggling to find any positives. Gaining the vote of the youth generally means a win or loss for the politicians.

Both the current Egyptian authorities and the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to attract the support of the youth, while women participated in the recent referendum to support stability. The youth see the remnants of Mubarak's administration through the government structure. The revolution wouldn't be important without changes to the government. Many political groups are trying to coax the youth to being on "their side," and meanwhile, the Egyptian youth are struggling to find any positives. Gaining the vote of the youth generally means a win or loss for the politicians.

This author gives an analysis of where the Egyptian youth failed and succeeded in their revolution. He applauds their original motivation: overthrowing the oppressive regime and seeking political freedom. However, he criticizes the movement for not having organized goals with practical implications. Their focus was so set on overthrowing Mubarak that they did not have a plan once that was achieved. As a result, the youth allowed the military to become politicized and enforce their political ideas. The author claims this move set a dangerous precedent for the future and took away the attention of the military from places it was needed. The author claims that by endorsing the army to act militarily against the first civilian elected president of the country, the youth is undermining their original goals. He goes on to explain his suggestions for the Egyptian youth to get back on track and follow through in the remaining phases of the revolution.

This article gives a description of the state of Egypt's once thriving Tahrir Square, just two years after the revolution. The mood of Tahrir Square has changed dramatically and is now solemn rather than buzzing with enthusiasm. The young activists interviewed in the article expressed their regret for the revolution or how it turned out. The youth population is still struggling for economic revival after two years of revolution. Mass unemployment is hitting the large youth population the hardest, which is still a source of anger. The majority of this population does not have adequate skills for the available job market.

This article describes the position and demands of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party of Egypt. The relationship of the youth protesters with the Egyptian Left was solidified when the Left provided the youth with the political power to make their revolution successful. The Socialist Popular Alliance demands a new constitution and a new government structure that is based on democracy, human rights, and freedoms. Their political position and ideal social structure are very similar to typical American ideals, especially those of the American left political parties. However, the Public Alliance seems very angered over Mubarak's previous friendly relations with Israel. This population feels as though they were forced to abandon the Arab people and support Israel instead of Palestine. This is interesting because Egypt's relations with Israel has garnered tremendous political and economic support from the United States. Having an Arab ally has been an advantageous point of negotiation for Israel and the US. With the Popular Alliance in severe opposition to this position of Israeli sympathy, it is a surprise that they seem to embrace "Americanized" ideas. In addition, it is worth noting that the youth finds a great identity with the Arab culture, although not so much with a specific religion.

Two years ago, I took a ride on the train in Egypt. After experiencing this unique world, all I wanted to do was find the human inside the train - not the one who takes the train every now and again but the one who constantly uses it and has made it ...