Group items tagged

“While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has found that spent nuclear fuel can be stored safely for at least 60 years in wet or dry cask storage beyond the licensed life of the reactor, the Committee has significant questions on this matter and is extremely concerned that the United States continues to accumulate spent fuel from nuclear reactors without a comprehensive plan to collect the fuel or dispose of it safely, and as a result faces a $15,400,000,000 liability by 2020. The Committee approved funding in prior years for the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future [BRC], which was charged with examining our Nation’s policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle and recommending a new plan. The BRC issued a draft report in July 2011 with recommendations, which is expected to be finalized in January 2012. The Committee directs prior existing funding, contingent on the renewal of its charter, to the BRC to develop a comprehensive revision to Federal statutes based on its recommendations, to submit to Congress for its consideration.

“The Committee directs the Department to develop and prepare to implement a strategy for the management of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste within 3 months of publication of the final report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future.  The strategy shall reduce long-term Federal liability associated with the Department’s failure to pick up spent fuel from commercial nuclear reactors, and it should propose to store waste in a safe and responsible manner. The Committee notes that a sound Federal strategy will likely require one or more consolidated storage facilities with adequate capacity to be sited, licensed, and constructed in multiple regions, independent of the schedule for opening a repository. The Committee directs that the Department’s strategy include a plan to develop consolidated regional storage facilities in cooperation with host communities, as necessary, and propose any amendments to Federal statute necessary to implement the strategy.

“Although successfully disposing of spent nuclear fuel permanently is a long-term effort and will require statutory changes, the Committee supports taking near- and mid-term steps that can begin without new legislation and which provide value regardless of the ultimate policy the United States adopts. The Committee therefore includes funding for several of these steps in the Nuclear Energy Research and Development account, including the assessment of dry casks to establish a scientific basis for licensing; continued work on advanced fuel cycle options; research to assess disposal in different geological media; and the development of enhanced fuels and materials that are more resistant to damage in reactors or spent fuel pools.

(Page 80) “The events at the Fukushima-Daiichi facilities in Japan have resulted in a reexamination of our Nation’s policies regarding the safety of commercial reactors and the storage of spent nuclear fuel.  These efforts have been supported by appropriations in this bill, and the Committee provides funding for continuation and expansion of these activities.

The report also contains extensive language regarding Nuclear Energy Research and Development: “Use of Prior Existing Balances. - If the Secretary renews the charter of the Blue Ribbon Commission, the Department is directed to use $2,500,000 of prior existing balances appropriated to the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management to develop a comprehensive revision to Federal statutes based on its recommendations.  The recommendation should be provided to Congress not later than March 30, 2012 for consideration.

“Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies. - The Committee recommends $68,880,000 for Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies, including $24,300,000 for the Energy Innovation Hub for Modeling and Simulation, $14,580,000 for the National Science User Facility at Idaho National Laboratory, and $30,000,000 for Crosscutting research.  The Committee does not recommend any funding for Transformative research. The Committee recommends that the Department focus the Energy Innovation Hub on the aspects of its mission that improve nuclear powerplant safety.

Light Water Reactor Small Modular Reactor Licensing Technical Support. - The Committee provides no funding for Light Water Reactor Small Modular Reactor Licensing Technical Support. “Reactor Concepts Research, Development, and Demonstration. - The Committee provides $31,870,000 for Reactor Concepts Research, Development and Demonstration. Of this funding, $21,870,000 is for Advanced Reactor Concepts activities. The Committee does not include funding for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Demonstration project. The Department may, within available funding, continue high-value, priority research and development activities for high-temperature reactor concepts, in cooperation with industry, that were conducted as part of the NGNP program.  The remaining funds, $10,000,000, are for research and development of the current fleet of operating reactors to determine how long they can safely operate.

“Fuel Cycle Research and Development. - The Committee recommends $187,917,000 for Fuel Cycle Research and Development.  Within available funds, the Committee provides $10,000,000 for the Department to expand the existing modeling and simulation capabilities at the national laboratories to assess issues related to the aging and safety of storing spent nuclear fuel in fuel pools and dry storage casks. The Committee includes $60,000,000 for Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition, and directs the Department to focus research and development activities on the following priorities: $10,000,000 for development and licensing of standardized transportation, aging, and disposition canisters and casks; $3,000,000 for development of models for potential partnerships to manage spent nuclear fuel and high level waste; and $7,000,000 for characterization of potential geologic repository media.

“The Committee provides funding for evaluation of standardized transportation, aging and disposition cask and canister design, cost, and safety characteristics, in order to enable the Department to determine those that should be used if the Federal Government begins transporting fuel from reactor sites, as it is legally obligated to do, and consolidating fuel. The Committee notes that the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future has, in its draft report, recommended the creation of consolidated interim storage facilities, for which the Federal Government will need casks and canisters to transport and store spent fuel.

The money trail can be tough to follow - Westinghouse, Duke Energy and the Nuclear Energy Institute (a "policy organisation" for the nuclear industry with 350 companies, including TEPCO, on its roster) did not respond to requests for information on funding research and chairs at universities. But most of the funding for nuclear research does not come directly from the nuclear lobby, said M.V. Ramana, a researcher at Princeton University specialising in the nuclear industry and climate change. Most research is funded by governments, who get donations - from the lobby (via candidates, political parties or otherwise).

“There's a lot of secrecy that can surround nuclear power because some of the same processes can be involved in generating electricity that can also be involved in developing a weapon, so there's a kind of a veil of secrecy that gets dropped over this stuff, that can also obscure the truth” said Biello. "So, for example in Fukushima, it was pretty apparent that a total meltdown had occurred just based on what they were experiencing there ... but nobody in a position of authority was willing to say that."

This is worrying because while both anti-nuclear activists and the nuclear lobby both have openly stated biases, academics and researchers are seen as the middle ground - a place to get accurate, unbiased information. David Biello, the energy and climate editor at Scientific American Online, said that trying to get clear information on a scenario such as the Daiichi disaster is tough.

"'How is this going to affect the future of nuclear power?'That’s the first thought that came into their heads," said Ramana, adding, "They basically want to ensure that people will keep constructing nuclear power plants." For instance, a May report by MIT’s Center For Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems (where TEPCO funds a chair) points out that while the Daiichi disaster has resulted in "calls for cancellation of nuclear construction projects and reassessments of plant license extensions" which might "lead to a global slow-down of the nuclear enterprise," that  "the lessons to be drawn from the Fukushima accident are different."

"In the United States, a lot of the money doesn’t come directly from the nuclear industry, but actually comes from the Department of Energy (DOE). And the DOE has a very close relationship with the industry, and they sort of try to advance the industry’s interest," said Ramana. Indeed, nuclear engineering falls under the "Major Areas of Research" with the DOE, which also has nuclear weapons under its rubric. The DOE's 2012 fiscal year budge request to the US Congress for nuclear energy programmes was $755m.

"So those people who get funding from that….it’s not like they (researchers) want to lie, but there’s a certain amount of, shall we say, ideological commitment to nuclear power, as well as a certain amount of self-censorship."  It comes down to worrying how their next application for funding might be viewed, he said. Kathleen Sullivan, an anti-nuclear specialist and disarmament education consultant with the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, said it's not surprising that research critical of the nuclear energy and weapons isn't coming out of universities and departments that participate in nuclear research and development.

"It (the influence) of the nuclear lobby could vary from institution to institution," said Sullivan. "If you look at the history of nuclear weapons manufacturing in the United States, you can see that a lot of research was influenced perverted, construed in a certain direction."

Sullivan points to the DOE-managed Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory at the University of California in Berkley (where some of the research for the first atomic bomb was done) as an example of how intertwined academia and government-funded nuclear science are.

"For nuclear physics to proceed, the only people interested in funding it are pro-nuclear folks, whether that be industry or government," said Biello. "So if you're involved in that area you've already got a bias in favour of that technology … if you study hammers, suddenly hammers seem to be the solution to everything."

And should they find results unfavourable to the industry, Ramana said they would "dress it up in various ways by saying 'Oh, there’s a very slim chance of this, and here are some safety measure we recommend,' and then the industry will say, 'Yeah,yeah, we’re incorporating all of that.'" Ramana, for the record, said that while he's against nuclear weapons, he doesn't have a moral position on nuclear power except to say that as a cost-benefit issue, the costs outweigh the benefits, and that "in that sense, expanding nuclear power isn't a good idea." 

The Center for Responsive Politics - a non-partisan, non-profit elections watchdog group – noted that even as many lobbying groups slowed their spending the first quarter of the year, the Nuclear industry "appears to be ratcheting up its lobbying" increasing its multi-million dollar spending.

Among the report's closing thoughts are concerns that "Decision-making in the  immediate aftermath of a major crisis is often influenced by emotion," and whether"an accident like Fukushima, which is so far beyond design basis, really warrant a major overhaul of current nuclear safety regulations and practises?" "If so," wonder the authors, "When is safe safe enough? Where do we draw the line?"

The Japanese public, it seems, would like some answers to those very questions, albeit from a different perspective.  Kazuo Hizumi, a Tokyo-based human rights lawyer, is among those pushing for openness. He is also an editor at News for the People in Japan, a news site advocating for transparency from the government and from TEPCO. With contradicting information and lack of clear coverage on safety and contamination issues, many have taken to measuring radiation levels with their own Geiger counters.

"The public fully trusted the Japanese Government," said Hizumi. But the absence of "true information" has massively diminished that trust, as, he said, has the public's faith that TEPCO would be open about the potential dangers of a nuclear accident.

A report released in July by Human Rights Now highlights the need for immediately accessible information on health and safety in areas where people have been affected by the disaster, including Fukushima, especially on the issues of contaminated food and evacuation plans.

A 'nuclear priesthood' Biello describes the nuclear industry is a relatively small, exclusive club.

The interplay between academia and also the military and industry is very tight. It's a small community...they have their little club and they can go about their business without anyone looking over their shoulder. " This might explain how, as the Associated Press reported in June, that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was "working closely with the nuclear power industry to keep the nationalise ageing reactors operating within standards or simply failing to enforce them."

However, with this exclusivity comes a culture of secrecy – "a nuclear priesthood," said Biello, which makes it very difficult to parse out a straightforward answer in the very technical and highly politicised field.  "You have the proponents, who believe that it is the technological salvation for our problems, whether that's energy, poverty, climate change or whatever else. And then you have opponents who think that it's literally the worst thing that ever happened and should be immediately shut back up in a box and buried somewhere," said Biello, who includes "professors of nuclear engineering and Greenpeace activists" as passionate opponents on the nuclear subject.

In fact, one is hard pressed to find a media report quoting a nuclear scientist at any major university sounding the alarms on the risks of contamination in Fukushima. Doing so has largely been the work of anti-nuclear activists (who have an admitted bias against the technology) and independent scientists employed by think tanks, few of whom responded to requests for interviews.

So, one's best bet, said Biello, is to try and "triangulate the truth" - to take "a dose" from anti-nuclear activists, another from pro-nuclear lobbyists and throw that in with a little bit of engineering and that'll get you closer to the truth. "Take what everybody is saying with a grain of salt."

Since World War II, the process of secrecy – the readiness to invoke "national security" - has been a pillar of the nuclear establishment…that establishment, acting on the false assumption that "secrets" can be hidden from the curious and knowledgeable, has successfully insisted that there are answers which cannot be given and even questions which cannot be asked. The net effect is to stifle debate about the fundamental of nuclear policy. Concerned citizens dare not ask certain questions, and many begin to feel that these matters which only a few initiated experts are entitled to discuss.  If the above sounds like a post-Fukushima statement, it is not. It was written by Howard Morland for the November 1979 issue of The Progressive magazine focusing on the hydrogen bomb as well as the risks of nuclear energy.

The US government - citing national security concerns - took the magazine to court in order to prevent the issue from being published, but ultimately relented during the appeals process when it became clear that the information The Progressive wanted to publish was already public knowledge and that pursuing the ban might put the court in the position of deeming the Atomic Energy Act as counter to First Amendment rights (freedom of speech) and therefore unconstitutional in its use of prior restraint to censor the press.

But, of course, that's in the US, although a similar mechanism is at work in Japan, where a recently created task force aims to "cleanse" the media of reportage that casts an unfavourable light on the nuclear industry (they refer to this information as "inaccurate" or a result of "mischief." The government has even go so far as to accept bids from companies that specialise in scouring the Internet to monitor the Internet for reports, Tweets and blogs that are critical of its handling of the Daiichi disaster, which has presented a unique challenge to the lobby there.

"They do not know how to do it," he said of some of the community groups and individuals who have taken to measure contamination levels in the air, soil and food

 Japan's government has a history of slow response to TEPCO's cover-ups. In 1989, that Kei Sugaoka, a nuclear energy at General Electric who inspected and repaired plants in Japan and elsewhere, said he spotted cracks in steam dryers and a "misplacement" or 180 degrees in one dryer unit. He noticed that the position of the dryer was later omitted from the inspection record's data sheet. Sugaoka told a Japanese networkthat TEPCO had instructed him to "erase" the flaws, but he ultimately wrote a whistleblowing letter to METI, which resulted in the temporary 17 TEPCO reactors, including ones at the plant in Fukushima.

the Japanese nuclear lobby has been quite active in shaping how people see nuclear energy. The country's Ministry of Education, together with the Natural Resources Ministry (of of two agencies under Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry - METI - overseeing nuclear policies) even provides schools with a nuclear energy information curriculum. These worksheets - or education supplements - are used to inform children about the benefits of nuclear energy over fossil fuels.

There’s reason to believe that at least in one respect, Fukushima can’t and won’t be another Chernobyl, at least due to the fact that the former has occurred in the age of the Internet whereas the latter took place in the considerably quaint 80s, when a car phone the size of a brick was considered the height of communications technology to most. "It (a successful cover up) is definitely a danger in terms of Fukushima, and we'll see what happens. All you have to do is look at the first couple of weeks after Chernobyl to see the kind of cover up," said Biello. "I mean the Soviet Union didn't even admit that anything was happening for a while, even though everybody was noticing these radiation spikes and all these other problems. The Soviet Union was not admitting that they were experiencing this catastrophic nuclear failure... in Japan, there's a consistent desire, or kind of a habit, of downplaying these accidents, when they happen. It's not as bad as it may seem, we haven't had a full meltdown."

Fast forward to 2011, when video clips of each puff of smoke out of the Daiichi plant make it around the world in seconds, news updates are available around the clock, activists post radiation readings on maps in multiple languages and Google Translate picks up the slack in translating every last Tweet on the subject coming out of Japan.

it will be a heck of a lot harder to keep a lid on things than it was 25 years ago. 

An insurance system based on the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage allows 120 billion yen of that amount to be covered by the government. TEPCO soon plans to ask the government for the payment. Although TEPCO can receive government funding for compensation payments, it has to procure its own financial resources to cover the cost of fuel for thermal power generation, which is expected to increase because of suspended nuclear reactors. This may also hurt the utility's financial state. It has, therefore, been proposed that the Compensation Facilitation Corp. could fund TEPCO to help increase its capital. Nishizawa, however, is cool to that idea. "We will revamp our management through streamlining as a private enterprise," he said. "We will make every effort to get along without receiving (the injection of public funds)."

4. Brief Overview of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing (from June 16 hearing charter)  Nuclear reactors generate about 20 percent of the electricity used in the U.S. No new nuclear plants have been ordered in the U.S. since 1973, but there is renewed interest in nuclear energy both because it could reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil and because it produces no greenhouse gas emissions.  One of the barriers to increased use of nuclear energy is concern about nuclear waste. Every nuclear power reactor produces approximately 20 tons of highly radioactive nuclear waste every year. Today, that waste is stored on-site at the nuclear reactors in water-filled cooling pools or, at some sites, after sufficient cooling, in dry casks above ground. About 50,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel is being stored at 73 sites in 33 states. A recent report issued by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that this stored waste could be vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Under the current plan for long-term disposal of nuclear waste, the waste from around the country would be moved to a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, which is now scheduled to open around 2012. The Yucca Mountain facility continues to be a subject of controversy. But even if it opened and functioned as planned, it would have only enough space to store the nuclear waste the U.S. is expected to generate by about 2010.  Consequently, there is growing interest in finding ways to reduce the quantity of nuclear waste. A number of other nations, most notably France and Japan, ''reprocess'' their nuclear waste. Reprocessing involves separating out the various components of nuclear waste so that a portion of the waste can be recycled and used again as nuclear fuel (instead of disposing of all of it). In addition to reducing the quantity of high-level nuclear waste, reprocessing makes it possible to use nuclear fuel more efficiently. With reprocessing, the same amount of nuclear fuel can generate more electricity because some components of it can be used as fuel more than once.

The greatest drawback of reprocessing is that current reprocessing technologies produce weapons-grade plutonium (which is one of the components of the spent fuel). Any activity that increases the availability of plutonium increases the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.  Because of proliferation concerns, the U.S. decided in the 1970s not to engage in reprocessing. (The policy decision was reversed the following decade, but the U.S. still did not move toward reprocessing.) But the Department of Energy (DOE) has continued to fund research and development (R&D) on nuclear reprocessing technologies, including new technologies that their proponents claim would reduce the risk of proliferation from reprocessing.

The report accompanying H.R. 2419, the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2006, which the House passed in May, directed DOE to focus research in its Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative program on improving nuclear reprocessing technologies. The report went on to state, ''The Department shall accelerate this research in order to make a specific technology recommendation, not later than the end of fiscal year 2007, to the President and Congress on a particular reprocessing technology that should be implemented in the United States. In addition, the Department shall prepare an integrated spent fuel recycling plan for implementation beginning in fiscal year 2007, including recommendation of an advanced reprocessing technology and a competitive process to select one or more sites to develop integrated spent fuel recycling facilities.''

During floor debate on H.R. 2419, the House defeated an amendment that would have cut funding for research on reprocessing. In arguing for the amendment, its sponsor, Mr. Markey, explicitly raised the risks of weapons proliferation. Specifically, the amendment would have cut funding for reprocessing activities and interim storage programs by $15.5 million and shifted the funds to energy efficiency activities, effectively repudiating the report language. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 110–312.

But nuclear reprocessing remains controversial, even within the scientific community. In May 2005, the American Physical Society (APS) Panel on Public Affairs, issued a report, Nuclear Power and Proliferation Resistance: Securing Benefits, Limiting Risk. APS, which is the leading organization of the Nation's physicists, is on record as strongly supporting nuclear power. But the APS report takes the opposite tack of the Appropriations report, stating, ''There is no urgent need for the U.S. to initiate reprocessing or to develop additional national repositories. DOE programs should be aligned accordingly: shift the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative R&D away from an objective of laying the basis for a near-term reprocessing decision; increase support for proliferation-resistance R&D and technical support for institutional measures for the entire fuel cycle.''  Technological as well as policy questions remain regarding reprocessing. It is not clear whether the new reprocessing technologies that DOE is funding will be developed sufficiently by 2007 to allow the U.S. to select a technology to pursue. There is also debate about the extent to which new technologies can truly reduce the risks of proliferation.

 It is also unclear how selecting a reprocessing technology might relate to other pending technology decisions regarding nuclear energy. For example, the U.S. is in the midst of developing new designs for nuclear reactors under DOE's Generation IV program. Some of the potential new reactors would produce types of nuclear waste that could not be reprocessed using some of the technologies now being developed with DOE funding.

5. Brief Overview of Economics of Reprocessing

The economics of reprocessing are hard to predict with any certainty because there are few examples around the world on which economists might base a generalized model.  Some of the major factors influencing the economic competitiveness of reprocessing are: the availability and cost of uranium, costs associated with interim storage and long-term disposal in a geologic repository, reprocessing plant construction and operating costs, and costs associated with transmutation, the process by which certain parts of the spent fuel are actively reduced in toxicity to address long-term waste management.

Costs associated with reducing greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel-powered plants could help make nuclear power, including reprocessing, economically competitive with other sources of electricity in a free market.

 It is not clear who would pay for reprocessing in the U.S.

Three recent studies have examined the economics of nuclear power. In a study completed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2003, The Future of Nuclear Power, an interdisciplinary panel, including Professor Richard Lester, looked at all aspects of nuclear power from waste management to economics to public perception. In a study requested by the Department of Energy and conducted at the University of Chicago in 2004, The Economic Future of Nuclear Power, economist Dr. Donald Jones and his colleague compared costs of future nuclear power to other sources, and briefly looked at the incremental costs of an advanced fuel cycle. In a 2003 study conducted by a panel including Matthew Bunn (a witness at the June 16 hearing) and Professor Steve Fetter, The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, the authors took a detailed look at the costs associated with an advanced fuel cycle. All three studies seem more or less to agree on cost estimates: the incremental cost of nuclear electricity to the consumer, with reprocessing, could be modest—on the order of 1–2 mills/kWh (0.1–0.2 cents per kilowatt-hour); on the other hand, this increase represents an approximate doubling (at least) of the costs attributable to spent fuel management, compared to the current fuel cycle (no reprocessing). Where they strongly disagree is on how large an impact this incremental cost will have on the competitiveness of nuclear power. The University of Chicago authors conclude that the cost of reprocessing is negligible in the big picture, where capital costs of new plants dominate all economic analyses. The other two studies take a more skeptical view—because new nuclear power would already be facing tough competition in the current market, any additional cost would further hinder the nuclear power industry, or become an unacceptable and unnecessary financial burden on the government.

6. Background

The fund can be used regardless of fiscal years. Fukushima Prefecture had strongly demanded the financial support from the national government for its "special fund for dealing with the nuclear accident and for the recovery". The national government and the Fukushima prefectural government will use this fund to build medical centers and R&D centers for medical equipments that are of international standard.

The remaining 150 billion yen will be used by the national government to financially help small businesses and agricultural, forestry and fishery businesses, to build R&D centers for renewable energy, and to deal with the "baseless rumor" damages [suffered by businesses in Fukushima Prefecture].Financial help will be in the form of loans to businesses.Fukushima Medical University, where Dr. Shunichi "It's so safe that children can play outside in nuclear fallout" Yamashita resides, wants 100 billion yen (link is in Japanese) to build a world-class hospital to treat cancer.

And Iitate-mura, where the Ministry of Education belatedly admitted to the existence of plutonium (and others to come), wants over 300 billion yen just for the village for the "decontamination" work.The fiscal 2011 budget of the Fukushima prefectural government is about 903billion yen. Adding the supplementary budgets, the total tally for this fiscal year so far is about 1.43 trillion yen. This injection of 500 billion yen from the national government, which is likely to be open-ended, represents more than one-third of the entire budget for Fukushima.

If Fukushima happened in the US? The people would pay the bill.

All countries with well-established nuclear programs have found themselves requiring spent fuel storage in addition to spent fuel pools at reactors. Some, like the US, use dry storage designs, such as individual casks or storage vaults that are located at reactor sites; other countries, Germany for one, use away-from-reactor facilities. Sweden has a large underground pool located at a centralized facility, CLAB, to which different reactors send their spent fuel a year after discharge, so spent fuel does not build up at reactor sites. Dry storage tends to be cheaper and can be more secure than wet storage because active circulation of water is not required. At the same time, because dry storage uses passive air cooling, not the active cooling that is available in a pool to keep the fuel cool, these systems can only accept spent fuel a number of years after discharge.6

The United States had been working toward developing a high-level waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada; this fell through in 2010, when the Obama administration decided to reverse this decision, citing political “stalemate” and lack of public consensus about the site. Instead, the Obama administration instituted the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to rethink the management of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.8 The US can flaunt one success, though. The Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP), located near Carlsbad in southern New Mexico, is actually the only operating deep geologic repository for intermediate level nuclear waste, receiving waste since 1998. In the case of WIPP, it only accepts transuranic wastes from the nuclear weapons complex. The site is regulated solely by the Environmental Protection Agency, and the state of New Mexico has partial oversight of WIPP through its permitting authority established by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The city of Carlsbad is supportive of the site and it appears to be tolerated by the rest of the state.9

France has had more success after failing in its first siting attempt in 1990, when a granite site that had been selected drew large protests and the government opted to rethink its approach to nuclear waste disposal entirely. In 2006, the government announced that it needed a geologic repository for high-level waste, identified at least one suitable area, and passed laws requiring a license application to be submitted by 2015 and the site to begin receiving high-level waste by 2025.

Canada recently rethought the siting process for nuclear waste disposal and began a consensus-based participatory process. The Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization was established in 2002, after previous attempts to site a repository failed. The siting process began with three years’ worth of conversations with the public on the best method to manage spent fuel. The organization is now beginning to solicit volunteer communities to consider a repository, though much of the process remains to be decided, including the amount and type of compensation given to the participating communities.

the most difficult part of the back end of the fuel cycle is siting the required facilities, especially those associated with spent fuel management and disposal. Siting is not solely a technical problem—it is as much a political and societal issue. And to be successful, it is important to get the technical and the societal and political aspects right.

After weathering the Fukushima accident, and given the current constraints on carbon dioxide emissions and potential for growth of nuclear power, redefinition of a successful nuclear power program is now required: It is no longer simply the safe production of electricity but also the safe, secure, and sustainable lifecycle of nuclear power, from the mining of uranium ores to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. If this cannot be achieved and is not thought out from the beginning, then the public in many countries will reject nuclear as an energy choice.

Certain elements—including an institution to site, manage, and operate waste facilities—need to be in place to have a successful waste management program. In some countries, this agency is entirely a government entity, such as the Korea Radioactive Waste Management Organization. In other countries, the agency is a corporation established by the nuclear industry, such as SKB in Sweden or Posiva Oy in Finland. Another option would be a public– private agency, such as Spain’s National Company for Radioactive Waste or Switzerland’s National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste.

Funding is one of the most central needs for such an institution to carry out research and development programs; the money would cover siting costs, including compensation packages and resources for local communities to conduct their own analyses of spent fuel and waste transportation, storage, repository construction, operations, security and safeguards, and future liabilities. Funds can be collected in a number of ways, such as putting a levy on electricity charges (as is done in the US) or charging based on the activity or volume of waste (Hearsey et al., 1999). Funds must also be managed—either by a waste management organization or another industry or government agency—in a way that ensures steady and ready access to funds over time. This continued reliable access is necessary for planning into the future for repository operations.

the siting process must be established. This should include decisions on whether to allow a community to veto a site and how long that veto remains operational; the number of sites to be examined in depth prior to site selection and the number of sites that might be required; technical criteria to begin selecting potential sites; non-technical considerations, such as proximity to water resources, population centers, environmentally protected areas, and access to public transportation; the form and amount of compensation to be offered; how the public is invited to participate in the site selection process; and how government at the federal level will be involved.

The above are all considerations in the siting process, but the larger process—how to begin to select sites, whether to seek only volunteers, and so on—must also be determined ahead of time. A short list of technical criteria must be integrated into a process that establishes public consent to go forward, followed by many detailed studies of the site—first on the surface, then at depth. There are distinct advantages to characterizing more than one site in detail, as both Sweden and Finland have done. Multiple sites allow the “best” one to be selected, increasing public approval and comfort with the process.

he site needs to be evaluated against a set of standards established by a government agency in the country. This agency typically is the environmental agency or the nuclear regulatory agency. The type of standards will constrain the method by which a site will be evaluated with regard to its future performance. A number of countries use a combination of methods to evaluate their sites, some acknowledging that the ability to predict processes and events that will occur in a repository decrease rapidly with each year far into the future, so that beyond a few thousand years, little can be said with any accuracy. These countries use what is termed a “safety case,” which includes multiple lines of evidence to assure safe repository performance into the future.

Moving forward

France, Canada, and Germany also have experienced a number of iterations of repository siting, some with more success than others. In the 1970s, Germany selected the Gorleben site for its repository; however, in the late 1990s, with the election of a Red–Green coalition government (the Greens had long opposed Gorleben), a rethinking of repository siting was decreed, and the government established the AkEnd group to re-evaluate the siting process. Their report outlined a detailed siting process starting from scratch, but to date too much political disagreement exists to proceed further.

Notes

Nuclear wastes are classified in various ways, depending on the country or organization doing the classification. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) notes six general categories of waste produced by civil nuclear power reactors: exempt waste, very short-lived waste, and very low level waste can be stored and then disposed of in landfill-type settings; low level waste, intermediate level waste, and high-level waste require more complex facilities for disposal.

Sweden is currently the country closest to realizing a final solution for spent fuel, after having submitted a license application for construction of a geologic repository in March 2011. It plans to open a high-level waste repository sometime after 2025, as do Finland and France.

Some countries, such as Sweden, Finland, Canada, and, until recently, the US, plan to dispose of their spent fuel directly in a geologic repository. A few others, such as France, Japan, Russia, and the UK have an interim step. They reprocess their spent fuel, extract the small amount of plutonium produced during irradiation, and use it in new mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Then they plan to dispose of the high-level wastes from reprocessing in a repository.

In finding that balance, I’m not sure it’s possible to overcome the political pressures tugging agencies and officials to stress refinement and deployment of known and maturing technologies (even though that’s where industry and private investors are most focused).

On the left, the pressure is for resources to deploy today’s “green” technology. On the right, as illustrated in a Heritage Foundation report on ways to cut President Obama’s budget for the Energy Department, the philosophy seems to be to discourage all government spending on basic inquiry related to energy.

According to Heritage, science “in service of a critical national interest that is not being met by the private sector” is fine if that interest is national defense, but not fine if it’s finding secure and sustainable (environmentally and economically) sources of energy.

I solicited reactions to the Energy Department review from a variety of technology and innovation analysts. The first to weigh in are Daniel M. Kammen, an energy technology researcher at the University of California, Berkeley, who is on leave working for the World Bank, and Robert D Atkinson, the founder and president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. Here’s Kammen: The idea of a regular review and status report on both energy innovation and deployment spending is a good one. Some of the findings in the QTR review are useful, although little is new. Overall, though, this is a useful exercise, and one that should be a requirement from any major programmatic effort.

he real need in the R&D sector is continuity and matching an increasing portfolio of strategic research with market expansion. My former student and colleague Greg Nemet have written consistently on this: - U.S. energy research and development: Declining investment, increasing need, and the feasibility of expansion - Reversing the Incredible Shrinking Energy R&D Budget

Perhaps the biggest worry in this report, however, is the missing logic and value of a ’shift to near term priorities in energy efficiency and in electric vehicles.’ This may be a useful deployment of some resources, but a range of questions are simply never addressed. Among the questions that need firmer answers are:

Following record levels funding made available to the energy industry through the [stimulus package of spending], what are the clearly identified market failures that exist in this area that added funding will solve? Funding is always welcome, but energy efficiency in particular, can be strongly driven by regulation and standards, and because good energy efficiency innovations have such rapid payback times, would regulatory approaches, or state-federal partnerships in regulation and incentives not accomplish a great deal of what can be done in this area? Congressman Holt raises a number of key questions on related issues, while pointing to some very hopeful experiences, notably in the Apollo program, in his 16 September editorial in Science.

given the state-by-state laboratories we already have of differing approaches to energy efficiency, the logic of spending in this area remains to be proven (as much as we all rightly love and value and benefit from energy efficiency).

Near-term electric vehicle deployment. A similar story could be told here. As the director of the University of California at Berkeley’s Transportation Sustainability Research Center (http://tsrc.berkeley.edu) I am huge believer in electric vehicles [EVs]. However, the review does not make clear what advances in this area are already supported through [the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy], and what areas of near-term research are also not best driven though regulation, such as low-carbon fuel standards, R&D tax credits, ‘feebates’ that transfer funds from those individuals who purchase inefficient vehicles to those who purchase efficient ones. Similar to the story in energy efficiency, we do have already an important set of state-by-state experiments that have been in place for some time, and these warrant an assessment of how much innovation they have driven, and which ones do and do not have an application in scale-up at the federal level.

Finally, the electric vehicle landscape is already very rich in terms of plans for deployment by automakers. What are the barriers five-plus years out that the companies see research-versus-deployment and market-expansion support as the most effective way to drive change in the industry? Where will this focus put the U.S. industry relative to China?

There are some very curious omissions from the report, such as more detail on the need to both generate and report on jobs created in this sector — a political ‘must’ these days (see, e.g., the “green jobs” review by the Renewable and Appropriate Energy Laboratory at Berkeley) — and straightforward comparisons in the way of ‘report cards’ on how the US is stacking up relative to other key players (e.g. China, Germany…).

Here’s Robert Atkinson: If DOE is shifting toward a more short-term focus, this is quite disturbing.  It would mean that DOE has given up on addressing the challenge of climate change and instead is just focused on the near term goal of reducing oil imports and modestly reducing the expansion the coal fired power plants. If DOE thinks it is still focused on climate change, do they think they are fighting “American warming”?

If so, cutting the growth of our emissions make sense.  But its global warming and solving this means supporting the development of scalable, cheap low or no-carbon energy so that every country, rich and poor, will have an economic incentive to transitioning to cheap energy.  Increasing building efficiency, modernizing the electric grid, alternative hydrocarbon fuels, and increasing vehicle efficiency do virtually nothing to meet this goal. They are “American warming” solutions.

This is also troubling because (as you point out) who else is going to invest in the long-term, more fundamental, high risk, breakthrough research than the U.S. government.  It certainly won’t be VCs. And it won’t be the Chinese who are principally interested in cutting their energy imports and exporting current generation clean energy, not developing technology to save the planet.  Of course all the folks out there who have been pushing the mistaken view that we have all the clean technologies we need, will hail this as the right direction.  But it’s doing what the rest of the market has been doing in recent years – shifting from high risk, long-term research to short-term, low risk.  If the federal government is doing this it is troubling to say the least.

or those seeking more, here are the slides used by Steven Koonin, the physicist and former BP scientist who now is under secretary for science at the department, in presenting the review earlier this week:

Rolling Out the Quadrennial Technology Review Report

To jump-start construction of modular reactors, the administration proposed a cost-sharing program of $500 million over five years to help two companies develop designs and obtain Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses. The DOE funds would be equally matched with industry money. There are those who maintain the government should not be involved in energy development, and that it should be left to the marketplace to determine which technologies emerge in America’s energy future. That’s an understandable sentiment, given the Solyndra scandal. But nuclear power, which has enabled the nation to meet its energy needs for more than a half-century without polluting the air or depending on the whims of foreign rulers, got its start with government financial backing. The first nuclear plants were built with government funds.

Like conventional nuclear plants, small modular reactors could produce electricity around the clock, day in and day out, without being subject to weather conditions. But what’s especially appealing about small reactors is their affordability. Instead of having to pay the capital cost of a new nuclear plant, which can run $8 billion or more, a utility would have the option of ordering small modular reactors for construction in a series, as funds become available and the need for electricity arises. The Tennessee Valley Authority recently signed a letter of intent to buy six small modular reactors using conventional light–water reactor technology, each with the capacity to produce 125 megawatts of electricity, from Babcock & Wilcox, a Virginia-based nuclear manufacturer. A small reactor is expected to take three years to build instead of five years or more for a conventional 1,200-megawatt nuclear plant. Experts say that a prototype reactor would cost about $500 million.

Small modular reactors — known as SMRs — would be shipped from a factory by rail or truck to a nuclear site and situated side-by-side. They would be hooked to the same electric-power grid but operate independently of one another. One module could be taken off line for refueling and maintenance while the others produce electricity. At some locations, modular reactors could be situated beneath the ground for security. What’s more, SMRs are air-cooled. They don’t have to be located on the oceanfront or near lakes and rivers, an important feature in large parts of the world where water resources are scarce.

The question is whether, in the face of opposition from Sen. Feinstein and some other members, Congress will make funds available for developing SMRs. At least 10 U.S. nuclear companies have done preliminary design work. They include such well-known names as Westinghouse, General Electric, General Atomics and Babcock & Wilcox. And a number of start-up companies are part of the competition. “SMRs could change the game and restore U.S. leadership in nuclear power,” said Vic Reis, a senior adviser in the Department of Energy’s Office of Science. “Nuclear power is essential to the administration’s commitment to clean energy.”

But if our reactor designs are going to be competitive in the global marketplace, it is essential that American companies be able to compete on a level playing field. Foreign reactor manufacturers have the backing of their governments in the form of subsidies and grants. Our companies, on the other hand, are cut off from government support. Congress can and must make this a turnaround decade in building a more affordable modular reactor for electricity generation. A factory-built small reactor should be the cornerstone of our government’s energy strategy.

In the latest filing, NARUC and NEI accuse the DOE of ignoring the size of the fund, the costs of the program it is intended to pay for, and the revenues already collected to pay those costs.

The White House initiative prompted NARUC and NEI to sue in March this year, arguing that the fee, which has been in effect since 1983, should be suspended because there was no justification for it.

In their latest legal brief, filed on Oct. 20, and released by NARUC on Monday, the petitioners substantiate their claims that the DOE's determination in December 2010 to leave the fee unchanged is not in compliance with the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which requires the department to regularly assess whether the fees are too high, too low, or necessary at all.

"Rather than complying with the NWPA requirement to annually evaluate the costs of the nuclear waste disposal program and determine whether the fees that have been and are being collected from ratepayers and utilities offset those costs, DOE has concluded that it must continue collecting the same fee it has been collecting since 1983 because it cannot determine that too much or too little revenue is being collected," the brief said.

But with no new plan in sight, NARUC challenged the fee that collects about $750 million a year from utilities, and ultimately from ratepayers.

"We do not take this action lightly; we are hopeful that the newly appointed Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future will chart a workable path," said NARUC President David Coen of Vermont.

"But until that time, there is no need to assess these fees on our consumers, particularly when we have no idea what solutions the commission will suggest, and whether they will be implemented," Coen said.

DOE spokeswoman Stephanie Mueller said the blue ribbon commission has been asked to recommend how the fees should be handled."The fees collected from the nuclear industry are legally mandated and reviewed every year and will pay the cost of the eventual long-term disposition of the materials," Mueller said. "Secretary (Steven) Chu has appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission of respected, bipartisan experts to make recommendations on these issues."

In the July through September period, NEI lobbied Congress, the Commerce Department, the Defense Department, the Executive Office of the President, the Departments of Transportation, Energy, State and Homeland Security Department, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Office of Management and Budget, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, according to the report the NEI filed October 19 with the House clerk's office.

To start with, those in charge of the replication attempt were members of the MIT Plasma Fusion Center. Their work with hot fusion Tokamak brought the university many millions of dollars in funding from the government, and maintained their job security. If cold fusion were to be accepted as a real phenomenon, it could have made hot fusion research appear to be near worthless. 

members of his department (including some scientists from others) took every opportunity they could to attack Pons and Fleischmann. For example, consider how..

A funeral party or "Wake for Cold Fusion" was held by the Plasma Fusion Center, before their replication test of Pons and Fleischmann's setup was even complete. They held another such party afterwards. Mugs belittling cold fusion were given out by Ron Parker, the head of the MIT hot fusion research group, who was supposed to be doing serious research to determine if cold fusion was a reality or not. The mugs read, "The Utah University: Department of Fusion Confusion" and had mocking instructions for cold fusion on the back. Ron Parker would use the test results to discredit cold fusion, while at a celebration of the death of cold fusion stated to Eugene Mallove (after being shown evidence in support for cold fusion) stated that the data from the MIT replication was "worthless." How examination of the data from MIT's replication showed obvious evidence of tampering. In fact, the corrected data showed excess heat. Yet it was still used to discredit cold fusion research for many years.

How the former President of MIT, Charles Vest, refused to order an investigation into how the Plasma Fusion Center handled the replication, and their obviously unscientific behavior -- such as partying for the death of something instead of doing unbiased research. Even worse, years later he signed onto a Department of Energy report stating that cold fusion did not deserve funding for research, yet hot fusion deserved millions of additional dollars and was a "bargain." Conflicts of interest were ignored from the very start. For example, those who had the strongest need for cold fusion to be proven not to work (hot fusion scientists), were tasked with the replication of the effect. It would be like giving a cigarette company the order to conduct a study on the reality of lung cancer, or the lumber industry the job of determining the usefulness of industrial hemp. What the hot fusion scientists were going to say was obvious! How some scientists were so closed minded they stated that if cold fusion was real, Pons and Fleischmann should be dead from radiation poisoning. In addition, some scientists went so far as to personally attack them. In one case, a scientist stated that even if a thousand tests showed excess heat, that the results would not vindicate Pons and Fleischmann.

The USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group, to include the cruiser USS Chancellorsville, the destroyer USS Preble and the combat support ship USNS Bridge, the guided-missile destroyers USS Fitzgerald, USS John S. McCain, USS McCampbell, USS Mustin and USS Curtis Wilbur continue relief operations off the east coast of Iwate prefecture. Three U.S. Navy liaison officers are on JS Hyuga to coordinate U.S. operations with Japan Maritime Self Defense force leadership.Helicopters from HS-4 and HSL-43 with the Reagan strike group, and HSL-51 from Carrier Airwing Five (CVW-5) in Atsugi, on the 18th delivered 28 tons of food, water, clothes, medicine, toiletries, baby supplies, and much needed kerosene to displaced persons at fifteen relief sites ashore. For two of the relief sites serviced, it was the first humanitarian aid they have received since the tsunami a week ago. Eight of the sites serviced made requests for specific aid, including a need for a medical professional.CVW-5 on Friday completed the relocation of 14 helos normally assigned to USS George Washington from Atsugi to Misawa Air Base in northern Honshu.

USS Cowpens continued its northerly track to rendezvous with the Reagan Carrier Strike Group. Cowpens is expected to join the Strike Group overnight. USS Shiloh is en route from Yokosuka to deliver relief supplies to the Strike Group.USS Blue Ridge, the flagship for the U.S. 7th Fleet, remains in the vicinity of Okinawa to conduct transfers of supplies and additional personnel to augment the staff.All 7th Fleet ships, including George Washington and USS Lassen which are currently conducting maintenance in Yokosuka, are preparing to go. Personnel have been recalled and leaves canceled.

Two P-3 Orion aircraft from Patrol Squadron Four conducted two aerial survey missions over ports and airfields in northern Honshu on Saturday. CTF-72 has embarked two liaison officers from Japan Maritime Self Defense Force on each mission. Aerial imagery captured on these missions is shared with Japan. VP-4 has established a detachment in Misawa with two aircraft and four aircrews. Radioactive iodine found in Tokyo drinking water10:07 p.m. Saturday, Tokyo timeFrom the Associated Press:TOKYO — Japan officials say radioactive iodine detected in drinking water for Tokyo and other areas.

A valuable resource on your entitlements during evacuations

The link for this Office of Personnel Management (OPM) handbook is: http://www.opm.gov/oca/compmemo/2008/HandbookForEmergencies(PayAndLeave)

Voluntary departure" updates at Misawa

Video: Yokosuka commander talks flights

Who is authorized to fly out?·         Command Sponsored and non-Command Sponsored Dependents of Uniformed and Civilian DoD personnelo    NOTE: Non-Command Sponsored dependents are only entitled to a round trip flight to the first destination in the United States. These dependents are not entitled to draw per diem or Safe Haven Allowance.What about girlfriends or significant others?They are not authorized departure. Only <span>Dependents</span> of Uniformed and Civilian DoD personnel are covered by the current authorization.

What about dependents of our NAFA/CFAY/ZAMA contractors?·         They will be allowed to board the plane and fly to the States, HOWEVER, as things currently stand, they are NOT entitled to any allowances or even to government-funded air travel out of NAFA.·         Funding issues should be worked through the contractor’s parent company, and the contractor sponsor should beware that he/she may ultimately be required to reimburse the U.S. Government for the value of the flight.

What about non-DoD American Citizens who aren’t contractors or attached to our bases?

The group of fast reactor supporters includes some notable scientists and engineers whose list of professional accomplishments is at least as long as those of the people who produced the MIT report. In addition, it includes people like Charles Till and Yoon Chang who were intimately involved in the US’s multi-decade long fast reactor development and demonstration program that resulted in demonstrating a passively safe, sodium cooled reactor and an integral recycling system based on metallic fuel and pyroprocessing.

That effort, known as the Integral Fast Reactor, was not just based on an out-dated concept of uranium availability, but also on the keen recognition that the public wants a clear solution to “the nuclear waste issue” that does not look like a decision to “kick the can down the road.”

he Science Council for Global Initiatives produced a detailed critique of the MIT paper and published that on Barry Brook’s Brave New Climate blog at the end of May 2011. The discussion has a great deal of interest for technical specialists and is supporting evidence that belies the often asserted falsehood (by people who oppose nuclear technology) that the people interested in developing and deploying nuclear technology speak with a single, almost brainwashed voice.

In recent days, however, the controversy has become more interesting because the IFR discussion group has decided to issue a public debate challenge and to allow people like me to write about that challenge in an attempt to produce some response.

I think your team is dead wrong on your conclusion that we don’t need fast reactors/closed fuel cycle for decades.Your study fails to take into account the political landscape the competitive landscape the safety issue environmental issues with uranium miningIt is unacceptable to the public to not have a solution to the waste issue. Nuclear power has been around for over 50 years, and we STILL HAVE NO OPTION FOR THE WASTE today other than interim dry cask storage. There is no national repository. Without that, the laws in my state forbid construction of a new nuclear power plant.

Other countries are pursuing fast reactors, we are not. Russia has 30 years of commercial operating history with fast reactors. The US has zero.We invented the best Gen IV technology according to the study done by the Gen IV International Forum. So what did we do with it? After spending $5B on the project, and after proving it met all expectations, we CANCELLED it (although the Senate voted to fund it).

An average investment of $300M a year could re-start our fast reactor program with a goal of actually commercializing our best reactor design (the IFR according the GIF study).

At least we’d have a bird in the hand that we know works, largely solves the waste problem, since the fast reactor waste needs only to be stored for a few hundred years at most, and doesn’t require electric power or any active systems to safely shut down.

Investing lots of money in a project and pulling the funding right before completion is a bad strategy for technology leadership.

MIT should be arguing for focusing and finishing what we started with the IFR. At least we’d have something that addresses safety, waste, and environmental issues. Uranium is cheap because we don’t have to pay for the environmental impact of uranium mining.