Group items tagged

The Zulus earned their greatest victory of the war and Chelmsford was left no choice but to retreat. The Victorian public was shocked by the news that 'spear-wielding savages' had defeated their army.

Formidable enemy Fearing British aggression, Cetshwayo had started to purchase guns before the war. The Zulus now had thousands of old-fashioned muskets and a few modern rifles at their disposal. But their warriors were not properly trained in their use. Most Zulus entered battle armed only with shields and spears. However, they still proved formidable opponents. They were courageous under fire, manoeuvred with great skill and were adept in hand-to-hand combat. Most of the actions fought during the war hinged on whether British firepower could keep the Zulus at bay.

The boom that accompanied the war, and the availability of new money resources to colonists and imperial soldiers, was extended into the sale of land.

Another major economic issue of the war, and one that has already been touched on, was that of the prices of items - this was an area that also became the cause of much correspondence between military and civilian authorities.

But it was on the increased number of soldiers that most price hikes were blamed, for they presented a new area of demand which greatly stimulated markets

Another point is that, despite the fact that during the first eight months of 1879 the cost ofliving rose by more than 50% 43 - a feature that attended the rise in prices and caused salaried colonists to suffer- there were few colonial complaints about the high prices

The feeding of troops and of the colonial population was a priority feature of the war months, particularly in the face of a decrease of stock for slaughter and of a decline in agricultural production. This factor is revealed in the importation of flour, meal and bran and of preserved meat and fish. While the importation of flour, meal and bran had always been a feature of the colonial economy. it rose to new importance during the war with imports virtually doubling from 33 602 barrels in 1877 to 69 078 barrels in 1878, then rising to 74 059 barrels in 1879 before falling to 50 094 the following year.

The situation regarding sugar, which was destined mainly for the Cape market,

Thus while the Anglo-Zulu War was a period of human and stock loss. and of dislocation and associated misery, it was also a period of major economic activity for the Colony

The Zulu War of 1879 had not only involved the loss of men, stock. the disruption of trade and agriculture, a rise in the cost of living, the use of telegraphs and the monopolisation of the railway and the new hospital at Addington, in Durban, it was also to provide a severe financial drain on Natal's coffers which were already depleted as a result of the railway loan and the public wo

The voracious one of Senzangakhona, Spear that is red even on the handle [. . .] The young viper grows as it sits, Always in a great rage, With a shield on its knees [. . .] 6

Kumbeka Gwabe, a veteran of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, remembered how at the battle of Isandlwana he killed a British soldier who fi red at him with his revolver and missed: ‘I came beside him and stuck my assegai under his right arm, pushing it through his body until it came out between his ribs on the left side. As soon as he fell I pulled the assegai out and slit his stomach so I knew he should not shoot any more of my people’. 4 This was the weapon of the hero, of a man who cultivated military honour or udumo (thunder), and who proved his personal prowess in single combat

As we have already learned from Singcofela, killing at a distance with a gun was of quite a different order from killing with an ‘assegai’, the short-hafted, long-bladed iklwa or stabbing-spear

‘to send a regiment of men to England who there would scatter in all directions in order to ascertain exactly how guns were made, and then return to construct some in Zululand’

It suggests that the battle tactics the Zulu undoubtedly employed in the war of 1838 against the invading Voortrekkers, and against each other in the civil wars of 1840 and 1856, had already taken full shape during Shaka’s reign.

Thus, when the Voortrekkers came over the Drakensberg passes in late 1837 and encamped in Zululand, Dingane knew that they and their guns posed a deadly threat to his kingdom. Dingane’s treacherous attempt, early in 1838, to take the Voortrekkers unawares and destroy them, was only partially successful. The Voortrekkers rallied, and proved their superiority over the Zulu army, as they had done previously over the Ndebele, when they repulsed them in major set-piece battles at Veglaer in August 1838, and Blood River (Ncome) in December, the same year. 23 The Zulu discovered that, because of the heavy musket fi re, in neither battle could they could

get close enough to the Voortrekkers’ laager to make any use of their spears or clubbed sticks in the toe-to-toe fi ghting to which they were accustomed. As Ngidi ka Mcikaziswa ruefully admitted to Stuart, ‘We Zulus die facing the enemy — all of us — but at the Ncome we turned our backs. This was caused by the Boers and their guns’. 2

The king ‘thereupon formed a regiment which he called Isitunyisa’ (isithunyisa is a Zulu word for gun). 26 Even so, when in January 1840 King Dingane unsuccessfully faced his usurping brother Prince Mpande at the battle of the Maqongqo Hills, both armies of about fi ve thousand men each were armed (as far as we know) almost entirely with spears and shields, and fought a bloodily traditional battle following Shaka’s hallowed tactics.

By the early 1870s, it seems that a good third of Pedi warriors carried a fi rearm of some sort. 33 The Zulu perceived that they should not fall behind their African neighbours such as the Pedi in the new arms race, not least because their kingdom seemed endangered in the late 1860s, and early 1870s. 3

However, because no Zulu man was permitted to leave the kingdom as he had to serve the king in his ibutho, Cetshwayo had to import fi rearms thorough traders. The enterprising hunter-trader John Dunn, who gained Cetshwayo’s ear as his adviser, cornered the lucrative Zulu arms market, buying from merchants in the Cape and Natal and trading the fi rearms (mainly antiquated muskets) in Zululand through

Portuguese Delagoa Bay to avoid Natal laws against gun traffi cking. 35 The Zulu paid mostly in cattle, which Dunn then sold off in Natal. 36

The Zulu had their own names for each of the bewildering varieties of fi rearms of all sizes and shapes and degrees of sophistication that came into their hands, and, in 1903, Bikwayo ka Noziwana recited a long list to Stuart that ranged from the musket that reached to a man’s neck (ibala) to the short pistol (isinqwana).

In this the Zulu were very different, for example, from the Xhosa who, between 1779 and 1878, fought nine Cape Frontier Wars against colonizers bearing fi rearms. During the course of this century of warfare, the Xhosa went from regarding fi rearms as mere ancillaries to their conventional weapons (as the Zulu still did) to making them central to the guerrilla tactics they increasingly adopted. By the time the Cape Colonial Defence Commission was taking evidence in September–October 1876, most witnesses were agreed that the Xhosa were skilled in their use of fi rearms, and made for formidable foes. 43

the best fi rearms went to men of high status

fi rearms became increasingly essential for hunting,

one of the most important economic activities in southern Africa because of the international value placed on tusks, hides, and feathers. White hunters sold these items on the world markets and recruited and trained Africans in the use of fi rearms to assist them in obtaining them. 48 Ivory, in particular, was equally a source of wealth for the Zulu king, who was no longer content with his men killing elephants (as described by the hunter, Adulphe Delagorgue) by stabbing them with spears and letting them bleed to death, or driving them into pits fi lled with stakes. 49 The king required fi rearms for the task.

Following the battle of Isandlwana, in which the Zulu captured about eight hundred modern Martini-Henry rifl es, Zulu marksmen, familiar through hunting with modern fi rearms, were able to make effective use of them in a number of subsequent engagements.

The Zulu believed that an overlap existed between this world and the world of the spirits that was expressed by a dark, mystical, evil force, umnyama, which created misfortune and could be contagious. 54 The Zulu, accordingly, were convinced that, when malicious witches (abathakathi) harnessed umnyama through ritual medicines (muthi), guns too could be made to serve their wicked ends.

He carried a breech-loading rifl e that he had taken at Isandhlwana [. . .] The Zulu army fl ed. He got tired of running away. He was a man too who understood well how to shoot. He shouted, ‘Back again!’ He turned and fi red. He struck a horse; it fell among the stones and the white man with it. They fi red at him. They killed him. 58

gro Universities

dlwana.

e battle of Ulun

estroy their gardens'.26 The burning of kraals was matched by the systematic seizure of large numbers of Zulu

Thus, Norris-Newman wrote that 'the monotony of camp life was broken and varied by cavalry expeditions, in one of which ... under Major Barrow and Lord Gifford, the large military Kraal of Empang weni one of Cetshwayo's chief places, about fifteen miles away, was effectually destroyed, as well as all the kraals f

ore anxious will they be to see it brought to an end.'32 The result of this systematic strategy of the burning of homes, the seizure of cattle in areas which the Zulus had not evacuated and of the destruction of the economic foundations of Zululand was to reduce society to the brink of starvation in many areas, a feature recorded in various accounts of the aftermath o

The Anglo-Zulu War was a conflict between the British Empire and the Zulu Kingdom from January 11, 1879, to July 4, 1879, in South Africa. The background of the battle began with the British having interest in Zululand.

The Anglo-Zulu War was a conflict between the British Empire and the Zulu Kingdom from January 11, 1879, to July 4, 1879, in South Africa. The background of the battle began with the British having interest in Zululand.

That battle resulted in a British victory where Chelmsford defeated Cetshwayo and his Army, thus ending the Anglo-Zulu War.

The Anglo-Zulu War was a conflict between the British Empire and the Zulu Kingdom from January 11, 1879, to July 4, 1879, in South Africa. The background of the battle began with the British having interest in Zululand.

From the Boer point of view, this was most disastrous when, in 1799-1802, the war against the Xhosa coincided with a massive uprising of their Khoisan servants, who deserted to the Xhosa side with their masters' guns and horses

The demands of the diamond fields for African labour in the I 87os-demands which apparently could only be met by allowing the labourers to purchase guns-greatly increased the availability of firearms to all the highveld African

In the I830s when conflict between the Nama and Herero was sharpening over the grazing lands of Okahandja, the Red Nation Nama, being worsted in the warfare, invited Jonker Afrikaner18 and his followers, known to be well-armed with guns, across the Orange River, to intervene on their beha

. From the Boer point of view, this was most disastrous when, in 1799-1802, the war against the Xhosa coincided with a massive uprising of their Khoisan servants, who deserted to the Xhosa side with their masters' guns and horses.

Hottentot

As a result of the long duration of the warfare, the Xhosa were able to adapt their tactics to deal with and utilize firearm

r. All of them were organized for a specialized form of raiding warfare against their African neighbours and were, on the whole, extremely successful at this without the use of firearms.4

Similarly, even Gungunyane and the Gaza, who had acquired large numbers of firearms from British, Portuguese and Indian traders, some of which they had used against their Chopi enemies, confronted the Portuguese army at the battle of Manjacazane in the traditional manner, and were simply mown down by machine guns and field artiller

firearms were used increasingly from the mid-century onwards for huntin

. In I852 they were able to withstand Potgieter's siege of their capital, Phiring, which lasted twenty-four days. Towards the end of his life the Pedi chief, Sekwati (died i86i), who had attracted some 6o,ooo70,000 people in the northern Transvaal into his orbit, was said to have an army of I 2,000 men, of whom fully a third were armed with guns. These they were able to use to good effect against Swazi and Boer raiders. As late as I876, they were able to hold Boer commandos at bay: by then their armoury had been improved and replenished by service on the diamond fields, where they were reputed to be the most numerous African group

. In I852 they were able to withstand Potgieter's siege of their capital, Phiring, which lasted twenty-four days. Towards the end of his life the Pedi chief, Sekwati (died i86i), who had attracted some 6o,ooo70,000 people in the northern Transvaal into his orbit, was said to have an army of I 2,000 men, of whom fully a third were armed with gun

As Dr Miers shows in her article on 'The Arms Trade and Government Policy in southern Africa between I 870-90'49 a great volume of arms and ammunition was shipped to southern Africa for sale to Africans, in spite of official regulations to the contrary. The trade was highly profitable, not least to the governments of the white colonies whose regulations forbade the traffi

British Empire provides an example of greedycapitalists dispossessing indigenous peoples in their search for new markets andraw materials,1yet w

That an army of this size had slipped pastBritish reconnaissance on the open veldt of South Africa to mount such a successfulattack was remarkable in itself,

On22 January1879,

O’CONNOROn22

January1879

after the British invaded Zululand in South Africa, it has led to a formation of a war called isandlwana or Impi yasesandlwana,it was between the British and the Zulu,s.

he British due their capability the British warrior split into half to fight powerful against the Zulu warriors, the Zulu's was lacking of the new techniques. that leads

IMPERIALSTRATEGY AND THEANGLO–ZULUWAR OF1879DAMIANP. O’CONNOROn22 January1879, the British army suffered its worst colonial defeat of thenineteenth century when 1,500 men armed with the most modern weapons thenavailable were wiped out at the battle of Isandlwana by a Zulu army––animpi––of25,000 warriors armed only with spears. That an army of this size had slipped pastBritish reconnaissance on the open veldt of South Africa to mount such a successfulattack was remarkable in itself, but a second battle on that same day at a smallmission station named Rorke’s Drift made these events more remarkable still. Here,120 men decided to stand and fight rather than flee the advancingimpithat had justwiped out their comrades. At bayonet point, they fought a last-round defenseagainst 4,000 Zulu warriors which earned them a victory and eleven VictoriaCrosses––the highest number of the highest award for bravery ever bestowed on asingle day in British military history. In 1964, this remarkable battle was immor-talized in Cy Enderfield’s classic filmZuluwhich, among other things, providedMichael Caine with his first screen role and generated an interest in the Anglo–ZuluWar of 1879 which has scarcely abated today. Indeed, the historiography on theevents of this war is now remarkably complete; we know more about the militaryevents of this war than perhaps any other. Still open to question, however, is whythose famous Redcoats were fighting Zulus at all, and the search for an answer tothis question has led to some conclusions that were not at all obvious.It has often been posited that the British Empire provides an example of greedycapitalists dispossessing indigenous peoples in their search for new markets andraw materials,1yet whenever one looks into the particular circumstances of anepisode of expansion, it is very difficult to isolate a viable economic motive. This isDamian P. O’Connor is a doctoral research student at the University of East Anglia, UnitedKingdom.1. See for example, A. Duminy and C. Ballard, eds.,The Anglo-Zulu War: New Perspectives(Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1981); R. L. Cope,Ploughshare of War: TheOrigins of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879(Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1999);</spa

ar was t

enemy after battle was not, as most historians, who have noticed it, suggest, simply an over-reaction by white troops or the uncontrollable behaviour of native levies, but became an essential though unacknowledged part of British strategy which emerged necessarily from the pathology of empire when confronted with the possibility of d

Over 850 white and several hundred black soldiers were killed and most of the dead were ritually c

geant Ellis had written in a letter to his father on 31 December 1878: 'if Cetshwayo does not come to terms, we will demand his lands, kill his people as they come across our path and burn all his kraals.'14 In a further letter, once the invasion had started, Ellis wrote that 'we are about to capture all the cattle belonging to the Zulus and also to burn their kraals.'1

massacres:

be add

rrow and Lord Gifford, the large military Kraal of Empang weni one of Cetshwayo's c

strategic and psychological reasons; unles

ganized

y imperial officers in the slaughter, their acquiescence in this operation is undoubted: the scene of

Wood rejected the charges and claimed that prisoners were well treated: Ί believe no Zulus have been killed by white men except in action, and as I rewarded Wood's irregulars for every live Zulu brought in, I had many saved.'50 Though Wood was able to show that Private Snooks's dates were inaccurate (he had confused 30 March for 29 March), Wood's response appears to be a minor masterpiece of official evasio

44 THEORIA

expanded her control over wide areas of Southern Africa during the nineteenth century against the opposition of indigenous peoples and the original Dutch settlers, the Boers, while at the same time repudiating any desire for an increase in territory or responsibility

This article will argue that the roots of this war lay in the strategic importance of the Cape route to India and the particular strategic situation of the British Empire in 1879.

Cetshwayo, however, was not a passive victim in the process that led to war. Rather , he was a shrewd leader who unfortunately suffered from an overwhelming ignorance of the extent of British power

Frere, however, making Cape Town secure was only part of the answer to external threats, and he argued that there were a number of opportunities for European powers to intervene in Southern Africa if they so wished.

ly , Cetshwayo had looked to the British as a potential ally against Boer land claims in the Disputed Territory along the Transvaal-Zululand border. Now he was in direct dispute with them.

Frere’s context was, therefore, that of a leading strategic thinker sent out to prepare a vulnerable point in the empire for a widely expected war with Russia that would include as a feature the possibility of a cruiser attack or commando raid on the ports of South Africa.

The king has changed his tone. He says that he is tired of talking and now intends to fight and that he can easily eat up the whole lot of whitemen [sic] like pieces of meat and then not have enough... that as soon as Secucuni heard that fighting had begun, he would attack us also.

the Anglo–Zulu War of 1879: an unauthorized aggression conducted for reasons of geopolitical strategy by a man who considered himself to have the interests of the empire at heart and who distrusted the good faith of politicians. It was emphatically not, as has often been claimed in historiography,

Isandlwana was a Zulu victory, but it is the British who commemorate it, not the

the Zulu point of view it seems that the War was not only somewhat insignificant, it was also somewhat irrational

It was clearly apparent that the white people were determined to wage war against the Zulus. . . . Sobantu was defending Cetshwayo and demanding to know what wrong he had done that he should be attacked. But there was no longer a loophole (ithuba) for the Natal Government to act otherwise, as it had already decided to invade

In

Cetshwayo