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Jukka Peltokoski

Europe's Left after Brexit | Yanis Varoufakis - 0 views

yanisvaroufakis.eu/...europes-left-after-brexit

Varoufakis left EU Eurooppa eurokriisi brexit diem25 vasemmisto

shared by Jukka Peltokoski on 09 Sep 16 - No Cached
  • This article
  • addresses left-wing critics of DiEM25 claiming that DiEM25 is pursuing the wrong objective (to democratise the EU) by means of a faulty strategy (focusing at the European rather than at the national level).
  • The question is not whether the Left must clash with the EU’s establishment and current practices. The question is in what context, and within which overarching political narrative, this confrontation should take place. Three are the options on offer.
  • ...39 more annotations...
  • Option 1: Euro-reformism
  • One (fast receding) option is the standard variety of euro-reformism, practised typically by social democrats who argue for ‘more democracy’,
  • dynamic analyses
  • The EU’s institutions are incapable of being reformed through the standard process of inter-governmental deliberations and gradual treaty changes.
  • Option 2: Lexit
  • This (Lexit) option raises concerns regarding its realism and probity. Is its agenda feasible? In other words, is it a realistic prospect that, by (in Kouvelakis’ words) calling for referenda to leave the EU, the Left can block “the forces of the xenophobic and nationalist Right from winning hegemony and diverting the popular revolt”? And, is such a campaign consistent with the Left’s fundamental principles?
  • the EU was constructed intentionally as a democracy-free zone designed to keep the demos out of decision-making
  • Given that the EU has established free movement, Lexit involves acquiescence to (if not actual support for) its ending and for the re-establishment of national border controls
  • the Left should demand common minimum wages in exchange for its support for the Single Market
  • xenophobic Right
  • do they truly believe that the Left will win the discursive and policy war against the fossil fuel industry by supporting the re-nationalisation of environmental policy?
  • Option 3: DiEM25’s proposal for disobedience
  • Instead, DiEM25 proposes a pan-European movement of civil and governmental disobedience with which to bring on a surge of democratic opposition to the way European elites do business at the local, national and EU levels.
  • national parliaments and governments have power
  • a progressive national government can only use this power if it is prepared for a rupture with the EU troika.
  • a clash with the EU establishment is inescapable.
  • wilfully disobeying the unenforceable EU ‘rules’ at the municipal, regional and national levels while making no move whatsoever to leave the EU.
  • Undoubtedly, the EU institutions will threaten us
  • Consider the profound difference between the following two situations: The EU establishment threatening progressive Europeanist governments with ‘exit’ when they refuse to obey its authoritarian incompetence, and Progressive national parties or governments campaigning alongside the xenophobic Right for ‘exit’.
  • It is the difference between: (A) Clashing against the EU establishment in a manner that preserves the spirit of internationalism, demands pan-European action, and sets us fully apart from the xenophobic Right, and (B) Walking hand-in-hand with nationalisms that will, inescapably, reinforce the xenophobic Right while allowing the EU to portray the Left as populists insufficiently distinguishable from Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen etc.
  • The Left’s traditional internationalism is a key ingredient of DiEM25, along with other constituent democratic traditions from a variety of political projects (including progressive liberalism, feminist and ecological movements, the ‘pirate’ parties etc.).
  • DiEM25 proposes a rebellion to deliver authentic democracy at the levels of local government, national governments and the EU.
  • This leftwing objection to DiEM25’s call for a pan-European movement is interesting and puzzling. In effect, it argues that democracy is impossible on a supranational scale because a demos must be characterised by national and cultural homogeneity.
  • The Left, lest we forget, traditionally opposed the bourgeois belief in a one-to-one relationship between a nation and a sovereign parliament. The Left counter-argued that identity is something we create through political struggle (class struggle, the struggle against patriarchy, the struggle for smashing gender and sexual stereotypes, emancipation from Empire etc.).
  • in order to create the European demos that will bring about Europe’s democracy
  • Only through this pan-European network of rebel cities, rebel prefectures and rebel governments can a progressive movement become hegemonic in Italy, in Greece, in England, indeed anywhere.
  • The question for Europe’s Left, for progressive liberals, Greens etc. is, now, whether this struggle, this project, should take the form of a campaign to leave the EU (e.g. Lexit) or, as DiEM25 suggests, of a campaign of civil, civic and governmental disobedience within but in confrontation with the EU
  • to those who berate DiEM25 and its call for a pan-European democratic movement as utopian, our answer is that a transnational, pan-European democracy remains a legitimate, realistic long-term goal, one that is in concert with the Left’s time honoured internationalism. But this objective must be accompanied by pragmatism and a precise plan for immediate action:
  • Oppose any talk of ‘more Europe’ now
  • Present Europeans with a blueprint (a comprehensive set of policies and actions) of how we plan to re-deploy Europe’s existing institutions
  • ensure that the same blueprint makes provisions for keeping internationalism alive in the event that the EU establishment’s incompetent authoritarianism causes the EU’s disintegration
  • “The EU will be democratised. Or it will disintegrate!”
  • We cannot predict which of the two (democratisation or disintegration) will occur. So, we struggle for the former while preparing for the latter.
  • DiEM25’s Progressive Agenda for Europe will be pragmatic, radical and comprehensive. It will comprise policies that can be implemented immediately to stabilise Europe’s social economy, while:
  • affording more sovereignty to city councils, prefectures and national parliaments, proposing institutional interventions and designs that will reduce the human cost in case the euro collapses and the EU fragments, and setting up a democratic Constitution Assembly process that enables Europeans to generate a European identity with which to bolster their reinvigorated national cultures, parliaments and local authorities.
  • Conclusion:
  • The EU is at an advanced stage of disintegration. There are two prospects. The EU is not past the point of no return (yet) and can, still, be democratised, stabilised, rationalised and humanised The EU is beyond the point of no return and incapable of being democratised. Therefore, its disintegration is certain, as is the clear and present danger of Europe’s descent into a postmodern version of the deflationary 1930s
  • So, what should progressives do?
  • Campaign vigorously along internationalist, cross-border, lines all over Europe for a democratic Union – even if we do not believe that the EU can, or ought to, survive in its current form Expose the EU Establishment’s authoritarian incompetence Coordinate civil, civic and governmental disobedience across Europe Illustrate through DiEM25’s own transnational structure how a pan-European democracy can work at all levels and in all jurisdictions Propose a comprehensive Progressive Agenda for Europe which includes sensible, modest, convincing proposals for ‘fixing’ the EU (the euro even) and for managing progressively the EU’s and the euro’s disintegration if and when the Establishment brings it on.
Jukka Peltokoski

The Blockchain: A Promising New Infrastructure for Online Commons | David Bollier - 0 views

bollier.org/...-infrastructure-online-commons

ethereum blockchain commons bollier smart contract verkosto

shared by Jukka Peltokoski on 11 Jun 15 - No Cached
  • Move beyond the superficial public discussions about Bitcoin, and you’ll discover a software breakthrough that could be of enormous importance to the future of commoning on open network platforms.
  • Blockchain technology
  • can validate the authenticity of an individual bitcoin without the need for a third-party guarantor such as a bank or government body
  • ...20 more annotations...
  • collective-action problem in an open network context
  • How do you know that a given document, certificate or dataset -- or a vote or "digital identity" asserted by an individual -- is the “real thing” and not a forgery? 
  • online “ledger” that keeps track of all transactions of all bitcoins
  • set of transactions known as the “block”
  • a kind of permanent record maintained by a vast distributed peer network
  • blockchain technology could provide a critical infrastructure for building what are called “distributed collaborative organizations.”
  • to give its members specified rights within the organization, which are managed and guaranteed by the blockchain
  • blockchain technology is not confined to digital currency
  • reliable systems to manage their inter-relationships on network platforms.
  • Bitcoin 2.0 projects
  • a way to create distributed networks of solar power on residential houses
  • Transactions would be near-instantaneous, and transaction costs would be minimal.
  • traditional issues related to shared common-pool resources—such as the free rider problem or the tragedy of the commons—could be addressed with the implementation of blockchain-based governance, through the adoption of transparent decision-making procedures and the introduction decentralized incentives systems for collaboration and cooperation.
  • to reach consensus and implement innovative forms of self-governance. The possibility to record every interaction on a incorruptible public ledger and the ability to encode a particular set rules linking these interactions to a specific transactions (e.g., the assignment of cryptographic tokens) makes it possible to design new sophisticated incentive systems
  • Decentralized blockchain technologies bring trust and coordination to shared resource pools, enabling new models of non-hierarchical governance, where intelligence is spread on the edges of the network instead of being concentrated at the center
  • commons-based peer-production communities
  • have had a hard scaling up, without turning into more bureaucratic and centralized institutions
  • could overcome many collective-action challenges that cannot be easily solved by conventional institutions today
  • Who guards the guards? 
  • blockchain technology does offer more formidable tools for better protecting the perimeter of the commons and for empowering commoners to decide their own fate
Jukka Peltokoski

Postcapitalism and the city - 0 views

blog.p2pfoundation.net/...12

'paul mason' p2pfoundation post-capitalism information jukkap2p technology commons

shared by Jukka Peltokoski on 12 Oct 16 - No Cached
  • bullshit jobs
  • Capitalism’s response mechanisms
  • a) to maximise capacity utilisation of low-skilled labour and of assets.
  • ...39 more annotations...
  • b) to artificially inflate the price and profitability of labour inputs
  • Things that in all previous eras of capitalism the elite desired to be as cheap as possible—to ease wage pressures—are now made as expensive as possible
  • capital migrates away from production and from private-sector services towards public sector services.
  • capitalism being replaced by a stagnant neo-feudalism
  • central bank, pumping money into the system
  • the state, propping up effectively insolvent banks
  • the migrant labour exploiter
  • the innovator someone who invents a way of extracting rent from low-wage people
  • But as soon as technology allowed it, we started to create organisations where the positive effects of networked collaboration were not captured by the market.
  • Wikipedia
  • Fortunately there is a third impact of info-tech. It has begun to create organisational and business models where collaboration is more important than price or value.
  • Linux
  • the platform co-operatives
  • The technology itself is in revolt against the monopolised ownership of intellectual property, and the private capture of externalities.
  • We must promote the transition to a non-capitalist form of economy which unleashes all the suppressed potential of information technology, for productivity, well.being and culture.
  • The strategic aim is: to reduce the amount of work done to the minimum; to move as much as possible of human activity out of the market and state sectors into the collaborative sector; to produce more stuff for free.
  • If the aim is for humanity to do as little work as possible, you can do it through three mechanisms. One is to automate. The other is to reduce the input costs to labour, so that we can survive on less wages and less work. The third is to push forward rapidly the de-linking of work and wages.
  • The city is where the networked individual wants to live
  • First—be overt. Help people to conceptualise the transition by actually talking about it.
  • Next—switch off the great neoliberal privatisation machine.
  • We know what it’s there for—to hand public assets to the private sector so that the profits of decaying businesses are temporarily boosted
  • The next proposal is more radical: model reality as a complex system.
  • Next—promote the basic income.
  • The basic income is an idea whose time is coming, because there won’t be enough work to go around. For me the basic income is a one-off subsidy for automation—to un-hook humanity from bullshit job creation and promote the delinking of work and wages.
  • However, it’s a transitional measure.
  • Next—actively promote the collaborative sector over the market and the state.
  • You have to understand the benefits of these entities are not completely measurable in GDP terms.
  • The building block is the co-op, the credit union, the NGO, the non-profit company, the peer-to-peer lender and the purely voluntary or social enterprise.
  • You have to promote new ways of measuring activity and progress.
  • Finally, understand and fight the battle over the externalities.
  • the state and eventually the commons should have first rights to all the data just the same as in a republic it owns all the land
  • Ultimately, however, the greatest good comes from the common ownership and exploitation of data, because it establishes the principle that this vast new information resource—which is our collaborative behaviour captured as data—is part of the commons.
  • Would capitalism collapse?
  • But you would attract the most innovative capitalists on earth, and you would make the city vastly more livable for the million-plus people who call it home.
  • No. The desperate, frantic “survival capitalists” would go away—the rip-off consultancies; the low-wage businesses; the rent-extractors.
  • All the other challenges would remain: the environmental challenge—not just low carbon but the preservation of quality living environments in a city sometimes deluged with visitors. Also the ageing challenge and the debt challenge.
  • a common platform for the left, for social democracy and for liberal capitalism
  • I could be completely wrong. But if I am right, it makes sense for all cities to ask themselves: could we become the first city to begin a demonstrable and tangible transition away from neoliberal capitalism, towards a society of high equality, high well-being, high collaboration?
  • the collaborative city, the city of participatory democracy, the networked city
Jukka Peltokoski

Europe's Ugly Future: A review of Varoufakis, Galbraith & Stiglitz - Foreign ... - 0 views

yanisvaroufakis.eu/...raith-stiglitz-foreign-affairs

vasemmisto Varoufakis DIEM25 EU Eurooppa euro eurokriisi Joseph Stiglitz Galbraith valtiopolitiikka kansallisvaltio valtio

shared by Jukka Peltokoski on 19 Oct 16 - No Cached
  • Fifteen years ago, when the EU established its single currency, European leaders promised higher growth due to greater efficiency and sounder macroeconomic policies, greater equality between rich and poor countries within a freer capital market, enhanced domestic political legitimacy due to better policies, and a triumphant capstone for EU federalism. Yet for nearly a decade, Europe has experienced just the opposite.
  • Since 2008, inflation-adjusted GDP in the eurozone has stagnated, compared with an expansion of more than eight percent in European countries that remain outside.
  • In this situation, a lost decade may well become a lost generation.
  • ...47 more annotations...
  • Nor has the euro reduced inequality among European countries.
  • The prolonged depression has helped fuel the rise of right-wing nationalists and Euroskeptics. In Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, radical right-wing parties now enjoy more success at the polls than at any time since the 1930s.
  • Trust in EU institutions,
  • has fallen through the floor.
  • The reason currency pegs often depress economic growth lies in the essential nature of monetary arrangements.
  • Varoufakis
  • Galbraith
  • Stiglitz
  • All three would prefer that the system be reformed.
  • Galbraith offers the most succinct explanation of why the system has benefited Germany at the expense of weaker economies:
  • The Greek story is properly a European story in which, as in all European stories, Germany takes the leading role.
  • Varoufakis, Galbraith, and Stiglitz differ on the details, but they all blame the euro system and, especially, Germany.
  • Stiglitz shows that international systems of pegged currencies, of which Europe’s single currency represents only an extreme example, “have long been associated with recessions and depressions.”
  • Most observers now attribute these troubles to the euro.
  • In the real world, however, countries have diverse market positions and domestic institutions, which means that macroeconomic convergence is hard to come by.
  • a currency peg prevents the governments of countries that run trade deficits and incur debt from pursuing healthy economic policies to correct the problem.
  • normally loosen domestic monetary policy (thereby lowering interest rates and stimulating investment), let its currency depreciate (thereby boosting exports, reducing imports, and transferring income to the sector of the economy that produces competitive goods), and increase government spending (thereby stimulating consumption and investment).
  • Deficit countries are thus left with only one way to restore their competitiveness: “internal devaluation,” the politically correct term for austerity
  • permanent austerity becomes the only way to maintain international equilibrium.
  • Citizens grasp at increasingly radical new parties and lack the faith in Europe required to enact needed reforms.
  • Germany has emerged almost unscathed—at least so far.
  • Yet the costs of a flawed monetary system may eventually boomerang and depress growth even in Germany. Austerity is slowly reducing Germany’s ability to sell its goods to other European countries,
  • Despite the EU principle of free movement, many informal barriers to mobility still protect special interests.
  • to force the German economy into line
  • the EU could discourage trade surpluses by imposing a tax on them
  • Another set of structural policies would encourage large fiscal transfers and migration in order to offset the inequities that the euro has induced. In essence, this would replicate the movements of capital and people that make single currencies viable within individual countries.
  • fiscal transfers from creditor countries such as Germany to deficit countries such as Greece and Italy.
  • Stiglitz proposes, Germany and other surplus countries could do more to accept and encourage continuous migration flows from deficit countries.
  • Germans are unlikely to renounce the export-led growth that has stemmed from their 60-year tradition of high savings, low inflation, and modest labor contracts. They are even less likely to accept massive fiscal transfers to other countries.
  • Stiglitz offers the most thorough evaluation of the possible options. There are three. The first entails reforming the fundamental structure of the euro system so that it generates growth and distributes the benefits fairly. Stiglitz details how the EU and the European Central Bank might rewrite tax laws, loosen monetary policy, and change corporate governance rules in order to boost wage growth, consumer spending, and investment.
  • Political opposition to immigration is already strong in Austria, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, and these countries would not tolerate many millions of additional foreigners.
  • a second policy option: muddling through. In this scenario, member states would strengthen the EU’s ability to manage the crisis.
  • European Stability Mechanism,
  • The burden of the current system on deficit countries must also be eliminated—a change that requires far more serious reform. Eventually, Europe would have to restructure its debt,
  • GDP-indexed bonds
  • eurobonds
  • the solvency of national banks,
  • Yet Germany and other creditor governments are naturally hesitant to accept financial responsibility for debtor countries.
  • Such reforms would also require the EU to massively expand its oversight over national financial systems,
  • If neither of the two options to save the single currency and restart growth is viable, this leaves only a third option: abolishing the euro.
  • Although Stiglitz would prefer that the euro be reformed, he admits that “there is more than a small probability that it will not be done” and therefore argues for breaking up the system.
  • from Grexit to his preferred alternative of breaking the eurozone into several subgroups, each with its own currency.
  • Yet even the radical step of breaking up the eurozone, Stiglitz makes clear, would probably help deficit countries only if Germany agreed to increase domestic spending, rein in speculation, and reduce deficits.
  • Abolishing the euro might slightly improve the options for deficit countries, but absent deeper structural reforms, it would not eliminate the underlying problem.
  • depressing reading, because in the end, they suggest that there is no easy way out of Europe’s predicament, given the current political constraints. In the long run, muddling through may be the worst outcome, and yet it is the most likely.
  • In response to such a bleak prognosis, many European federalists, particularly on the left, contend that Europe’s real problem is its “democratic deficit.” If only EU institutions or national governments were more representative, they argue, then they would enjoy sufficient legitimacy to solve these problems. The EU needs more transparency in Brussels, more robust direct elections to the European Parliament, a grand continent-wide debate, and political union, the argument runs, so that the resulting European superstate would be empowered to impose massive fiscal transfers and macroeconomic constraints on surplus countries. Alternatively, if more radical alternatives could be fully debated in national elections, then member states might muster the power to pull out of the eurozone or renegotiate their terms in it.
  • everything comes down to choices made by self-interested sovereign states. Governments have little incentive to make charitable and risky concessions, even in a united Europe with economic prosperity on the line. Politicians simply lack the strength and courage to make a genuine break with the status quo, either toward federalism or toward monetary sovereignty.
Jukka Peltokoski

Book of the Day: Funding an Economy of Civic Spaces in the Cooperative City through Com... - 0 views

blog.p2pfoundation.net/...27

kuntapolitiikka kapinakunta jukkap2p finance kapinakaupunki kansalaisyhteiskunta funding rahoitus municipalism yhteisötalous Cooperative City

shared by Jukka Peltokoski on 20 Aug 17 - No Cached
  • Funding the Cooperative City focuses on the post-welfare transition of today’s European societies: with austerity measures and the financialisation of real estate stocks and urban services, the gradual withdrawal of the state and municipal administrations from providing certain facilities and maintaining certain spaces have prompted citizen initiatives and professional groups to organise their own services and venues.
  • The self-organisation of new spaces of work, culture and social welfare was made possible by various socio-economic circumstances: unemployment, solidarity networks, changing real estate prices and ownership patters created opportunities for stepping out of the regular dynamisms of real estate development.
  • cooperative ownership
  • ...21 more annotations...
  • new types of investors, operating along principles of ethics or sustainability, or working on moving properties off the market.
  • inventing new ways to enable, finance and govern community-run spaces.
  • European municipalities responded to this challenge in a variety of ways.
  • The question if community capital can really cure the voids left behind by the welfare state has generated fierce debates in the past years.
  • crowdfunded urban infrastructures.
  • in the course of the economic crisis, many European cities witnessed the emergence of a parallel welfare infrastructure:
  • This collection brings together protagonists from various cities to help shaping a new European culture of urban development based on community-driven initiatives, civic economic models and cooperative ownership
  • community organisations
  • crowdfunding
  • participatory budgeting,
  • invest
  • pre-financed
  • some cities chose to support local economy and create more resilient neighbourhoods with self-sustaining social services through grant systems
  • priority neighbourhoods
  • The granted projects, chosen through an open call, have to prove their economic sustainability and have to spend the full amount in one year.
  • the public sector plays an important role in strengthening civil society in some European cities, many others witnessed the emergence of new welfare services provided by the civic economy completely outside or without any help by the public sector
  • n some occasions, community contribution appears in the form of philanthropist donation to support the construction, renovation or acquisition of playgrounds, parks, stores, pubs or community spaces. In others, community members act as creditors or investors in an initiative that needs capital, in exchange for interest, shares or the community ownership of local assets
  • Besides aggregating resources from individuals to support particular cases, community infrastructure projects are also helped by ethical investors.
  • Creating community ownership over local assets and keeping profits benefit local residents and services is a crucial component of resilient neighbourhoods.
  • complementary currencies
  • The fact that many of the hundreds of projects supported by civic crowdfunding platforms are community spaces, underlines two phenomena: the void left behind by a state that gradually withdrew from certain community services, and the urban impact of community capital created through the aggregation of individual resources.
Jukka Peltokoski

The People's Disruption: Platform Co-ops for Global Challenges : Platform Cooperativism - 0 views

platform.coop/...m-co-ops-for-global-challenges

shared by Jukka Peltokoski on 25 May 17 - No Cached
  • Experiments with cooperatively owned online platforms are demonstrating that democratic business models can be a dynamic force in building a more equitable economy for people across various income, race and class strata, starting with the most vulnerable populations.
  • Since the first platform cooperativism event at The New School two years ago, an ecosystem of people, knowledge, and tools has developed around this model.
  • To think and act our way out of the current crisis, we need to understand the roots of these extractive business models. With such insight, we will be able to build alternatives that best meet the needs of workers, consumers, and citizens.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Managerial pay has increased prodigiously; income inequality has sharpened, affecting women and marginalized communities most acutely, and trillion of dollars of individual wealth have been tucked away in tax havens. Beyond that, there has been a general shift away from direct employment, leaving more and more workers vulnerable to stalled worker rights, as well as declining wages and benefits.
  • the Web has not made good on its cyber-utopian promises of democracy or social well-being; the rise of the digital commons and practices of peer production, while profoundly important, has not succeeded in generating business models that can deliver livelihoods for practitioners.
  • highly concentrated ownership of robots seems the likely outcome
  • financing and legal support
  • Platform co-ops have emerged in areas like child care, art, journalism, transportation, social media, and food.
  • it is time to determine in which sector this business model works best
  • public policy
  • centralization of data and platforms ownership
  • The fairer digital economy we need is already emerging everywhere around us.
  • Jukka Peltokoski on 25 May 17
     
    Vuoden 2017 alustaosuuskuntakonferenssi tulee. http://platform.coop/2017
Jukka Peltokoski

Incubator.coop: an Incubator for Platform Cooperatives | P2P Foundation - 0 views

blog.p2pfoundation.net/...13

Incubator.coop kiihdyttämö start up osuuskunta cooperative yhteiskunnallinenyritys rahoitus yhteisörahoitus Unioni alustaosuuskunta

shared by Jukka Peltokoski on 13 Sep 17 - No Cached
  • 1. Conventional Incubators are not viable in themselves.  Instead they act as a business development tool for “side-car” investors trying to pick winners.  We think you need an incubator that exists to serve its incubatees.2. Conventional Incubators look for a 1-in-1000 unicorn to repay their many wrong bets.  We think you need an incubator that creates businesses of value that go the distance.3. Conventional Incubators looks for exceptional talent.  We think you need an incubator for collective endeavours4. Conventional Incubators function with a top-down approach.  We think you need an incubator that harnesses the wisdom of the crowd.5. Conventional Incubators promote returns for the 1%.  We think you need an incubator where 1 Member = 1 Vote6. Conventional Incubators run for 6-months.  We think you need an incubator that supports the whole period of development from formation through to operation.
  • We help any type of Cooperative to ‘Form, Organise, Fund and Operate‘.  The exciting areas of new CoOp formation include:– Community Owned Enterprises – anything from a pub to a post-office, school to satellite, house to hospital– Platform or Online CoOperatives – these are being created by online communities in place of Venture Capital backed 2-sided marketplaces
  • Collaborative ventures employ a variety of tools (web apps, social media, wikis etc.) and strategies (regular group meetings, webinars etc.) to make working as a group functional.There are some challenges with working as a group that aren’t solved by todays technology and they include1. Reaching a timely and productive consensus that in turn creates “collaboration paralysis“.  2. Groups try to be decentralised, but often most have a bottleneck around finance related decisions.3. Collectives need a way to track and incentivise efforts with non-financial and / or financial rewards and4. Groups need a way to create agreement contingent on future outcomes on the blockchain to improve trust within commerce
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • The extent of the tools we can offer comes down to the success of this crowdfunding campaign.If we get the money to develop the technology, then projects going through incubation can offer supporters black chain agreements and in turn offer payment contingent of future events.  This is a big deal.
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