The ultimate goal was the capture of Ulundi - Cetshwayo’s capital.

Pulleine was an administrator, not a soldier, and it was his inexperience that contributed to the disaster that was about to unfold.

He chose not to do so, leaving a much less experienced man in charge.

As the warriors began to arrive over the horizon, they started to muster into an ‘impi’ – the traditional Zulu formation of three infantry columns that together represented the chest and horns of a buffalo.

inflicting heavy casualties on the Zulu side, forcing many to retreat behind Isandlwana hill to shelter from the hail of shells and bullets.

As Durnford’s men retreated back against

Screams rang out across the camp as soldiers were stabbed and clubbed to death where they stood.

however, and as their ammunition ran out, they resorted to hand-to-hand combat until they were overwhelmed.

As the Zulus left the battlefield in triumph, 4,000 of them split from the main army and headed for the mission station at Rorke’s Drift. There, 150 British and colonial troops fought off wave after wave of attacks for ten grueling hours before the Zulus finally retreated. Eleven Victoria Crosses were awarded following the station’s remarkable survival.

butchered B

a small mission station named Rorke’s Drift made these events more remarkable still. Here, 120 men decided to stand and fight rather than flee the advancing impi that had just wiped out their comrades. At bayonet point, they fought a last-round defense against 4,000 Zulu

Lord Carnarvon’s concern with security that powered his controversial policy of confederation for South Africa, whereby the problems of defense among others would be solved by amalgamating the various states—Boer, African, and British—into one powerful British bastion on the Canadian mode

As well as being an “Indian” administrator of enormous talent, a zealous antislavery campaigner and humanitarian, Frere was one of the foremost defense thinkers of the day

was he who wrote the plan for the defense of India,

his successor as commander there, Lord Chelmsford.

Constantinople fell to the Russians then their fleet would be able to interdict the Mediterranean route to Indi

onal situation. For Frere, however, making Cape Town secure was only part of the answer to external threats, and he argued that there were a number of opportunities for European powers to intervene in Southern Africa if they so wished.

He annexed Walfisch Bay 34 and the mouth of the St. John’s River, 35 both potential sites for a port, and pressed for the annexation of all territories between the Cape Colony and Natal and for a “complete and exact survey” of all the coastline. 3

Frere made strenuous efforts to construct local forces through the Peace Preservation Act of 1878, 40 including a revived Cape Mounted Rifles, which would go some way to alleviating the defenselessness of the Colony

the beginning that imperial troops would be needed to defeat a major threat and applied for two regiments in July 1877. 41

The second Boer republic, the Orange Free State, rejected confederation the next month.

He was also aware that the annexation would have repercussions for the relations of Britain with the Zulus, in that the British had now inherited Boer border quarrels with Cetshwayo, the Zulu King, who would no doubt look on this development as something of a diplomatic revolution. 48

Although the Zulus had moved up Frere’s list of priorities, they still ranked far behind the construction of adequate naval defenses and the untangling of Shepstone’s Transvaal fiasco

the war came to be celebrated in Britain as an example of heroic warfare between well-matched warriors, a conflict given added excitement by the contrast between the (noble) savagery of the Zulus and the civilized discipline of the British. In popular histories, as well as in real-life adventure books for boys and in novels of imperial adventure, the war

gh, in recent years, academic historians, many of them based at the University of Natal and writing in the Journal of Natal and Zulu History, have begun a critical reappraisal of the historical process of which the war was

This perspective on events has, until recently, formed the basis of most interpretations of the war even in books which criticize the British commanders, the justice of the invasion or aspects of

'.8 In this spirit Lord Chelmsford laid down guidelines for the conduct of the war, emphasizing to native regiments in particular that 'no prisoners, women or children were to be harmed in any way' and there i

The events at the start of the war dramatically altered British percep tions and policies. The British launched their invasion on 11 January 1879. Within two weeks a British column was annihilated at the battle of Isandlwana. Over 850 white and several hundred black soldiers were killed and most of the dead were ritually cut open, the Zulu custom in war: Zulus did not take prison

killing and, as the British saw it, mutilation of the dead, created a mood of revenge whi

British waited for reinforcements to arrive, before they could launch a second invasion, the realization that the Zulus could not easily be tamed by a 'military promenade' rapidly produced alternative strategic proposals.

II It was a strategy increasingly backed up as the war progressed by the slaughter of those trying to surrender and of the wounded. T

British heroic represen

ver, that such defences are misconceived in the context of many incidents in 1879. Captain Hallam Parr, who was on Lord Chelmsford's staff, vehemently denied that British officers could be involved in su

although the Anglo-Zulu War was initially of little interest to the British press, it was able to become a focus for popular imperialism, and a source of great national importance. These points impacted heavily on the reporting of the Anglo-Zulu War, and in reaction to defeat or in celebration of victory

show that British Valour has once again proved itself as true as of yore’.

emphasising the bravery of the British soldiers and heroic characteristics.

our military prestige

restore imperial pride,

For example, the paper asserted that ‘beyond the display of heroism on the part of the individuals there is nothing in this dismal business that can be regarded with complacency’, whilst simultaneously lambasting the army for allowing its officers to carry luxurious baggage on campaign, pleading that ‘in future it is to be hoped that when British armies invade savage States they will not take as their model the luxurious effeminacy of the Oriental’.

The political alignment of different publications did shape their coverage of the AngloZulu War. Although the press was comparatively consistent in expounding general imperial values in its coverage, reporting was

The Northern Echo takes a similar stance in its coverage of the campaign, in one instance reporting that ‘the responsibility for the slaughter of a British regiment in Zululand rests primarily upon the head of Sir Bartle Frere...But it lies also at the door of Her Majesty’s Ministers, whose half-hearted irresolute policy rendered it possible’

Sir Bartle Frere

s a result of this factor, newspapers, important instruments in creating the imperial identities of the late nineteenth century, covered the war in a nationalistic manner.