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Ed Webb

Morsi's Ramadan Surprise - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - 0 views

  • The administrative courts or the Supreme Constitutional Court might indeed refuse to honor Morsi’s addendum. But unless there is strong opposition from a powerful political force (and the most likely opponent, the SCAF itself, seems to be going along with the president instead), a court taking such a move would be bold indeed.
  • The same co-governance is in place, but with the president as the more powerful actor. Indeed, by cancelling the June 2012 constitutional addendum Morsi has now legally reinserted himself as chairman of the SCAF itself
  • Morsi’s selection of a Mahmud Makki, a prominent judge, as vice president—after selecting Mahmud’s older brother Ahmad as minister of justice—may be an attempt to outmaneuver judicial opposition. The Makki brothers were both prominent members of the 2005 judicial reform movement and thus have some credibility in circles opposed to the old regime. Both were also rumored to have mild Islamist inclinations, though such rumors are hard to evaluate since judges rarely disclose their partisan feelings even when they have them. But the placement of prominent judges in such positions—and the brief floating of a suggestion that the new justice minister draft a new judicial law to be issued by presidential decree (not waiting for the new parliament)—may be a way of signaling to the judiciary that accommodation rather than a full frontal assault may be a better strategy for those anxious about the presidency and the Islamist rise. Whether a presidency at least momentarily free of strong checks on its authority will set its sights on restructuring the judiciary is not yet clear—but judges will definitely be scouring presidential statements and decisions for indications of Morsi’s intentions
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  • It seems likely that Egypt’s current constitutional assembly will continue in its task; indeed, Morsi’s actions may give it a strange kind of insurance policy. Any potential opponents to the assembly will have to think twice about questioning its legitimacy or its work, since the body’s failure would be followed by an assembly entirely appointed by Morsi. Similarly, non-Islamists currently sitting in the assembly may calculate that the existing membership—which has been working largely by discussion and consensus—is their best bet to produce a document they can tolerate.
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