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allieggg

http://mgt.guc.edu.eg/wpapers/005mohamed_hamdy2008.pdf - 2 views

DIIGO_FILE_HOME/4xj2f/byi0

watsa cronyism nepotism guanxi social norms middle east

shared by allieggg on 05 Oct 14 - No Cached
  • Jordanian survey, 87% of the respondents wanted to eradicate wasta.
  • Cunnigham and Sarayrah (1994) suggest that the modern oil boom in the Arab world may have perpetuated wasta by reducing the need for hard work.
  • human resource departments in the Arab world depend heavily on subjective assessment tools such as unstructured interviews.
  • ...21 more annotations...
  • most Arab economies suffer from very high levels of unemployment. Good jobs are scarce. This motivates applicants to use every mean possible to improve their chances of being hired.
  • For example, sons of police and military officers are given preference in admission to the Egyptian police academy or military college, respectively.
  • study conducted by Whiteoak, Crawford and Mapstone (2006) showed the young UAE citizens believed that wasta is more useful than do their older citizens. This finding may imply that wasta is strengthening rather than diminishing in Arab societies. Commenting on the spread of wasta in Egypt, a senior bank official told one of the authors that up to 25% of his staff were hired only because of their wasta.
  • many top governmental positions are reserved for members of the ruling families or members of their supporting tribes
  • First, to maintain their grip on authority, Arab political regimes tend to place close confidants in key positions even if they are not the most qualified for such positions.
  • In Syria, the key argument made in favor of selecting Basher Al Asad as the country’s president was that he was the son of the late president Hafez Al Asad.
  • study conducted by Kilani and Sakija in Jordan showed that 90% of the respondents believed that they would use wasta in the future.
  • In the Quran, Muslims are instructed that “the best that you can hire employee is one who is competent and trustworthy” (Quran, 28, 26). Prophet Mohamed is also reported to have said “He who is in a leadership position and appoints knowingly a person who is not qualified to manage, than he violates the command of God and His messenger”. He also stated “when a person assumes an authority over people and promotes one of them because of personal preferences, God will curse him for ever”.
  • Rising to high levels requires important connections. Receiving important privileges or benefits is contingent upon using the right connections.
  • Intercessory wasta on the other hand, involves someone intervening on behalf of a client to obtain an advantage or 2overcome a barrier from an authority figure. It is this type of wasta that affects hiring decisions.
  • Those who are supported by strong others will not be put down or rejected. Only the unconnected or unsupported are punished.
  • people who are related to important others (especially in government) are fortunate as they will have their demands or needs fulfilled. People serve those that are related to important people.
  • People tend to serve those that they know. Without knowing anybody, you will have difficulty getting the service you want.
  • The turban symbolizes a senior respected person. If you know a senior person, your demands will be meet. Similar to the second proverb
  • Intermediary wasta is utilized to facilitate the resolution of intergroup or interpersonal conflicts. In this system, wasta improves human relations and reinforces social norms.
  • Intermediary wasta is utilized to facilitate the resolution of intergroup or interpersonal conflicts. In this system, wasta improves human relations and reinforces social norms. Intercessory wasta on the other hand, involves someone intervening on behalf of a client to obtain an advantage or 2overcome a barrier from an authority figure. It is this type of wasta that affects hiring decisions.
  • feed feelings of injustice and frustration among those who are qualified for the job but do not have a wasta. Wasta is also different from the more popular nepotism and cronyism. While nepotism involves hiring of relatives and friends, wasta is not restricted to such groups and may involve strangers
  • may lead to poor job performance and economic decline.
  • Indeed, wasta is blamed for Arab world’s poor economic performance and brain drain (Al Maeena, 2003; Cunnigham & Sarayrah, 1994). Kilani and Sakijha (2002) stress that wasta is becoming a burden on its seeker, its granter and the government.
  • Arab wasta has been compared to the Chinese concept of guanxi. Both wasta and guanxi use social networks to influence the distribution of advantages and resources. However, while guanxi is based on Confucian ethics which focus on strengthening collective ties (Hutchings & Weir, 2006a; Hutchings & Weir, 2006b); wasta violates Muslim ethics which prescribe hiring the most qualified.
  • Wasta plays a critical role in hiring and promotion decisions in Arab organizations. Before applying to a position, applicants may seek out a wasta to improve their chances of being hired. A person with poor qualifications but a strong wasta will be favored over a person who is more qualified but does not have a wasta. Because many people may apply with wasta, the applicant with the most important wasta often gets the position.
  • allieggg on 05 Oct 14
     
    Compiled by faculty members at the German University in Cairo, this working paper series addresses the effect that watsa has on competence and morality in Middle Eastern economics and society. The authors define watsa as, "the intervention of a patron in favor of a client to obtain benefits and/or resources from a third party." In simpler terms it is a system of social networking in Arab culture in which family and social ties play a significant role in the attainment of economic advantages and resources, largely in the hiring process in businesses and organizations. A person applying for a job seeks out watsa to increase their chances of getting hired. Comparable to nepotism and cronyism, but is not restricted to friends and associates, watsa can also involve strangers linked through some social web of people. Watsa runs somewhat parallel to a Chinese concept of guanxi, based on Confucian ethics and focusing on strong collective ties. While guanxi is a part of Chinese ethics it actually defies Muslim ethical values, which advocates hiring the person most capable. In a Jordanian survey, 87% of respondents want watsa eradicated. While we know that unemployment in the Arab region is widespread, we can assume that this motivates people to do anything they can to improve their chances of obtaining a job. However, the practice of watsa as a whole is actually degrading the economic systems in the Arab sates even further. The article explains the linkage between watsa and poor job performance, economic decline, and the festering of injustice and frustration among the masses in Arab countries.
  • micklethwait on 07 Oct 14
     
    This looks super interesting, but I can't get the link to open. Thanks for writing a thorough summary of it!
cbrock5654

BBC News - Mosul Dam: Why the battle for water matters in Iraq - 0 views

www.bbc.com/...world-middle-east-28772478

IS ISIS Iraq Mosul water

shared by cbrock5654 on 22 Sep 14 - No Cached
  • cbrock5654 on 22 Sep 14
     
    The Mosul Dam is an incredibly important strategic location in the war between IS and Iraqi and Kurdish forces. This is because the dam controls water flow and generates electricity for most of Iraq. After it was captured by IS on 09/11/14, President Obama authorized air support for Iraqi and Kurdish forces, in response to the treat posed by the flooding of the Tigris river. The dam was recaptured, but the third largest dam in Iraq, the Fallujah dam, is still under IS control.
  • cbrock5654 on 22 Sep 14
     
    The Mosul Dam is an incredibly important strategic location in the war between IS and Iraqi and Kurdish forces. This is because the dam controls water flow and generates electricity for most of Iraq. After it was captured by IS on 09/11/14, President Obama authorized air support for Iraqi and Kurdish forces, in response to the treat posed by the flooding of the Tigris river. The dam was recaptured, but the third largest dam in Iraq, the Fallujah dam, is still under IS control.
  • cbrock5654 on 22 Sep 14
     
    The Mosul Dam is an incredibly important strategic location in the war between IS and Iraqi and Kurdish forces. This is because the dam controls water flow and generates electricity for most of Iraq. After it was captured by IS on 09/11/14, President Obama authorized air support for Iraqi and Kurdish forces, in response to the treat posed by the flooding of the Tigris river. The dam was recaptured, but the third largest dam in Iraq, the Fallujah dam, is still under IS control.
wmulnea

Libya's civil war: That it should come to this | The Economist - 3 views

www.economist.com/...factional-chaos-it-should-come

shared by wmulnea on 11 Apr 15 - No Cached
  • It is split between a government in Beida, in the east of the country, which is aligned with the military; and another in Tripoli, in the west, which is dominated by Islamists and militias from western coastal cities
  • Benghazi is again a battlefield.
  • The black plumes of burning oil terminals stretch out over the Mediterranean.
  • ...69 more annotations...
  • Libya looked like the latest fragile blossoming of the Arab spring
  • Army commanders, mostly of Arab Bedouin origin, refused orders to shoot the protesters
  • the revolutionaries cobbled together a National Transitional Council (NTC) claiming to represent all of Libya
  • Volunteers from students to bank managers took up arms, joining popular militias and only sometimes obeying the orders of defecting army commanders trying to take control
  • In August Western bombing of government bases surrounding Tripoli cleared an avenue for the revolutionaries to take the capital.
  • Recognised abroad, popular at home and enjoying the benefits of healthy oil revenues—97% of the government’s income—the NTC was well placed to lay the foundations for a new Libya
  • he judges, academics and lawyers who filled its ranks worried about their own legitimacy and feared confrontation with the militias which, in toppling Qaddafi, had taken his arsenals for their own.
  • militia leaders were already ensconced in the capital’s prime properties
  • The NTC presided over Libya’s first democratic elections in July 2012, and the smooth subsequent handover of power to the General National Congress (GNC) revived popular support for the revolution.
  • Islamist parties won only 19 of 80 seats assigned to parties in the new legislature, and the process left the militias on the outside
  • The Homeland party, founded by Abdel Hakim Belhad
  • tried to advertise its moderation by putting an unveiled woman at the head of its party list in Benghazi
  • The incumbent prime minister, Abdurrahim al-Keib, a university professor who had spent decades in exile, fretted and dithered
  • He bowed to militia demands for their leaders to be appointed to senior ministries, and failed to revive public-works programmes
  • which might have given militiamen jobs
  • Many received handouts without being required to hand in weapons or disband, an incentive which served to swell their ranks
  • the number of revolutionaries registered with the Warriors Affairs Commission set up by the NTC was about 60,000; a year later there were over 200,000. Of some 500 registered militias, almost half came from one city, Misrata.
  • In May 2013 the militias forced parliament to pass a law barring from office anyone who had held a senior position in Qaddafi’s regime after laying siege to government ministries.
  • In the spring of 2014, Khalifa Haftar, a retired general who had earlier returned from two decades of exile in America, forcibly tried to dissolve the GNC and re-establish himself as the armed forces’ commander-in-chief in an operation he called Dignity
  • The elections which followed were a far cry from the happy experience of 2012. In some parts of the country it was too dangerous to go out and vote
  • Such retrenchment has been particularly noticeable among women. In 2011 they created a flurry of new civil associations; now many are back indoors.
  • Turnout in the June 2014 elections was 18%, down from 60% in 2012, and the Islamists fared even worse than before
  • Dismissing the results, an alliance of Islamist, Misratan and Berber militias called Libya Dawn launched a six-week assault on Tripoli. The newly elected parliament decamped to Tobruk, some 1,300km east
  • Grasping for a figleaf of legitimacy, Libya Dawn reconstituted the pre-election GNC and appointed a new government
  • So today Libya is split between two parliaments—both boycotted by their own oppositions and inquorate—two governments, and two central-bank governors.
  • The army—which has two chiefs of staff—is largely split along ethnic lines, with Arab soldiers in Arab tribes rallying around Dignity and the far fewer Misratan and Berber ones around Libya Dawn.
  • Libya Dawn controls the bulk of the territory and probably has more fighters at its disposal.
  • General Haftar’s Dignity, which has based its government in Beida, has air power and, probably, better weaponry
  • the Dignity movement proclaims itself America’s natural ally in the war on terror and the scourge of jihadist Islam
  • Libya Dawn’s commanders present themselves as standard-bearers of the revolution against Qaddafi now continuing the struggle against his former officers
  • Ministers in the east vow to liberate Tripoli from its “occupation” by Islamists, all of whom they denounce as terrorists
  • threatens to take the war to Egypt if Mr Sisi continues to arm the east. Sleeping cells could strike, he warns, drawn from the 2m tribesmen of Libyan origin in Egypt.
  • Yusuf Dawar
  • The struggle over the Gulf of Sirte area, which holds Libya’s main oil terminals and most of its oil reserves, threatens to devastate the country’s primary asset
  • And in the Sahara, where the largest oilfields are, both sides have enlisted ethnic minorities as proxies
  • ibya Dawn has drafted in the brown-skinned Tuareg, southern cousins of the Berbers; Dignity has recruited the black-skinned Toubou. As a result a fresh brawl is brewing in the Saharan oasis of Ubari, which sits at the gates of the al-Sharara oilfield, largest of them all.
  • Oil production has fallen and become much more volatile
  • oil is worth half as much as it was a year ago
  • The Central Bank is now spending at three times the rate that it is taking in oil money
  • The bank is committed to neutrality, but is based in Tripoli
  • Tripoli may have a little more access to cash, but is in bad shape in other ways
  • Fuel supplies and electricity are petering out
  • Crime is rising; carjacking street gangs post their ransom demands on Twitter
  • In Fashloum
  • residents briefly erected barricades to keep out a brigade of Islamists, the Nuwassi
  • “No to Islamists and the al-Qaeda gang” reads the roadside graffiti
  • Libya’s ungoverned spaces are growing,
  • Each month 10,000 migrants set sail for Europe
  • On January 3rd, IS claimed to have extended its reach to Libya’s Sahara too, killing a dozen soldiers at a checkpoint
  • The conflict is as likely to spread as to burn itself out.
  • the Western powers
  • have since been conspicuous by their absence. Chastened by failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, they have watched from the sidelines
  • Obama washed his hands of Libya after Islamists killed his ambassador
  • Italy, the former colonial power, is the last country to have a functioning embassy in Tripoli.
  • Even under Qaddafi the country did not feel so cut off
  • Dignity is supported not just by Mr Sisi but also by the United Arab Emirates, which has sent its own fighter jets into the fray as well as providing arms
  • The UAE’s Gulf rival, Qatar, and Turkey have backed the Islamists and Misratans in the west
  • If oil revenues were to be put into an escrow account, overseas assets frozen and the arms embargo honoured he thinks it might be possible to deprive fighters of the finance that keeps them fighting and force them to the table
  • Until 1963 Libya was governed as three federal provinces—Cyrenaica in the east, Fezzan in the south and Tripolitania in the west
  • The old divisions still matter
  • the marginalised Cyrenaicans harked back to the time when their king split his time between the courts of Tobruk and Beida and when Arabs from the Bedouin tribes of the Green Mountains ran his army
  • Tensions between those tribes and Islamist militias ran high from the start.
  • July 2011 jihadists keen to settle scores with officers who had crushed their revolt in the late 1990s killed the NTC’s commander-in-chief, Abdel Fattah Younis, who came from a powerful Arab tribe in the Green Mountains. In June 2013 the Transitional Council of Barqa (the Arab name for Cyrenaica), a body primarily comprised of Arab tribes, declared the east a separate federal region, and soon after allied tribal militias around the Gulf of Sirte took control of the oilfields.
  • In the west, indigenous Berbers, who make up about a tenth of the population, formed a council of their own and called on larger Berber communities in the Maghreb and Europe for support
  • Port cities started to claim self-government and set up their own border controls.
  • Derna—a small port in the east famed for having sent more jihadists per person to fight in Iraq than anywhere else in the world
  • opposed NATO intervention and insisted that the NTC was a pagan (wadani) not national (watani) council
  • Some in Derna have now declared their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq.
  • In December the head of America’s Africa command told reporters that IS was training some 200 fighters in the town.
mcooka

Iraq divisions undermine battle against IS - BBC News - 0 views

www.bbc.com/...world-middle-east-35492067

iraq war crossfire politics suni

shared by mcooka on 24 Feb 16 - No Cached
  • More than in any other country, Iraq's future is intimately bound up with the fate of self-styled Islamic State (IS).
  • Territory that was lost in a day or two is taking many months to claw painfully back.
  • But even if initially successful, such an ambitious project, indeed, any further moves to oust IS, could go badly wrong if the foundations are not sound
  • ...11 more annotations...
  • The IS fighters were able to lodge so easily in the Sunni Arab heartlands because the people there had been largely alienated by the sectarian policies and practices of the Shia Arab-dominated Baghdad government under Nouri al-Maliki, who was finally prised out of the prime minister's office in August 2014.
  • gislation to empower the Sunnis by devolving security and financial responsibilities to the provinces has not happened.
  • Nor have measures to reverse the persecution of former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party, or the random arrests, detentions, and to assuage other Sunni grievances.
  • he US, who have about 3,500 military personnel training and advising Iraqi government forces on the ground, also seems to be aware that military muscle is not enough.
  • If that process continues and the militants are defeated, the way Iraq fits together - if it does - will be decided by who pushes them out, and how the resulting vacuum is filled.
  • osul is an almost wholly Sunni city with a population of about two million.
  • Some residents may still see IS - about 85% of whose fighters in Iraq are believed to be Iraqi - as their protectors against an Iranian-backed, Shia-dominated Baghdad government.
  • When the Iraqi army collapsed like a house of cards in the face of the IS eruption in June 2014, it was a motley array of hastily-assembled Shia irregulars, loosely banded into the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation) that prevented the militants reaching Baghda
  • Ramadi gave a boost to the embattled Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi.He has scant support even from his own Shia Daawa party, and is seen across the board by Sunni, Shia and Kurdish politicians as weak, hesitant, lacking in leadership and unable to stand up to the militias.But there was a down-side to the Ramadi victory too: heavy destruction, and the displacement of the entire population.
  • Nor can the formula that finally and slowly worked in Ramadi simply be applied at Mosul. It took government forces with coalition backing seven months to regain Ramadi. Mosul is 10 times bigger.
  • He omitted to mention coalition air support, which would also clearly be crucial to the campaign.Some Iraqi analysts believe outside ground forces would also be needed. US military leaders, while reticent, clearly want to up the pace and have not ruled out more boots on the ground. In the absence of serious moves towards national reconciliation, one senior government figure also saw a campaign to retake Mosul as a vital way of forging national unity.
  • mcooka on 24 Feb 16
     
    This article is about the Iraq divisions which undermine the Iraqi purpose of war. This is a result of an unstable foundation to build plans off of. They are trying to find foundation because they do not want to fall back into an IS state five years down the line. 
allieggg

Libya has become the latest Isil conquest - Telegraph - 0 views

www.telegraph.co.uk/...-the-latest-Isil-conquest.html

ISIL militias armed groups syria Iraq Jihad Benghazi

shared by allieggg on 17 Nov 14 - No Cached
  • If the conditions remain unchallenged and, hence, unchanged, it will turn into another Syria or Iraq.
  • Nowhere is this threat more profound than with the rise of radical Islam in Libya
  • The ongoing low-level insurgency in Benghazi is driven by two factors. The first is the radical Islamist ideology of certain groups that refuse to recognise the modern state and its institutions. For example, according to the leader of AS’s Benghazi branch, Mohammed al-Zahawi, his group will not disarm and demobilise until its version of sharia is imposed. The realisation of such an Islamic state constitutes the group’s main aim. In other words, it is the nature of their Jihad.
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • The second reason is the Islamists’ history with the state security forces. During the 1990s, Muammar Gaddafi unleashed a crackdown on all expressions of Islamism, which saw thousands of youths arrested and jailed as political prisoners. Many were incarcerated in the notorious Abu-Saleem prison. Today’s rejection of state institutions has its roots in that brutality.
  • However, Benghazi is not the only Islamist stronghold in Libya: the city of Derna, which has historically been a strong recruiting ground for Jihadi fighters to Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently Syria, is of serious concern
  • Derna’s Shura Council of Islamic Youth and Ansar al-Sharia have decided to declare Derna an “Islamic emirate” and publicly announce their allegiance to ISIL and its leader and so called “Caliphate” of Abu Baker al-Baghdadi. This means that ISIL now has its terrorist tentacles in Libya.
  • If the international community continues to overlook the current Libyan crisis, the country is likely to become an incubator of militant Islamist groups.
  • In addition to a military response, however, we need a holistic and proactive approach that focuses on achieving reconciliation and stability. This involves forcing all rival political parties to the negotiation table to agree that a newly elected parliament is the sole representative body in the country.
  • allieggg on 17 Nov 14
     
    This article basically accentuates the driving factors to the ongoing insurgency of ISIL in Libya and how the threat is even more extreme than that of Iraq and Syria. One is the Islamist ideology in itself, rejecting any form of a modern state and the institutions that accompany its success. For example in Libya the leader of the AS branch declares that his militants will not disarm or demobilize until sharia law is imposed. Second, during Gaddafi's rule he unleashed a crackdown on all Islamic expression. The brutality shown towards Islamic groups during this time has fueled their resentment towards sectarian rule and has urged them to push for the rejection of state institutions even more so. The article explains how Islamic groups have claimed power in both Benghazi and Derna, the latter being the historic recruiting ground for Jihad fighters to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The author makes it clear that both military and diplomatic force from the international community is crucial for the reconciliation of security.
mcooka

Lebanon - Educational System-overview - Schools, Private, Students, and Lebanese - Stat... - 0 views

education.stateuniversity.com/...UCATIONAL-SYSTEM-OVERVIEW.html

lebanon system overview schools private public

shared by mcooka on 02 Mar 16 - No Cached
  • The Lebanese educational system is divided in two sectors: private schools and universities, for which there is a charge for admission, and public (government) schools and universities that are practically free of charge.
  • Education was once almost exclusively the responsibility of religious communities or foreign groups, but because the number of students in public schools has risen to more than two-fifths of the total school enrollment, the government was pressured to open more public schools to meet the demands of the general public.
  • While public schools have not paid much attention to the preschool phase and have required students to be five-years-old to be accepted in kindergarten until the 1990s, private schools have always had a preschool phase and have accepted students as young as three-years-old
  • ...18 more annotations...
  • The total duration in school remains intact, 12 years. The primary cycle of general education has been increased by one year, and is divided into two modules of three years each, while the intermediary cycle was reduced to three years instead of four. The first year of general education's secondary cycle must be considered common for all four different series of instruction, and the second year is common to only two out of four series. Lebanese students are not allowed to enter formal technical education before age 12, which is the age limit of obligatory education. The scholastic year was changed to 36 weeks, and 4 supplementary hours per week were added at the intermediary and secondary cycles.
  • The new school curricula was launched in September 1998, and the Educational Center for Research and Development had trained 16,000 teachers in public schools and 6,000 teachers in private schools on the new uses and principles of the new program. The new system took into account economic, social, and national perspectives. The principle characteristics of this new system consist of the following:
  • The Lebanese educational system has usually relied heavily on private schooling to accommodate the evergrowing demand for learning in the country
  • In short, the new formal educational system of Lebanon, like in many other countries, divides the years of instruction as follows: 6-3-3 (six years for the primary cycle, three years for the intermediate cycle, and three years for the secondary cycle), followed by the higher education cycle. Primary school education is followed either by a six-year intermediary and secondary program, leading to the official Lebanese baccalaureate certificate, which was originally based on the equivalent French school diploma, or by a three- to six-year technical or vocational training program.
  • There are 1508 public and private intermediary and secondary schools for the general instruction program in Lebanon, while there are only 262 schools for the technical and professional instruction program divided between the public sector (29 schools) and the private sector (233 schools).
  • Education is compulsory until the end of the intermediate cycle, is available to all Lebanese students, and is attended by nearly 95 percent of school-age children
  • The school year starts in early October and ends in late June. The school day consists of six hours starting at 8:00 a.m. with two hour lunch break and ends at 4:00 p.m. The length of class periods ranges from 50 to 55 minutes. Both public and private schools are supposed to observe official holidays, which are decided by the government; however, Christian-administered, religious private schools take Saturday and Sunday off every week, while Moslem-run religious private schools take Friday and Sunday, and Jewish-run private schools take off all of Saturday and Sunday afternoon only.
  • As to special education concerning handicapped students, there were about 10,000 handicapped people in 1975 (prior to the Lebanese civil war). During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, this number reached 13,000; it is more than 15,000 in 2001. About 2,500 handicapped people were being educated and made ready to enter the work market.
  • In addition, females appeared to have a slightly higher percentage than males with regard to attending schools and universities. After age 25 male attendance becomes almost double that of female attendance.
  • the literacy rate was 88.4 percent in 1997
  • ue to the Lebanese people's negative attitude toward manual work, especially in industry and agriculture, students of lower socioeconomic status enroll mostly in vocational and technical schools. Therefore, there is a big difference between the two major types of instruction, as well as the relative numbers of schools and students enrolled in each of these types
  • The brevet certificate is only required by public schools, vocational schools, and teacher training institutes. The baccalaureate part I exam has two main tracks: literary and scientific. The baccalaureate part II has four main tracks: literature and humanities, which includes language, literature, history, philosophy, education, arts, and religion; sociology and economy, which includes economic sciences, politics, business and management, law, and sociology; general sciences, which includes mathematics, physics, chemistry, and their applications at the level of engineering; and life sciences, which includes biology and life sciences, chemistry and their applications in the area of medicine, health, agriculture, and other related subjects.
  • Most institutions of higher education require entrance examinations besides the baccalaureate part II, which is required by law.
  • The grading system is generally based on scales of 0 to 20 or 0 to 100, with 10 or 60, respectively, as passing grades
  • he curriculum in Lebanese schools is somewhat rigid, for all students must pursue the same programs in all three cycles
  • rivate schools can choose textbooks that meet their syllabi, except in the civics area where the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport requires them to use the center's textbooks.
  • rabic and either French or English are the languages of instruction in the Lebanese schools.
  • The United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency (UNRWA) provides funds supporting a private nonsectarian school system for Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East. This type of private schooling has been very effective in offering education and social services for children of Palestinian Refugees residing in Lebanon
  • mcooka on 02 Mar 16
     
    This article gave a great general overview to the education in Lebanon. One of the major components of Lebanon's education system is when they changed it 1999 to reflect the style of French education systems. Additionally, Lebanon has a high rate of 95% attendance for its students and it also has a high rate of literacy at 89%
fcastro2

Are China and Russia Moving toward a Formal Alliance? | The Diplomat - 0 views

thediplomat.com/...oving-toward-a-formal-alliance

china russia alliance politics

shared by fcastro2 on 04 Feb 15 - No Cached
    • fcastro2
      fcastro2 on 04 Feb 15
       
      Why is this relationship forming now? Ukraine Crisis, they want a multipolar world, China/Japan dispute, & Russia and the NATO expansions. 
    • fcastro2
      fcastro2 on 04 Feb 15
       
      Advocates for China-Russian alliance. Shared strategic interests and possible length of this alliance, U.S. and its Allies threat to Russia leaves in no choice but to side with China, but may lead to another cold war.
    • fcastro2
      fcastro2 on 04 Feb 15
       
      Opponents of China-Russian Alliance. China could be dragged to war by Russia, Russian's unwillingness to be a junior to China, Russia wants good relations with ALL Asian countries. They believe this alliance is unrealistic and a strategic partnership is more reasonable. 
  • ...25 more annotations...
  • In the joint statement issued by China and Russia, the main message is that China-Russia relations have reached a new stage of comprehensive strategic partnership and this will help increase both countries’ international status and influence, thus contributing to a more just international order
  • China secures a long-term (30 years) provision of natural gas from Russia and Russia can reduce its dependence on the European markets as well as strengthen Russia’s position against Western sanctions
  • Russia is now moving closer to China’s side with regard to the territorial disputes between China and Japan
  • China and Russia last week vetoed a draft UN resolution to send Syria to the International Criminal Court for war crimes. China and Russia had vetoed three previous UNSC resolutions condemning Syria
  • China and Russia signed a huge natural gas deal that is worth about $400 billion.
  • China and Russia will deepen cooperation under the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA), a new security framework in Asia-Pacific that conveniently excludes the U.S. and Japan.
  • , the main trigger is the recent Ukraine crisis that has seriously damaged Russia-West relations
  • mutual strategic needs as both China and Russia want to create a multipolar world that is not dominated by the U.S., particularly as China faces threats from the US-led alliance in Asia
  • China’s chance of winning maritime disputes with Japan partly depends on maintaining a good relationship with Russia
  • the NATO expansion is a serious threat to Russia’s national security and as such Russia has to fight back
  • new China-Russia alliance is now emerging and this will eventually lead to a multi-polar world order.
  • problems in China-Russia relations such as historical mistrust, the lack of a common threat, and conflicting interests in Central Asia
  • he most important factor determining whether China and Russia should form an alliance is whether the two countries have shared strategic interests and how long such shared strategic interests can last
  • China nor Russia could become a member of the Western bloc led by the U.S. because other allies of the U.S. would feel threatened by China and Russia
  • thus Russia has no better alternative to siding with China
  • , China’s number two position in the world means that China will not be supported by the U.S. with regard to most international affairs issues
  • Yan also refutes the argument that a China-Russia alliance against the U.S. would lead to another cold war.
  • ould be potentially high costs of such an alliance due to common problems such as fears of abandonment and entrapment
  • U.S. militarily threatens both China and Russia at the same time
  • Russia is unwilling to be China’s junior partner in the relationship
  • Russia wants to maintain good relations with all Asian states and thus will not side with China when it comes to territorial disputes between China and Japan
  • China-Russia alliance is unrealistic and a strategic partnership is more flexible and better for China.
  • seems that in the near future a formal alliance between China and Russia will not happen due to a variety of reasons.
  • China could be dragged into an unnecessary war by Russia
  • , a formal alliance will not occur
diamond03

Prevalence of female genital cutting among Egyptian girls - 0 views

www.who.int/...en

female genital cutting egyptian

shared by diamond03 on 06 Oct 14 - No Cached
    • diamond03
      diamond03 on 06 Oct 14
       
      This is so strange and taboo. 
  • fundamental violation of women’s and girls’ rights
  • 50% or highe
  • ...41 more annotations...
  • female circumcisio
  • harmful physical, psychological and human rights consequences has led to the use of the term “female genital mutilation
  • women who have undergone FGC do not consider themselves to be mutilated and have become offended by the term “FGM”
  • no definitive evidence documenting when or why this ritual began
  • practised in ancient Egypt as a sign of distinction, while others hypothesize its origin in ancient Greece, Rome, Pre-Islamic Arabia and the Tsarist Russian Federation.
  • 97% of married women surveyed experienced FGC.3
  • 94.6% of married women had been exposed to FGC and 69.1% of those women agreed to carry out FGC on their daughters
  • 41% of female students in primary, preparatory and secondary schools had been exposed to FGC.
  • females interviewed was 38 816. The prevalence of FGC among schoolgirls was 50.3%. The prevalence of FGC was 46.2% in government urban schools, 9.2% in private urban schools and 61.7% in rural schools.
  • FGC has remained a common practice in the countries where it has traditionally been performed.4
  • Egypt are type I (commonly referred to as clitoridectomy) and type II (commonly referred to as excision).5 In Africa, the most common type of FGC is type II (excision of the clitoris and the labia minor) which accounts for up to 80% of all cases.6 I
  • In 1995, a ministerial decree forbade the practice and made it punishable by fine and imprisonment
  • The difference in the prevalence rates of FGC is mainly due to educational status in both rural and urban areas
  • There is an obvious negative correlation between the female’s parents’ education and the practice of FGC
  • Parents with low or no education are the most likely to have circumcised their daughters with prevalence rates ranging between 59.5% and 65.1%
  • higher degrees of education are the least likely to have their daughters circumcised and the prevalence rate ranged between 19.5% and 22.2%.
  • age at which FGC is performed on girls varies
  • 4 and 12 years old
  • the procedure may be carried out shortly after birth to some time before the age of marriage.6
  • some girls mentioned that they were circumcised soon after birth, during the neonatal period.
  • . In Egypt, in the past, the majority of FGC procedures were performed by traditional midwives, called dayas. However, according to the Demographic and Health Survey (1995),16 the number of
  • An immediate effect of the procedure is pain because FGC is often carried out without anaesthesia.
  • Short-term complications, such as severe bleeding which can lead to shock or death
  • include infection because of unsanitary operating conditions, and significant psychological and psychosexual consequences of FGC
  • complications (early and late) such as severe pain, bleeding, incontinence, infections, mental health problems, sexual problems, primary infertility and difficult labour with high episiotomy rate. In addition, the repetitive use of the same instruments on several girls without sterilization can cause the spread of HIV and Hepatitis B and C.
  • Fathers played minor roles as decision-makers for the procedure (9.4%
  • mothers are the main decision-makers for the procedure of FGC (65.2%)
  • circumcision is an important religious tradition (33.4%)
  • religious tradition is still the most important reason for performing FGC in Egypt,
  • In these surveys, 72% of ever-married women reported that circumcision is an important part of religious tradition and about two-thirds of the women had the impression that the husband prefers his wife to be circumcised
  • one-third of ever-married women cited cleanliness as a reason while a small number saw it as a way to prevent promiscuity before marriage.
  • milies refuse to accept women who have not undergone FGC as marriage partners
  • Around 12% of girls believed that there is no religious support for circumcision.
  • . It is an issue that demands a collaborative approach involving health professionals, religious leaders, educationalists and nongovernmental organizations.
  • partial or total cutting away of the female external genitalia
  • Female genital cutting (FGC
  • Past issues Information for contributors Editorial members How to order About the Bulletin Disclaimer Prevalence of female genital cutting among Egyptian girls
  • 100 and 130
  • cultural or other non-therapeutic reason
  • 28 African countries and the Middle East have been subjected to FGC.2
  • million girls and women
  • micklethwait on 07 Oct 14
     
    This is such a controversial topic. I saw a reference to it recently (was it possibly something that was brought up in the Bill Maher/Ben Affleck dust-up?) that pointed out that the practice is almost unheard of outside of central and northeastern Africa, with a few small pockets in Iraq and the Gulf.
mcooka

Schooling in a crisis: the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey - ODI HPN - 0 views

odihpn.org/...e-of-syrian-refugees-in-turkey

refugee schooling crisis turkey Syria camps education

shared by mcooka on 17 Feb 16 - No Cached
  • The Syrian civil war has created one of the largest and most intense episodes of human suffering of the early twenty-first century.
  • 387,883, with 200,039 living in government camps and 164,143 living in rented apartments
  • Turkey’s efforts to meet the needs of refugees have been spearheaded by the Afet ve Acil Durum Yonetimi Baskanligi
  • ...36 more annotations...
  • majority of refugees are women and, especially, children; of the 200,000 refugees in Turkish camps, about 60% are children.
  • t was left to him to find tents, wooden flooring, carpets and paving bricks, desks, chairs, drawing boards, teaching aids and, of course, textbooks
  • urkish Red Crescent
  • acquired through AFAD channels a
  • egging
  • he result
  • ten large tents with floors
  • drawing boards
  • electricity
  • computer projectors.
  • limate control consisted of large fans
  • he pre-school director in Islahiye Camp used empty office and storage space in the warehouse to house five rooms full of loud young children
  • preschools enjoyed the largest proportion of age-group participation.
  • camp schools are administered by Turks
  • curricula are not recognised or sanctioned by the Turkish education authorities, and so licenced Turkish teachers cannot be assigned to them.
  • amp education directors rely heavily on volunteers from among the refugees themselves
  • time and instruction with the children is often inconsistent
  • not be able to teach in Arabic
  • There is little incentive for parents to commit their children to learning a new language
  • Closely related to the issue of language is the curriculum
  • eenage students in the camps generally do not have access to the secondary schooling
  • Indeed, one source of tension between Syrian parents and the Turkish authorities has been the Syrian demand for special classes for advanced students whose preparations for university entrance exams were interrupted by the war.
  • Syrian schools have opened outside of the camps with funding from the local government,
  • using the Syrian curriculum and books salvaged from Syrian schools and reproduced
  • Gaziantep
  • namely Syrian demands for the separation of the sexes in classrooms
  • Syrian parents also tend to insist that their daughters wear headscarves (hijab) in public and in schools, while it is illegal for Turkish teenage girls to cover their hair at school.
  • Tensions over the separation of the sexes, curriculum and language of instruction are compounded by the politics of Syrians’ refugee status
  • y contrast, the Turkish government chose not to officially recognise the Syrians as refugees as defined by UNHCR, and did not ask UNHCR to register the newcomers as refugees.
  • officially designate Syrians as refugees would limit Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian civil war,
  • Turkey has allowed arms and non-lethal aid through its territory to supply the Free Syrian Army
  • here are also concerns that Syrians, desperate for income, take jobs at lower wages than Turks
  • Even guests can outstay their welcome, and with no end in sight to the civil war and no prospect of a return of Syrians to Syria, Turks are beginning to question how long they can sustain their assistance. I
  • une 2013 AFAD began accepting offers of financial and other aid from outside agencies, including UNHCR and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).
  • The schools developed in Syrian refugee camps in Turkey provide valuable models for establishing schools for rapidly growing refugee populations.
  • The next critical challenge for Syrian education in Turkey is what to do with the growing number of Syrian teenagers who need to finish their high-school studies at accredited schools in order to compete for places at universities in Turkey or elsewhere.
  • mcooka on 17 Feb 16
     
    This was probably the most interesting article I have read about education in the MIddle East. It is from the "Humanitarian practice Network". This article is about Turkey and the Syrian refugees, who are not documented as refugees, and the growing desire for improvements to education. Right now, the education which is in place for Syrians is adequate for a temporary stay of preserving knowledge. It is not designed to be used long term, to advance students, or to prep them for universities. This article looks at those issues and tensions which are happening currently in Turkey
fcastro2

Syria allies: Why Russia, Iran and China are standing by the regime - CNN.com - 1 views

www.cnn.com/...a-iran-china-russia-supporters

syria allies russia iran china middle east politics

shared by fcastro2 on 28 Jan 15 - No Cached
  • One has to do with economics; the other with ideology.
  • Russia is one of Syria's biggest arms suppliers
  • Syrian contracts with the Russian defense industry have likely exceeded $4 billion
  • ...29 more annotations...
  • Russia also leases a naval facility at the Syrian port of Tartu
  • Moscow also signed a $550 million deal with Syria for combat training jets
  • value of Russian arms sales to Syria at $162 million per year in both 2009 and 2010
  • Russia's key policy goal is blocking American efforts to shape the regio
  • Russia doesn't believe revolutions, wars and regime change bring stability and democracy
  • It believes humanitarian concerns are often used an excuse for pursuing America's own political and economic interests.
  • Putin's existential fear for his own survival and the survival of the repressive system that he and al-Assad represent
    • fcastro2
      fcastro2 on 28 Jan 15
       
      Putin is scared that the "west" will defeat Russia if Syria is defeated
  • not only driven by the need to preserve its naval presence in the Mediterranean, secure its energy contracts, or counter the West on 'regime change
  • al-Assad cannot lose because it means that one day he, Putin, might as well
  • The West handles the Islamic world the way a monkey handles a grenade," Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin tweeted
  • Russia is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. It has the power to veto Security Council resolutions against the Syrian regime and has done so repeatedly over the past two years
  • religion and strategy.
  • Islamic Republic has provided technical help such as intelligence, communications and advice on crowd control and weapons as protests in Syria morphed into resistance
  • The last thing Iran wants now is a Sunni-dominated Syria -- especially as the rebels' main supporters are Iran's Persian Gulf rivals: Qatar and Saudi Arabi
  • proxy through which Iran can threaten Israel with an arsenal of short-range missiles
  • Iran counted on Syria as its only Arab ally during its eight-year war with Iraq. Iraq was Sunni-dominate
  • war between the front of hegemony and the front of resistance
  • Syrian government is a victim of international plots
  • Iran says the main objective of this plot is to make the region safer for Israe
  • Many believe Iran is Washington's greatest threat in the region, especially with its nuclear potential
  • the Americans will sustain damage like when they interfered in Iraq and Afghanistan
  • Syria's third-largest importer in 2010, according to data from the European Commission
  • maintain its financial tie
  • indicates that China sees Syria as an important trading hub
  • China has said foreign countries shouldn't meddle in Syria's internal affairs
  • Rather than siding with either Assad or the opposition and standing aside to 'wait and see,' Beijing is actively betting on both
  • China said it is firmly opposed to the use of chemical weapons and supports the U.N.'s chemical weapons inspectors.
  • It also said it wants a political solution for Syri
  • China is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. And like Russia, China has repeatedly blocked sanctions attempts against the Syrian regime
  • fcastro2 on 28 Jan 15
     
    Syria's allies, Russia, Iran, and China, all stand by them despite western powers opposing the Syrian government. There are different reasons to why these powers seem to stay with Syria such as Russia's ideologies, Iran's strategy, or China's trading. Either way, these government will stand by them until there is nothing left to lose. 
kbrisba

Tunisia Is Still a Success - The Atlantic - 0 views

www.theatlantic.com/...388436

shared by kbrisba on 29 Mar 15 - No Cached
  • kbrisba on 29 Mar 15
     
    The question asked is, "Does the March 18 Tunis attack signal that Tunisia will be the next Arab Spring state to be swallowed by violence and repression?" The answer is no. The attack was shocking and like I said in the article it has damaged the country's tourism industry which is a huge part of Tunisia's economy. The bigger picture of this article is the neighboring states of Tunisia. Libya is in a worse state where a lot of terrorist attacks are going on or the terrorists are coming from Libya into Tunisia. Tunisia can never have true security until Libya's situation is addressed.
kevinobkirchner

BBC News - Egypt 'has key role' in fight against Islamic State - Kerry - 0 views

www.bbc.com/...world-middle-east-29186686

egypt IS kerry sinai

shared by kevinobkirchner on 28 Sep 14 - No Cached
  • kevinobkirchner on 28 Sep 14
     
    US Secretary of State John Kerry is on a tour of the Middle East rallying support for the fight against the IS. Egypt is part of a 10 state Middle Eastern coalition dedicated to eradicating the IS. Kerry said Egypt has a, "Key role," in defeating the IS due to their success in dealing with Sinai jihadists, he also acknowledged that Egypt is the cultural and intellectual capitol of the Middle East implying that they can resist IS's influence.
allieggg

I watched Libya seize its freedom. Now I have to flee its new chaos | World news | The ... - 0 views

www.theguardian.com/...bya-freedom-now-flee-new-chaos

libya armed groups middle east Revolution recontruction war militias chaos the guardian revolutionaries

shared by allieggg on 13 Nov 14 - No Cached
  • the first democratically elected parliament, the General National Congress, rather than disband the militias, funded them, each faction seeing its own forces as insurance against those of everyone else.
  • An Islamist-led coalition came to dominate parliament, but as the squabbling grew worse it realised it would lose an election, so delayed having one.
  • Then, in May, a former Gaddafi-era general turned rebel leader, Khalifa Hiftar, launched an offensive against Islamist brigades in the east while his allies stormed congress in Tripoli. An election was duly called in June, and the Islamists duly lost, or expect to lose when parliament assembles this week. The result has seen some of their militias grab what Tripoli real estate they can, triggering civil war.
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • "Within Libya it is region against region, within regions, tribe against tribe, within tribes, family against family."
  • The Islamists call themselves revolutionaries, implying that anyone opposed to them is against the revolution. Their opponents also call themselves revolutionaries, labelling the Islamists "terrorists", while the Islamists accuse their opponents of following Gaddafi. Neither label is true: both sides have plenty to give that is positive. But the time for giving in Libya seems past.
  • "We are like a class of kids where the bad teacher is suddenly dead," he said. "Now we all fight each other."
  • "My problem is, it's hard to be a radical moderate."
  • Flying away, I leave the country as I found it, back at war. It is a country so rich in possibility and so undone by a chaos you can unpick for ever without getting to the nub.
  • My photographer friend had the answer. "Confused?" he told me. "Then you understand Libya."
  • allieggg on 13 Nov 14
     
    This article illuminates the aftermath of Gaddafi's reign from a first person perspective of a citizen fleeing the country due to its devastating chaos. He offers a short version of the conflict and the rise in militant groups. The root of the issue is the fact that when the GNC took power, the factions funded the militant groups for their own insurance rather than working towards their disbandment. The Islamist coalition dominated parliament, and as chaos deepened when they realized they would loose the election so they just delayed having one. This is where General Khalifa Haftar chimed in, launching his offense against islamic insurgency by storming the capitol in Tripoli leading the country to slip into civil war. The Author says "We are like a class of kids where the bad teacher is suddenly dead," he said. "Now we all fight each other." When the light finally comes to a country that was for so long in the dark, its blinding. 
ajonesn

How Egypt is keeping its women trapped in zombie society - Your Middle East - 0 views

www.yourmiddleeast.com/...rapped-in-zombie-society_26800

Egypt womens rights zombies

shared by ajonesn on 29 Sep 14 - No Cached
  • he majority of families would rather have their daughters in an unfulfilling, even miserable marriage, convinced that she will somehow find a magical way to adapt, than see her alone
    • diamond03
      diamond03 on 29 Sep 14
       
      This is so sad and disturbing!
  • Female independence is looked down on,
  • true religious scholars are the first to reject any form of overt or clandestine female oppression
  • ...47 more annotations...
  • there is hope
  • intellectual women today stand in solidarity
  • woman's marital status is mutually exclusive from her value and right to lead a healthy, fulfilling life of her own.
  • suffering economy
  • women
  • society
  • spinsterhood
  • marriage in Egypt really means.
  • trapped
  • declining marriage rate in Egypt,
  • “transforming her into a commodity for the highest bidder.”
  • family to be the pillar of one's success
  • pros and cons,
  • codependence is highly favorable in the Middle Eas
  • typical Egyptian female's life, is to pursue an auspicious college degree
  • regarded as a supporter or sidekick,
  • “...an archaic notion that defines a woman's value by her husband's status”
  • improve her chances of finding a proper suitor
  • lifelong purpose of securing a husband.
  • he standard sequence of events for a typical Egyptian female's life, is to pursue an auspicious college degree (to improve her chances of finding a proper suitor, and assist her future children with their studies), possibly add to her assets by acquiring a mediocre job for a year or two (under the pretext of killing time and elevating her practical wisdom), and eventually fulfill her lifelong purpose of securing a
  • ones who suffer are those who can't find a “star.”
  • pressure from three distinctive sources
  • their rights and full potential, desperately seeking approval before they reach their “expiration date.
  • “Stepford wife model”,
  • incompatible matc
  • transforming her identity, s
  • driven towards more extreme measures.
  • parents employing psychological abuse
  • subject to such scrutiny
  • generation of women
  • oblivious t
  • conforming comes naturally to a lot of women,
  • On one hand
  • (parents-peers-society
  • quoting religious commandments promoting marriage,
  • coerce their daughters
  • into submission
  • threat of eternal damnation
  • (should she fail to perform this role and still wishes to enjoy her life then she will have indeed committed sacrilege and is a covertly regarded as a disgrace regardless of any other achievement)
  • peer-pressure;
  • still under the impression that exceptions do not exist .
  • 25-40
  • “business marriages”
  • Egyptians have a problem with evolution
  • persecute anomalies
  • educated middle class that crowns the highest rate of unmarried wome
  • women can hardly take care of themselves and that is the norm.
  • ajonesn on 13 Apr 15
     
    I enjoyed this article because it uses terminology that is not typically associated with this topic. The author compares Egyptian women to zombies, stating that they must "play-dead" or be "obliterated and shunned."
hwilson3

How YouTube Is Aiding The Libyan Revolution | SocialTimes - 0 views

www.adweek.com/...40683

#libya #youtube #socialmedia #citizentube

shared by hwilson3 on 23 Feb 16 - No Cached
  • hwilson3 on 23 Feb 16
     
    When people are long distances away from revolutions, it is easy to not focus or forget about them. That is why the use of video is so important. This article discusses the uprising in Libya and how the over 9,000 videos uploaded to youtube impacted their causes. It also discusses another platform called Citizentube that helped people upload videos even when youtube is blocked. Being able to see all of the whats really going on really puts things in perspective and helps to spread message on a global scale.
  • hwilson3 on 23 Feb 16
     
    When people are long distances away from revolutions, it is easy to not focus or forget about them. That is why the use of video is so important. This article discusses the uprising in Libya and how the over 9,000 videos uploaded to youtube impacted their causes. It also discusses another platform called Citizentube that helped people upload videos even when youtube is blocked. Being able to see all of the whats really going on really puts things in perspective and helps to spread message on a global scale.
amarsha5

How long can Saudi Arabia afford Yemen war? - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East - 14 views

www.al-monitor.com/...ia-economic-repercussions.html

saudi yemen war economics

shared by amarsha5 on 07 Apr 16 - No Cached
  • long history of political animosity; this is a history that continues until our present day.
    • joepouttu
      joepouttu on 07 Apr 16
       
      "However, as Saleh continued to kill, these countries had no choice but to issue a forceful declaration to show that they were not in favor of Saleh's relentless, murderous campaign to ignore a civil war in Yemen." pg 128
  • Yemen's treasury was burdened by the costs of unification such as paying for southern civil servants to move to the new capital, Sanaa, and paying interest on its massive debt. On top of its other economic challenges, Yemen was to absorb the shock of 800,000 returnees and their pressure on the already weak job market. With their return, the estimated $350 million a month in remittances
    • joepouttu
      joepouttu on 07 Apr 16
       
      "My father had decided to leave Eritrea and return to Yemen, his homeland, after long years of exile..." pg 110
  • Civil war broke out in the summer of 1994 in what could be interpreted as a symptom of economic failure.
  • ...20 more annotations...
  • By 1995 the Yemeni government implemented a program of macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms with support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and reduced spending on defense and civil service and cut subsidies. The Yemeni economy started showing signs of recovery and stability.
  • Masood Ahmed, director of the IMF’s Middle East and Central Asia Department, wrote in 2012 that “fiscal sustainability will be an issue” for Gulf Cooperation Council countries. In its 2012 regional economic outlook, the IMF recommended to “curtail current expenditures while protecting the poor” as a response to the risk of declining oil prices.
  • Policies to cut spending were unlikely to be introduced in a monarchy like Saudi Arabia, especially after the Arab Spring, where tax-paying citizens along with non-tax-paying Bahrainis and next-door Yemenis went out on the streets to claim their rights in shaping the policies that govern their daily lives. The risk of people demanding more political rights was growing and cutting spending was not the optimal strategy for the kingdom.
    • joepouttu
      joepouttu on 07 Apr 16
       
      "The students of Sanaa were unique, marching straight out onto the street from their classrooms and chanting, 'The people demand the fall of the President and the regime.'" pg 126
  • As the kingdom continued its generous fiscal policy by providing more benefits to its citizens in response to the people’s dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation, it ran a deficit of 3.4% of GDP in 2014 due to a fall in oil revenues.
  • The kingdom's economic reforms of raising gas and diesel prices, cutting fuel subsidies in half and supporting the introduction of a GCC-wide value-added tax might ease the pressure of sustaining a war for nine months and perhaps longer. These structural reforms were long overdue and their introduction at this time is revealing.
    • amarsha5
      amarsha5 on 07 Apr 16
       
      CIG pg. 120 -> "We live in a world with many layers of linkages between countries. Nations will exchange goods and services through trade and will engage in cross-border investments from bank loans to setting up businesses. Each of these linkages can serve as a transmission mechanism in a time of crisis."
  • the political inclusion of the taxpaying citizen. It's a price the kingdom is now willing to pay, as we have seen Saudi women not only
  • and suffered an uprising fueled by anger at economic failure. The Saudi economy is trying to absorb
  • As they introduce revenue-collecting mechanisms, they should also reform mechanisms of capital transfer to the public to minimize the gap between the rich and the poor, as it is known that the poor are the most affected by tighter revenue-collecting policies. Otherwise, the Saudi war on Yemen will mark the beginning of an economic downturn that will surely spill over onto its political system in the long run.
    • joepouttu
      joepouttu on 07 Apr 16
       
      "So the young revolutionaries fight on, until all their demands are met and they are free to build their State: a state founded on social justice and equality between all citizens where Saleh's reign is just a page in the history books." pg 129
    • amarsha5
      amarsha5 on 07 Apr 16
       
      CIG pg. 116 -> "Globalization, in the shape of freer trade and multinational investments, has been generally a force for good and economic prosperity. But it has also advanced, rather than harmed, social agendas"
    • ccfuentez
      ccfuentez on 07 Apr 16
       
      But it became apparent that Saleh was not going to leave me to my own devices. He declared war in mid-1994, occupying the South and defeating the Socialist Party. Everything was finished, or so I believed. Its property stolen by the regime, the paper shut down, and once more I found myself broken, defeated and without hope. Worse, I was a known employee of the Socialist Party through my work at the paper. In the region where I lived agents for the regime had been hunting down and detaining anyone who had belonged to the Socialist Party or getting them fired from their jobs. Although I had not been a party member myself, just worked at a party newspaper, the regime made no distinction. My mother intervened, however, and hid me. She wouldn't let me out of the house. My mother always protects me.   (2013-12-31). Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution: Voices from Tunis to Damascus (p. 115). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. 
    • atownen
      atownen on 07 Apr 16
       
      Civil War: in 1994 Jamal currently in high school, describes the times as a world, when the color of his skin would define him. The Civil War, "interpreted as a symptom of economic failure", was evident in the reading when Jamal described the lack of jobs as a college graduate, members of the socialist party were completely shut out when Saleh took the presidency, depriving hard workers the ability to integrate into the economy. 
    • ccfuentez
      ccfuentez on 07 Apr 16
       
      CIG Ch. 4 -> in relation to international rulemaking on fiscal policy -> is international intervention needed to contain and reverse financial crises in countries, esp. when it comes to the human rights and economic equality of citizens
    • mcooka
      mcooka on 07 Apr 16
       
      Relating to page 120 Sanaa could not find work after college. While his degree wasn't very fluid, he was unable to find work for about 5 years. He got into journalism which blacklisted him against the government. Now he is unemployed again. 
    • mcooka
      mcooka on 07 Apr 16
       
      This paragraph, while not highlighted, is important to the idea of globalization and why the war is not stopping. There is a flow of revenue from these oil prices that Yemen is reliant on, but they are also competing with countries that produce higher amounts of oil. This would have happened during the time Sanaa was in College writing scathing articles
    • mcooka
      mcooka on 07 Apr 16
       
       On page 113 around this time the author was working as a journalist for the newspaper. 
    • mcooka
      mcooka on 07 Apr 16
       
      Related to page 129 Sanaa is still living in hiding and in poverty. The animosity keeps him in fear. 
    • csherro2
      csherro2 on 07 Apr 16
       
      Market liberalization outlook
    • csherro2
      csherro2 on 07 Apr 16
       
      When Saleh came to power he and the leader of the southern part of Yemen, Salem al-Beid, agreed to coesxist as leaders of Yemen.  WIthin weeks of this in play, Saleh began to try to make the south his and this created the civil war.  
    • csherro2
      csherro2 on 07 Apr 16
       
      Jamal notes that the standard of living in Yemen was decreasing gradually the longer Saleh stayed in power.  
    • csherro2
      csherro2 on 07 Apr 16
       
      People, including Jamal, were writing about the Saleh regime and how they were upset with them.  
    • csherro2
      csherro2 on 07 Apr 16
       
      When Saleh's son was coming into power, Jamal saw that Yemen was moving towards a monarchy, realizing that his and the country's future was in the hands of an unqualified person.  
katelynklug

BBC News - Egypt's youth: "What has the revolution done for us?" - 0 views

www.bbc.com/...world-middle-east-22687407

egypt youth revolution

shared by katelynklug on 15 Sep 14 - No Cached
  • You don't feel safe or secure anymore
  • given up
  • square is virtually empty
  • ...14 more annotations...
  • faces of dead people
  • Most of the faces on the wall are those of young people
  • Women have stopped coming to Tahrir now
  • sexual harassmen
  • "One hundred per cent, I regret it"
  • Nothing has happened. Everything's changed for the worse.
  • I don't regret my decision
  • deteriorating economy
  • increasingly hard to live
  • mass unemployment is the most pressing and it is the young who are hit the hardest
  • Half of Egypt's population is below 24 years old
  • not using this youth and energy to its benefit
  • don't have enough skills
  • has to create between 800,000 and a million jobs a year
  • katelynklug on 15 Sep 14
     
    This article gives a description of the state of Egypt's once thriving Tahrir Square, just two years after the revolution. The mood of Tahrir Square has changed dramatically and is now solemn rather than buzzing with enthusiasm. The young activists interviewed in the article expressed their regret for the revolution or how it turned out. The youth population is still struggling for economic revival after two years of revolution. Mass unemployment is hitting the large youth population the hardest, which is still a source of anger. The majority of this population does not have adequate skills for the available job market.
allieggg

Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East's 30 year war » The Spectator - 0 views

www.spectator.co.uk/...armageddon-awaits

proxy wars leadership polarization US Saudi Iran the middle east war

shared by allieggg on 21 Nov 14 - No Cached
  • There are those who think that the region as a whole may be starting to go through something similar to what Europe went through in the early 17th century during the Thirty Years’ War, when Protestant and Catholic states battled it out. This is a conflict which is not only bigger than al-Qa’eda and similar groups, but far bigger than any of us. It is one which will re-align not only the Middle East, but the religion of Islam.
  • Either way there will be a need for a Treaty of Westphalia-style solution — a redrawing of boundaries in a region where boundaries have been bursting for decades.
  • But for the time being, a distinct and timeless stand-off between two regional powers, with religious excuses and religiously affiliated proxies will in all probability remain the main driver of this conflict.
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  • ‘Saudi Arabia is the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the birthplace of Islam. As such, it is the eminent leader of the wider Muslim world. Iran portrays itself as the leader of not just the minority Shiite world, but of all Muslim revolutionaries interested in standing up to the West.’
  • ‘Saudi Arabia will oppose any and all of Iran’s actions in other countries, because it is Saudi Arabia’s position that Iran has no right to meddle in other nations’ internal affairs, especially those of Arab states.’
  • Saudi officials more recently called for the Iranian leadership to be summoned to the International Criminal Court in The Hague for war crimes. Then, just the month before last, as the P5+1 countries eased sanctions on Iran after arriving at an interim deal in Geneva, Saudi saw its greatest fear — a nuclear Iran — grow more likely. And in the immediate aftermath of the Geneva deal, Saudi sources darkly warned of the country now taking Iranian matters ‘into their own hands’. There are rumours that the Saudis would buy nuclear bombs ‘off the shelf’ from their friends in Pakistan if Iran ever reaches anything like the nuclear threshold. In that  case, this Westphalian solution could be prefaced with a mushroom cloud.
  • allieggg on 21 Nov 14
     
    This article touches on an array of ideas but for the sake of my research I focused on the "Thirty Years War" section. Douglass Murray from The Spectator conveys the perspective that the Middle East is likely to be going through a similar 17th century European 30 years war, when Protestant and Catholics launched a full fledged war against one another. This means that religious war in the Middle East is so much bigger than just al-Qaeda and similar groups. The conflict will re-align the region, but also the entire religion of Islam. Douglass says the outcome would call for a Treaty of Westphalia-style solution, redrawing boundaries of a region where they've been bursting for decades.  For the time being the drivers of the conflict is a standoff between the two regional powers and their affiliated proxies, Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
fcastro2

A daring plan to rebuild Syria - no matter who wins the war - Ideas - The Boston Globe - 0 views

www.bostonglobe.com/...story.html

syria plan war politics china russia the west

shared by fcastro2 on 23 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • The first year of Syria’s uprising, 2011, largely spared Aleppo, the country’s economic engine, largest city, and home of its most prized heritage sites. Fighting engulfed Aleppo in 2012 and has never let up since, making the city a symbol of the civil war’s grinding destruction
  • Rebels captured the eastern side of the city while the government held the wes
  • , residents say the city is virtually uninhabitable; most who remain have nowhere else to go
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  • In terms of sheer devastation, Syria today is worse off than Germany at the end of World War II
  • ven as the fighting continues, a movement is brewing among planners, activists and bureaucrats—some still in Aleppo, others in Damascus, Turkey, and Lebanon—to prepare, right now, for the reconstruction effort that will come whenever peace finally arrives.
  • In a glass tower belonging to the United Nations’ Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, a project called the National Agenda for the Future of Syria has brought together teams of engineers, architects, water experts, conservationists, and development experts to grapple with seemingly impossible technical problems
  • It is good to do the planning now, because on day one we will be ready,”
  • The team planning the country’s future is a diverse one. Some are employed by the government of Syria, others by the rebels’ rival provisional government. Still others work for the UN, private construction companies, or nongovernmental organizations involved in conservation, like the World Monuments Fund
  • As the group’s members outline a path toward renewal, they’re considering everything from corruption and constitutional reform to power grids, antiquities, and health care systems.
  • Aleppo is split between a regime side with vestiges of basic services, and a mostly depopulated rebel-controlled zone, into which the Islamic State and the Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front have made inroads over the last year
  • The population exodus has claimed most of the city’s craftsmen, medical personnel, academics, and industrialists
  • It took decades to clear the moonscapes of rubble and to rebuild, in famous targets like Dresden and Hiroshima but in countless other places as well, from Coventry to Nanking. Some places never recovered their vitality.
  • Of course, Syrian planners cannot help but pay attention to the model closest to home: Beirut, a city almost synonymous with civil war and flawed reconstructio
  • We don’t want to end up like Beirut,” one of the Syrian planners says, referring to the physical problems but also to a postwar process in which militia leaders turned to corrupt reconstruction ventures as a new source of funds and power
  • Syria’s national recovery will depend in large part on whether its industrial powerhouse Aleppo can bounce back
  • The city’s workshops, famed above all for their fine textiles, export millions of dollars’ worth of goods every week even now, and the economy has expanded to include modern industry as well.
  • Today, however, the city’s water and power supply are under the control of the Islamic State
  • Across Syria, more than one-third of the population is displaced.
  • A river of rubble marks the no-man’s land separating the two sides. The only way to cross is to leave the city, follow a wide arc, and reenter from the far side.
  • Parts of the old city won’t be inhabitable for years, he told me by Skype, because the ground has literally shifted as a result of bombing and shelling
  • The first and more obvious is creating realistic options to fix the country after the war—in some cases literal plans for building infrastructure systems and positioning construction equipment, in other cases guidelines for shaping governanc
  • They’re familiar with global “best practices,” but also with how things work in Syria, so they’re not going to propose pie-in-the-sky idea
  • If some version of the current regime remains in charge, it will probably direct massive contracts toward patrons in Russia, China, or Iran. The opposition, by contrast, would lean toward firms from the West, Turkey, and the Gulf.
  • At the current level of destruction, the project planners estimate the reconstruction will cost at least $100 billion
  • Recently a panel of architects and heritage experts from Sweden, Bosnia, Syria, and Lebanon convened in Beirut to discuss lessons for Syria’s reconstruction—one of the many distinct initiatives parallel to the Future of Syria project.
  • “You should never rebuild the way it was,” said Arna Mackic, an architect from Mostar. That Bosnian city was divided during the 1990s civil war into Muslim and Catholic sides, destroying the city center and the famous Stari Most bridge over the Neretva River. “The war changes us. You should show that in rebuilding.”
  • Instead, Mackik says, the sectarian communities keep to their own enclaves. Bereft of any common symbols, the city took a poll to figure out what kind of statue to erect in the city center. All the local figures were too polarizing. In the end they settled on a gold-colored statue of the martial arts star Bruce Lee
  • “It belongs to no one,” Mackic says. “What does Bruce Lee mean to me?
  • is that it could offer the city’s people a form of participatory democracy that has so far eluded the Syrian regime and sadly, the opposition as well.
  • “You are being democratic without the consequences of all the hullabaloo of formal democratization
  • A great deal of money has been invested in Syria’s destruction— by the regime, the local parties to the conflict, and many foreign powers. A great deal of money will be made in the aftermath, in a reconstruction project that stands to dwarf anything seen since after World War II.
  • fcastro2 on 23 Feb 15
     
    While it is still unclear as to who will win the Syrian conflict, there are people who are already looking towards the future and a better Syria. Plans are being made but, of course, these plans will entirely depend on who wins the war. 
allieggg

What Happened to the Humanitarians Who Wanted to Save Libyans With Bombs and Drones? - ... - 0 views

firstlook.org/...nted-save-libyans-bombs-drones

humanitarian libya civil war politics US Intervention NATO revolution

shared by allieggg on 23 Nov 14 - No Cached
  • “Libya is a reminder that sometimes it is possible to use military tools to advance humanitarian causes.”
  • intervention was a matter of upholding “universal values,” which itself advanced America’s strategic goals. In justifying the war to Americans (more than a week after it started), President Obama decreed: “Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.”
  • But “turning a blind eye” to the ongoing – and now far worse – atrocities in Libya is exactly what the U.S., its war allies, and most of the humanitarian war advocates are now doing.
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  • “this was a rare military intervention for humanitarian reasons, and it has succeeded” and that “on rare occasions military force can advance human rights. Libya has so far been a model of such an intervention.”
  • What’s most notable here isn’t how everything in Libya has gone so terribly and tragically wrong. That was painfully predictable: anyone paying even casual attention now knows that killing the Bad Dictator of the Moment (usually one the U.S. spent years supporting) achieves nothing good for the people of that country unless it’s backed by years of sustained support for rebuilding its civil institutions.
  • As the country spun into chaos, violence, militia rule and anarchy as a direct result of the NATO intervention, they exhibited no interest whatsoever in doing anything to arrest or reverse that collapse. What happened to their deeply felt humanitarianism? Where did it go?
  • But the most compelling reason to oppose such wars is that – even if it all could work perfectly in an ideal world and as tempting as it is to believe – humanitarianism is not what motivates the U.S. or most other governments to deploy its military in other nations.
  • If there were any authenticity to the claimed humanitarianism, wouldn’t there be movements to spend large amounts of money not just to bomb Libya but also to stabilize and rebuild it? Wouldn’t there be just as much horror over the plight of Libyans now: when the needed solution is large-scale economic aid and assistance programs rather than drone deployments, blowing up buildings, and playful, sociopathic chuckling over how we came, conquered, and made The Villain die?
  • The way most war advocates instantly forgot Libya existed once that fun part was over is the strongest argument imaginable about what really motivates these actions. In the victory parade he threw for himself, Kristof said the question of “humanitarian intervention” will “arise again” and “the next time it does, let’s remember a lesson of Libya.”
  • allieggg on 23 Nov 14
     
    This article basically lays out the faults in US intervention in Libya during the fall of Gaddafi and condemns the US officials for their lack of hindsight in their agenda. The US claimed that they could not "turn a blind eye" to atrocities and human right violations in other countries and to intervene in Libya was a matter of upholding "universal values." After the successful ousting of Gaddafi, the US hypocritically turned their back on the country as a whole, leaving them to pick up the pieces and re-build themselves in the midst of socio-political and economic chaos. The US claims that military intervention is sometimes necessary to address human right violations, but in the case of Libya more violations have occurred as a result of a fallen regime rather than because of its reign. The author basically says that the US should have predicted that short-term intervention strategies achieves nothing without years of sustained support for rebuilding the civil institutions. 
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